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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines a controversial and unsettled aspect of international tax law 
in the transfer pricing field: should the effect of “passive association” within a 
multinational group of companies be taken into account in pricing transactions 
between group members?  The marketplace may assume, typically in a financing 
context, that (aside from any “explicit” support – the paradigm being a parent 
company guarantee) a group member experiencing financial distress will be 
supported by one or more affiliates. 
The paradox to investigate is the apparent contradiction between (i) the need, in 
arriving at an arm’s length price, to postulate a transaction between independent 
parties, and (ii) the possible recognition, in the pricing analysis, of effects deriving 
from corporate association.  How far does the independence hypothesis extend? 
What features of affiliation must be disregarded in constructing that hypothesis? 
An absence of clarity and consistency between national tax systems in this respect 
presents multinational enterprise groups with legal uncertainty and the threat of 
international double taxation – a recognised obstacle to cross-border commerce. 
This study presents an analysis of supranational guidance; a comparative 
investigation of national tax laws in selected countries with sophisticated transfer 
pricing codes; and a critical review of relevant practitioners’ and academic 
literature.  The arguments for and against the recognition of passive association 
are distilled and evaluated from a legal perspective.  The quest is for the most 
rational, “black-letter” interpretation of existing laws.  Alternative solutions based 
on policy judgments or economic theories are not pursued. 
Although the case for disregarding passive association cannot be dismissed 
casually, the contrary argument – for its recognition, as part of the relevant factual 
matrix, in pricing controlled transactions – appears convincing. 
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Therefore, recommendations are made to clarify internationally endorsed 
guidance, with a view to developing a harmonized approach to what, to date, has 
remained an unresolved conundrum.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
“The expressions ‘arm’s length’ and ‘non-arm’s length’ are creations of law.  They are 
not words of ordinary language from which a plain meaning can be easily distilled.”1 
 
Background, key questions, scope of research and justification 
1.1 This study considers a detailed technical, but nonetheless controversial, 
aspect of transfer pricing in international tax law: the effect of “passive 
association” on the transfer pricing treatment of “controlled” transactions2.   My 
conclusion is that passive association/implicit support should indeed be taken into 
account in pricing controlled transactions.  
1.2 Long-established international convention applies the “arm’s length 
principle” to transactions between associated enterprises.  This is the foundation of 
international transfer pricing, having originated in international tax law through 
the work of the League of Nations3.  It now finds expression in Article 9(1) of the 
 
1
  Justice Hogan in General Electric Capital Canada Inc v The Queen 2009 TCC 563, 
paragraph [188].  
2
  Transactions between two enterprises that are associated enterprises with respect to 
each other, according to the TPG glossary.  
3
  League of  Nations (1927): a report with a draft model treaty was issued in 1927, 
followed by a revised series of models in 1928, establishing the separate entity approach (or 
“separate accounting”) for the first time. Mitchell B. Carroll, an adviser to the US Treasury, 
undertook a survey of relevant law and administrative practices in 35 countries, leading to a new 
draft multilateral treaty in 1933 which included at Article 3 authority to the Contracting States, in 
the context of permanent establishments, “to re-establish the prices or remuneration entered in 
the books at the value which would prevail between independent persons dealing at arm’s 
length”. Article 5 contained a forerunner of Article 9(1) MTC,  referring to “commercial or 
financial relations” of controlled enterprises and the diversion of profits. Article 5 was derived 
from Article IV of  the 1932 US-France tax treaty, which itself was based on section 45 of the US 
Revenue Act of 1928. In 1935 the arm’s length principle was included as a rule in US transfer 
pricing regulations: Treasury Regulation 86, Article 45-1(b): “The standard to be applied in every 
case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with another uncontrolled 
taxpayer.” See Hamaekers (2002), Wittendorff (2010a) chapter 3 and Vögel (2015) page 605, for 
historical accounts of the adoption of the principle.  
LON27983956/13 
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Model Taxation Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development4: 
“Where  
(a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or 
(b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or 
capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting 
State, 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between 
independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have 
accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, 
may be included in the profits of the enterprise and taxed accordingly.”5  
1.3 The expression “arm’s length”6 does not appear, but it is implied by the 
comparison with what independent enterprises would have done.  “Even though 
Article 9(1) does not explicitly lay down a comparability requirement, there is no 
doubt that there is such a requirement.”7  My aim is not to challenge the arm’s 
length model and so I will not dwell on alternative tax policy approaches8.  
 
4
  Also see the essentially identical Articles 9(1) of the UN and US Models.  Article 9(1) 
OECD MTC is adopted verbatim by the 1987 Intra-ASEAN Model Double Taxation Convention 
and also in essence in the multilateral 1994 CARICOM Income Tax Treaty, the 1996 Nordic 
Convention and the 2004 Andean Community Income and Capital Tax Treaty.  
5
  Despite the permissive “may” towards the end of Article 9(1), sometimes viewed as 
an authority to contracting states to impose transfer pricing adjustments, Article 9(1) may be seen 
as having a primary purpose of preventing double taxation by restricting adjustments under 
domestic laws: see e.g. Wittendorff (2010a) page 147 and sources cited, and pages 196-198; 
Marres (2015); paragraph 2.7 below.  
6
  The Oxford English Dictionary (on-line edition, accessed 23 June 2015) offers “a sale 
or transaction in which neither party controls the other”, and also cites Webster’s 3rd New 
International Dictionary of the English Language (1961): “the condition or fact that parties to a 
transaction or negotiation are independent and that one does not dominate the other”.   
7
  Wittendorff (2010a) page 314, and the discussion at section 3.3.6.5; see also 
paragraphs 1.6 and 1.7 TPG.  Vann (2010), pages 149-150, entertainingly draws a comparison 
between what the language of Article 9 literally indicates, and what the TPG suggest.   
8
  For some modern advocacy in support of an alternative “unitary” or formulary 
apportionment scheme, including by reference to the EU proposal for a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base, see e.g. Avi-Yonah (2015) chapter 13.  However, “[t]he G-20 should not 
LON27983956/13 
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Instead, I offer an in-depth legal exploration of an important aspect of the existing 
arm’s length pricing convention on which international norms have not yet clearly 
been established9.  The controversy was described in 2007 as follows:  
“[t]he more important debate is emerging at the conceptual level with respect to whether 
the determination of the credit quality should factor in any implicit support due to the 
affiliate being a ‘member of a group’ or whether this should be based solely on a ‘stand-
alone’ basis. A noticeable demarcation on the approach taken by taxing authorities can 
be observed”.10   
1.4 For some commentators, the recognition of passive association goes 
against the grain11.  Certainly law and tax authority practice is far from settled in 
many countries.  The result, as matters still stand, is cross-border inconsistency, 
 
waste its political capital to explore an option that is conceptually flawed and stands little chance 
of success, and NGOs should use their newfound political influence to focus on improving, rather 
than replacing, the arm’s length principle”: Owens (2013), standing by his earlier prediction that 
“the arm’s length principle will remain the international consensus for the foreseeable future”: 
Owens (2005) page 101.  The UN also supports the arm’s length principle: see e.g. UN Practical 
Manual on Transfer Pricing paragraph 1.4.3. Antipathy to unitary taxation has been widespread 
and long-standing, even provoking “retaliation” in the UK’s Finance Act 1985 section 54. For a 
measured critique of the arm’s length principle, with some suggested adjustments, see e.g. 
Feinschreiber and Kent (2012), and for a proposal to “recalibrate” the principle with an 
adaptation of the profit split method, see Wilkie (2012). The main thrust of the academic debate 
on the concept of the arm’s length standard refers to its compatibility with the very rationale for 
the existence of large firms: see e.g. Schön (2011) page 3 and papers cited at footnote 4.  See in 
particular discussion of the “continuum price problem” (referring to the efficiencies of MNE 
groups relative to independent enterprises, and thus the difficulty of pricing intra-firm 
transactions in a way which recognises those efficiencies), notably Langbein (1986), and the 
Bloomberg BNA Special Report The Globally Integrated Multinational, the Arm’s Length 
Standard and the Continuum Price Problem (2000).    A recent alternative perspective was 
offered by the International Monetary Fund, asserting that Ronald Coase’s 1937 work The Nature 
of the Firm “does not undercut the [arm’s length principle] but, to the contrary, rationalizes it”: 
IMF (2014) paragraph 48.  Kane (2014) (Introduction) argues for a “fractional” interpretation of 
Article 9 i.e. that it “does not purport to allocate synergy value that could not have been earned at 
arm’s length and thus by its terms purports to allocate only a fraction of the profit earned by 
commonly controlled enterprises”, or in other words (section 3.1) “does not require allocation of 
total profits”.   See paragraph 2.23 below regarding paragraph 1.10 TPG’s apparent 
acknowledgement of this.  
9
  A wide range of national views was apparent in Bloomberg BNA’s International 
Forum Examines Pricing of Related-Party Guarantees in 27 Countries, 19 TMTPR 764, Moses 
(2010b).   For a more recent account of divergent national views, see paragraphs 3.5-3.6 below.   
10
  Van der Breggen et al (2007).  Even the Canadians, who have led the way with their 
jurisprudence (paragraph 3.163.16ff below), have said “[t]he ambit of the implicit support 
doctrine … remains to be determined”: Bakker and Levey (2012), Canada chapter by members of 
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, page 172. 
11
  E.g. Bakker and Levey (2012), introduction by Antonio Russo and Omar Moerer, who 
express the view that the recognition of implicit support “appears to run counter to the very 
essence of the arm’s length principle” (page 5).  
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significant tax uncertainty for MNE groups and potential international double 
taxation.  My objective is enhanced clarity, and harmonized understanding, as 
regards the operation of existing rules, to be sought through the interpretation and 
construction of those rules.  A nice formulation of that aim is that – 
“[t]he art and method of international tax rules seek systematic, principled and 
institutionalized compromises that can be relied on and applied to avoid overlapping tax 
claims and gratuitous distortions of trade.”12 
1.5 By “passive association” I mean the relationship per se that exists 
between members of a multinational enterprise (MNE group).  As a matter of 
ordinary language, the term connotes that relationship without action: an 
association which is passive.  I choose this particular term because it is also 
neutral, in that it does not necessarily imply favour or disfavour to any particular 
person.  It is thus a less loaded starting point than “one-sided” (albeit helpful, 
where apt) expressions such as “affiliation benefit” (or “privilege”), “implicit 
support”13 and even the angelic “halo effect”14, though notions of benefit or 
support may be a consequence of passive association.  (It is conceivable that the 
effects of association could be detrimental15.)  “Passive association” is used in 
 
12
  Wilkie (2009) page 395.  
13
  A definition was offered by Justice Hogan in the General Electric case (note 1 above; 
paragraph [281]): “Implicit support is nothing more than one’s expectation as to how someone 
will behave in the future because economic reasons will cause the person to act in a certain 
manner.”  Seemingly, the judge agreed with one of the taxpayer’s expert witnesses that “implicit 
support was simply an extrapolation of someone’s opinion that economic incentives would cause 
the parent company to act although not legally bound to do so. Implicit support is like a 
‘metaphorical wallet’.  It is something investors believe exists and may be available to provide 
financial support if the right circumstances are present, but few investors are foolish enough to 
believe that it is equivalent to a guarantee” (paragraph [287]).  Also, “the level of passive support 
a subsidiary expects to receive from the parent ultimately stems from the self-serving interests of 
the parent.  For instance, to the extent that a subsidiary’s operations are heavily intertwined with 
those of the multinational group, in the event of financial distress on the part of the subsidiary, 
there should be a higher level of implicit support from the parent to limit its financial exposure to 
operational disruptions.  Also, to the extent that the subsidiary shares the same name and sources 
of finance, it would be in the parent’s interest to support the subsidiary due to the potential 
reputational and financial impacts it could incur when the subsidiary is facing financial 
difficulties” (Tarassov and Tsiopoulos (2012)).  Nielsen and Holmes (2010) present research 
suggesting that a subsidiary using a valuable group brand “would immediately receive the group 
credit rating linked interest rate without any explicit credit support”.  
14
  Breen (2010) at section II.C refers to the “‘atmospheric’ effect of membership within 
the controlled group”.  
15
  As Standard & Poor’s note in their Corporate Credit Ratings – General Criteria: 
Principles of Credit Rating, paragraph 35.  This was argued by the taxpayer in the Finnish A Oy 
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TPG paragraph 7.13, as is “affiliation alone”.  Passivity is critical.  It provides the 
basis for the distinction between a passive state of affairs (part of the facts and 
circumstances) and an activity which requires some sort of performance.  These 
terms feature prominently in the TPG16.  Note the important requirement in Article 
9(1) that conditions are “made or imposed”.  Either way, this implies some form 
of action: the conditions between the controlled entities are either the result of 
some form of negotiation or other consensus, or are dictated through the exercise 
of control17. 
1.6 There is some linkage between notions of passive association and the 
rationale for the existence of MNE groups.  From an economics perspective, it is 
said that an MNE exists because the integration of its various associated 
enterprises mitigates transaction costs and safeguards against market uncertainties; 
these benefits are absent between independent enterprises, and may be referred to 
as affiliation or association benefits18.  My line of enquiry is however confined to 
the special sub-set of benefits which arise passively.  
1.7 I observe that refraining from undertaking an activity within the power 
of a putative actor will usually not constitute a transfer price-able event – as it will 
not entail (in Article 9(1) MTC terms) conditions being made or imposed.  But 
this is not an absolute rule.  An example might be refraining from preventing an 
affiliate’s otherwise unlicensed use of intellectual property, behaviour which 
would be tantamount to the grant of a licence.19  One may also argue that 
 
case KHO 2010/3092, see Helminem (2011). Macey-Dare (2014) describes the potential 
complexity of positive and negative effects of association in vertical and horizontal directions 
across a corporate group structure.  New paragraph 1.157 TPG acknowledges that group 
synergies may be negative (“dis-synergies” according to the Leiden International Tax Center in 
its 1 October 2013 comments on the 2013 OECD discussion draft on Intangibles: paragraph 2.80 
below; note 163 below for public comments website).   
16
  Particularly in the Chapter VII discussion of intra-group services e.g. paragraphs 7.6, 
7.9, 7.12-14.  
17
  Discussed by Wittendorff (2010a) at 3.3.6.4. 
18
  See e.g. Kamphuis (2010).  The alleged inability of the arm’s length principle to cope 
with affiliation benefits is sometimes used by the proponents of formulary apportionment to 
support their cause.  
19
  Wittendorff (2010b), in discussing the possibility that refraining from action may form 
part of the relevant parties’ “commercial or financial relations”, argues that the US Bausch & 
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refraining from terminating an unfavourable contract, when it lies within the 
contractual rights of the dis-favoured party to do so (and any rational business 
person would take that opportunity), amounts to the provision of a gratuitous 
benefit which should attract remuneration20.  Leaving in place a loan which is 
repayable on demand and where the interest rate now looks unappealing or where 
the borrower has begun to look shaky is an example.  Yet refraining from 
repudiating a particular state of affairs which might confer upon an affiliate some 
benefit from passive association surely does not amount to making or imposing 
conditions.  If the benefit of passive association is, according to paragraph 7.13 
TPG, not compensable, the absence of any repudiation of such association is an a 
fortiori case.  
1.8 Given the passivity premise, I leave aside the spectrum of “soft” but 
active corporate support (falling short of binding formal guarantees) seen in the 
form of “comfort” or “keep-well” letters, or statements of intention or policy as to 
maintenance by a parent of ownership of, or capital in, its subsidiary, whether or 
not legally binding.  All these require some form of action by the putative 
supporter21; they are all forms of “explicit” support, even where not legally 
binding22.  That shifts the transfer pricing framework significantly: it entails a 
 
Lomb case (paragraph 3.223 below) “can be seen as support for the proposition that, in principle, 
omissions may be subject to adjustment under Sec. 482”.   
20
  See e.g. Wittendorff (2010b) for other cases of omissions as “commercial or financial 
relations” within the scope of Article 9(1) MTC; Bullen (2011b), suggests that Article 9(1) 
authorises the “imputation of a hypothetical renegotiation or termination”, in the light of the 
“realistically available options standard”. Claymont Investments, Inc v Commissioner TCM 2005-
254 (US Tax Court) was a case where the IRS failed in its argument to recast a fixed rate loan 
transaction as a repayment and a new advance, but also failed to run the argument that the 
borrower, which had a no-penalty prepayment right, should have prepaid the loan and borrowed 
afresh at a lower rate.  
21
  Contrast the view expressed by the ATO in their June 2008 discussion paper Intra-
group finance guarantees and loans (paragraph 3.94 below) at paragraph 121 to the effect that 
“the benefits of implicit support from letters of comfort or similar non-binding statements of 
intent should be treated similarly to any creditworthiness benefits a subsidiary incidentally 
obtains from its group or parental affiliations”.  Burgers and Bierlaagh (1998) provide a review 
of the distinctions between guarantees, comfort letters and related instruments, including some 
comments foreshadowing the tax thinking in the General Electric case (paragraph 3.16 below).  
See also the ABA Guarantees Paper (2012) pages 13-24.   
22
  Despite being legally non-binding, “comfort letters” may nonetheless have an effect 
on a risk rating.  See e.g. United States Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2001), page 
28.  
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transaction, or at least an action, which may well merit compensation in its own 
right.23  
1.9 “Association” can be taken to have its ordinary meaning e.g. the action 
of combining together for a common purpose; the condition of such 
combination24.  In the context of an MNE group it will usually mean the 
relationships between a parent company and its subsidiaries; in the transfer pricing 
context one most naturally thinks of the control, or common control, concepts 
articulated in Article 9(1) MTC25.  But the term is capable of looser meaning; 
“association” does not necessarily connote any particular level of ownership of 
shares, stock or other legal instrument, or any particular level of voting control.  
Conceivably (though unusually) a controlled transaction between, say, a parent 
and a subsidiary could be influenced by the subsidiary’s association with a third 
party.  
1.10 Thus, to reiterate and re-emphasise, the objective of this study is to test 
the legal significance of passive association on controlled (usually cross-border 
and intra-group) transactions.  The question is: where a transaction or activity falls 
to be evaluated for transfer pricing purposes, is passive association to be heeded as 
a relevant factor in that analysis? 
1.11 The significance of passive association raises a fundamental question as 
regards the application of the arm’s length principle.  The test to be applied by 
Article 9(1) MTC postulates a hypothetical comparator transaction, and asks 
“what would have occurred between independent parties?”  But what exactly is 
 
23
  “[I]t might be contended that such instruments [comfort letters etc] represent mere 
incidents of passive association … The short answer here, we think, is that execution and 
delivery of instruments by a corporation, upon request from a lender, do not constitute ‘passive 
association’ or the ‘mere incidents’ of passive association. Rather, definite activity is undertaken 
by a member of a controlled group in each case.  It is not the affiliation status alone that 
constitutes the transaction, but the affirmative and purposeful act of the controlled group 
member.” (ABA Guarantees Paper (2012) page 24.)  
24
  Oxford English Dictionary (on-line edition, accessed 23 June 2015).  
25
  I do not analyse further the meaning of the control relationships contemplated by 
Article 9(1).  The discussion of passive association does not depend on an exhaustive definition 
of all the cases within the provision’s scope.  See paragraph 2.6 below.  A pro forma definition is 
volunteered however in the OECD’s June 2011 paper Transfer Pricing Legislation – A Suggested 
Approach, draft section 2. See also Vögel (2015) pages 633-634: “control seems indeed to be the 
dominant requirement for association”.   
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required by the “independence” hypothesis in Article 9(1)?  What precisely is to 
be assumed, or what part of the factual matrix is to be disregarded, in constructing 
that comparator?   
1.12 These questions can be refined in several ways.  In applying the 
“separate entity” concept mandated by the TPG26, to what extent is the actual 
affiliation between the parties, or the consequences or effects of that affiliation, to 
be put aside?  In assessing a comparable uncontrolled price (CUP)27, to what 
extent is the control relationship to be disregarded?  This presents the paradox: 
one must construct an arm’s length comparator, but take into account all 
economically relevant circumstances, some of which may be consequent upon 
group affiliations.  Does a borrower’s attribute of being a beneficiary of passive 
association “merge” into the transaction when the (supporting) parent is the 
lender?  All these questions amount to enquiring “How far does one go in 
postulating a hypothetical?”  To what extent must we “rein in the hypothetical by 
reference to economic reality”?28  To draw from an application of English law 
statutory construction, “‘the hypothetical must not be allowed to oust the real 
further than obedience to the statute compels’. … A statutory hypothesis, no 
doubt, must not be carried further than the legislative purpose requires, but the 
extent to which it must be carried depends upon ascertaining what that purpose 
is”29.  
 
26
  TPG paragraph 1.6.  
27
  Even Langbein (1986) recognised that the “continuum price problem” exists only 
where satisfactory CUPs are unavailable (page 666).   
28
  Thanks to David Southern QC for this imagery.  
29
  Millett LJ in Bricom Holdings Ltd v CIR [1997] STC 1179, 1193j, the initial quotation 
being taken from Megarry V-C in Polydor Ltd and RSO Records Inc v Harlequin Record Shop 
Ltd and Simons Records Ltd [1980] 1 CMLR 669, 673.  As to the purpose of Article 9(1) MTC, 
see paragraph  2.6ff below.  More generally on the construction of statutory deeming provisions, 
for the UK perspective see e.g. the decision of the Supreme Court in DCC Holdings (UK) 
Limited v HMRC [2010] UKSC 58, endorsing the principles enunciated by Peter Gibson J in the 
Court of Appeal in Marshall v Kerr 67 TC 56 and developed by Neuberger J in Jenks v 
Dickinson [1997] STC 853. For a perspective in the Australian transfer pricing context, see 
Commissioner v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 74, paragraph 95: statutory fictions 
erected by deeming provisions are to be strictly construed, and one should not travel beyond the 
hypothesis erected by the statute.  A review of the Canadian approach is offered by Davies Ward 
Philips & Vineberg LLP (2012).  
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1.13 It is axiomatic that international double taxation obstructs global 
commerce and investment and thus economic development.  The asymmetric 
application of transfer pricing rules is a particularly pernicious and widespread 
cause of double taxation.  These notions are the foundations of the harmonising 
work of the OECD30, the UN, the EU and other multilateral organisations and 
blocs in the tax field.  Progress towards a uniform understanding and treatment of 
passive association in the transfer pricing context will contribute to harmonization 
and thus the lowering of fiscal hurdles to cross-border trade.  At present, a 
common understanding is missing, this contributing to significant uncertainty (and 
the potential for disputes) in the international tax arena, thus erecting a barrier to 
international business31.   
1.14 It may be useful to scene-set with a simple example of a passive 
association case.  Imagine, as in Fig. I below, a MNE group comprising Parent 
company in country P and Subsidiary company in country S.  Parent makes a loan 
to Subsidiary at an interest rate of 9%.  It is established evidentially that 
Subsidiary could have borrowed an equal amount on equivalent terms from an 
independent bank (a) upon the strength of its own creditworthiness but without 
regard to its affiliation with Parent at 8%, or (b) in its own right but also having 
regard, as part of the complete factual matrix, to a degree of hope or expectation, 
on the bank’s part, that (despite the absence of any formal guarantee or indeed 
softer assurances from Parent) Parent would in fact support Subsidiary if the latter 
experienced financial distress – at 7%.  The country S tax authority invokes 
transfer pricing rules to challenge interest deductibility for Subsidiary: should the 
disallowance be 1% or 2%?32   
 
30
  “The OECD, with its mission to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a 
multilateral, non-discriminatory basis and to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth in 
member countries, has continually worked to build a consensus on international taxation 
principles, thereby avoiding unilateral responses to multilateral problems” (TPG preface, 
paragraph 7).  
31
  See e.g. Wittendorff (2012) on the damaging effects of mismatched domestic law 
interpretations of the arm’s length principle and Price, Rahman and Yohana (2012) discussing 
differing approaches adopted by tax authorities (and taxpayers).  
32
  It is conceivable that other outcomes would be justifiable e.g. by reference to the 
comparability of the parties, requiring other adjustments.  The example above stops where it does 
to illustrate the basic conundrum referable to passive association.   
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Fig. I 
 
1.15 Fundamentally, this question depends on the application of the arm’s 
length standard.  Testing what would have happened between independent parties 
is inherently hypothetical.  It demands the construction of a counter-factual 
proposition.  The ordinary starting point in testing the pricing of a “controlled” 
transaction between related parties is to assume away the control relationship.  
Thus the paradox emerges: in the illustration above, what is the effect of 
disregarding Parent’s control of Subsidiary?  Is the effect of passive association 
inherently to be ignored so that the correct interest rate is 8%?   Or is it legitimate, 
in arriving at an arm’s length price, to point to the attitude of the unrelated bank 
who would, as a factual matter, lend at 7%, based upon its view of Parent’s likely 
support for Subsidiary?   
1.16 On embarking upon this study I proposed to accept the proposition, 
implicit in paragraph 7.13 TPG (in full at paragraph 2.44 below33), that passive 
association does not itself merit compensation.  Some commentators34 had 
advocated a departure from that proposition, in part to re-establish taxing 
equilibrium following the rejection of passive association as a pricing factor.  In 
my opinion, as developed in chapter 4, such an approach is flawed, essentially 
because (a) it abandons the actual facts and circumstances of the case (Subsidiary 
 
33
  Now backed by new paragraph 1.158 TPG (paragraph 2.81 below).  
34
  E.g. Blessing (2010), page 164.  
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in paragraph 1.14/Fig. I above could borrow externally at 7%); and (b) it 
propounds the remuneration of non-activity or of the (in my view) illusory 
provision of property.  My standpoint has now been substantially vindicated by 
the group synergies material added to Chapter I TPG (paragraph 2.81 below).   
1.17 Another objection, occasionally raised in the literature35, to the 
recognition of passive association in pricing transactions is the supposed trivial 
effect it may have; that triviality may then present a disproportionate compliance 
obligation.  The effects of passive association are so slight (it is said) that the 
complexity, difficulty and expense of measurement are not merited by the fiscal 
outcome.  That may be true, of course, in many cases: as a practical matter, many 
MNEs will adopt highly pragmatic transfer pricing policies where the risks of 
significant double taxation, or penalties for non-compliance, are perceived to be 
low.  Yet this thesis searches for principle.  Suppose that the loan in paragraph 
1.14 above was for a gargantuan, but in today’s world not at all implausible, 
$10bn36.  The differential transfer pricing effect, as between a 7% or 8% interest 
rate, presents a very significant tax consequence.  And (to make a BEPS-flavoured 
point) what if, say, country P is a tax haven?  The suspicion of country S’s tax 
authority is, in any event, that the loan is over-priced, but by $100m or $200m per 
year?  In such a case, putting significant effort into the pricing analysis may well 
be worthwhile.   
1.18 Moreover, given the quest for principle, it is not proposed to analyse 
critically national tax systems’ so-called “safe harbour” regimes.  Worthwhile as 
these often are37, they represent practical short-cuts to compliant transfer pricing 
 
35
  Ibid., page 23.  
36
  See the numbers involved in the Australian Chevron case, paragraph 3.82 below.  In 
that case, the taxpayer’s expert Dr Becker asserted that “a single notch which results in moving 
from non-investment grade to investment grade alone lowers the interest rate by 196 basis points 
and two notches can result in a 268 basis point bump”: taxpayer’s Outline of Submissions, file 
NS569/2012, 11 August 2014, paragraph 164(e).  A change of 196 basis points “translates to 
$350 million of interest in this case” (paragraph 197). Statistics reproduced by Ledure et al 
(2010) demonstrated a gap between credit spreads on long-term BBB (investment grade) and B 
rated bonds of approximately 6–7%, depending on tenor.   
37
  Though see the reservations expressed in TPG Chapter IV section E and e.g. Chapter 
9 of the US “White Paper” (1988).  The US “total services cost” method is a form of safe 
harbour, but does not apply to financial transactions including guarantees: paragraph 3.206 
below.  
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 23 
reporting, and by definition avoid the issue of principle with which I am 
concerned.  
1.19 A further exclusion from the scope of this thesis: I do not propose to 
examine the application of quantitative pricing methodology to the effects of 
passive association.  In many scenarios a market reaction to the relationships of 
any particular counterparty (typically a borrower) will be subjective.  Practical 
quantitative techniques are utilised in some contexts, most notably the 
construction of synthetic credit ratings for entities which lack their own formal 
credit rating38.  The robustness of such techniques, and their proper applicability to 
situations beyond the issue of transferable debt securities into the capital markets, 
is open to debate.  That aspect could be the subject of significant research in the 
commercial world (e.g. as to the extent which commercial lending banks would 
adopt this type of metric in evaluating the creditworthiness of an unrated 
borrower39).  But it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
1.20 In testing the qualitative effects of passive association, I will 
concentrate on transactions concerned with credit risk.  This is the most obvious 
candidate for analysis – because I am concerned primarily with the impact of 
perceived likely behaviour within the MNE group that should mitigate a 
counterparty’s risk.  Credit risk (including credit risk for damages for non-
performance of contracts), i.e. a measure of the probability of default40, stands out 
among the panoply of business risks as one most obviously susceptible to 
mitigation via helpful intervention by associates of one’s counterparty.  Although 
much of the focus in the literature has been on the effects of passive association on 
 
38
  See e.g. Standard & Poor’s material on its Group Rating Methodology (2013). General 
Electric Capital Canada Inc (the subject of the eponymous Canadian case: paragraph 3.16ff 
below) used S&P’s “Debt Rater” software to calculate its stand-alone credit rating.  Standard & 
Poor’s Guidelines for Evaluating Corporate Credit Risk: Parent/Subsidiary Relationships (2014) 
contemplates the preparation of a notional rating for the entire group, which can then become a 
reference point for the ratings of various subsidiaries. S&P notes (page 4) that “stand-alone 
analysis of a subsidiary is an incomplete picture of a firm’s true credit characteristics”.  A 
potential formulaic methodology, utilising S&P criteria, is presented in Tarassov and Tsiopoulos 
(2012).  See also Hales et al (2010).  
39
  Justice Robertson in the Australian Chevron case (see paragraph 3.82 below) thought 
that “a commercial lender would not approach the question of the borrower’s credit-worthiness in 
the same way as would a credit rating agency” (paragraph 503).  
40
  Discussed in e.g. Guzman-Delgado (2012) page 24ff.  
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interest rates and guarantee fees41, the quantum of debt which a borrower is 
capable of raising could plainly be affected by its affiliations42.  There is thus also 
a thin capitalisation dimension to my enquiry43.   
1.21 Intercompany financial transactions have been described as “one of the 
hottest and most debated fields of transfer pricing”44.  Aside from loans and 
guarantees, the pricing of indebtedness and thus counterparty financial risk is 
potentially relevant to a range of other instruments, including various species of 
derivative (e.g. prepaid forward contracts and deep in the money options), 
receivables sales (as in the Canadian McKesson case45), outstanding receivables 
(several Indian decisions46), and finance leasing.  More complex situations may 
readily arise where – as is common – groups operate highly integrated treasury 
functions e.g. raising finance under multi-borrower cross-guaranteed debt 
facilities, or optimising credit and debit balances via cash pooling arrangements47.  
 
41
  “These transactions are among the most controversial in the transfer pricing world” 
and “the role of implicit support in the analysis of intercompany guarantee fees (and, for that 
matter, intercompany interest on loans) will likely continue to be debated by tax authorities, 
taxpayers and transfer pricing specialists around the world”:  Duff & Phelps’ Transfer Pricing 
Times vol. VIII issue 8 (2011).  Also, “the pricing of implicit guarantees … has been one of the 
most problematic transfer pricing issues for years”: 1 October 2013 comments of Taxand upon 
the OECD’s 2013 discussion draft on Intangibles (see note 163 below for public comments 
website).   
42
  See however paragraph 3.189 below for a contrary view from HMRC.  Vögel (2015) 
at page 603 observes that Article 9(1) MTC “may also be extended to prohibit, for example, thin 
capitalization rules that would disallow deductions for interest otherwise paid at arm’s length”.  
Baker (2015) paragraph 9B.11 note 4 cites Specialty Manufacturing v The Queen [1999] 3 CTC 
82 where the taxpayer argued that US-Canada tax treaty analogues of Article 9(1) MTC 
precluded the application of domestic thin capitalisation  rules where it had a capital structure 
which would be sustainable at arm’s length.  The FCA did not decide the legal question because 
the 100,000:1 debt:equity ratio was “obviously” (paragraph [23]) not arm’s length.   
43
  In the Thin Cap Group Litigation case (Case C-524/04) the ECJ observed that the 
arm’s length test focused on whether “had there been an arm’s length relationship between the 
companies concerned, the loan would not have been granted or would have been granted for a 
different amount or at a different rate of interest” (paragraphs 83, 92, cited in Vögel (2015) page 
671).  See notes 234, 255 below as regards divergent country approaches to thin capitalisation.  
44
  Moerer and Russo (2013).  
45
  Paragraph 3.32ff below.  
46
  Paragraph 3.141 below.  
47
  See e.g. Rafiq et all (2010). Cash pooling has led to transfer pricing litigation in 
several recent cases e.g. ConocoPhillips case 12-0189459, Utv. 2010, 199 (Norway); Anon 
(Portugal) case 55/2012-T; Bombardier Transportation (Denmark) case LE-1990-574A.  
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1.22 There may be aspects to passive association which go beyond a hope or 
expectation of financial support in times of distress. For example, a lender may 
consider that a borrower will have ready access to valuable group management 
expertise or other support, even in the absence of any formal/contractual 
arrangements for this to be provided48.    
1.23 It is quite conceivable that passive association may influence other 
types of controlled transaction. A group’s pooled purchasing power is sometimes 
given as an example49, but arrangements entered into by MNE groups to organise 
collective/bulk buying will almost inevitably entail activity and thus intra-group 
conditions being made or imposed50.  On the other hand, for example, one could 
imagine that a foodstuffs producer might well attach value to (and thus perhaps 
adjust prices as a consequence of) the buying entity’s mere membership of a 
renowned supermarket chain group51.  My conclusions could be adapted to apply 
to such a situation i.e. to contribute to the transfer pricing analysis of controlled 
supplies of goods within the MNE group.  The challenges however lie in the 
intertwined areas of (a) qualitative research – it seems likely that many such 
 
48
  See e.g. Hollas and Hands (2014). 
49
  E.g. Blessing (2010) page 165; Kamphuis (2010) page 297. See also Examples 3-5 in 
new Section D.8 Chapter I TPG (paragraph 2.80ff below); compare the Example given in the US 
section 482 Regulations: paragraph 3.210(v) below.  
50
  In the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal decision in Indalex Limited v The Queen 
[1988] 1 CTC 60 the group’s enhanced bargaining power (vis-à-vis its supplier) arose because of 
the purchasing power of a number of group members; but as regards the Bermudan buying 
company the court found “no evidence whatsoever that [it] contributed an iota of that pooled 
purchasing power” (page 68).  
51
  Relative bargaining power is naturally the most potent force at work here, but it could 
be combined with a more or less conscious willingness to deal with affiliates of the “main” 
buying group entity, and acceptance of credit or other risks as a consequence, because of an 
expectation of uniform commercial behaviour from the purchaser group.  Passive association 
may also exist between parties dealing at arm’s length.  An example is a soft beverage bottler 
company, which may experience an uplift in its credit rating because of the perception of likely 
support from the otherwise unrelated (or at least, non-controlling) concentrate producer: see e.g. 
Moody’s Rating Methodology: Global Soft Beverage Industry (2013).  See also Hickman, 
Rockall and Hall (2011) section II: “[s]ometimes in third-party situations a supplier is so critical 
that support may be provided even though there is no contractual requirement to do so”. A 
different but topical area is that of potential governmental support e.g. for banking institutions 
considered to be of systemic importance, see e.g. the Standard & Poor’s publication Rating 
Government-Related Entities: Methodology and Assumptions (2010).  An interesting study of the 
values of implicit guarantees of bank debt is provided by Schich and Kim (2012), noting 
declining values attributable to the establishment of resolution and recovery structures but also to 
weakening sovereign credits.   
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suppliers, if asked how they take account of passive association present within 
their customers, would find it hard to relate the question to their business dealings 
beyond it being one of many components (including notably relative bargaining 
power) leading to price; and (b) actual (quantitative) pricing effect which, as 
mentioned, is beyond the scope of this thesis and, outside the creditworthiness 
context, is likely to be highly subjective and impressionistic.  Even for lenders, it 
is plain that uniform practices are not applied (at least outside ratings models) and 
more likely that, as a matter of (e.g.) lender discretion at credit committee stage, a 
subjective/arbitrary pricing concession may be made52.  
 
 
1.24 Much of the focus of the media/political furore over transfer pricing has 
been on arrangements concerning intellectual property or other intangibles, or the 
sale of tangible goods. The passive association concept brings little to bear in 
these contexts – beyond possible credit support for financial obligations. Thus 
limiting my enquiry to credit risk seems appropriate, despite the “noise” around 
globally mobile IP, limited risk distributorships and so on. 
1.25 There is no tax avoidance dimension to this study.  The investigation is 
a non-partisan search for the “right” approach to allocating taxing rights between 
states.  Transfer pricing is in the news as never before.  It is used as a pejorative, 
implying a reprehensible strategy to avoid paying a “fair share” of corporate 
income tax. Put more calmly though, it is simply the science (or perhaps art) of 
setting inter-company prices as required by international tax laws53.  
1.26 Economic theories are outside the scope of my research.  Such theories 
can be relevant to (a) shaping policy, and of course (b) establishing hypothetical 
arm’s length prices. To reiterate, my concern is to develop and clarify the 
 
52
  “[L]enders – like bond rating agencies – apply non-quantifiable judgmental factors in 
practice”: Rosenblum (2004), Guarantee Fees section.  
53
  According to the UN, the term “transfer pricing is … sometimes used, incorrectly, in a 
pejorative sense, to mean the shifting of taxable income from a company, belonging to an MNE, 
located in a high taxing jurisdiction to a company belonging to the same group in a low taxing 
jurisdiction through incorrect transfer prices in order to reduce the overall tax burden on the 
group”: UN (2001) page 4, also citing paragraph 3 of the preface to the 1979 OECD Report 
which instructs that “consideration of transfer pricing problems should not be confused with the 
consideration of problems of tax fraud or tax avoidance”.  See now the UN Practical Manual on 
Transfer Pricing at 3.2.1.   
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interpretation of the law as it stands, not with changing it nor, for the reasons just 
given, with attempting to construct a framework for pricing the effects of passive 
association.   
1.27 Considerations of national fiscal policy might also enter into particular 
states’ attitudes to the recognition of passive association.  Developing countries 
have traditionally been viewed as net importers of capital54 and technology, and 
thus as enthusiasts for withholding taxes and other forms of source-basis taxation.  
Where such capital is in the form of debt due to related parties, the local 
(borrower’s) fisc will instinctively prefer lower rather than higher interest rates: 
such countries should therefore be relatively amenable to recognising the 
beneficial effects on borrowers’ interest costs where passive association is 
factored into loan and guarantee pricing55.  But the concept “has served as support 
for both taxpayers and tax authorities … to defend their positions”56. 
1.28 This thesis does not extend to an investigation of the qualitative issues 
of when or whether, and how, passive association is recognised and accorded 
pricing significance in arm’s length dealings.  It is taken for granted in the cases 
and literature (and empirically applied by the rating agencies57), and it seems 
 
54
  This study does not investigate theories concerning capital import (including 
ownership or savings) neutrality or capital export neutrality (as to which see Schön (2009-10) 
Part I pages 79-82 and Part II pages 70-73 for a good summary). The passive association concept 
potentially performs a function in establishing the tax base, not determining how it should then 
be taxed.   
55
  The analysis (and thus partisan preferences) may be reversed, however, where passive 
association supports an enhanced quantum of debt or where a tax system permits relief for the 
write down of impaired loans.   
56
  Zorzi and Rizzuto (2013) page 432, referring to the General Electric case: paragraph 
3.16ff below.  
57
  See e.g. Standard & Poor’s General Criteria: Corporate Ratings Criteria – General 
Criteria: Principles of Credit Rating (2014) and Moody’s Investors Service’s Rating Non-
Guaranteed Subsidiaries: Credit Considerations in Assigning Subsidiary Ratings in the Absence 
of Legally Binding Parent Support (2003) which includes Coca-Cola and Schlumberger 
subsidiaries as examples of companies enjoying ratings uplift by virtue of group affiliation.   A 
vivid example is the case of German transportation specialist bank DVB Bank SE, which is 
accorded a stand-alone credit profile of “bb” by S&P, but which is then uplifted for “group 
support” (which in DVB’s case also had regard to the prospect of support from the German 
cooperative banking sector) by seven notches to an “issuer credit rating” of A+/A-1: 
http://www.dvbbank.com/~/media/Files/D/Dvb-Bank-Corp/ratings/sp-dvb-analysis-221214.pdf 
(accessed 4 June 2015).  Another interesting example is Fitch’s notching uplift of Indonesian 
telecoms operator Indosat by reference to parental support from Ooredoo: “Indosat’s ‘BBB’ IDR 
[issuer default rating] incorporates a three-notch uplift from its stand-alone credit profile of ‘BB’ 
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logically compelling, that passive association can in appropriate circumstances 
have an effect on uncontrolled transaction pricing.  So I conclude that there is little 
utility in attempting to “prove” that; to do so convincingly would entail substantial 
research into the practices of (at least) banks and probably corporate groups. 
Research methods 
1.29 The approach adopted in this paper is a combination of: 
(a)  an application of doctrinal or “black-letter” techniques, including the 
teleological search for purpose, applied to the law or quasi-law, and international 
legal vocabulary, represented by the increasingly global standards embodied in 
OECD or UN guidance as applicable to international tax treaties, and the national 
laws (including case law) of selected states which implement the arm’s length 
principle into those laws: thus the search is for lex lata (“the law as it is”) and not 
for lex ferenda (“the law as it should be”); and  
(b) a functional comparative law analysis58 of those national laws based 
upon the proposition that a common need for a universal interpretation defines the 
 
based on its strategic and financial linkages with its 65% parent Ooredoo QSC (Ooredoo; 
A+/Stable)”:         
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/idUSFit91805520150327?type=companyNews 
(accessed 4 June 2015).  Wittendorff (2011) at footnote 179, and Bundgaard at page 88, cite the 
Danish Egnsbank Han Herred case TfS (2000) 243H, where six savings banks paid the 
unsecured debt of their joint venture company because the bankruptcy of the company would 
have had significant adverse consequences for the credit ratings and business affairs of the 
owners. Wilmhurst (2012) summarises the methodologies applied by the three main rating 
agencies, S&P, Moody’s and Fitch.  
58
  See e.g. Zweigert and Kötz (1998), who splendidly observe (page 3) upon 
scholarship’s “ultimate goal of discovering the truth”.  They quote Lambert from 1905: 
“comparative law must resolve the accidental and divisive differences in the laws of peoples at 
similar stages of cultural and economic development, and reduce the number of divergencies in 
law, attributable not to the political, moral, or social qualities of the different nations but to 
historical accident or to temporary or contingent circumstances”; and (at page 17) Jhering from 
1955: “The reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness 
and need.  No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home, 
but only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grow in his back garden.” The House 
of Lords opinions in T (A.P.) v Immigration Officer [1996] UKHL 8 display open-mindedness to 
the use of foreign (US and Canadian) case law authorities and supranational materials (the UN 
Handbook on Refugee Status) where international treaty obligations (the 1951 Geneva 
Convention on Refugees) were under consideration. “In a case concerning an international 
convention it is obviously desirable that decisions in different jurisdictions should, so far as 
possible, be kept in line with each other” (per Lord Lloyd). See also Indofood International 
Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA Civ 158 paragraph 42 developing the 
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usefulness (i.e., in the present context, lowering of barriers to commerce by the 
elimination of international economic double taxation) of such universality. For 
Wittendorff (2010a):  
“The [comparative] method is particularly important to the subject, in part because the 
drafting of rules is to a large extent international, and in part because the transfer pricing 
adjustment of international transactions will normally involve the legal systems of at least 
two countries. A transfer pricing adjustment can thus lead to negotiations with the tax 
authorities of other countries who may disagree with the adjustment.  … The case law on 
the arm’s length principle in relation to MNEs is relatively modest in most countries, so 
that studies of foreign law can significantly supplement analyses of domestic law.”59   
Where a rule based on Article 9(1) MTC is the subject of dispute in one country, 
the case law of other countries, where it produces well-reasoned decisions, may be 
of significant persuasive utility given the desirability of a uniform global 
interpretation. More generally, the drafting of national transfer pricing legislation, 
and the development of tax authority practices, can be informed by an 
understanding of other country approaches. 
1.30 My  research therefore seeks illumination from an exploration of (a) the 
existing international models, commentaries and guidance which touch upon 
passive association (chapter 2); and (b) comprehensive consideration of the 
relevant national laws and practices of six English language common law 
countries, each of which has a relatively sophisticated transfer pricing regime60 
(chapter 3).  The objective is to construct a synthesis of legislative, juristic and 
 
concept of an “international fiscal meaning” for a tax treaty phrase (“beneficial owner”), 
including by reference to the OECD MTC Commentary. 
59
  Wittendorff (2010a), pages 13-14; see also Bullen (2011) 1.5.3.2, citing IFA (1993) 
and OECD MTC, Introduction, paragraph 5.   
60
  India is included as a notable example of a developing economy. Although its transfer 
pricing laws date back only to 2001, case law is prolific - symptomatic of aggressive tax 
authority pursuit of revenue and a determined emphasis on source-basis taxation.  Zweigert and 
Kötz (page 8) note that the recognition of “principles of law accepted by the large majority of 
nations … is rendered more difficult by the basic differences of attitude between the developed 
industrial nations and those in process of development”. This difference manifests itself in the 
international tax world through the somewhat competing model tax treaties, and related 
interpretations, promulgated respectively by the OECD and the UN.  The UK presents, among 
the selected country studies, the added dimension of EU membership: see paragraph 3.174ff 
below.  
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governmental attitudes (including conflicting attitudes) to the question.  Then the 
published literature of academics and practitioners is critically examined, both as 
regards the specific role of passive association and more generally in relation to 
the meaning in that respect of the arm’s length principle (chapter 4).  Others have 
not to date convincingly proposed a closely-reasoned academic legal analysis 
leading to a conclusion.   I confess to leaving aside non-English language 
literature61.  A yet deeper dive into my subject could engage with this, as it could 
with non-English laws (see paragraph 3.237 below).    
1.31 My conclusion (chapter 5) draws together the analysis of the 
international and national material outlined above, and proposes the affirmation of 
the recognition of the effects of passive association in pricing controlled 
transactions (not, it is reiterated, the compensation of benefits from passive 
association in favour of the putative provider).  The conclusion reached is based 
upon the assumed desirability of the arm’s length principle as the fundamental 
global tool for (a) the balanced allocation between states of taxing rights over 
MNE groups, and thus (b) the minimisation of international economic double 
taxation.  To re-emphasise, the objective is a step towards the elimination of 
uncertainty and the development of consistency.  
Chapter structure 
1.32 Thus the chapter structure of this thesis is as follows:  
Chapter 1:  introduction; 
Chapter 2:  analysis of guidance from international bodies; 
Chapter 3:  analysis of relevant legislation, case law and tax authority 
practices from selected countries;  
 
61
  I acknowledge the possibility of relevant literature in languages other than English not 
having been identified.  However, I believe the risk is somewhat mitigated because (i) the 
countries where my topic has received most attention are English speaking (not least because of 
the emerging case law and other relevant sources), and (ii) it is common for non-English 
commentators in this area to publish in English, including in the main international transfer 
pricing periodicals. 
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Chapter 4: critical review of the academic and business literature 
addressing the significance of passive association in transfer pricing and the 
meaning, so far as relevant to this study, of the arm’s length principle; 
Chapter 5: summary of conclusions. 
1.33 Finally, the Annex offers proposed guidance for use by taxpayers and 
tax administrations.  The Annex to the TPG records the instruction of the OECD 
Council to the CFA “to monitor implementation of the TPG in cooperation with 
the tax authorities of member countries and with the participation of the business 
community and to recommend to the Council to amend and update, if necessary” 
the TPG, and “to identify areas where the Guidelines may require amendments or 
additions” including in relation to “problematic issues”.  In my view the function 
of passive association is one such issue.  So the Annex to this thesis proposes 
some brief new material for inclusion in the TPG.  This may be a “courageous” 
venture, as Sir Humphrey Appleby could have said, but, at a time when the OECD 
is in the process of establishing new and improved guidance on transfer pricing, 
including in the financial transactions area, might conceivably contribute to the 
international debate.  
1.34 I have deliberately adopted a numbered paragraph approach, especially 
to assist with cross-referencing, given the important comparative aspect of this 
study and the interwoven character of the materials reviewed.  
1.35 The law is stated as at 25 January 2016.    
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2.  ANALYSIS OF GUIDANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL BODIES 
“Transfer pricing is the modern battleground, the tax Armageddon.  No more duelling at 
dawn with gentlemanly Inspectors.”62 
Introduction 
2.1 This chapter reviews guidance from international organisations to the 
extent it bears upon the relevance of passive association in pricing controlled 
transactions.  A forensic review of the materials considered indicates that passive 
association should indeed be taken into account in pricing controlled transactions.  
I have identified from each of the instruments addressed below the statements with 
direct or indirect relevance to the topic of this study, and commented on what 
those statements mean for my analysis.  
2.2 An important question in relation to any international instrument 
concerns its legal status.  The answer may well vary from country to country.  
Directly effective EU law can apply across the Member States, and tax treaties 
may take immediate effect in “monist” states.  Other instruments may more 
properly be characterised as “soft” international law which, for example, states 
agree in principle to observe, but without formally incorporating the relevant rules 
into national laws.  An intermediate class comprises instruments which may be 
received into national laws by some legal act of ratification or other 
implementation.  Chapter 3 illustrates some different country approaches.   
2.3 The key themes emerging from the materials considered below are: (1) 
the fundamental objective of transfer pricing of establishing tax parity between 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions; (2) the need for a causal connection 
between the exercise of control and price distortion; (3) the arm’s length 
principle’s reliance upon comparability analysis – to test what would have 
happened between independent parties; (4) thus the need to take into account the 
circumstances of the parties to the controlled transaction and where necessary to 
adjust an uncontrolled transaction to align its circumstances (and those of its 
 
62
  Carroll (2004), page 40, with thanks to François Vincent.  
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parties) with those of the actual transaction; (5) the requirement to test arm’s 
length behaviour by reference to the options realistically available to the parties to 
the controlled transaction; (6) the express recognition of passive association in 
paragraph 7.13 TPG and the implication that it is a relevant factor in a 
comparability analysis – now confirmed by the BEPS project materials.  
 
 
 
OECD MTC Commentary 
2.4 The OECD’s Model Tax Convention is exactly that: a model treaty for 
use by OECD member states or others who may favour it63.  The grand unification 
of law project promoted by comparative lawyers relies to some extent on the 
production of model laws64: the MTC represents a high achievement towards that 
goal in the international tax field.  The Commentary on the MTC importantly aids 
interpretation of bilateral double tax treaties which adopt the model form.  The 
OECD has made a non-binding recommendation to member countries to follow 
the Commentary in applying their treaties65.   
 
63
  See e.g. Wittendorff (2010a) pages 95 et seq for historical background to the OECD, 
established in 1961 as successor to the 1948 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, 
and the adoption of the OECD’s first Model Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and 
Capital with Commentary in 1963 containing an Article 9 in identical form to that in the current 
MTC.  Paragraph 12 of the Commentary on Article 7 contained reference to “ordinary market 
prices” for goods, and the Article 9 Commentary referred to “normal open market commercial 
terms” for transactions between associated enterprises.  As an early foray into international tax 
ethics, the 1976 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises encouraged MNEs to comply 
transparently with the arm’s length principle; this is reiterated in the modern version of the 
Guidelines revised in 2011 (Part I, s. XI, paragraph 106).  The MTC was revised in 1977 and 
again in 1992, 2008, 2010 and 2014.  
64
  See e.g. Zweigert and Kötz (1998) page 25.  
65
  Recommendations of the OECD Council Concerning the Model Tax Convention on 
Income and Capital C(97)195/Final.  Under Article 18(b) OECD Rules of Procedure, members 
are left with discretion to consider whether it is appropriate to implement a recommendation.  
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2.5 The Article 9 Commentary probably falls short of ranking as customary 
international law66.  National tax systems may however explicitly provide for the 
Commentary to be used as a guide, or judges may be prepared to refer to the 
Commentary, as a form of “soft law”67, to gain insights into what must have been 
intended by contracting parties in finalising their treaty having full knowledge of 
the contents of the Commentary.  The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties may aid treaty construction68.  Its rules of interpretation are recognised as 
customary international law, even where parties to a treaty have not ratified the 
Convention, though there are a range of views regarding how the MTC 
Commentary is properly aligned with those rules69.   
2.6 Detailed guidance on the interpretation and application of Article 9 
MTC is provided in the TPG.  Therefore the OECD Commentary on Article 9, 
which adopts by cross-reference the TPG, is extremely brief, especially as regards 
Article 9(1).  The introductory description of Article 9 in paragraph 1 of the 
Commentary describes “associated enterprises” as “(parent and subsidiary 
companies and companies under common control)”.  However, the notions of 
“parent”, “subsidiary” and “control” are themselves not defined in the 
Commentary.  As Article 9(1) (recited at paragraph 1.2 above) uses the broader 
language of “participat[ion] directly or indirectly in the management, control or 
capital” by one enterprise in another, I doubt significant interpretive assistance can 
 
66
  See e.g. Wittendorff (2010a) pages 123-124, 290.  Compare Kofler (2013) page 646 
and materials cited.  Vega (2012) page 9, in discussing the TPG, “identifies soft law with legally 
non-binding instruments which, nonetheless, are created with the intention of having an impact 
on the behaviour of states”, but also notes (page 12, quoting Rose and Page (2001)), “that soft 
law could be seen as legislation through the back door, with the corresponding deficiencies in 
terms of public scrutiny and accountability”. Compare the comment of Boyle J in the Canadian 
McKesson case: note 258 below.   
67
  See e.g. Engelen (2006).  
68
  See e.g. Avery Jones (1984; 2002; 2008); Ward et al (2005); Weiss (2008); 
Wittendorff (2010a) section 3.3.2.2; Schwarz (2015) pages 93-98, also covering UK principles 
derived from IRC v Commerzbank AG [1990] STC 285.  A recent example of the UK approach 
(though not relying on Commerzbank) is Anson v HMRC [2015] UKSC 44.  For some Australian 
judicial commentary see e.g. SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd v Commissioner [2011] FCAFC 74, 
paragraphs [107]–[117].   
69
  For detailed coverage of the Vienna Convention and its application to tax treaties see 
e.g. Engelen (2004) Part II; also Bullen (2011) pages 27 and 33, and materials cited; paragraph 
2.16 below regarding the TPG.   
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be derived from this rather casual parenthetical.  The nuances are in any event not 
relevant to this study.   
2.7 Despite the apparently permissive tone of Article 9(1) (“any profits 
which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, 
by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the income 
of the enterprise and taxed accordingly”), paragraph 2 of the Commentary 
indicates that a reading a contrario is appropriate, i.e. that, if the conditions made 
or imposed do not differ from those that would have been made between 
independent enterprises, then no other income may be included70.  Paragraph 2 
states that “[n]o re-writing of the accounts of associated enterprises is authorised if 
the transactions between such enterprises have taken place on normal open market 
commercial terms (on an arm’s length basis).”  Thus Article 9 “is designed to 
avoid economic double taxation” (its purpose); “DTCs merely restrict, rather than 
generate, domestic law”; and “the word ‘where’ must be read to mean ‘only 
where’ and the word ‘may’, as used in Art. 9(1) in connection with ‘any profits’, 
must be taken to refer to ‘any profits, and only these’”71.   
2.8 Importantly for this study, it is plain that, for a transfer pricing 
adjustment to be made, a causal connection must exist between the control 
relationship and a transactional price distortion.  Paragraph 2 of the Commentary 
contemplates a re-writing of accounts by a state’s tax authority “if, as a result of 
the special relations between the enterprises, the accounts do not show the true 
taxable profits arising in that state”.  Thus “adjustments envisaged by Art. 9 may 
be carried out, but only if such interconnection was the cause of special 
 
70
  Vincent and Bloom (2006) prefer a “restrictive” approach to an “illustrative” 
interpretation.   Maisto (1992) pages 60-62 describes varying national approaches to this issue: 
“[t]he illustrative theory is not convincing” – as effectively depriving Article 9 of effect and 
being inconsistent with the binding application of the arm’s length principle in Article 7.  Baker 
(2015) paragraph 9B.05 describes a purpose of Article 9(1) as “limit[ing] the methods which may 
be used in the domestic law of Contracting States for adjusting profits between associated 
enterprises: only the arm’s length principle is acceptable”.  
71
  Vögel (2015) pages 603-604; also pages 597-598 (doubting Article 9(1)’s purpose as 
anti-avoidance); Wittendorff (2009) pages 109-110.  Kane (2014), section 3.1, observes that 
Article 9 both (a) permits states to make adjustments based on the arm’s length principle, but (b) 
limits such adjustments to accord with an outcome based on that principle.  (He draws the 
conclusion that, in the context of potential MNE synergy value, Article 9 “does not require 
allocation of total profits under an arm’s length standard”.) 
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conditions being made or imposed … and beyond that only according to arm’s 
length criteria”; “[p]articipation in management, control or capital must be the 
cause of the non-arm’s length conditions”; and “[a] profit adjustment may be 
made only if the conditions made or imposed on account of the influence 
exercised result in a diminution of the profits of one of the two enterprises … the 
divergence from the arm’s length price must ultimately have been caused by the 
conditions made or imposed”72.  According to Bullen (2011), Article 9(1):   
“is only concerned with profit adjustments triggered because the amount of profits is 
distorted as a result of a community of interest existing between the parties to a relation 
affecting the amount of such profits”.73 
2.9 “Conditions” in Article 9 bears a naturally broad meaning, but most 
obviously focuses on the terms of a transaction.  Vögel says:  
“[c]onditions may be either ‘made’ (i.e. the result of negotiations) or ‘imposed’ (i.e. the 
result of the exercise of control).”74 
2.10 The object of Article 9(1) is the “commercial or financial relations” 
between the relevant parties.  This is not further defined in the MTC, but “the 
Commentary uses the term ‘transactions’, and the OECD Guidelines use the term 
‘controlled transactions’ synonymously with ‘commercial or financial relations’ in 
Article 9(1)”75.  The transactional focus of Article 9(1) is highlighted by paragraph 
3.9 TPG which asserts that ideally the arm’s length principle should be applied on 
a transaction-by-transaction basis.76  
 
72
  Vögel (2015), pages 638; author’s emphasis.   
73
  Page 70, my emphasis.  But Baker (2015) at paragraph 9B.16 note 1 observes that 
“[c]uriously enough, the Article does not expressly state that the conditions must be made or 
imposed by virtue of the participation in the management, control or capital of the other 
[enterprise]”.  
74
  Vögel (2015) page 638, referring to the UK DSG Retail case, paragraph 66, see 
paragraph 3.165ff below.  Bullen (2011) pages 109-113 addresses the broad meaning of 
“conditions”.   
75
  Wittendorff (2010b), note 3, citing the Commentary on Article 9 and the Glossary to 
the TPG.  
76
  Vann (2010b), page 140, suggests that “[i]t is not, however, necessary that the [arm’s 
length] principle be based on transactions, because there is nothing in article 7 or article 9 of the 
OECD model convention to require it, but it is a deep-seated intuition for separate entities”.  
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2.11 Paragraph 3 of the Commentary notes the interaction between Article 9 
and thin capitalisation concepts.  In essence, Article 9 does not obstruct domestic 
thin capitalisation rules provided the outcome is consistent with the arm’s length 
principle.  
2.12 The arm’s length principle also appears in Article 7 MTC.  Under 
Article 7(2) profits attributable to a PE are taxable in the host state to the extent of 
“the profits it might be expected to make, in particular in its dealings with other 
parts of the enterprise, if it were a separate and independent enterprise engaged in 
the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions”.  This 
“corresponds to the arm’s length principle which is also applicable, under the 
provisions of Article 9, for the purpose of adjusting the profits of associated 
enterprises”77.  Wittendorff (2009)78 observes that “[a] contextual interpretation of 
Art. 9(1) should, in particular, take Art. 7(1) into account since Art. 9(1) 
determines the amount of business profits from transactions between associated 
enterprises which is covered by the exclusive taxing rights of the two residence 
states according to Art. 7(1)”. 
2.13 Note also Articles 11(6) and 12(4) MTC.  The arm’s length principle is 
used here to determine the extent to which treaty relieving provisions79 are 
disapplied as regards transactions between parties who enjoy a “special 
relationship” (a potentially broader test than the Article 9(1) associated enterprises 
concept).  The general view is that Articles 11(6) and 12(4) supplement Article 
9(1) to the extent they operate in an overlapping manner80.  
 
77
  Commentary on Article 7, paragraph 16.  
78
  Page 116.  
79
  Commentary on Article 11, paragraph 32; Commentary on Article 12, paragraph 22.  
80
  See e.g. Vögel (2015) pages 627-628: whereas Article 9(1) would permit adjustments 
to the profits of the payer of interest/royalties to an arm’s length level, Articles 11(6)/12(4) 
permit the source state to tax the recipient on the excessive amount.  See also Wittendorff 
(2010a) page 188.   
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2.14 See also the brief discussion of non-discrimination in the PEs context 
(Article 24(3) MTC) at paragraph 2.67 below, which has some relevance to the 
passive association debate81.  
OECD TPG 
2.15  This section provides a comprehensive review of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations82 as 
they relate to the topic of passive association, including important related aspects 
concerning the nature of the arm’s length standard and the assumptions to be made 
in arriving at an arm’s length price.83    
2.16 The legal importance accorded to the TPG by different national tax 
systems varies.  The OECD Commentary on Article 9 MTC paragraph 1 considers 
the TPG to represent “internationally agreed principles”.  In some systems the 
TPG have little or no persuasive effect, indeed may be officially renounced as a 
basis for policy and law84.  Other legal systems accept the TPG as a more or less 
powerful aid to interpretation85.  A third group directly applies the TPG into 
 
81
  On the interaction between Article 24(4) (which does not apply where Article 9(1) 
does), see Marres (2015). As regards the interaction between Article 24(5) (non-discrimination 
regarding controlled enterprises) and Article 9(1), since the latter forms “part of the context in 
which [the former] must be read … adjustments which are compatible with [Article 9(1)] could 
not be considered to violate [Article 24(5)]”: paragraph 79 OECD Commentary on Article 24.  
82
  TPG paragraph numbers used in this study are those reflecting the BEPS 2015 Final 
Reports, i.e. anticipating the changes being in (or coming into) effect: “[t]he guidance in this 
Report takes the form of amendments to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines”: page 10, Executive 
Summary; “[s]ome of the revisions may be immediately applicable such as the revisions to the 
[TPG]”: OECD Explanatory Statement to the Final Reports, paragraph 23.  However, a pending 
OECD Council Recommendation formally incorporating the BEPS 2015 Final Reports into the 
TPG has not, at the date of writing, been made.  Mayra Lucas of the OECD’s Transfer Pricing 
Unit told me (by email, 22 January 2016) that such a Recommendation was expected in the first 
half of 2016, “probably by March”.  
83
  See e.g. Wittendorff (2010a) chapter 3 on the emergence of the TPG, including the 
contribution of Working Party No. 6, appointed in 1973 to look into the taxation of MNEs 
including transfer pricing, and the US influence upon the TPG.  
84
  Brazil is a notable example, see e.g. Tax Justice Network (2012) reacting to Falcão 
(2012), and KPMG (2013), cited in IMF (2014) footnote 76: “Brazil does not follow the OECD 
guidelines, rather imposes unique standards for evaluating transfer prices … with related parties 
and [other] companies located in low-tax jurisdictions”.  But, enigmatically, it will “use the 
guidance in [the BEPS 2015 Final Reports] in this context” (note 1 to those Reports).  
85
  E.g. Canada. The TPG “are clearly a type of soft law and represent, arguably, the most 
important source of information on transfer pricing”: Li (2012), page 78. But see the qualified 
approach in the Canadian courts described at note 258 below.  Vögel (2015) says the TPG “have 
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national transfer pricing laws86.  The trend is an increasing embrace across the 
globe of the TPG (even in many states which incline towards the parallel approach 
promulgated by the UN).  Thus the TPG have gradually acquired, and continue to 
acquire, legal or quasi-legal authority.  An Appendix to the TPG replicates the 
OECD Council’s Recommendation on the Determination of Transfer Pricing 
Between Associated Enterprises.  This operates on a political level and, having 
recited “the fundamental need for cooperation among tax administrations in order 
to remove the obstacles that international double taxation presents to the free 
movement of goods, services and capital between Member countries”, it 
recommends to Member countries’ governments that their tax administrations (i) 
follow the TPG for arriving at arm’s length pricing for transactions between 
associated enterprises, and (ii) encourage taxpayers also to follow the TPG.  It is 
thus a form of “soft” international law, with “powerful influence”87.  Bullen 
(2011)88 argues that the Vienna Convention’s canons of interpretation can be 
applied by analogy to the TPG.  
2.17 After first summarising the conclusions which I propose may be drawn 
from the content of the TPG, I review below a number of extracts from the TPG in 
detail because of their importance to the propositions developed in this study.   
 
virtually the same weight as [the OECD MTC Commentary]”: page 612.  See also Bullen (2011) 
page 34 on the possibility of the arm’s length principle itself acquiring the status of customary 
international law, or at least an internationally accepted standard or norm.   
86
  E.g. the UK: section 164 TIOPA.  Vega (2012) page 17 refers to several tax treaties 
where the TPG are adopted by protocol or exchange of notes.  
87
  Li (2012) page 78; see also the discussion which follows (pages 79–86) as to the role 
of this soft law, and the potential for its development into yet more compelling authority.  It 
seems uncontroversial to view the TPG as the best source of international transfer pricing 
thinking (see the UK’s DSG Retail case, paragraph 3.165ff below) on the arm’s length principle, 
despite the colourful but scathing alchemy simile offered by Durst (2012): “The reason for their 
[the alchemists’] success seems to have been a mixture of greed, embarrassment among those 
who were deceived, and a large dose of pure humbug. The crowned heads of Europe were 
desperate for revenues, largely for military purposes; they desperately wanted to believe that they 
had obtained a rich source of revenues, and they also wanted their competitors to believe this. 
Also, once a customer had paid the alchemist for work performed, the customer, even if it 
became clear that the alchemical services were fraudulent, generally did not want to admit that he 
or she had been deceived. Further, the more successful among the alchemists were adept at using 
the appearance of scientific terminology to promote themselves; at times, they published lengthy 
guidelines for how to conduct their work, which looked wonderful on the printed page but, to the 
apparently few who attempted really to read them, proved to contain nothing but speculation and 
empty, flowery prose. And the institution of alchemy survived in Europe for hundreds of years.”  
88
  Pages 45-49.  
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Commentary and analysis: TPG 
2.18 Several key themes appear in the TPG which bear strongly on the 
recognition of passive association as a pricing factor.  The concept is explicitly 
described in paragraph 7.13 TPG (paragraph 2.44 below).  BEPS-led amendments 
are directly relevant (paragraph 2.80ff below).  Emphasis is given to the central 
principle that transfer pricing law serves to correct distortions caused by the 
control relationship, and thus restore parity between controlled and uncontrolled 
transactions.  Importantly, it is necessary for a controlled transaction to be 
compared with the “options realistically available” to the parties, and 
comparability analysis must postulate independent enterprises in “comparable 
circumstances” and thus take into account the attributes of the parties.  Risk is a 
significant factor in assessing comparability.   
2.19 The preface to the TPG introduces the arm’s length principle – thus 
(paragraph 6) “individual group members must be taxed on the basis that they act 
at arm’s length in their transactions with each other”.  The context is explained by 
reference to potential distortions in intra-group behaviour:  
“the relationship among members of an MNE group may permit the group members to 
establish special conditions in their intra-group relations that differ from those that would 
have been established had the group members been acting as independent enterprises 
operating in open markets.  To ensure the correct application of the separate entity 
approach, OECD member countries have adopted the arm’s length principle, under 
which the effect of special conditions on the level of profits should be eliminated.” 
Chapter I:  the arm’s length principle 
2.20 Chapter I TPG addresses the fundamentals of the arm’s length principle.   
It is “the international transfer pricing standard that OECD member countries have 
agreed should be used for tax purposes by MNE groups and tax administrations” 
(paragraph 1.1).  The BEPS project has emphatically endorsed this, despite its 
flirtation with “special measures” to counteract forms of avoidance where transfer 
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pricing seemed an inadequate remedy89.  When independent enterprises transact 
with each other, the conditions of their commercial and financial relations 
ordinarily are determined by market forces (paragraph 1.2).  The tax position can 
be “distorted” when pricing does not reflect market forces, so the solution is that 
“for tax purposes the profits of the associated enterprises may be adjusted as 
necessary to correct any such distortions and thereby ensure that the arm’s length 
principle is satisfied” (paragraph 1.3).  Even where autonomous MNE group 
members bargain hard between themselves, “it may occur that the relationship 
between the associated enterprises may influence the outcome of the bargaining” 
(paragraph 1.5)90.  
2.21 TPG paragraph 1.6 promulgates the “separate entity approach”.  This 
lies at the heart of the controversy concerning passive association.  Paragraph 1.6 
provides, importantly: 
“By seeking to adjust profits by reference to the conditions which would have obtained 
between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable 
circumstances (i.e. in ‘comparable uncontrolled transactions’), the arm’s length principle 
follows the approach of treating the members of an MNE group as operating as separate 
entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business.  Because the 
separate entity approach treats the members of an MNE group as if they were 
independent entities, attention is focused on the nature of the transactions between those 
members and on whether the conditions thereof differ from the conditions that would be 
obtained in comparable uncontrolled transactions.  Such an analysis of the controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions, which is referred to as a ‘comparability analysis’, is at the 
heart of the application of the arm’s length principle.”91 
 
89
  See Actions 8-10 in the 2013 BEPS Action Plan: “… special measures, either within 
or beyond the arm’s length principle, may be required with respect to intangible assets, risk and 
over-capitalisation to address these flaws [in the current system]”.  Various potential special 
measures were described in the December 2014 discussion paper on Actions 8-10.  See e.g. 
Boidman and Kandev (2015) pages 841-842 proposing that the way in which certain (“brazen”) 
changes promoted by OECD as arm’s length measures do not stand up as such.  
90
  Emphasis added.  This is a potential weakness of the “negotiated price method” 
promoted by Hamaekers (2002): paragraph 4.19 below.  
91
  Emphasis added.  
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2.22 Paragraph 1.6 TPG is a foundation for any discussion of the recognition 
of passive association in pricing controlled transactions.  Comparability analysis is 
at the heart of the arm’s length principle.  The emphasis is on transactions.  Not 
only must comparable transactions be identified, but equally an analysis of 
circumstances is required.   In my view, the effect of passive association upon a 
party to a transaction is as clearly a “circumstance” as any other.  The question is 
then whether such effects should be pushed aside by reference to the concept of 
independence.  MNE group members are to be treated as “operating as separate 
entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business” and “as if they 
were independent entities”.  Traditionalists (and, where it suits them, litigants) 
have taken the view that this requires all consequences of affiliation to be 
disregarded92.  But on closer inspection (with some illumination from case law 
and other developments in recent years), this is not what paragraph 1.6 prescribes.  
The very essence of transfer pricing requires the separateness of corporate entities 
within an MNE group to be respected.  The rejection of a “single unified business” 
approach requires (in contrast to application of the arm’s length principle) that 
notions of the integrated multinational “firm” are ignored.  “Operating as separate 
entities” simply respects legal actuality (even though businesses which are in fact 
integrated or divisionalised frequently behave without much regard to the legal 
personality of group members).  There is no fundamental inconsistency between 
treating group members “as if they were independent entities” and respecting their 
actual characteristics, including those which are a consequence of group 
membership.  What is required, however, to arrive at an independent treatment, is 
to disregard distortions to pricing caused by the exercise of control.  
2.23 TPG paragraph 1.8 offers as a major reason for adoption of the arm’s 
length principle that it “provides broad parity of tax treatment for members of 
MNE groups and independent enterprises”, achieving a non-distortive “more equal 
footing for tax purposes”.  Hamaekers (1992) calls this the neutrality principle 
(paragraph 4.21 below).  Indeed, it has been said that the TPG “give pride of place 
 
92
  See e.g. Wilmshurst (2012): “Ignoring the impact of implicit support may seem 
appropriate if the statement of the arm’s length principle in paragraph 1.6 of the OECD 
Guidelines is interpreted narrowly and the members of a group are treated as entirely separate 
entities. Indeed, to do so has been the norm in the analysis of debt for transfer pricing purposes.” 
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as a justificatory matter to the claim that the arm’s length standard gives parity of 
treatment to commonly controlled enterprises and non-commonly controlled 
enterprises”93.  The lending of money is considered to be a case where arm’s 
length prices from comparable transactions “may readily be found” (paragraph 
1.9).  Paragraph 1.10 notes, but brushes over, criticism from some quarters of the 
arm’s length principle because “the separate entity approach may not always 
account for the economies of scale and interrelation of diverse activities created by 
integrated businesses”94.  This just touches on passive association in the sense that 
MNE group synergies may benefit group members in some respects without there 
necessarily being transactions or other activities which create the relevant 
benefits.95  On group synergies, see paragraph 2.80ff below.   
2.24 TPG paragraph 1.14 defends the arm’s length principle as “the closest 
approximation of the workings of the open market” and “reflects the economic 
realities of the controlled taxpayer’s particular facts and circumstances” (my 
emphasis).   
2.25 Newly-revised Chapter I Part D.1 explains the process of comparability 
analysis. Various amendments and expansions of Part D have now been made by 
the BEPS 2015 Final Reports.  There are two key parts of the analysis (paragraph 
1.33) –  
“the first aspect is to identify the commercial or financial relations between the 
associated enterprises and the conditions and economically relevant circumstances 
attaching to those relations in order that the controlled transaction is accurately 
delineated; the second aspect is to compare the conditions and the economically relevant 
circumstances of the controlled transaction as accurately delineated with the conditions 
 
93
  Kane (2014) section 3.1.  The parity concept finds express articulation in US 
legislation: Regs. §1.482-1(a)(1): paragraph 3.197 below.  
94
  Schön (2011) page 38 says: “[t]he arm’s length standard is rather a legal than a 
commercial concept, trying to grant equal treatment to group companies and independent 
companies, but it cannot be defended as a business concept as it generically misses the efficiency 
requirements within the firm.” Also literature cited, ibid., footnote 96.   
95
  Wittendorff (2010a) at page 335 considers that what is now paragraph 1.10 TPG 
“implies that economies of integration should be taken into account for transfer pricing 
purposes.”  
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and the economically relevant circumstances of comparable transactions between 
independent enterprises”. 
2.26 The economically relevant characteristics to be considered include “the 
economic circumstances of the parties”/“the circumstances of the associated 
enterprises” (paragraphs 1.36-37)96.  
2.27 Independent enterprises will compare a potential transaction to the 
“other options realistically available to them, and they will only enter into the 
transaction if they see no alternative that offers a clearly more attractive 
opportunity to meet their commercial objectives”. Such enterprises “would 
generally take into account any economically relevant differences between the 
options realistically available to them (such as differences in the level of risk) 
when valuing those options … [and it is important that] the transaction adopted 
offers a clearly more attractive opportunity to meet commercial objectives than 
alternative options realistically available” (paragraph 1.38, my emphasis, see also 
Chapter IX discussed below).   
2.28 Paragraph 1.40 robustly asserts that “[a]ll methods that apply the arm’s 
length principle can be tied to the concept that independent enterprises consider 
the options realistically available to them and in comparing one option to another 
they “consider any differences between the options that would significantly affect 
their value”; “before purchasing a product at a given price, independent 
enterprises normally would be expected to consider whether they could buy the 
equivalent product on otherwise comparable terms and conditions but at a lower 
price from another party”.  The comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method, 
described as comparing “a controlled transaction to similar uncontrolled 
transactions to provide a direct estimate of the price the parties would have agreed 
to had they resorted directly to a market alternative”, becomes less reliable “if not 
all the characteristics of these uncontrolled transactions that significantly affect the 
price charged between independent enterprises are comparable”.  And “[w]here 
 
96
  TPG paragraph 2.16 alludes to the determination of comparability adjustments “where 
differences exist between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions or between the enterprises 
undertaking those transactions” (emphasis added).  
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there are differences between the situations being compared that could materially 
affect the comparison, comparability adjustments must be made, where possible, 
to improve the reliability of the comparison” (all per paragraph 1.40).  Reference 
to realistically available alternatives is an aspect of comparability analysis, 
including the way in which comparability adjustments should be undertaken.  It is 
not a justification for recharacterising the actual controlled transaction97.    
2.29 An important post-BEPS theme is a more acute focus on the conduct of 
the parties beyond merely taking into account contractual terms.  “Where there are 
material differences between contractual terms and the conduct of the associated 
enterprises in their relations with one another, the functions they actually perform, 
the assets they actually use, and the risks they actually assume, considered in the 
context of the contractual terms, should ultimately determine the factual situation 
and accurately delineate the transaction” (paragraph 1.46).  Sometimes “the actual 
outcome of commercial or financial relations may not have been identified as a 
transaction by the MNE, but nevertheless may result in a transfer of material 
value, the terms of which would need to be deduced from the conduct of the 
parties.  For example, … synergies may have been created through deliberate 
concerted action …” (paragraph 1.49).  
2.30 The assumption of risk is highly relevant in a comparability study: it 
will “influence the prices and other conditions of transactions between the 
associated enterprises … The level and assumption of risk, therefore, are 
economically relevant characteristics that can be significant in determining the 
outcome of a transfer pricing analysis” (paragraph 1.56).  “Where an associated 
enterprise contractually assumes risk but does not exercise control over the risk or 
does not have the financial capacity to assume the risk, the risk will be allocated to 
the enterprise exercising control and having financial capacity (paragraph 1.98)98.  
However, whereas an evaluation of risk is naturally intrinsic in the financing 
context to an assessment of creditworthiness and thus pricing (such that passive 
 
97
  See e.g. Wittendorff (2009) page 127.  Compare the US approach: paragraph 3.202 
below.  
98
  Compare Schön (2014), who urges that the importance of control should not be 
overstated, in contrast to the important capacity to bear risk.   
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association may have an effect), that should not be confused with arrangements 
which allocate risk (or purport to allocate risk, perhaps implausibly) across an 
MNE group – which is more the focus of concern in the BEPS project99.      
2.31 Chapter I Section D.2 addresses “Recognition of the accurately 
delineated transactions”.  This authorises tax authorities to disregard the character 
of a controlled transaction “where the arrangements made in relation to the 
transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been 
adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in 
comparable circumstances, thereby preventing determination of a price that would 
be acceptable to both of the parties taking into account their respective 
perspectives and the options realistically available to each of them at the time of 
entering into the transaction” (paragraph 1.122).  But this controversial100 rule 
(and its fascinating interaction with purported risk allocations) does not have a 
significant bearing on the passive association topic.   
2.32 Importantly for this study, the BEPS 2015 Final Reports introduce a 
new101 Chapter I Section D.8 TPG dealing with “MNE group synergies”.  See 
paragraph 2.80ff below.   
Chapter II: transfer pricing methods 
2.33 The modern TPG abandoned the traditional “hierarchy” of transfer 
pricing methods102 in favour of “finding the most appropriate method for a 
particular case” (paragraph 2.2).  Nonetheless, “where it is possible to locate 
comparable uncontrolled transactions, the CUP method is the most direct and 
reliable way to apply the arm’s length principle.  Consequently, in such cases the 
CUP method is preferable over all other methods” (paragraph 2.14).  In the case of 
straightforward lending transactions, it should ordinarily be possible to locate 
 
99
  Paragraph 1.56ff TPG contains substantial new material on risk.  
100
  See e.g. Wittendorff (2009), challenging the proposition that Article 9 permits 
transactional adjustments.  
101
  Albeit trailed since July 2013.  
102
  Paragraph 2.49 of the 1995 TPG, explicitly stated that “traditional transaction methods 
are preferable to other methods”.  
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comparables of good quality, or at least comparables which are readily susceptible 
to adjustment103.  
Chapter III: comparability analysis 
2.34 TPG Chapter III provides guidance on comparability analysis.  “By 
definition, a comparison implies examining two terms: the controlled transaction 
under review and the uncontrolled transactions that are regarded as potentially 
comparable … the process of identifying comparables is dependent upon a prior 
analysis of the taxpayer’s controlled transactions and of the relevant comparability 
factors” (paragraph 3.1).  Thus empirical transactional comparison is at the heart 
of the arm’s length principle.  To price straightforward loan and guarantee 
transactions, in applying the CUP method, one should search for evidence of 
comparable transactions in comparable circumstances.  
2.35 TPG paragraph 3.4 offers a stepped summary of a “typical process” for 
comparability analysis. Step 2 is a “broad-based analysis of the taxpayer’s 
circumstances” which inter alia considers all “elements that affect the taxpayer 
and its environment” to “understand the conditions in the taxpayer’s controlled 
transaction as well as those in the uncontrolled transactions to be compared, in 
particular the economic circumstances of the transaction” (paragraph 3.7).   
2.36 Step 4 prescribes a “review of existing internal comparables, if any” 
(ahead of Step 5 which is an assessment of sources of external comparables where 
they “are needed, taking into account their relative reliability”).   An “internal” 
comparable is a comparable transaction between one party to the controlled 
transaction and an independent party.  In applying the CUP method to a purchase 
(or, by analogy, a borrowing) transaction, an internal comparable would be the 
purchase price (or cost of finance) paid by the taxpayer for comparable goods or 
services (loan) obtained from an unrelated party in comparable circumstances.104  
An “external” comparable is a transaction between two independent enterprises, 
 
103
  The Indian case law repeatedly resorts to the CUP method: paragraph 3.117ff below.  
104
  This formulation is drawn from the OECD’s 2006 paper on comparability 
CTPA/CFA(2006)31, paragraph 16. 
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neither of which is party to the controlled transaction (paragraph 3.24).  Paragraph 
3.28 observes that “[o]ne obvious and forceful aspect of internal comparability is 
that the taxpayer will self-evidently itself have constant characteristics whoever it 
is dealing with”105.   
2.37 Comparables may need to be adjusted to enhance accuracy: examples 
include adjustments for differences in capital, functions, assets and risks 
(paragraphs 3.47 and 3.48).  Adjustments must be made to the reference 
transaction i.e. the candidate comparable, not the controlled transaction.106 
Chapter IV: administrative approaches 
2.38 The significance of a borrower company’s credit rating is 
acknowledged in the TPG’s discussion of advance pricing agreements for loans: 
paragraph 4.125.   
Chapter VI: intangibles 
2.39 New paragraph 6.60 TPG notes the integral connection between funding 
and risk-taking, and hence the connection with credit-worthiness.  The updated 
guidance on intangibles further emphasises the “options realistically available”, 
both generally (e.g. paragraphs 6.112-113 TPG) and specifically in relation to 
“financing options” (paragraph 6.62).  Funding decisions and the ability to 
evaluate and monitor risk are given prominence (e.g. paragraph 6.64).       
Chapter VII: intra-group services 
2.40 Chapter VII TPG addresses “Special Considerations for Intra-Group 
Services”.  Two core issues are identified: (a) whether intra-group services have 
been provided, and (b) if so, what the charge should be (paragraph 7.5).  The 
BEPS 2015 Final Reports introduce new material on low value-adding services.  
The changes are not material for the purposes of this study.  In particular, financial 
 
105
  Proponents of the “lender as guarantor” viewpoint (see e.g. HMRC’s position, 
paragraph 3.188 below) might argue otherwise.  
106
  This is apparent from paragraph 3.47 and also the working capital example in the 
Annex to Chapter III.  
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transactions are not to qualify for the simplified approach proposed in the draft 
(paragraph 7.47).   
2.41 Chapter VII emphasises the need for the performance of an activity in 
order to constitute the provision of a service: paragraphs 7.6, 7.9, 7.12 and 7.14.  
This fits with the dynamic terminology “made or imposed” in Article 9(1) MTC.  
It may also follow from the use in Article 9(1) of “commercial or financial 
relations”: thus Wittendorff (2010a) observes that the TPG “use the term 
‘controlled transactions’ synonymously with ‘commercial or financial relations’” 
and argues that “[a]ccordingly, the arm’s length principle of Article 9(1) only 
relates to the valuation of transactions which qualify as commercial/financial 
relations under domestic law”107.   
2.42 Usually a service will confer upon the recipient a benefit.  Thus 
(paragraph 7.6):    
“Under the arm’s length principle, the question whether an intra-group service has been 
rendered when an activity is performed … should depend on whether the activity provides 
a respective group member with economic or commercial value to enhance or maintain 
its business position.  This can be determined by considering whether an independent 
enterprise in comparable circumstances would have been willing to pay for the activity if 
performed for it by an independent enterprise or would have performed the activity in-
house for itself …” 
2.43 Activities (on the part of a member of an MNE group) may “produce 
economic benefits for other group members not directly involved in the potential 
decision”; but such “incidental benefits ordinarily would not cause these other 
group members to be treated as receiving an intra-group service because the 
activities producing the benefits would not be ones for which an independent 
enterprise ordinarily would be willing to pay” (paragraph 7.12).  
 
107
  Section 3.3.6.3.1, footnote 791, page 222; section 16.2.1.2, page 479.  
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2.44 TPG paragraph 7.13 is the bedrock guidance on passive association108.  
It is worth reciting in full: 
“Similarly, an associated enterprise should not be considered to receive an intra-group 
service when it obtains incidental benefits attributable solely to its being part of a larger 
concern, and not to any specific activity being performed.  For example, no service would 
be received where an associated enterprise by reason of its affiliation alone has a credit-
rating higher than it would if it were unaffiliated, but an intra-group service would 
usually exist where the higher credit rating were due to a guarantee by another group 
member, or where the enterprise benefitted from deliberate concerted action involving 
global marketing and public relations campaigns. In this respect, passive association 
should be distinguished from active promotion of the MNE group’s attributes that 
positively enhances the profit-making potential of particular members of the group.  Each 
case must be determined according to its own facts and circumstances. See Section D.8 of 
Chapter I on MNE group synergies.”109 
2.45 It is hard to improve upon the American Bar Association’s description 
of the functioning of paragraph 7.13: 
“Paragraph 7.13 provides in effect that if the parties do not do anything, there is no 
transaction or service that can give rise to a transfer pricing analysis. The mere fact that 
one company is affiliated with another company is not the performance of a service even 
if the affiliation is mutually beneficial.  It follows that ‘passive association’ (a synonym 
for ‘affiliation alone’) likewise is not a service or transaction.  The objective of paragraph 
7.13 is to prevent tax authorities from imposing a transfer pricing adjustment based solely 
on some notion of relative contribution by members of a multinational group.  It makes 
clear that an adjustment is appropriate only where something has been done – where 
there is a ‘specific activity’, such as the execution of a guarantee or the performance of a 
global marketing campaign.  There is then an activity that can be subjected to a transfer 
pricing analysis and a transaction or service that can be priced.”110 
 
108
  “Much of the uncertainty that surrounds the transfer pricing of guarantees can be 
traced to this paragraph and the competing interpretations that have sprung up around it”: Breen 
(2010) section II.C.  
109
  Emphasis added.  Wittendorff (2010a) at page 507 says “[t]his may be explained both 
by the fact that no specific activity is performed, and that the benefits are solely caused by the 
association of the group enterprises”. 
110
  ABA Guarantees Paper (2012) page 9.  
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2.46 Paragraph 7.13 can itself be proposed as a justification for the 
recognition of passive association in pricing transactions.  The argument is that (in 
contrast with the case of provision of an explicit guarantee) because no service is 
received where the beneficiary of implicit support has a relatively higher credit 
rating due to “affiliation alone”, it must follow that the beneficiary need not pay 
for any such benefit.  Therefore, where an actual guarantee or loan is provided, 
only a fee or interest reflective of the passive association benefit already enjoyed 
should be paid.  In other words, “this paragraph implies that no interest charge 
should be made in relation to the improvement in a credit rating due to implicit 
support”111.  
2.47 In calculating the arm’s length consideration for a service, “the matter 
should be considered both from the perspective of the service provider and from 
the perspective of the recipient of the service … relevant considerations include 
the value of the service to the recipient and how much a comparable independent 
enterprise would be prepared to pay112 for that service in comparable 
circumstances, as well as the cost to the service provider” (paragraph 7.29).  I 
suggest that the value of a loan to an intra-group borrower can be tested by 
reference to the cost to that borrower of an identical loan from a third party.  That 
benchmark, where available, demonstrates what the borrower, if transacting with 
an independent lender “would be prepared to pay”.   
2.48 Again, “the economic alternatives available to the recipient of the 
service also need to be taken into account in determining the arm’s length charge” 
(paragraph 7.35); and it is relevant to determine “whether the intra-group services 
represent the same value for money as could be obtained from an independent 
enterprise” (paragraph 7.36).  This recapitulates the “options realistically 
available” concept (paragraph 2.27 above), which indeed appears expressly at 
paragraph 7.41.  To re-emphasise: if an option realistically available to an intra-
group borrower includes a third party loan at a certain price (the third party lender 
 
111
  Wilmshurst (2012).  
112
  Or be paid?  
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taking account of passive association), why should the intra-group loan be any 
more expensive? 
Chapter IX: business restructurings 
2.49 Several propositions contained in Chapter IX, while written in the 
context of business restructurings, are of wide application.  For example, “[a]n 
examination of the allocation of risks between associated enterprises is an 
essential part of the functional analysis”, and “[u]sually, in the open market, the 
assumption of increased risk would also be compensated by an increase in the 
expected return” (paragraph 9.10).  Risk analysis starts from an examination of the 
contractual terms between the parties though, reflecting paragraphs 1.98ff, the 
purported contractual allocation of risk may be challenged if it is inconsistent with 
the economic substance of the transaction (paragraphs 9.11, 9.166).  Where 
“comparable uncontrolled transactions are found that evidence a similar allocation 
of risks in uncontrolled transactions … then the risk allocation between the 
associated enterprises would be regarded as arm’s length” (paragraph 9.111).  For 
lending transactions, credit-worthiness is the paradigm risk.  A question is 
“whether independent parties would have agreed to a similar allocation of risk”; 
and “[at] arm’s length the party making the investment might not be willing to 
assume with no guarantee a risk (termination risk) that is controlled by the other” 
(paragraphs 9.111-112).  In a controlled loan, termination risk is manageable via 
contractual terms; a variation imposed via the exercise of shareholder control on 
the other hand would itself be non-arm’s length – as a distortion attributable to the 
control relationship.   
2.50 The concept of “options realistically available” also features 
prominently in Chapter IX - upon which “the application of the arm’s length 
principle is based” (paragraph 9.59).  Importantly, “alternative structures 
realistically available are considered in evaluating whether the terms of the 
controlled transactions (particularly pricing) would be acceptable to an 
uncontrolled taxpayer faced with the same alternatives and operating under 
comparable circumstances”; and “the consideration in the controlled transaction 
may be adjusted by reference to the profits that could have been obtained in the 
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alternative structure, since independent enterprises will only enter into a 
transaction if they see no alternative that is clearly more attractive” (paragraphs 
9.60, 9.175).  In assessing intra-group loan pricing, it is surely a powerful fact that 
the borrower could have borrowed externally on certain terms in circumstances 
where it would be an “independent enterprise” vis-à-vis its lender.   
2.51  “The arm’s length principle requires an evaluation of the conditions 
made or imposed between associated enterprises, at the level of each of them” 
(paragraph 9.63).  This implies, in the financing context, a need to have regard to 
the characteristics and circumstances of each of the parties to the controlled 
transaction (notably the creditworthiness of the borrower).113   
Conclusions: TPG 
2.52 Taking all these points together, it seems to me that a compelling case is 
made out, via a careful application of the TPG (the most influential instrument of 
international guidance on transfer pricing), to recognise the effect of passive 
association in pricing controlled transactions.  The likely availability of 
parental/affiliate support to a member of an MNE group is not a pricing distortion 
caused by the exercise of control in relation to any particular transaction.  It is an 
attribute or characteristic of that member.  Thus it is appropriate, in performing a 
comparability analysis in the financing context, to consider a notionally 
independent borrower which nonetheless possesses such an attribute. Indeed, 
whether one considers a notionally independent lender, guarantor or borrower, the 
notional borrower may be regarded as benefiting from the implicit support of its 
(notional) parent/affiliate, precisely so as to align its circumstances and 
characteristics with those of the actual borrower.  Nothing in this exercise requires 
the effect of passive association to be disregarded by reference to the actual 
connection between the parties to the controlled transaction.  
2.53 Moreover, if the borrower under an intra-group loan could instead, with 
the benefit of group implicit support, have raised funds from a third party at a 
 
113
  See also paragraph 5.4 and note 885 below as regards the 
characteristics/circumstances of a lender.   
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certain rate (an option realistically available), based upon such an independent 
lender’s assessment of risk, there should be no reason for the borrower to accept a 
higher cost of funds on its intra-group funding, ceteris paribus.  
OECD 1979 and 1984 Reports 
2.54 The OECD 1979 Report served as the original guidelines on the 
interpretation of the arm’s length principle114.  “The aim in short is, for tax 
purposes, to adjust the price for the actual transaction to an arm’s length price”115.  
The OECD recommended an approach which bore “a strong resemblance to the 
United States regulations”116.  In 1992 the MTC Commentary effectively made the 
Report part of the Commentary117.  The Report unsurprisingly says little about 
passive association.  It did however include a section on loans, including the 
remark that “[t]he arm’s length interest rate is the rate of interest which is charged, 
or would have been charged at the time the indebtedness arose, in transactions 
with, or between, unrelated parties under similar circumstances”; and “[i]deally, in 
each case, the interest rate to be determined for tax purposes should be set 
according to the conditions in financial markets for similar loans.  In deciding 
what is a comparable or similar loan, it is necessary to take into account … the 
credit-standing of the borrower”118. 
2.55 Paragraph 2 in the preface observes (thus focusing on price distortions 
caused by the control relationship) that “[t]he prices charged for [intra-group 
transactions] do not necessarily represent a result of the free play of market forces, 
but may, for a number of reasons and because the MNE is in a position to adopt 
whatever principle is convenient to it as a group, diverge considerably from the 
prices which would have been agreed upon between unrelated parties engaged in 
 
114
  Though the 1979 Report was not formally adopted by an OECD Council measure, and 
so cannot be accorded the same legal status: see e.g. Bullen (2011) page 50.  
115
  Paragraph 23.  
116
  Langbein (1986) page 651.  
117
  Paragraph 3 of the 1992 Commentary on Article 9 MTC.  
118
  Paragraphs 198-199.  
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the same or similar transactions under the same or similar conditions in the open 
market (hereafter referred to as ‘arm’s length prices’)”.  
2.56 The 1979 Report deferred any discussion of loans between enterprises 
engaged in banking or financing activities as part of their regular business119.  That 
theme was picked up in the second part of the OECD’s 1984 Report Transfer 
Pricing and Multinational Enterprises, Three Taxation Issues, but little is found 
there which further illuminates the arm’s length principle in general, and nothing 
in terms touching on passive association.  The 1984 Report, which as regards the 
treatment of bank PEs was largely superseded by the OECD PEs Report, does 
confirm that “the appropriate arm’s length rate of interest for a loan between 
associated banking or financial enterprises is the rate which would be charged in 
similar circumstances in a transaction between unrelated parties”. Also, 
“[n]ormally the transactions to be used for comparison should be arm’s length 
transactions between unrelated banks where the amount lent, the term of the loan, 
the currency involved and the other conditions are the same or similar to those in 
question”120.  This does not significantly advance the debate about the approach to 
passive association, but is at least consistent with recognising the “conditions” 
surrounding controlled transactions when identifying, or adjusting, comparables.  
What is plain is that a key consideration in pricing financial transactions is risk 
and thus, as a measure of risk, the creditworthiness of a borrower.  
OECD 1987 Thin Capitalisation Report 
2.57 The 1987 Thin Capitalisation Report offers a few further observations 
which bear upon the interpretation of the arm’s length principle.  The focus is on 
the regulation via tax codes of “excessive” amounts of debt – which tend to erode 
the tax base of the debtor’s home jurisdiction via consequentially excessive 
interest expense.  The 1987 Report focuses upon the size of a loan which would 
have been made in an arm’s length situation121.  There is also a useful discussion, 
 
119
  Paragraphs 181 and 198.  
120
  Paragraphs 35–37 of the part of the Report entitled The Taxation of Multinational 
Banking Enterprises.  
121
  Paragraph 25(i). 
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related to the thin capitalisation context, of Article 9 MTC, generally accepted by 
the CFA to be relevant to thin capitalisation122.  In principle, the application of 
rules designed to deal with thin capitalisation ought not normally to increase the 
taxable profits of the relevant domestic enterprise to any amount greater than the 
arm’s length profit; and this principle should be followed in applying existing tax 
treaties123. 
2.58 In considering the practical application of thin capitalisation rules, one 
approach would be to enquire whether an independent person would have 
provided such a high proportion of the capital of the enterprise as debt, perhaps 
adopting an approach comparable to that which a banker would adopt, asking 
whether, considering the borrower’s financial and economic condition, an 
independent bank would have provided the funds as a loan on the terms actually 
agreed between the parties124 (sometimes referred to as the “independent lender” 
test125).  Again, this points immediately to an evaluation of risk, and hence the 
borrower’s creditworthiness.  It seems self-evident that if passive association can 
enhance the risk proposition for a lender, that may in appropriate circumstances 
encourage a greater quantum of lending, just as it may the conceding of a lower 
interest rate.  The limitations of the independent lender approach caused by 
informational asymmetry are recognised by the 1987 Report126 e.g. because a 
parent company might have a better understanding of the profit potential of its 
own subsidiary than would a banker viewing things from the outside.  Detailed 
informational loan covenants may however go a long way towards neutralising 
this asymmetry.  
2.59 One other possibly useful concept used in the Report is that of “hidden 
equity capitalisation”127.  The Report focuses in particular on “hybrid” financing 
 
122
  Paragraph 48.  
123
  Paragraph 50.  Compare paragraph 2.7 above.   
124
  Paragraphs 75–76.  
125
  E.g. in the ATO’s Taxation Ruling 92/11, paragraph 60(g).  
126
  Paragraphs 75-76.  
127
  Ibid., paragraph 11.  
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such as debt instruments with equity-like features128, but this is just “one such 
manifestation”.  It prompts the thought that where a subsidiary might be regarded 
as the beneficiary of implicit support from its parent, such support might arguably 
be seen as a form of hidden equity capitalisation i.e. by virtue of the expectation 
that the parent would inject subordinated capital to support the subsidiary in times 
of financial stress.  Thus conceivably there is an “asset” aspect to this theory, if 
being the beneficiary of implicit support approaches holding an “asset”.  However, 
the beneficiary does not hold anything in this respect which amounts to a 
legal/proprietary right.  See paragraph 2.80 below on the OECD’s modern 
rejection of the notion that MNE group synergies should be regarded as intangible 
assets129.  
OECD Task Force Reports on US Proposed Regulations130 
2.60 Alarmed by certain aspects of proposed US transfer pricing regulations 
(particularly the “commensurate with income standard” for transactions in 
intangibles), the OECD formed a Task Force to consider the proposals and 
provide the US Administration with the collective views of other OECD member 
countries.  The Task Force’s first report, derestricted in December 1992 and 
published in January 1993, offers some observations about the nature of the arm’s 
length principle and the risk of transfer prices being “manipulated” within an 
MNE group.131  It also quotes from the CFA 1989 Report on Tax Treaty 
Override132 which, in noting the purposive approach to treaty interpretation 
promoted by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, concluded that “the 
interpretation of [a tax treaty] on the basis of its object and purpose requires a high 
degree of coordination between the Contracting States”, such that the typical 
 
128
  See now the OECD’s final report on BEPS Action 2, Neutralising the Effects of 
Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, 5 October 2015.   
129
  Also paragraph 4.52(ii) below as regards credit standing as a “group asset”.  
130
  Tax Aspects of Transfer Pricing within Multinational Enterprises: The United States 
Proposed Regulations (January 1993) referred to as the 1992 OECD Task Force Report, and 
Intercompany Transfer Pricing Regulations under US Section 482 Temporary and Proposed 
Regulations (April 1993) referred to as the 1993 OECD Task Force Report.  See also CFA 
Report on Intercompany Transfer Pricing Under US § 482 Temporary and Proposed Regulations 
(December 1993), reproduced in TMTPR News Archive 2 February 1994. 
131
  Executive summary, paragraph A.1; Introduction paragraph A.1.20.  
132
  DAFFE/CFA/89.13 (2nd revision).  
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mutual agreement procedure should be used (quoting directly from Article 25(3) 
OECD MTC) “to deal with any difficulties or doubts arising as to the 
interpretation or application of the treaties”.  I observe that the use of MAP in this 
way could indeed be an efficient way to establish consensus between treaty 
partners as regards the proper recognition of passive association133.  
2.61 A follow-up report was issued in December 1993.  Some might think 
that the US approach had not been materially attenuated, but nonetheless the 
OECD was able to feel “particularly pleased to see a reaffirmation of the arm’s 
length standard”134.  Continued support for the CUP method was voiced, even 
where “differences are material, if their effect on the prices concerned is definite 
and reasonably ascertainable”.135 
OECD PEs Report 
2.62 The generally excellent PEs Report is concerned with the attribution of 
profits to PEs under Article 7 MTC. Yet (perhaps unsurprisingly, given the focus 
on the international tax treatment of a single entity and thus the credit-related 
aspects discussed below) there is very little directly relevant to the meaning of the 
arm’s length principle as it relates to passive association.  
2.63 It is attractive to apply a degree of consistency to the application and 
interpretation of Articles 7 and 9 given that they are both concerned with the 
taxation of MNE businesses. Indeed the arm’s length principle should be regarded 
as an equivalent concept for the purposes of both rules136.  But certain conceptual 
limitations are inescapable.  
 
133
  A broadly-based amendment to paragraph 4.29 TPG, designed to develop this 
proposition, is included in the Annex to this study.  On a confidential client matter, I was told on 
13 February 2015 that a UK headed MNE group will invoke MAP in a situation where the 
French tax authority is promoting the implicit support concept to limit interest deductions on a 
loan from the UK parent to its French subsidiary 
134
  Paragraph 2.1.  
135
  Paragraph 3.14.  
136
  OECD Commentary on Article 7, paragraph 14.  
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2.64 Article 7(2) OECD MTC contains its own version of the arm’s length 
principle. Where an enterprise has a permanent establishment in a host state, the 
profits that may be taxed in that state are: 
“the profits it might be expected to make, in particular in its dealings with other parts of 
the enterprise, if it were a separate and independent enterprise engaged in the same or 
similar activities under the same or similar conditions, taking into account the functions 
performed, assets used and risks assumed by the enterprise through the permanent 
establishment and through other parts of the enterprise”. 
2.65 Thus the “authorised OECD approach” promotes the concept of a PE as 
(notionally) a “functionally separate entity”, and thus attributes to the PE the 
profits it would have earned at arm’s length.  A comparison of dealings between 
the PE and other parts of the enterprise of which it is part with transactions 
between independent enterprises is required137.  Thus where dealings are capable 
of being recognised, they should be priced on an arm’s length basis, assuming the 
PE and the rest of the enterprise of which it is part to be independent of one 
another – by analogy with the transfer pricing methods in the TPG138.  In the PE 
context, some of the “conditions” of the PE as a hypothesised separate and 
independent enterprise are to be derived from a functional and factual analysis of 
the internal attributes of the enterprise itself; other “conditions” will be derived 
from the external environment in which the functions of the PE are performed139.    
2.66 However, as a markworthy exception to the notional separateness of the 
PE, the creditworthiness of the entity as a whole is attributed to each PE140.   “It is 
an observable condition that PEs generally enjoy the same creditworthiness as the 
enterprise of which they are a part.”141  Thus there is no scope for the operation of 
 
137
  OECD PEs Report, Part I paragraph 183.  
138
  Part I paragraph 39.  
139
  Part I paragraph 58.  
140
  Part I paragraph 100;  Part II paragraph 83; Part III paragraph 230; Part IV paragraph 
122.  “Creditworthiness is the perception by an independent party, e.g. a credit rating agency, of 
the likelihood that a company (e.g. a bank) will meet its commitments in respect of any 
borrowings it has made and investments it has received”: Part II paragraph 29.  
141
  Part I paragraph 99.  Section 21(2)(a) Corporation Tax Act 2009 is the UK statutory 
articulation of this proposition.   
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passive association - or indeed explicit support - in favour of (or from) a PE within 
the entity of which it is part. Accordingly, dealings in respect of guarantee fees 
between a PE and its head office, or between the PE and another PE, are not to be 
recognised142.  Equally, it makes sense, in relation to pricing an intra-entity 
“dealing” in the nature of lending (e.g. from head office to a PE), to “equalise” the 
credit-standing of the respective parts of the enterprise: all of the capital of the 
entity is available to all parts of the entity143.  Of course, a business carried on 
through a PE may itself be a beneficiary of passive association with other 
members of the MNE group - just not from the entity which is “itself”.    
2.67 The “authorised OECD approach” does not purport to achieve equality 
of treatment between PEs and subsidiaries where there are economic differences 
between them: “the legal form chosen, PE or subsidiary, may have some economic 
effects that should be reflected in the determination of taxable profits” e.g. as 
regards efficient capital utilisation or risk diversification144.  Thus there is no 
discrimination between PEs and subsidiaries by virtue of applying transfer pricing 
principles in different ways – because the legal forms have different economic 
consequences.  An enterprise can guarantee the debts of a second enterprise, but a 
purported “guarantee” given by one part of an enterprise in respect of 
“obligations” of another part is not legally meaningful.  Thus “PEs in their 
dealings with other parts of the same enterprise in the context of guarantee fees 
may not be in similar circumstances to a subsidiary”; and “[i]n general, the factual 
situation of a PE determines that it necessarily has the same creditworthiness as 
the enterprise of which it is part. In contrast, a subsidiary may or may not have the 
same creditworthiness as its parent”145.  Therefore, in my view, there is no room 
for a taxpayer to invoke a treaty provision modelled on Article 24(3) MTC to 
assert that a PE has been discriminated against by reference to the unified 
creditworthiness of the entity (e.g. by alleging that its “separate entity/stand alone” 
 
142
  Part I paragraph 103. 
143
  Save in exceptional circumstances where specific laws or regulations may in some 
way “ring-fence” particular assets from the entity’s creditors in general.  See e.g. Part II 
paragraph 30; Part III paragraphs 204 and 230; Part IV paragraph 122. 
144
  Part I paragraph 55; Part II paragraph 4.  
145
  Part I paragraphs 103-104; Part II paragraph 31.   
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credit has been “dragged down” by the financial weakness of other parts of the 
entity)146.  The effect on creditworthiness of passive association should be 
experienced across the entity as a whole, thus sitting comfortably with the unified 
creditworthiness rule.  
2.68 One possible clue to the correct way to hypothesise comparable 
transactions with independent parties is found in an illustration concerning 
distribution of goods – where the internal dealing is a “purchase” of goods by the 
PE from its head office.  If the head office also sells the product to third parties 
operating in circumstances similar to those of the PE, the CUP method might be 
used to determine the price at which the PE would have obtained the products had 
it been a “separate and independent enterprise”147.  One can analogise this with the 
provision of finance: it is relevant to consider the price at which a third party 
would transact with (lend to) the enterprise – or, by extension, in assessing the 
arm’s length price of intra-group lending, it is relevant to consider the price at 
which a third party would lend to a subsidiary. In the PEs context, “the part of the 
enterprise making such a ‘provision’ should receive the return which an 
independent enterprise would have received for making a comparable ‘provision’ 
in a transaction at arm’s length”148.  Of course, where finance is concerned – and 
as reflected in the PEs Report itself – the price of transacting should, so far as 
creditworthiness goes, be the same for a PE as for the head office or other part of 
the enterprise.  But the principle of seeking parity with uncontrolled transactions 
is nevertheless manifest in the Report.  
2.69 Article 7(2) MTC offers potential support for arguments on both sides 
of the passive association controversy i.e. for both a stand-alone approach to 
pricing transactions (“separate and independent enterprise”) or, to the contrary, the 
recognition of passive association having regard to the “same or similar 
conditions”149.  It seems to me however that the Article 7(2) context in this respect 
 
146
  Paragraph 42 OECD Commentary on MTC Article 24 confirms that Article 7(2) is 
part of the context in which Article 24(3) must be read.   
147
  Part I paragraph 185. 
148
  Part I paragraph 191.  
149
  As suggested by van der Breggen et al (2007).  
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 62 
is no different to that of Article 9(1) which in its terms applies an independent 
enterprise hypothesis to evaluate the “conditions” of the transaction (paragraph 1.6 
TPG: paragraph 2.21 above).  The reconciliation of these two strands lies simply 
in respecting the separateness of the taxpayer (or deemed notional separate 
taxpayer in the PE case) while at the same time taking into account all relevant 
circumstances.   
Transfer Pricing Legislation – A Suggested Approach 
2.70 In June 2011, the OECD released the above-titled paper containing a 
suggested approach to the drafting of transfer pricing legislation.   Its status is 
“purely illustrative” and it is without legal force; indeed, it does not necessarily 
represent the views of any particular OECD member state.  Nonetheless, it 
represented a further assertion of the arm’s length principle as the best available 
method for preventing artificial profit shifting, providing MNE groups with some 
certainty, reducing the risk of double taxation, providing a level playing field for 
international investment and also as between MNEs and independent enterprises.  
And it is presumably at least “illustrative” of a substantial body of OECD member 
states’ thinking. 
2.71 In the Introduction, reference is made equally to Article 9 in each of the 
MTC and the UN Model.  The proposition that the arm’s length principle is more 
favourable to developed economies than to developing and transitioning ones is 
firmly rejected: “transfer pricing is not as much about a tension between 
developed and developing countries, as about a tension between high and low tax 
jurisdictions”.  Also, importantly:  
“[t]he arm’s length principle simply states that transactions between associated 
enterprises should not be distorted by the special relationship that exists between the 
parties.” 150 
2.72 The proposed legislation itself expressly requires that the tax effects of 
controlled transactions shall be determined “in a manner that is consistent with the 
arm’s length principle”; and taxable profits “derived by an enterprise that engages 
 
150
  Page 3; my emphasis. 
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in one or more commercial or financial transactions with an associated enterprise 
shall be consistent with the arm’s length principle if the conditions of those 
transactions do not differ from the conditions that would have applied between 
independent enterprises in comparable transactions carried out under comparable 
circumstances”151. 
2.73 There is not too much in this which is radical or new, but the paper is at 
least a positive recapitulation and global promotion of the arm’s length principle, 
including a legislative formulation of comparability and a purposive focus on the 
elimination of transactional distortions attributable to control.  
Thin Capitalisation Legislation: A Background Paper for Country Tax 
Administrations 
2.74 More intriguing is the above-mentioned “initial draft”/“pilot version for 
comments” paper released by OECD in August 2012.  It remarks that the arm’s 
length approach “involves taking a view on the amount of debt that third party 
lenders, acting at arm’s length, would be willing to lend to the specific company in 
question, taking into account the specific attributes of that company”152.  But it 
then describes several perspectives on the “separate enterprise approach”, noting 
that “there is less than full consensus”153.  Draft legislation is tabled based on 
“approach 3”, which tests borrowing capacity of a company “on the basis that it is 
not a member of a wider group of companies, and benefits from no explicit or 
implicit guarantees from group members, but also on the basis of owning the same 
subsidiary companies”.  In the Annex, draft clauses are proposed: 
“Non-arm’s amount of length debt [sic] means the amount of debt that exceeds the 
amount that the borrower would be able to obtain [or would obtain] from a lender that is 
not associated, and acts at arm’s length. 
“The amount of debt that the borrower would be able to obtain [or would obtain] from a 
lender that is not associated shall be determined on the basis that such a lender takes no 
 
151
  Section 1(1). 
152
  Page 9.  
153
  Page 10.  
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account of any guarantees (whether explicit or implicit) provided by an associated 
enterprise, nor of the borrower’s membership of a group of associated enterprises.” 
2.75 It is interesting that this particular approach was favoured ahead of 
“approach 2” (“determining the borrowing capacity of [the company] on the basis 
that it is a subsidiary of a group of companies that enjoys an AAA rating”), despite 
what was then the fairly recent Canadian General Electric judgment (paragraph 
3.16ff below).  And it is more interesting still that only the following year the 
OECD Intangibles workstream produced an example adopting “approach 2” 
(paragraph 2.83 below).  Maybe the fingerprints of HMRC can be detected on the 
2012 draft (see paragraph 3.160 below)?   
BEPS 
2.76 As a reaction to a sustained political and media outcry about perceived 
tax avoidance by MNE groups, and against the background of stressed national 
budgets in the wake of the global financial crisis, in 2012 the leaders of the 
world’s major economies, represented through the group of G20 finance ministers, 
called upon the OECD to develop an action plan to address Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) issues in a comprehensive and coordinated manner.  
2.77 After an initial report in February 2013 (dramatically: “[w]hat is at 
stake is the integrity of the corporate income tax”)154, the OECD BEPS Action 
Plan155 was published in July 2013.  It has been an extraordinarily radical, intense 
and rapid programme of international tax reform, comprising 15 “Actions”, 
backed by political determination at the highest levels from 44 countries 
representing the preponderance of global GDP156.  Moreover, the UN established a 
 
154
  Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, page 8.  
155
  Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. According to Owens (2015) (page 
20) “[t]he multilateral instrument [contemplated by Action 15] will not include any provision 
dealing with transfer pricing, which conceptually means that, although soft law, the transfer 
pricing guidelines are considered sufficient to implement the changes needed”.  (I imagine the 
multilateral instrument may in fact address dispute resolution (Action 14).)  
156
  The 44 countries comprise the 34 OECD members plus two OECD accession states 
(Colombia and Latvia) and the eight members of the G20 which are not OECD members 
(including the BRICS states).  Using figures from IMF (2013), the aggregate of the BEPS 
countries’ 2013 GDP figures was US$83,681bn out of a global total of US$101,934bn, or 82.1%.  
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Subcommittee on BEPS for developing countries and the OECD has developed a 
programme of active engagement with such countries.   
2.78 Unsurprisingly, transfer pricing is a central focus of the BEPS project: it 
is self-evidently capable of producing base erosion and/or profit shifting!  
Moreover, “the use of interest (and in particular related party interest) is perhaps 
one of the most simple of the profit-shifting techniques available in international 
tax planning”157. It has emphatically not been the BEPS plan however to abandon 
the arm’s length principle; instead, several aspects of transfer pricing were 
identified for investigation, notably in Actions 8, 9 and 10.  These have 
respectively addressed intangibles, risk and capital and “other high-risk 
transactions”.   
2.79 Yet none of this – aside from the materials on group synergies in the 
updated TPG (see paragraph 2.80ff below) - bears directly on the relevance of 
passive association.  Action 4 promised to “limit base erosion via interest 
deductions and other financial payments”, and it was announced that “transfer 
pricing guidance will … be developed regarding the pricing of related party 
financial transactions, including financial and performance guarantees”158.  On 5 
October 2015 the OECD released its final report Limiting Base Erosion Involving 
Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments.  This presents a recommended 
“best practice” formulaic restriction of interest deductions by reference to a fixed 
ratio rule limiting deductions to a percentage of EBITDA (possibly supplemented 
by a worldwide group ratio rule).  Developing countries have identified Action 4 
as a priority area159.  But the review of transfer pricing for related party financial 
transactions “will be carried out as a separate project”160.    
 
157
  OECD’s discussion draft BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions and Other Financial 
Payments, 18 December 2014, page 6.  
158
  From the text of Action 4 in the Action Plan (note 155 above).   
159
  OECD, Strategy for Deepening Developing Country Engagement (2014).  
www.oecd.org/ctp/strategy-deepening-developing-country-engagement/pdf (accessed 5 June 
2015).  
160
  December 2014 BEPS Action 4 discussion draft, pages 8 and 66.  See also note 169 
below.     
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BEPS 2015 Final Reports: “MNE group synergies” 
2.80 The OECD’s July 2013 discussion draft on the transfer pricing aspects 
of intangibles, now significantly modified and firmly integrated into the BEPS 
2015 Final Reports, included proposed new material for Chapter I TPG161 
addressing inter alia location savings, other market features, assembled workforce 
and MNE group synergies.  That work was completed in the 5 October 2015 
BEPS Final Reports.  After some vigorous debate, it was concluded that these 
phenomena are not to be regarded as intangibles162 but instead are relevant to 
comparability analysis.  The material on synergies now delivered represents new 
Section D.8 Chapter I TPG, including Examples 1 to 5.    
2.81 Among the group synergies mentioned is “increased borrowing 
capacity”163. It is also noted that while synergies are often favourable to the group, 
there may be circumstances where synergies have a negative effect164.  New 
paragraph 1.158 TPG, cross-referring to paragraph 7.13, prescribes that no intra-
group service arises when a MNE group member: 
 
161
  In evidence to the Australian Senate’s Economics References Committee on 9 April 
2015 Pascal Saint-Amans of OECD indicated that once consensus on changes to the TPG was 
achieved “it will mean that judges in Australia or in the US or in Europe will interpret the cases 
based on these new interpretations, so it will be implemented immediately – it will not need 
legislative translation” (transcript available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au accessed 5 June 2015) 
i.e. advocating a form of “ambulatory” approach.  This is possibly an over-enthusiastic view of a 
wide range of national law approaches; compare paragraphs 2.84 and 3.157 below.   
162
  New paragraph 6.30 TPG.  Kane (2014) offers a carefully reasoned rejection of the 
case for recognition of a form of “synergy intangible”.  In 2007, group synergies barely merited a 
mention in the 2007 IFA General Report on Transfer Pricing and Intangibles beyond a passing 
reference on page 24 to “affiliate structure, not being intangible property for want of substantial 
independent value”. 
163
  Paragraph 1.157 TPG.  The International Alliance for Principled Taxation argued at 
page 5 of its 30 September 2013 submission to OECD that “if implicit parental support is 
relevant to the pricing of financial transactions, then it should be taken into account not only in 
the interest rate but also in the quantum of debt a borrower can support”.  Submission signed by 
Caroline Silberztein (former head of the OECD’s transfer pricing unit) for the IAPT.  Public 
comments available at www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/comments-intangibles-discussion-
draft.htm (accessed 2 December 2015).   Despite the new guidance, Andrew Hickman, head of 
the OECD’s transfer pricing unit, was recently quoted as saying “One of the thorny issues is the 
different views among delegates about how Article 9 and domestic transfer pricing rules apply to 
the quantum of debt in evaluating the pricing of the arrangements”: interview with BNA, 
TMTPR news archive, 14 December 2015.  
164
  Paragraph 1.157 TPG; see paragraph 1.5 above.  The reference to “increased 
borrowing capacity” is important in assessing the extent to which passive association may be 
relevant to questions of thin capitalisation. Paragraph 3.188 below notes HMRC’s current 
resistance to this.   
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“obtains incidental benefits attributable solely to its being part of a larger MNE group.  
In this context, the term incidental refers to benefits arising solely by virtue of group 
affiliation and in the absence of deliberate concerted actions or transactions leading to 
that benefit. … Consistent with this general view of benefits incidental to group 
membership, when synergistic benefits or burdens of group membership arise purely as a 
result of membership in an MNE group and without the deliberate concerted action of 
group members or the performance of any service or other function by group members, 
such synergistic benefits of group membership need not be separately compensated or 
specifically allocated among members of the MNE group.” 
2.82 A brief discussion of centralised purchasing power is interesting (for the 
comparison it presents), given the emphasis placed on “affirmative steps” or 
“deliberate concerted group action”165, noting the distinction drawn between such 
arrangements and the effects of purely passive association.  In the latter category 
is the case “[w]here a supplier unilaterally offers one member of a group a 
favourable price in the hope of attracting business from other group members, 
[where] no deliberate concerted group action would have occurred” (paragraph 
1.160 TPG).  Examples 3, 4 and 5 illustrate “deliberate concerted group action” in 
the purchasing power context166.  Observing that group synergies can include 
“streamlined management, elimination of costly duplication of effort, integrated 
 
165
  “Deliberateness” is criticised by Feinschreiber and Kent (2014) page 37 as “too 
uncertain from a proof standpoint”, though I do not see it as especially more challenging in 
evidential terms than the plethora of factual issues in transfer pricing cases.  The focus in 
paragraph 1.158 TPG is on the absence of deliberate concerted action.  Incidental benefits could 
of course arise because of unilateral (unconcerted) actions.   
166
  Compare Example 19 in the US section 482 Services Regulations: paragraph 3.210(v) 
below.  The Business and Industry Advisory Committee to OECD expressed concern in its 30 
September 2013 comments on the July 2013 paper about the potentially blurred line between 
benefits of “scale” and cases of “deliberate concerted action” e.g. where a parent with substantial 
purchasing power merely “allows” a subsidiary to access discount arrangements with a supplier.  
Deloitte’s comments of 29 September 2013 proposed that “any action solely resulting from a 
unilateral decision of an unrelated supplier would by default be characterised as an incidental 
benefit, and therefore should then not deserve a specific comparability adjustment since it is the 
result of an unrelated party’s decision (which by nature is consistent with the arm’s length 
principle)”. Deloitte, KPMG and EY also criticised the presumption that the benefit of 
purchasing discounts should be shared between group members proportionately to purchase 
volumes as overly simplistic (but this is maintained in new paragraph 1.162 TPG).  See note 163 
for public comments website.   
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systems, purchasing or borrowing power … [s]uch features should be addressed 
for transfer pricing purposes as comparability factors”167. 
2.83 Most tellingly, two examples, illustrated in Figs. II and III below, and 
surely inspired by the Canadian General Electric case168 (especially Example 2, 
which essentially reflects the facts of that case), are provided in the financing area.  
These are highly relevant to this study.  
 
Fig. II  
“Example 1” 
 
P is the AAA-rated parent of an MNE financial services group; S is a member of 
the group engaged in similar business on a large scale in an important market.  On 
a stand-alone basis, S could support a credit rating of Baa but, because of its 
affiliations, large independent lenders will advance funds at interest rates that 
would be charged to independent borrowers with an A rating.  S borrows €50m 
from an independent lender at such an interest rate and also borrows a similar 
amount from its sister company T on the same terms and conditions.  Example 1 
(paragraphs 1.164-166 TPG) asserts that the intra-group interest rate is arm’s 
length because it is the same as for the comparable loan from the independent 
 
167
  New paragraph 6.30 TPG. 
168
  Paragraph 3.16ff below.   
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lender; no payment is required for the group synergy benefit because it arises from 
group membership alone (consistent with TPG paragraph 7.13).  The Example 
presents a clearcut utilisation of the CUP method, and an application of the 
“options realistically available” principle, taking into account an analysis of risk.  
Fig. III  
“Example 2”169 
 
Here, similarly-placed S borrows €50m from Bank A; Bank A would be prepared 
to lend to S at an A-rated interest rate (because of S’s affiliations).  However, P 
guarantees the loan so S accesses an AAA-rated interest rate.  S pays a guarantee 
fee to P.  Example 2 concludes that this should reflect the benefit of raising S’s 
credit-standing from A to AAA (not Baa to AAA).  The guarantee is a “deliberate 
concerted action”.  This is manifestly based on General Electric and is a clear 
assertion of the recognition of passive association in pricing the intra-group 
provision of the guarantee.170  
 
169
  According to note 6 to the BEPS 2015 Final Reports, “Example 2 should not be 
viewed as providing comprehensive transfer pricing guidance on guarantee fees in respect of 
financial transactions.  Further guidance will be published on transfer pricing for financial 
transactions including identifying the economically relevant characteristics for determining arm’s 
length conditions.  This work will be undertaken in 2016 and 2017.” 
170
  One potentially interesting extra twist is the possible effect on the guarantor of 
passive association from other affiliates: see e.g. Russo et al (2014).  In other words, the credit 
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2.84 The adoption of these amendments to Chapter I TPG will not 
necessarily or automatically create binding transfer pricing law at the national 
level in all BEPS participant countries.  Yet the changes will surely have a 
powerful effect in encouraging tax authorities and taxpayers to embrace the 
passive association recognition proposition.171  
2.85 Despite the reference in new paragraph 1.157 TPG to “borrowing 
capacity”, the Examples themselves do not engage explicitly with the “thin cap” 
dimension to my enquiry mentioned at paragraph 1.20 above.  Perhaps this will be 
an aspect of the forthcoming “additional consideration” promised by OECD in 
note 6 relating to Example 2.  My Annex proposals include an additional Example 
on this.   
 
 
 
 
 
standing of a guarantor entity (which will not necessarily be the ultimate parent company of a 
group) can be influenced by implicit support from elsewhere in the group.  In their 1 October 
2013 comments on the 2013 Intangibles discussion draft, Taxand pose an alternative supposedly 
problematic scenario in which a second subsidiary with an A-rating, rather than the AAA-rated 
parent, provides the guarantee. It is said that S is then no better off than it was by virtue of the 
implicit guarantee (which already enhanced S’s credit-standing to A); but the sister subsidiary 
guarantor will nonetheless require payment.  The “true beneficiary” is said to be P, being 
“relieved of its implicit economic burden”. But this example fails to recognise that some value 
should attach to the guarantee reflecting the second-string recourse granted to the lender against 
another A-rated obligor: if S falls on hard times and defaults, its sister guarantor may still be 
good for the money.  See note 163 for public comments website.  
171
  The continuing divergence of views on the recognition of passive association is 
apparent from the comments of BDO dated 6 February 2015 (contained at page 126 of the 
comments received by OECD on BEPS Actions 8-10, published 10 February 2015: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/public-comments-actions-8-9-10-chapter-1-tp-
guidelines-risk-recharacterisation-special-measures.htm (accessed 30 December 2015)): “We are 
concerned that the OECD is recommending the recognition of ‘implicit support’ provided to one 
company by other companies in the group … This appears to deviate from the arm’s length 
principle … Recognizing any ‘benefit’ from being part of a group of companies is a direct 
contradiction of the arm’s length principle that is ‘the’ foundation for the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines”. 
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United Nations 
2.86 By 2001, the UN had concluded that “[f]rom a financial perspective 
transfer pricing is probably the most important tax issue in the world”172.  In the 
tax treaty and transfer pricing fields, the UN has traditionally represented the 
interests of less-developed and developing economies, as something of a counter-
weight to the views of the “rich” countries articulated by the OECD173.  Several 
emerging world economic powers periodically express the view that their 
concerns are not fully addressed by ongoing international tax policy debate174.  In 
1968 the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries was formed; their work in due course evolved into the UN 
Model, formally adopted in 1980 and revised in 2001.  The Ad Hoc Group was 
upgraded in 2005 to become the Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters175.  There is a Subcommittee on Article 9, originally 
established in 2009 to work on the UN Manual (paragraph 2.90 below) and 
reconstituted in 2013.  Its mandate is to “provide draft revised commentary on 
Article 9 and especially with regard to paragraph 1 of that article [and it] shall, in 
particular, take into account the common arm’s length principle embodied therein 
and in the corresponding Article of the OECD Model Convention”176.  A further 
revised version of the UN Model Double Taxation Convention referred to as the 
 
172
  UN (2001) page 2.  
173
  See e.g. Wittendorff (2010a) page 95 on the origins of the UN Model, including the 
League of Nations 1943 Mexico Model and the subsequent 1946 London Model, the latter 
restricting the source state’s taxing rights, and the former representing the basis for the eventual 
UN Model.  
174
  See e.g. Owens (2013), citing, illustratively, a March 2012 letter from the Indian tax 
authority to the UN regarding the UN Committee of Experts on International Taxation, at 20 
TMTPR 1249, 1284 (2012).  
175
  At the Financing for Development conference in July 2015, a proposal to replace the 
Committee with a fully-fledged global tax agency has been debated, though various countries, 
including the UK, are not supportive, see e.g. The Guardian 15 July 2015.   
176
  E/C.18/2014/CRP.15, 21 October 2014, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/tenthsession/index.htm  (accessed 26 July 2015). 
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2011 Update was issued in 2012, together with a Commentary which is “regarded 
as part of”177 the Model.  A future update to the Model is expected in 2017178.  
2.87 Article 9(1) of the UN Model is identical in form to Article 9(1) of the 
OECD MTC.  The UN Commentary on Article 9 is substantially based on the 
OECD Commentary on the MTC, including reciting the OECD position on thin 
capitalisation (paragraph 2.11 above).  Articles 11(6) and 12(3) of the UN Model 
are also the same as those in the OECD MTC.  Yet in applying what one might 
expect to be a universal principle, several divergences of view emerge; the UN is 
sometimes criticised for promoting approaches which are hard to reconcile with 
arm’s length treatment179.  Nevertheless, a commitment to Article 9 and the arm’s 
length principle were reaffirmed in a call for feedback from developing countries 
in January 2014180.  The Secretariat to the Committee of Experts produced a note 
on 15 August 2014181 on the Article 9 Commentary update, standing by the arm’s 
length principle but shifting the emphasis a little from the previous 
recommendation that countries should follow the OECD TPG.  The proposal was 
that the Commentary would “recognise the value” of the TPG while noting that 
they are “not the only source of guidance” and explicitly mentioning the UN 
Transfer Pricing Manual as providing “authoritative assistance in the field of 
transfer pricing”182.  New paragraph 4 of the draft UN Commentary noted it to be 
“highly important for avoiding international double taxation of profits that a 
common understanding prevails on how the arm’s length principle should be 
 
177
  Introduction to the 2011 version of the Model, paragraph 20.  
178
  Economic and Social Council meeting on international cooperation in tax matters, 22 
April 2015: E/2015/51 paragraph 19. 
179
  See e.g. Liguori and Dicker (2014).  
180
  Letter of 14 January 2014 from Stig Sollund, Coordinator of the UN Subcommittee on 
Article 9.  
181
  E/C.18/2014/4.  
182
  The US Council for International Business wrote on 24 October 2014 to the UN 
(available at: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/tenthsession/index.htm accessed 26 July 2015) 
objecting to the proposed changes as a “significant move away from the OECD’s Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines”, observing that the “broad consistency” proposed by the UN “is not 
necessarily consistency at all” and criticising “an attempt to retroactively change the status of the 
Manual”.  At least “broad” has now been dropped: see paragraph 2.88.   
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applied, and that the two Model Conventions provide a common framework for 
preventing and resolving transfer pricing disputes where they would occur”.     
2.88 The 10th session of the Committee in October 2014 decided to delete 
paragraph 3 of the UN Commentary on Article.  This recited the view of the 
former Group of Experts that “the Contracting States will follow the OECD 
principles, which are set out in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines”.  The 
deletion of paragraph 3 was “because it could be read as suggesting that countries 
are bound to follow the [TPG]”.  Nonetheless, the revision would confirm that the 
TPG contained “valuable guidance relevant for the application of the arm’s length 
principle under Article 9 of bilateral tax conventions” 183.  In referring to the UN 
Manual, the Commentary will note the desirability of “consistency” with the 
TPG184.     
2.89 In identifying the origins of transfer pricing laws in both (i) several 
continental European countries which focused on extraordinary shareholder 
benefits, and (ii) specific rules introduced in the UK and the US, the UN has 
observed that:  
“both approaches are based on the concept of equal treatment or in the neutrality 
principle; shareholders with a controlling interest in a company are placed in the same 
position as other shareholders and controlled taxpayers are placed on a parity with 
uncontrolled taxpayers through application of the arm’s length principle which 
neutralizes the advantage of the former”.185 
2.90 On 29 May 2013 the UN Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for 
Developing Countries186 was launched.  It significantly draws on the TPG e.g. as 
regards comparability analysis.  The Article 9 Subcommittee is mandated to 
 
183
  Bell (2014b);  formally reported: E/2014/45-E/C.18/2014/6.  
184
  Ibid.  
185
  UN (2001) page 5.  
186
  Available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Manual_TransferPricing.pdf 
(accessed 23 July 2015).  
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 74 
provide its final updated draft Manual for discussion and adoption at the 12th  
annual session of the Committee of Experts in 2016187.    
2.91 The 11th session of the Committee, held in October 2015, has presented 
a draft chapter on intra-group services.  It contains a section on passive 
association188.  The emphasis (like paragraph 7.13 TPG) is on how incidental 
benefits of association within an MNE group do not arise from the provision of a 
chargeable service, rather than going to the next step of analysing the effect of 
passive association on pricing controlled transactions.  Nonetheless, it is noted that 
an “associated enterprise may be viewed by [an] independent supplier as a low 
risk customer that is unlikely to default on any trade credit”.  And “[t]he passive 
association of an associated enterprise with its MNE group may improve the 
associated enterprise’s credit rating”.  Examples are also given of “incidental 
follow-on benefits” arising to group members other than the primary beneficiary 
of a service.  This new material should provide a strong foundation for recognising 
passive association effects in pricing transactions in countries that adhere to the 
UN approach.  
2.92 Chapter 10 of the Manual is innovative, containing the individual 
country viewpoints on selected transfer pricing matters from Brazil, China, India 
and South Africa.  See paragraph 3.143ff below on certain Indian perspectives 
relevant to this study.  
 
 
European Union 
2.93 In the direct taxation field, the most striking influence of European law 
has been exerted by the ECJ.   In relatively recent years, the Court has ventured 
 
187
  E/2015/51 paragraph 19.   
188
  E/C.18/2015/CRP.12; paragraph 29ff, expected to be finalised in 2016.   
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into the thin capitalisation and transfer pricing arenas.  The arm’s length principle 
has acquired an important status in EU direct tax law.  It has been adopted by the 
Court as a yardstick for testing artificiality and abuse, as well as the 
proportionality of national measures (see paragraph 2.103ff).  Thus arriving at a 
consensus on the relevance of passive association to pricing will have an impact 
on these threshold issues.  The jurisprudence of the Court has not, however, itself 
engaged with the passive association topic.  
2.94 Despite the formulary apportionment inspired Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (“CCCTB”) project189, the EU has in general long been a 
supporter of the arm’s length principle, and has concerned itself with the distortive 
or obstructive effects of asymmetric transfer pricing adjustments.  According to 
the “Ruding Report”: 
“[t]he establishment of the single market will involve … expansion of cross-border flows 
of intermediate products and services within groups of firms … transfer pricing within the 
Community is bound to assume greater importance.  In this regard, the Committee 
supports the arm’s length principle as the basis for determining transfer prices.”190 
2.95 The Ruding Committee expressed concern about divergent country 
practices: 
“diversity of treatment within the EC could not only lead to distortions, but also to 
disputes between tax administrations on what is the appropriate transfer price to accept 
 
189
  Refreshed enthusiasm for which has been apparent following the Commission’s 
Action Plan of 17 June 2015 A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 
5 Key Areas for Action COM(2015) 302 final, which contemplates making CCCTB mandatory; a 
public consultation launched on 8 October 2015: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5796_en.htm (accessed 10 January 2016); and a European Parliament resolution of 16 December 
2015 proposing a common corporate tax base as a first step towards a CCCTB: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-
0457+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (accessed 11 January 2016).   
190
  Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Chapter 10, 
Part III (page 205), Policy Recommendations, March 1992, Commission of the European 
Communities.  The Committee saw the arm’s length principle as “essentially a fair market value 
criterion that requires the hypothetical determination of prices” (page 40); compare e.g. 
Wittendorff (2011).  
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for the purposes of reaching a taxable base.  This underlines the need for … greater 
uniformity of transfer pricing practices under the arm’s length principle.”191 
2.96 The arm’s length standard is recognised explicitly in the 1990 
multilateral Arbitration Convention192.  Article 4 demands that “the following 
principles shall be observed in the application of this Convention”, and Article 
4(1) reproduces virtually verbatim Article 9(1) OECD MTC193, while Article 4(2) 
reproduces in essential respects Article 7(2) OECD MTC in its pre-2010 format.  
The TPG are not referred to, but “[a]doption of OECD language means that 
interpretation is facilitated by reference to the OECD Commentary on these 
articles, and the various OECD studies on transfer pricing are implicitly 
recognised.  In furtherance of this, a Code of Conduct194 requires the arm’s length 
principle ‘as promulgated by the OECD’ to be applied.  Under Article 3(2) of the 
Convention, undefined terms are to take their meanings from the relevant bilateral 
tax treaty between the states concerned, which in turn, as far as transfer pricing is 
concerned, will take their meaning by reference to Article 9(1) MTC and thus, to 
the extent that the MTC Commentary and the TPG provide interpretative 
guidance, from those instruments.   In principle, the Vienna Convention may also 
be brought to bear (paragraph 2.5 above and materials footnoted).  The Arbitration 
Convention is expressed “to give effect to” Article 220 of the Treaty Establishing 
the EEC195 (later Article 293 of the EC Treaty) which has now disappeared 
because that provision was not replicated in the TFEU.  But this “is probably of no 
consequence for the validity of the Convention, as it is an instrument of ordinary 
international public law, for which (Member) States do not need any EU law 
 
191
  Ibid., page 129.  
192
  Convention of 23 July 1990 on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection 
with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises (90/436/EEC).  
193
  There is a further echo of Article 9(1) MTC in Articles 78 and 79 of the European 
Commission’s proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) (COM(2011) 121/4) which, although generally based upon the formulary 
apportionment model, must engage with conventional arm’s length pricing for non-consolidated 
group members.  
194
  See paragraph 2.109 below.  
195
  “Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other 
with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals … the abolition of double taxation 
within the Community.”  
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basis. … [T]he Arbitration Convention is not an EU law instrument, but an 
ordinary, though multilateral, international public law instrument” 196.  The ECJ is 
not competent to interpret the Convention197, the Convention does not have direct 
effect, there is no deadline for implementation, and a State could unilaterally 
withdraw198.   
2.97 The Arbitration Convention could clearly play a role in a case where 
two Member States disagree over the recognition of passive association e.g. in 
relation to a parent company’s loan to a subsidiary.  If the parent’s country refused 
to recognise such effects, but the subsidiary’s tax authority insisted that passive 
association should be taken into account to lower what would have been an 
interest rate based on stand-alone creditworthiness, the parent jurisdiction would 
be taxing more interest income than the subsidiary country permits the borrower to 
deduct - a classic form of economic double taxation. 
2.98 Article 4(2) of the Interest and Royalties Directive199 contains a “special 
relationship” rule essentially modelled on Articles 11(6)/12(4) OECD MTC200.  
Thus the arm’s length principle is applied in the same way to payments potentially 
within the Directive; so notions of passive association should equally be brought 
to bear in that context.  
ECJ case law 
2.99 The case law of the ECJ has engaged with transfer pricing and also on 
multiple occasions specifically with thin capitalisation.  The arm’s length principle 
has become an important component in the Court’s jurisprudence on these topics.  
It has not however touched expressly upon the passive association concept.   
 
196
  Terra and Wattel (2012) pages 367-368.  
197
  Though query whether the Court might accept jurisdiction to ensure the Convention’s 
uniform application.  
198
  Terra and Wattel, ibid, note 196 above.  
199
  2003/49/EC.  
200
  Implemented, for example, by the UK in section 763 Income Tax (Trading and Other 
Income) Act 2005.  
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2.100 In the direct tax field, the ECJ’s principal task is to assess the 
compatibility of domestic law rules with the fundamental freedoms of the 
TFEU201.  It is plain that cross-border thin capitalisation and transfer pricing rules 
have the potential to operate as a restriction202 on the fundamental EU freedom of 
establishment (Article 49 TFEU, companies or firms established in the EU being 
assimilated to individual nationals by Article 54), or conceivably the freedom to 
provide (lending) services (Article 56) or the free movement of capital (Article 
63)203.  Alternatively, transfer pricing/thin capitalisation rules could present 
discrimination on grounds of nationality.   
2.101 Where national transfer pricing rules operate truly without regard to the 
location of the transaction parties, no unlawful restriction or discrimination will be 
present.  But such cases demand a forensic analysis to determine whether in fact 
unjustifiable procedural or evidential disadvantages are still imposed upon cross-
border situations, possibly resulting in indirect or covert discrimination or at least 
a restriction204 (see paragraph 3.173ff regarding the UK position).  The freedom of 
establishment principle requires that foreign nationals and companies are treated 
 
201
  But not generally to police the prevention of double taxation: see e.g. Case C-298/05 
Columbus Container Services BBVA v Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt, paragraph 46; Case 
513/04 Kerckhaert & Moores v Belgium, paragraph 20; Case C-128/08 Damseaux v Belgium, 
paragraphs 30, 33.   
202
  “[N]ational measures that apply indiscriminately to all persons but which in fact 
hinder intra-Union trade”: HJI Panayi (2013) page 152.  
203
  Where national legislation is premised on a control relationship, and thus the ability to 
influence financing decisions, it is primarily freedom of establishment that is affected; thus 
restrictive effects on freedom to provide services and free movement of capital “must be seen as 
an unavoidable consequence of any restriction on freedom of establishment and do not justify an 
independent examination” of the legislation under Articles 56 or 63: see e.g. Case C-524/04 Test 
Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Inland Revenue Commissioners, paragraphs 33-34.  
In Case C-282/12 Itelcar, free movement of capital was engaged because the Portuguese thin 
capitalisation rules under review encompassed situations beyond shareholding relationships.  In 
Case C-492/04 Lasertec, the German national rules only applied to cases of “definite influence” 
and thus freedom of establishment was the relevant freedom, to the exclusion of free movement 
of capital.  Compare Case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz, involving consumer loans from Switzerland 
to German borrowers: freedom to provide services was predominant so free movement of capital 
displaced; Case C-433/04 Commission v Belgium, where withholding on payments to contractors 
restricted freedom to provide services.  See e.g. HJI Panayi (2007), and (2013) page 148ff, on 
identifying the relevant freedom.  
204
  See e.g. Tryfonidou (2014) on the separate notions of, and relationship between, 
“discrimination” and “restriction”: “‘discrimination’ can include discriminatory measures which 
do not lead to restrictions that are contrary to the free movement provisions, and ‘restriction’ can 
cover national measures that are not discriminatory” (page 386).  
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in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that Member State; it 
also prohibits a Member State “of origin” from hindering (restricting) the 
establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or a locally 
incorporated company205.  Restrictions on such freedoms can, however, be 
justified if the national rules are aimed at wholly artificial arrangements designed 
to circumvent national tax rules, or by reference to securing the balanced 
allocation of taxing rights combined with the prevention of tax avoidance; but 
those rules must be proportionate to securing such objectives.   
2.102 The leading modern ECJ authority on transfer pricing is the Court’s 
decision in Société de Gestion Industrielle SA v Belgium206 - the “SGI” case.  The 
case concerned the legality, in light of the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment, of Belgian tax code provisions which served a transfer pricing 
function207 – expressed in terms of adjustment to a Belgian company’s income 
where it had granted an “unusual or gratuitous advantage” to a person outside 
Belgium.  The Belgian company, SGI, had made an interest-free loan available to 
its French subsidiary and had paid allegedly excessive director’s fees to a 
significant Luxembourg shareholder. Advocate-General Kokott’s opinion noted208 
that transfer pricing rules and treaty rules like Article 9 MTC can be tested for 
legality under [what is now] Article 49 TFEU.  The Belgian rules, which only 
applied in a cross-border setting, were readily found by the ECJ to constitute 
 
205
  See e.g. Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, paragraph 42 and cases cited there.   
206
  Case C-311/08, representing a development of the earlier jurisprudence of the Court 
including Case C-347/04 Marks & Spencer; Case C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst (where the 
German thin capitalisation rules were held unlawful despite a saving for cases where the taxpayer 
could have obtained the loan capital from a third party under similar conditions; the German and 
UK Governments argued that the relevant domestic law was an expression of Article 9 OECD 
MTC, but – other than to reject this as a basis for the “coherence” justification - the ECJ did not 
react in any detail to that argument: see e.g. Cordewener (2003)); the Thin Cap decision, note 
203 above (where the ECJ at paragraphs 36-63 recognised that application of the arm’s length 
principle can be justified by overriding public requirements, and “accepted the arm’s length test 
as an objective and verifiable test of absence of artifice, the failing of which may give rise to a 
presumption that the loan arrangement is artificial”: Terra and Wattel (2012) page 383); and Case 
C-231/05 Oy AA.  Thin Cap was recapitulated in Case C-105/07 Lammers & Van Cleeff, and in 
Case C-282/12 Itelcar.   
207
  Article 26 Code des Impôts sur les Revenus 1992.  
208
  Paragraph 52.  
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restrictions on both inward and outbound investment209.  Nonetheless, the Court, 
noting the basis for justification210 of a national measure where it specifically 
targets “wholly artificial arrangements designed to circumvent [national] 
legislation”, considered that the objective of preventing tax avoidance taken 
together with preserving the “balanced allocation” of the power to tax, could be a 
justification for a restriction on the freedom of establishment.   The Belgian 
legislation in question was suitable to prevent “artificial arrangements 
[facilitating] income transfers … within companies having a relationship of 
interdependence” .211  
2.103 To be proportionate (and thus satisfy the Court that the legislation in 
question did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve justifiable objectives), 
the tax measure in question had to be confined to what was necessary to establish 
a result that companies would have agreed if acting “under fully competitive 
conditions”212 – apparently synonymous with, or approximating to, “at arm’s 
length”213.  Thus if arm’s length pricing is applied by a taxpayer, there is no room 
for the national legislation to impose an adjustment because the national measure 
must not go beyond the part of the price which exceeds what would have been 
agreed absent interdependence214.  The ECJ in effect accepted the arm’s length 
principle as a relevant indicator of whether “wholly artificial arrangements” were 
 
209
  SGI judgment, paragraphs 44-55.   
210
  In Case 55/94 Gebhard, at paragraph 37, the ECJ summarised four conditions for 
justification of restrictive national measures, which must: (1) be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; (2) be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; (3) be suitable for 
securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; (4) not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to attain it.   
211
  Paragraphs 65-69.  In Cadbury Schweppes (note 205 above) the UK CFC legislation 
was “suitable to achieve the objective for which it was adopted” (paragraph 59).  In Itelcar, note 
206 above, the Portuguese thin capitalisation rules were “capable of preventing practices the sole 
purpose of which is to avoid tax that would normally be payable on profits generated by activities 
undertaken in the national territory.  It follows that such rules are an appropriate means of 
attaining the objective of combatting tax evasion and avoidance” (paragraph 35).  Similarly, an 
unregulated ability to transfer tax losses across borders could be liable “to jeopardise a balanced 
allocation between Member States of the power to impose taxes”: Case C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer, paragraph 46.    
212
  SGI judgment paragraph 71.  
213
  The ECJ’s ruling in Thin Cap permitted interest disallowance “only so far as [the 
interest] exceeds what would have been agreed upon at arm’s length”.  
214
  SGI  paragraph 72.  
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targeted (satisfying the arm’s length principle may itself demonstrate 
commerciality and thus displace the notion of “wholly artificial arrangements”215), 
and as a limiting agent upon the extent of transfer pricing adjustments216.  “Clearly 
the judgment confirms that such cross-border transfer pricing provisions may be 
justified, even if they operate only cross-border and even if they have a restrictive 
effect, provided that they secure the balanced allocation of tax jurisdiction and 
they are necessary for combating tax avoidance.”217    
2.104 In my view it follows (given the conclusion I reach in this thesis 
regarding the recognition of passive association as part of the arm’s length 
principle) that if the tax law of EU country X restricts a borrower’s interest 
deduction by refusing to accept that passive association effects may support a 
relatively high level of debt (i.e. refusing to take passive association into account 
in determining acceptable capitalisation), then this presents a potential claim for 
TFEU infringement where some difference of treatment between cross-border and 
domestic cases is apparent218.  Conversely, if an EU taxing jurisdiction attempts to 
impute an excessive interest rate to a lender by reference to an assumed 
borrower’s (lower) credit rating on the basis of disregarding passive association 
(contrary, I say, to the arm’s length principle), then equally its laws might 
contravene the TFEU.  In short, national thin capitalisation and transfer pricing 
 
215
  Thin capitalisation and transfer pricing legislation will not generally “have the specific 
purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements … but [will apply] generally”: Lankhorst-
Hohorst, paragraph 37; SGI at paragraph 66 reflects this.   
216
  This is all consistent with the thin capitalisation judgment in Lammers & Van Cleeff, 
note 206 above, which (citing Thin Cap, paragraph 80) noted that anti-abuse legislation may be 
justified where it renders interest non-deductible “only if, and so far as, it exceeds what those 
companies would have agreed upon on an arm’s length basis”, and that terms not corresponding 
to those which would have been agreed upon at arm’s length constitute an objective and 
verifiable element in identifying a purely artificial arrangement” (paragraph 29).  In Thin Cap the 
Court acknowledged that companies can structure their capital as they wish, but “this possibility 
reaches its limit when the company’s choice amounts to abuse of law” (paragraph 69).   
217
  Baker (2010).  Note also that lack of legal certainty in national tax provisions may 
make them disproportionate: see Case C-318/10 SIAT, paragraphs 57-59, cited in Case 282/12 
Itelcar, paragraph 44, where reliance on governmental extra-statutory practice left the Portuguese 
thin capitalisation rules disproportionate for lack of legal certainty.  
218 An ECOFIN resolution of 8 June 2010 noted that “thin capitalisation rules which 
observe the arm’s length principle are capable of preventing tax avoidance, or maintaining the 
balanced allocation of taxing powers, or both”:  
www.register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST_10597_2010_INIT (accessed 17 
December 2015).  
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laws which require passive association effects to be left out of account219 fail 
adequately to permit taxpayers to rely upon the arm’s length standard in justifying 
a level of interest expense, so may go beyond what is proportionate, and are thus 
potentially (subject to the cross-border dimension) unlawful in the EU context.   
2.105 A possible additional ingredient of proportionality is that, under the 
relevant national legislation, taxpayers must be given an opportunity to 
demonstrate the commerciality of their arrangements. One can argue from the ECJ 
case law that, even where a taxpayer’s arrangements fall short of arm’s length 
pricing, the national law must, to be proportional, permit the taxpayer to 
demonstrate a commercial justification for the arrangement220.  Lankhorst-Hohorst 
is an example: the Dutch parent’s loan to its German subsidiary was a “rescue 
attempt … with the sole objective of minimising the expenses of [the subsidiary] 
and achieving significant savings in regard to bank interest charges”221.     
2.106 For the ECJ, the arm’s length principle is perhaps not therefore the be-
all-and-end-all.  The blending of the principle into the justification recognised by 
the Court of the anti-abuse notion (which is to some extent dependent on the 
taxpayer’s subjective motives) may translate into a permission to taxpayers to 
challenge justification by reference to their genuine commercial reasons for – or 
 
219
  Such as the UK’s sections 152(5) and 153(5) TIOPA: paragraph 3.160 below.  
220
  See e.g. SGI, paragraph 71.  Section 13 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 was 
found to fail to allow the taxpayer to demonstrate the economic reality of a shareholding: Case C-
112/14 Commission v UK, paragraph 28.  Henderson J at paragraph 60 of the High Court 
decision in Thin Cap describes how the abuse concept in the Halifax case (Case C-255/02) 
inspires the discussion: the arm’s length principle is a “valid starting point”.  In Case C-103/09 
Weald Leasing, the terms of the leasing transactions would be particularly likely to be contrary to 
the Sixth Directive if the rent was “unusually low or did not reflect any economic reality” 
(paragraph 39) i.e. “not at arm’s length … [the case] is important as the Court openly embraced 
the arm’s length principle as a means of delineating elements that could go towards establishing 
the abusive nature of a transaction”: HJI Panayi (2013) page 336.  
221
  Lankhorst-Hohorst, paragraphs 14-15.  Yet the majority in the UK Court of Appeal 
decision in Thin Cap thought that adherence to the arm’s length principle was the only relevant 
test.  O’Shea (2012-13) criticises HMRC’s 2011 consultation document on CFC reform which, in 
Annex I, assumes that “wholly artificial arrangements” equate with that beyond what would have 
been agreed between parties at arm’s length.   O’Shea endorses the approaches of Henderson J in 
the High Court in Thin Cap GLO at paragraph 70 (arm’s length test not a complete “proxy” for 
determining whether there was abusive tax avoidance) and of Arden LJ dissenting in the Court of 
Appeal (even where transaction not on arm’s length terms, taxpayer must be given the 
opportunity to demonstrate commerciality: paragraph 108): see paragraph 3.172 below.    
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the “commercial rationality” of - a transaction222.  However, in the context of an 
MNE firm, “‘commercial rationality’ of related-party transactions – as pronounced 
by the ECJ in the afore-mentioned judgments - is not necessarily related to the 
arm’s length pattern.  To the contrary, commercial rationality of transfer prices 
within firms has to follow the rationality of the firm itself, i.e. the specific reasons 
why the founders of the firm have put together a hierarchical and integrated entity 
in order to beat the operations of competitors in the open market”223.  As regards 
the Court’s approach to the arm’s length principle it has been said that –  
“[o]ne of the most striking features of Lankhorst is that the ECJ took into account the 
relevant commercial reasons behind the loan granted to the German subsidiary, even if, 
from an arm’s length point of view, a third party (for example, a bank) would not have 
granted the same loan to the German company. This conclusion, in itself, amounted to a 
significant departure from the OECD’s transfer pricing logic … [I]f what the ECJ means 
by ‘commercial justification’ is that the subjective business reasons of the taxpayer (or its 
group) should be taken into account in the evaluation of transfer pricing policies, this 
would mean a significant departure from the OECD principles as established in the 1995 
OECD TP Guidelines (or the 2009/10 OECD Draft TP Guidelines).”224  
2.107 But I doubt that the ECJ should be accused of a “departure from logic”.  
The arm’s length principle, as informed by the OECD’s approach to transfer 
pricing, seems now clearly to be a reference point for non-discriminatory and non-
restrictive national measures. Schön (2015) sees the ECJ viewing the OECD MTC 
 
222
  See e.g. Boone et al (2010) page 187.  Compare HJI Panayi (2013) page 356 
expressing some uncertainty.  Arguably, SGI does blur the analysis.  Although at paragraphs 71-
72 the Court enumerates (“first”) the taxpayer’s opportunity to demonstrate “any” commercial 
justification, and (“second”) the requirement that the legislation should only counteract excess 
expenditure beyond arm’s length conditions, it also accepted the proportionality of the legislation 
based on the Belgian Government’s position (paragraph 73) that the taxpayer had the opportunity 
to establish that no unusual or gratuitous advantage was involved (which somehow blends the 
two points together).  Jiménez (2010) suggests (page 277) that “in SGI, the ECJ failed to make it 
clear whether the ‘commercial justification’ the taxpayer can provide as a defence for the prices 
used in transactions with associated entities is part of the arm’s length analysis (as one of the 
comparability factors) or is more a justification of the kind considered in Lankhorst (a non-tax 
reason for the transaction)”.    
223
  Schön (2011) page 35.  
224
  Jiménez (2010) page 276.  
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“as a sort of ‘gold standard’ for international tax allocation”225.  “Commercial 
justification” has emerged as a potential taxpayer defence i.e. an escape-clause 
which must be available under national laws for the relevant rule to be sustainably 
proportionate.  Although commerciality may of course overlap conceptually with 
arm’s length pricing to some extent, the concepts are not perfectly coincident.  
Instead, “commerciality” is at most an overlay which should be seen primarily as a 
limb of the Court’s formulation of proportionality rather than as an attempt to 
redefine the arm’s length standard.   
2.108 Whether or not the jurisprudence of the ECJ “has moved transfer 
pricing control within the European Union into a corner where the arm’s length 
standard will gradually be eroded and has to be refined or replaced by another 
model”226, the recognition of passive association as a component of the application 
of the arm’s length principle of itself in no way generates any friction with EU law 
principles.  Such recognition is, I contend, merely one component in the 
computation of an arm’s length price.  It will thus operate in an even-handed way 
as between the respective taxing jurisdictions concerned with a cross-border 
transaction.  Possibly the proposition favours the tax-take in countries in which 
borrowers rather than lenders are preponderantly situated (see paragraph 1.27, 
though compare paragraph 5.13), but, as between legal systems, the point of 
principle cuts both ways, fairly and without discrimination.  It should therefore be 
seen as a refining element of objective transaction pricing which can be common 
to all national transfer pricing systems based upon the Article 9(1) OECD MTC 
format.  From there, one can readily conclude that a failure to recognise the 
pricing effects of passive association, at least where any difference between 
national and cross-border cases is present, may itself deprive an EU government 
of the ability to justify national transfer pricing rules which could otherwise 
operate as a restriction on EU fundamental freedoms.    
 
225
  Page 275, and cases cited at note 43.  Meussen (2010) at page 249 says “[t]he SGI 
case … demonstrates that the ECJ accepts that the arm’s length principle is indeed a principle of 
EU law that gives Member States the tools to secure their tax bases in cross-border transaction 
[sic] between related companies”.   
226
  Schön (2011) page 8. 
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EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum  
2.109 The EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF) was created in 2002 with 
terms of reference focusing on practical problems rather than fundamental matters 
of principle. However, the brief as originally conceived extended to considering 
“the scope for improving and rendering more uniform transfer pricing 
methodologies within the OECD guidelines”227.  The Commission has observed 
that variations in the interpretation and application of the arm’s length principle 
between countries, and between businesses and tax administrations, “can result in 
uncertainty, increased costs and potential double taxation or double non-taxation.  
These aspects impact negatively on the smooth functioning of the Internal 
Market”228.   A recommendation of the JTPF led to the European Council adopting 
a Code of Conduct for the effective implementation of the Arbitration 
Convention229, which noted that “profit adjustments arising from financial 
relations, including a loan and its terms, and based on the arm’s length principle 
are to be considered within the scope of the Arbitration Convention”230, and “the 
arm’s length principle shall be applied, as advocated by the OECD, without regard 
to the immediate tax consequences for any particular Member State”231.  Still in 
2014 “the approach adopted by EU Member States to correctly evaluate the price 
of [associated enterprises’ cross-border] transactions is that of the arm’s length 
principle”232.  The most recent report on the JTPF’s work programme233 focuses 
on the use of comparables in the EU, profit split methods, economic valuation 
methods and effective transfer pricing administration.  Relevantly for this study, 
one important point identified by the JTPF’s work is the continued lack of 
 
227
  Commission Communication COM(2001) 582, 23 October 2001.  
228
  Ibid. 
229
  First adopted in 2004, then revised in 2009: 2009/C 322/01.  
230
  Paragraph 1.2.   
231
  Paragraph 6.1(b).  
232
  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee on the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing 
Forum in the period July 2012 to January 2014 COM(2014) 315 final, page 2.  
233
  JTPF Program of Work 2015-2019 (“Tools for the Rules”), meeting of 25 June 2015 
JTPF/005/Final/2015/EN.  The OECD’s BEPS work on financial transactions will be “monitored 
and evaluated” to determine whether further work on this should be done by the JTPF (page 8).  
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uniformity concerning Member States’ application of the Convention to thin 
capitalisation cases234.   
2.110 There has not to date been any deeper JTPF investigation into the 
meaning of the arm’s length principle.  In any event, Wittendorff (2010a) notes 
that such an initiative may be problematic: “[f]irst, the value, as a source of law, of 
the JTPF’s interpretation of the arm’s length principle must be considered modest 
in relation to the Member States’ tax treaties and, in most cases, in relation to 
transfer pricing provisions in domestic law.  Second, it would not be appropriate 
to develop a consensus on arm’s length rules in the EU which departed from the 
OECD Guidelines.”235 However, at the 42nd JTPF meeting in Brussels on 12 
March 2015, a proposed topic for the future work programme was “financial 
transactions”236.  
Other EU work 
2.111 The Commission’s 2007 Communication The application of anti-abuse 
measures in the area of direct taxation – within the EU and in relation to third 
countries237 summarised various propositions to be drawn from ECJ case law.  In 
relation to financing arrangements, emphasis is laid upon whether terms and 
conditions “deviate from those that would have been agreed upon between 
independent persons”238 in testing whether a purely artificial arrangement is 
present.  As an aspect of proportionality: 
“adjustment to the taxable income as a result of the application of the anti-abuse rules 
should be limited to the extent that is attributable to the purely artificial arrangement.  
 
234
  The JTPF identified certain Member States excluding thin capitalisation from 
Convention resolution on the basis that such rules represented general anti-avoidance concepts 
(discussion paper JTPF/002/2013/EN section B.1) and recently noted “application of the AC to 
issues of thin capitalisation” as a “possible issue for consideration” (Final Report on Improving 
the Functioning of the Arbitration Convention JTPF/002/Final/2015/EN), and as an “open item” 
(“Tools for the Rules” report, page 11, note above).  
235
  Page 283.  
236
  Doc: JTPF/004/2015/EN.  
237
  COM(2007) 785 final.  
238
  Page 4, citing the Thin Cap case.  
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With regard to intra-group transactions, this means adherence to the arm’s length 
principle”.239 
2.112 Thin Capitalization Rules and Multinational Firm Capital Structure 
(2014)240 is a report examining the impact of thin capitalisation rules limiting the 
deductibility of interest on the capital structures of foreign affiliates of US 
multinationals.  It does not address passive association effects, but does 
interestingly distinguish between tax codes which apply an “automatic”, or 
formulaic, approach and those which operate on a “discretionary” basis, said to 
mean a system based on comparisons with corporate indebtedness in arm’s length 
situations.  The “automatic” approach does not sit easily with the restriction in 
Article 9(1) MTC (where applied by a tax treaty) upon governments tempted to 
tax a greater amount of profits than those which would arise according to the 
arm’s length standard (paragraph 2.7 above).    
2.113 A newsworthy modern EU intervention into the transfer pricing world 
has been the invocation of concepts of unlawful state aid, particularly with regard 
to the rulings practices of certain national tax authorities.  2014 saw decisions 
from the Commission to initiate the procedure in Article 108(2) TFEU as regards 
the treatment by Ireland of Apple, Luxembourg241 of Fiat and The Netherlands of 
Starbucks and Amazon242.  Decisions finding selective tax advantages have now 
 
239
  Page 5.  
240
  Commission Taxation Working Paper N.42–2014.  
241
  See also the “LuxLeaks” company rulings revelations: 
http://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks, which may provide the Commission with further 
ammunition.  
242
  C(2014) 3606 final (Apple); C(2014) 3626 final (Starbucks); C(2014) 3627 final 
(FFT) (all of 11 June 2014); C(2014) 7156 final (Amazon) (7 October 2014).  The Commission 
brings to bear the concept of a “prudent independent operator acting under normal market 
conditions”, stating that “market conditions can be arrived at through transfer pricing established 
at arm’s length” (e.g. Starbucks, paragraphs (75)-(76)).  The precise relationship between the 
prudent independent operator concept (which appears to have roots in the “market economy 
investor principle”: see e.g. Slocock (2002)) and the arm’s length principle remains unclear.  
Somewhat earlier Commission forays into transfer pricing are listed in Micheau (2014) page 198 
and footnotes, including the Forum 187 decision (Case C-217/03), where it was found that “the 
transfer prices do not resemble those which would be charged in conditions of free competition” 
(paragraph 96).   
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been made in the Fiat and Starbucks cases243.  An investigation regarding 
McDonald’s was announced on 3 December 2015244.  None of these cases touches 
on the passive association topic however.   
2.114 But the issue has arisen in the Commission’s investigation into the 
Belgian “excess profit” rulings system.  This allowed Belgian members of MNE 
groups to reduce their taxable profits by amounts attributable to the synergetic 
advantages of being a member of the group.  The Commission has said that 
“[a]ccording to the Belgian authorities, this tax provision245 only implements the 
OECD ‘arm’s length’ principle.  However, at this stage the Commission doubts 
that this interpretation of the OECD principle is valid”246.  Belgium referred to 
paragraphs 1.10, 7.12, 9.57 and 9.58 TPG to argue that “the attribution of 
synergies to individual group entities, which are only realised because a group 
entity is part of a larger group, is a very difficult exercise.  Therefore, when 
analysing the tax situation of a ‘tested party’, Belgium adopted a stand-alone 
approach, leaving out the profits from synergies or economies of scale which are 
only realized not because of the activity itself but because the tested party is 
integrated in a larger group”247.  The Commission for its part asserted that 
“Belgium does not apply the arm’s length principle properly by excluding from 
the tax base profits resulting from synergies and economies of scale”248.  The 
Commission appeared, therefore, to be promoting the notion that a company 
benefiting from group synergies should retain such benefits in an application of 
the arm’s length principle.   
 
243
  Decisions of 21 October 2015 available at www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5880_en.htm  (accessed 8 November 2105).   
244
  www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6221_en.htm (accessed 17 December 
2015).  
245
  Article 185§2,b Code des Impôts sur les Revenus 1992, which authorises a form of 
unilateral downward adjustment.  
246
  Commission press release 3 February 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-4080_en.htm (accessed 12 June 2015) and letter of the same date C(2015)563 
(final). 
247
  Letter of 3 February 2015, paragraph (36).  
248
  Ibid., paragraph (71).  
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2.115 Translating the Commission’s stance into the passive association/debt 
financing context, a Belgian subsidiary which the market would expect to be the 
beneficiary of parental support should enjoy a commensurately reduced financing 
cost (the 7% rate in Fig. I, paragraph 1.14 above).  It will be interesting to see how 
far the Commission presses this argument.  Their attitude is presumably coloured 
to some extent by the way that “the deductions granted through the excess profit 
ruling system usually amount to more than 50% of the profits covered by the tax 
ruling and can sometimes reach 90%”.  On 11 January 2016 the Commission 
announced its decision that the Belgian scheme illegally granted selective tax 
advantages to at least 35 MNEs.  The press release249  observes that the scheme 
departed from “the ‘arm’s length principle’ under EU state aid rules” because 
excess profits generated by group synergies should be shared according to 
economic reality, not “discounted unilaterally from the tax base of a single 
company”.  This suggests that the Commission stands by the arm’s length 
principle in general, and in doing so maintains that profits attributable to a Belgian 
enterprise’s share of group synergies should indeed remain within the Belgian tax 
net.  This appears supportive of the proposition that passive association should be 
taken into account in pricing transactions, i.e. that, where passive association 
benefits are present, the consequent economic effect on the profile of the 
beneficiary company should be respected as part of the factual matrix.  At the date 
of writing the formal decision is unavailable.   
Conclusions 
2.116 The OECD’s BEPS 2015 Final Reports, including material on group 
synergies added to Chapter I TPG, have clearly articulated the appropriateness of 
recognising passive association in pricing a controlled transaction.  The General 
Electric Capital Canada case is obviously the inspiration.  Other more long-
standing pillars of the arm’s length principle (tax parity, the counteraction of price 
distortions caused by the exercise of control, options realistically available) on a 
careful analysis all militate in favour of the recognition of passive association.  
 
249
  At: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-42_en.htm (accessed 11 January 2016); 
decision under case number SA.37667 to follow.  
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One might reasonably be quite surprised therefore at the extent of ongoing 
controversy surrounding the topic250, and the divergence of national opinions.   
 
  
 
250
  E.g. HMRC’s persistent position that implicit support cannot affect borrowing 
capacity.    
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3.   ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT LEGISLATION, CASE LAW AND TAX 
AUTHORITY PRACTICES FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES 
“The question asked by the ‘arm’s-length’ method is whether, if you had a brother, he 
would like cheese.”251 
Introduction 
3.1 This chapter reviews in detail the legislation, case law and tax authority 
practices that bear on the effects of passive association in transfer pricing in six 
common law countries (Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States252). While some introductory exploration of the 
basic workings of the respective countries’ transfer pricing rules is necessary, it is 
beyond my scope to provide comprehensive narrative on the workings of national 
codes.   
3.2 The object is to learn from a comparative study. To the extent that 
transfer pricing laws are founded on tax treaties, especially where the format of 
Article 9(1) MTC, or its analogues, is adopted, and in any event where laws 
require the application of the arm’s length principle, one is dealing with the 
interpretation of a form of “uniform” law.  
“Such laws result from international conventions, governmental cooperation, or 
supranational or international legislation, and since the underlying aim is to unify law, 
their construction and development must be geared to this goal.  This means that when a 
national judge is faced with a uniform law, he must not simply deploy his trusty old 
national rules of construction but modify them so as to arrive at an internationally 
acceptable result which promotes legal uniformity. This often calls for a comparative law 
interpretation: the judge must look to the foreign rules which formed the basis of the 
provision to be applied, he must take account of how courts and writers abroad interpret 
 
251
  Rosenbloom (2004) page 28,  alluding to the US “cheese examples” in Regs. §1-482-
4(f)(3)(iv) 68 FR 53447, examples (2), (3) and (4), prior to rewriting of the regulations governing 
services, now at Regs. §1.482-9.  See paragraph 3.210 and note 705.  
252
  In the case of Canada and the US, analysis is confined to federal income taxes, not 
state or provincial taxes.  
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it, and he must make good any gaps in it with general legal principles of law which he has 
adduced from the relevant national legal systems.”253 
3.3 The discussion below begins with Canada because of the singularly 
developed state of case law there bearing on passive association.  The Tax Court’s 
2009 decision in General Electric Capital Canada (paragraph 3.16ff below) 
served as catalyst for the international debate.  The other common law 
jurisdictions are then considered alphabetically254.  All the selected countries are 
OECD members, other than India, which provides contrast in being a leading, but 
developing, world economy which resists unquestioning and wholesale acceptance 
of OECD norms; instead it has traditionally preferred the international tax 
constructs promoted by the UN – which tend somewhat to favour “source”-based 
taxation.  India is nonetheless an “observer” at OECD, regarded as a “key partner” 
and is an active participant in the BEPS project.   
3.4 It is apparent from this comparative research that (i) there is a high 
degree of consistency between the selected countries as regards statutory 
implementation of the arm’s length principle in general; (ii) Canada and Australia 
aside, the courts have yet to engage with the task of recognising passive 
association as a factor in the proper pricing of controlled transactions; (iii) none of 
the countries considered explicitly rejects the recognition of passive association; 
and (iv) in most, regulation or tax authority practice support recognition to a 
greater or lesser extent. 
3.5 Fig. IV illustrates in a very high level manner the degree of recognition, 
in national tax systems, of passive association in the transfer pricing context.  The 
 
253
  Zweigert and Kötz (1998) page 21. Avery Jones (1984, page 101) observes that 
foreign case law can rank as a supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention.  
254
  Also, Zweigert and Kötz, page 19: “Courts in England, Australia, Canada, and other 
commonwealth countries have long made reciprocal reference to each other’s decisions and are 
now invoking continental law to a remarkable degree.” Moreover, “decisions of foreign courts on 
the interpretation of a convention or treaty text depend for their authority on the reputation and 
status of the court in question”: Lord Diplock in James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding 
& Shipping (UK) Ltd [1987] AC 141, 295, cited in CIR v Commerzbank AG [1990] STC 285.  
See also the T (A.P.) v Immigration Officer case, note 58 above.  In the transfer pricing context 
see e.g. the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal decision in GlaxoSmithKline Inc v The Queen 
2010 FCA 201 paragraph [80] referring to the Australian Roche case (paragraphs 3.30, 3.73 
below respectively) .   
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indicators are numbered (1 to 7) and colour-coded to represent the state of 
development of tax systems to accommodate passive association in this way: 1 = 
least degree of recognition, including rejection of passive association as a pricing 
factor; 4 = little or no developed law or practice or official ambivalence; 7 = full 
recognition.  This scoring is inherently impressionistic, but attempts a fair 
evaluation based upon the selective country survey in this chapter and, for other 
countries, summary narratives contained in BNA Bloomberg’s Transfer Pricing 
Forum on the topic of implicit support, and PwC’s Navigating the Complexity 
survey (2013)255.   
 
Fig. IV 
 
 
  
 
255
  As regards divergent country approaches to thin capitalisation see e.g. Lund, 
Korsgaard and Albertsen (2008),  the IFA 2008 Cahiers, vol. 93b and Zielke (2010).  
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3.6 The Transfer Pricing Forum survey was reported256 as finding that, of 
the 23 countries reviewed, 11 (Australia, Austria, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, the USA and the UK) would 
usually reduce a guarantee fee, paid by a subsidiary to a parent, to the extent an 
arm’s length lender would assume a level of implicit support for the borrower. Six 
(Argentina, Denmark, Japan, South Africa, South Korea and Switzerland) would 
assess a borrower’s creditworthiness on a stand-alone basis. And the positions of 
another six countries (France, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Italy and Spain) are 
unsettled.  I have tried in the world map diagram above to adopt a slightly more 
nuanced evaluation. 
 
 
Canada 
3.7 For a comprehensive survey of Canadian transfer pricing law and 
practice, see François Vincent’s excellent Transfer Pricing in Canada257. What 
follows attempts to pick out key elements of the jurisprudence relevant to the 
passive association controversy.  
3.8 Canada has led the world in developing law on this topic. The General 
Electric case (paragraph 3.16ff below) ignited the debate, and subsequent 
decisions of the courts have entrenched the reasoning adopted.  In essence, passive 
association, or the implicit support that may be considered to be derived from 
passive association, must be recognised as an economically relevant circumstance 
in a comparability analysis when pricing controlled transactions.  
 
256
  Bell (2014a). 
257
  Carswell (2013).  
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Legislation 
3.9 The transfer pricing provisions in the legislation govern and are 
determinative of the approach to be taken by a court, not any particular 
methodology or commentary from the TPG258.  The TPG have nonetheless been 
referred to and relied upon by the Canadian courts to inform the application of 
domestic legislation259. 
3.10 The central modern Canadian transfer pricing rule is section 247 
Income Tax Act260 (ITA).  It is heavily influenced by the 1995 version of the 
TPG261.  The key operative rules are in subsection (2), set out below (omitting 
material relevant to partnerships, and also the statutory transaction 
 
258
  Opinion of the Supreme Court per Rothstein J in GlaxoSmithKline Inc v The Queen 
2012 SCC 52 at paragraph [20]: “The Guidelines are not controlling as if they were a Canadian 
statute and the test of any set of transactions or prices ultimately must be determined according to 
S.69(2) rather than any particular methodology or commentary set out in the Guidelines”.  Per 
Boyle J in McKesson at paragraph [120] (also citing GlaxoSmithKline):  “I would add that the 
OECD Commentaries and Guidelines are written not only by persons who are not legislators, but 
in fact are the tax collection authorities of the world.  Their thoughts should be considered 
accordingly.”  Boidman and Kandev (2013) at footnote 62 note that it is conceivable that a 
different approach might be taken to the modern Canadian transfer pricing rule in section 247 
ITA.  In Marzen Artistic Aluminium Ltd v The Queen 2014 TCC 194 it was said of the TPG that 
they “do not have the force of law but rather are intended as tools to assist in determining what a 
reasonable business person would have paid if the parties to a transaction had been dealing with 
each other at arm’s length” (paragraph [177]).  Outside the transfer pricing arena, in Prévost Car 
Inc v The Queen  2009 DTC 5721 the Federal Court of Appeal was willing to recognise the 
potentially persuasive effect of the MTC Commentaries even where changes occurred subsequent 
to adoption of the treaty in question if the material could be regarded as clarifying or better 
informing the relevant provision (see on this Wilkie (2009) page 399).  Nat Boidman pithily put 
the point to me as follows: “The SCC in Glaxo post-dates all prior FCA comments on OECD and 
basically tells the courts below that they can look at OECD if they would like, but they are not 
bound by it.” 
259
  Bakker and Levey (2012), Canada chapter by members of Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt 
LLP, page 142.  Indeed this is true (by reference to the 1995 version of the TPG) in 
GlaxoSmithKline itself.  See also Rip ACJ’s approbation, in GlaxoSmithKline before the Tax 
Court, of the Federal Court of Appeal’s confirmation in SmithKline Beecham Animal Health Inc 
v Canada 2002 FCA 229 that the OECD Commentary should inform the interpretation and 
application of section 69(2). The Supreme Court of Canada in Crown Forest Industries Ltd v The 
Queen [1995] 2 CTC 64 used the MTC Commentaries to determine the proper interpretation of 
the Canada-US tax treaty.  Given the adoption by paragraph 1 of the Commentary on Article 9 
MTC of the TPG, it is possible that, where a tax treaty applies to a particular case, the TPG may 
even prevail over the ITA via the application of the legislation which implements the relevant 
treaty: Vincent (2013) page 147.  
260
  R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp).   
261
  Bloom and Vincent (2012), section A.1(a), citing the Supplementary Information to 
the 1997 Federal Budget: one of the Government’s objectives was to “harmonize the standard 
contained in section 69 of the Act with the arm’s length principle as defined in the [1995] revised 
OECD Guidelines”. 
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 96 
recharacterisation rule in section 247(2)(b) and (d), neither of which is needed for 
present purposes262): 
“Where a taxpayer … and a non-resident person with whom the taxpayer … does not deal 
at arm’s length263 are participants in a transaction or a series of transactions and 
(a) the terms or conditions made or imposed, in respect of the transaction or series, 
between any of the participants in the transaction or series differ from those that would 
have been made between persons dealing at arm’s length … 
any amounts that, but for this section and section 245, would be determined for the 
purposes of this Act in respect of the taxpayer … for the taxation year or fiscal period 
shall be adjusted (in this section referred to as an ‘adjustment’) to the quantum or nature 
of the amounts that would have been determined if, 
(c) where only paragraph 247(2)(a) applies, the terms and conditions made or imposed, 
in respect of the transaction or series, between the participants in the transaction or 
series had been those that would have been made between persons dealing at arm’s 
length …”. 
3.11 It is worth also noting the predecessor rule – dating from 1972 - in 
section 69(2) ITA.  Some of the case law relates to that provision264.  Taking the 
1985 version265 of the provision for comparison: 
“Where a taxpayer has paid or agreed to pay to a non-resident person with whom the 
taxpayer was not dealing at arm’s length as price, rental, royalty or other payment for or 
 
262
  There is also a no charge safe harbour for loans to foreign subsidiaries engaged in 
active business and guarantees of third party loans to such subsidiaries: sections 247(7) and 
247(7.1).  
263
  Paragraph (a) of section 251 ITA deems related persons (including those in a de jure 
control relationship) not to be dealing at arm’s length with each other.  In Highland Roofing Ltd v 
MNR 1998 TCC 310 at paragraph [20] the court referred to Revenue Canada’s use of the notion 
of a “common mind which directs the bargaining for both parties to the transaction” in 
Interpretation Bulletin IT-419 as an indicator of not dealing at arm’s length.  The court noted that 
MNR v Sheldon’s Engineering Ltd 55 DTC 1110 (SCC) and MNR v Merritt Estate 69 DTC 5159 
(Ex. Ct.) “basically stated that where the same mind that directs the negotiations or bargaining 
for one party is the same mind that controls negotiations for the other party, then the Court must 
conclude that there is a common mind and that the parties do not deal with each other at arm’s 
length”.  Note here the flavour of pricing being distorted by the exercise of control.  
264
  Notably GlaxoSmithKline, paragraph 3.30 below.   
265
  If only because this was the version under consideration in The Queen v 
GlaxoSmithKline 2012 SCC 52. 
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for the use or reproduction of any property, or as consideration for the carriage of goods 
or passengers or other services, an amount greater than the amount (in this subsection 
referred to as ‘the reasonable amount’) that would have been reasonable in the 
circumstances266 if the non-resident person and the taxpayer had been dealing at arm’s 
length, the reasonable amount shall, for the purpose of computing the taxpayer’s income 
under this Part, be deemed to have been the amount that was paid or is payable 
therefor.” 
3.12 Section 69(3) then provided the converse rule to cover cases where the 
non-arm’s length non-resident had not paid to the Canadian taxpayer an amount 
equal to or greater than the “reasonable amount”, adjusting the taxpayer’s income 
to reflect the reasonable amount.  
3.13 In Alberta Printed Circuits Ltd v The Queen267 it was said by the judge 
that the Federal Court of Appeal in the General Electric case confirmed “there is 
no meaningful difference between paragraphs 247(2)(a) and (c) and subsection 
69(2) of the Act”.  In fact the Federal Court of Appeal in General Electric merely 
observed that the parties had agreed, and the Tax Court judge had accepted, that 
“for present purposes” there was no meaningful difference.  Bloom and Vincent 
(2012)268 note that the Australian Federal Court in the SNF case269 considered that 
subsections 69(2) and (3), in contrast to the Australian transfer pricing rules, 
posited an arm’s length price between the actual parties to the controlled 
 
266
  The “reasonable in the circumstances” component does not appear in section 247(2), 
but it has been suggested that this is implicit in the comparative exercise mandated by the 
adoption of the arm’s length principle in that provision: Tobin (2012); Bloom and Vincent (2012) 
section A.1(b).  See also Wilkie (2009) page 397: “The reference to ‘reasonable in the 
circumstances’ imported the possibility that the particular circumstances of a taxpayer might well 
explain and justify an outcome for that taxpayer almost in spite of what strict transactional 
pricing, as now understood, might recommend and despite how other seemingly similar 
taxpayers might be treated.” Boidman (1987) considers that “reference in the provision to arm’s 
length dealing … seems to contemplate the price which a reasonable person would have agreed 
to in the same circumstances and in order to maximise his own profit where he has a separate 
economic or profit interest” (page 451).   
267
  2011 TCC 232 at paragraph [147] citing paragraph [12] in General Electric 2010 FCA 
344.  
268
  At section 2(b). 
269
  Paragraph 3.74ff below.  
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transaction rather than as between undefined arm’s length persons (as in 
paragraphs 247(2)(a) and (c))270.  
3.14 The question normally asked by paragraphs 247(2)(a) and (c) has been 
described as: “[a]ssuming all of the (non-price) terms and conditions remain 
constant, what would have been the price or results of the controlled transaction 
had it been concluded by persons dealing at arm’s length with each other?” – also 
referred to as a “ceteris paribus approach”271. 
3.15 Canada operates a separate statutory code governing thin 
capitalisation272.  This is essentially formulaic, applying a debt:equity ratio limit of 
1.5:1, rather than relying on the arm’s length standard to determine borrowing 
capacity273, and so is beyond the scope of this study. 
Case law 
3.16 It is not the chronologically first important Canadian transfer pricing 
case274, but General Electric Capital Canada Inc v The Queen275 deserves – 
internationally - pole position in the collection of case law relevant to the 
recognition of passive association as a pricing factor276.  I hesitate to assume, 
regarding the facts, that “only aliens from other galaxies could possibly be 
unfamiliar with them”277, so briefly scene-set here by noting that the case 
concerned the deductibility in Canada of 1% p.a. fees (amounting to C$136.4m) 
paid to the taxpayer company’s AAA-rated US parent for the provision of a 
 
270
  Though this seems at least arguable given the hypothetical “would have been” and “if 
[the parties] had been dealing at arm’s length”.  
271
  Bloom and Vincent (2012), section 2(a).  
272
  Section 18(4)–(8) ITA.  
273
  Other quantitative rules may be relevant to the tax treatment of interest e.g. section 
80.4(2) ITA, which operates by reference to a “prescribed rate” rather than the arm’s length 
standard.  
274
  Some early cases are summarised in Baistrocchi and Roxan (2012) page 122ff.  
275
  2009 TCC 563, affirmed 2010 FCA 344.  
276
  The Australian Chevron case notwithstanding: paragraph 3.82ff below.  
277
  Tremblay (2011).  
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formal guarantee in favour of third party holders of the Canadian company’s 
debentures and commercial paper.   
Fig. V 
 
3.17 The Canadian subsidiary did not have its own formal credit rating but, 
after hearing and evaluating substantial expert testimony, the Tax Court concluded 
that its rating absent the guarantee would be in the range BBB/BB+.  This 
represented an uplift from its “stand-alone/status quo” rating to take account of 
implicit support of three notches on a standard scale of the type operated by 
Standard & Poor’s278.  Of the various pricing methodologies put before it, the 
court preferred a “yield” approach under which the interest cost savings to the 
appellant attributable to the parent guarantee based on a ratings differential 
between BBB-/BBB+ and AAA (the parent’s rating) was approximately 1.83% (y 
– z, in Fig. VI below).  Accordingly the 1% p.a. fee did not exceed an arm’s length 
price as the appellant enjoyed a significant net economic benefit from the 
arrangement; thus the taxpayer’s deduction for the fee was upheld279.  
 
 
 
278
  2009 TCC 563, paragraph [301]. 
279
  The yield approach in principle only provides an upper bound for the fee a borrower 
would pay.  
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Fig. VI280 
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CRA in General Electric argued for notching up to point “c”, thus equalisation of ratings, thus no 
benefit/value in guarantee.
 
3.18 “At the centre of the dispute was the issue of whether, in determining an 
arm’s length price, taxpayers should disregard altogether the factors which are 
particular to the relationship between them or whether those factors form the 
framework in which an arm’s length price is determined.”281  The Court found it 
straightforward to dismiss the CRA’s contention that the economic effect of 
passive association was so strong that the creditworthiness (and thus rating) of the 
Canadian subsidiary should be equalised with that of its US parent.  Also 
 
280
  Intended as a general illustration.  In fact the correlation between rating and borrowing 
cost will not be linear as depicted.  And in the General Electric case, as described above, point 
“c” was in fact the AAA rating of the US parent company.  
281
  Brooks (2013) page 135.  
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dismissed was the Crown’s alternative argument that the Court should make 
adjustments to any interest rate differential to take account of benefits flowing to 
the US parent under the arrangement.  The taxpayer, on the other hand, had argued 
that passive association should be disregarded: “[a]ll distortions that arise from the 
parties’ relationship must be eliminated to arrive at an arm’s length result”; and 
that the Crown’s argument, based upon parent company benefits, should similarly 
be dismissed because such benefits, e.g. the prospect of higher dividend income, 
arose because of share ownership and again therefore should be ignored282.    
3.19 Justice Hogan articulated the choice between two opposing positions:  
“Do all of the economically relevant factors have to be considered in the definition of an 
arm’s length price for the transaction in order to arrive at a meaningful comparison, as 
suggested by the Crown?  Does the scheme of paras 247(2)(a) and (c) suggest that all 
factors which are particular to the non-arm’s length relationship must be discarded, as 
suggested by counsel for the appellant?”283   
3.20 After observing that “dealing at arm’s length” refers to how 
independent parties negotiating in the marketplace would behave, such that the 
arm’s length principle is tied to modern economic theory, including cost-benefit 
analysis, considering available alternatives and seeking out relevant 
information284, the judge found that what was required was “identifying the 
economically relevant characteristics of the transaction that may influence the 
arm’s length parties in their negotiation”.  Thus, counsel for the appellant 
“misapplied the arm’s length principle when he suggested to me that the concept 
of ‘implicit support’ should be ignored because it is rooted in the non-arm’s length 
 
282
  2009 TCC 563, paragraphs [173]-[175].  Al Meghji, counsel for GE, asserted in 
argument that “[t]he real question here is: Should [GE] Canada have to pay for accessing the 
parent’s balance sheet, or should they [have a] free ride?” (Quoted from the trial transcripts in 
Menyasz (2009a).)  I would say, and the court concluded, that the answer is (1) “yes” of course it 
must pay as regards the express guarantee, but (2) “no” it need not pay as regards the benefit 
already conferred by parental implicit support. Whatever one feels as a policy matter, the “free 
ride” is a fact of business life. See further paragraph 4.49(v) below.  
283
  Ibid., paragraph [187]. 
284
  The judge also cited paragraph 1.6 TPG as the basis for adjusting profits “by reference 
to the conditions which would have obtained between independent enterprises in comparable 
transactions in comparable circumstances”, and paragraph 1.15 TPG as “reinforcing” this 
principle: TCC decision, paragraph [204].  
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 102 
relationship.  That concept has nothing to do with the exercise of de facto or de 
jure control which defines a non-arm’s length relationship.  The reputational 
pressure is exerted by GECUS’ debt holders.  It is GECUS’ debt holders that 
would react negatively if the appellant was allowed to default on its debt”285.    
3.21 The statement that implicit support has “nothing to do with” the 
phenomenon of control is controversial, or at least, as one prominent commentator 
archly put it, “the logic in this part of the judgment is hard to follow”286.  In fact 
there is not really any articulation in the judgment of the logic of the proposition, 
beyond the judge’s view that counsel for the appellant over-simplified the 
corporate law applicable to the appellant because, despite a general power to 
appoint and remove directors, a shareholder did not have power to run the 
business of the company287.  But this cannot sensibly be taken as judicial opinion 
that the limitations on shareholder control over a company’s day-to-day 
management neuter the shareholder’s control over the subsidiary to the extent that 
those parties should be regarded as independent.   Actually the key to this 
important aspect of the case is that “implicit support was simply a fact that existed 
independently of whether one of the parties could exercise control over the other 
party and did not emanate from the exercise of control”288.  
3.22 Another interesting aspect of the Tax Court’s analysis was the 
connection made with “modern economic theory” (there is a link here to the 
OECD’s articulation at paragraph 1.38 TPG of the importance of the “options 
realistically available” to a taxpayer): 
“In the final analysis, the ‘arm’s length’ principle in the transfer pricing context is tied to 
modern economic theory, which is based on observations of how parties act in the 
marketplace.  Economic theory assumes that individuals in the marketplace will employ a 
 
285
  Ibid., paragraphs [196]-[199]. 
286
  David Ward QC’s commentary in 12 ITLR 508, at page 513.  
287
  2009 TCC 563 at paragraphs [240]-[246]. 
288
  Bloom and Vincent (2012), section A.1(c). Vincent cites the Tax Court decision at 
paragraph [199]: “… nothing to do with the exercise of de facto or de jure control which defines 
a non-arm’s length relationship”: Transfer Pricing in Canada (2013) page 99. 
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cost benefit analysis in choosing among the alternatives available for achieving their 
commercial objectives.”289 
3.23 The Federal Court of Appeal emphatically endorsed the judgment of the 
Tax Court290.  The Court accepted the taxpayer’s invitation to rule on the implicit 
support aspect of the litigation, even though it was not necessary to do so to 
dispose of the case - the FCA’s observations on the topic may thus be regarded as 
obiter. (If the Tax Court’s recognition of implicit support was overruled, that 
would tend to suppress the taxpayer’s creditworthiness and thus increase the 
credibility of the guarantee fee it had paid, so in that sense a finding that implicit 
support had the effect perceived by the judge was unnecessary to reject the CRA’s 
appeal.)  In its submissions to the FCA291, the taxpayer opposed the Crown’s 
contention that the trial judge had misapplied the “business judgment rule” which 
requires deference to business decisions that lie within a range of reasonable 
alternatives292.  On that, the FCA observed that the trial judge considered there 
was in fact no need to rely on “business judgment” because he had already found 
that the taxpayer’s unguaranteed debt would not be rated close to AAA.  
Accordingly, based on objective factors, the guarantee was necessary293.  The 
taxpayer also asserted that “as a matter of law, the arm’s length standard required 
the trial judge to situate the parties to the transaction (here, GECUS and GECCI) 
as persons unaffiliated with each other”. Thus implicit support would not arise 
because “the concept of implicit support is rooted in the familial relationship 
between affiliated companies”294. Various case law authorities were given for this 
proposition, though in fact these mostly address the question whether or not 
 
289
  2009 TCC 563 at paragraph [197].  
290
  2010 FCA 344.   
291
  Taxpayer’s Memorandum of Fact and Law, filed 2 June 2010, court file A-1-10. 
292
  Ibid., paragraph 43, citing Gabco Limited v Minister of National Revenue (1968) 68 
DTC 5210, 5216 per Justice Cattanach.   
293
  2010 FCA 344 paragraphs [80]-[82].  The Crown had also argued that, if the FCA 
refused to equalise the taxpayer’s credit standing with its AAA-rated parent, the taxpayer should 
nonetheless be regarded as “strategically important” and thus uprated to AA+.  
294
  Ibid., paragraph [44].  
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parties were dealing at arm’s length, rather than the (pricing) consequences of not 
doing so295. 
3.24 Referring to the Tax Court’s formulation of the dispute (paragraph 3.19 
above), the FCA perceived the issue as a “pure question of statutory construction”; 
and “[t]he only question is whether implicit support is a factor that can be 
considered when applying subsection 69(2) and paragraphs 247(2)(a) and (c), 
given that it arises by reason of the non arm’s length relationship”296.  In the 
Court’s view, it was necessary to take into account “all the circumstances which 
bear on the price whether they arise from the relationship or otherwise”. Evidently 
this proposition is to be coloured by the Court’s view of the statutory objective, 
namely “to prevent the avoidance of tax resulting from price distortions which can 
arise in the context of non arm’s length relationships by reason of the community 
of interest shared by related parties.  The elimination of these distortions by 
reference to objective benchmarks is all that is required to achieve the statutory 
objective.  Otherwise all the factors which an arm’s length person in the same 
circumstances as the respondent [the taxpayer] would consider relevant should be 
taken into account”; and “it is common ground that in the context of the yield 
method implicit support is a factor which an arm’s length person would find 
relevant in pricing the guarantee”297.   
3.25 Paragraph 1.6 TPG, and the FCA’s own decision in GlaxoSmithKline298 
(to the effect that all relevant circumstances are to be taken into account in a 
transfer pricing analysis), were regarded as supporting the Court’s conclusion.  
There was “no doubt that the existence of the implicit guarantee is relevant to the 
inquiry and must be considered in identifying the arm’s length price”299.  Thus the 
 
295
  Taxpayer’s Memorandum of Fact and Law paragraph 55, citing e.g. Swiss Bank Corp. 
et al v Minister of National Revenue [1974] SCR 1144: parties found to be not dealing at arm’s 
length, although (at 1152) “[t]he fact that the interest actually authorized or paid is consistent 
with arm’s length dealing is not enough in itself to avoid this conclusion”.  Essentially the same 
question arose in e.g. Peter Cundill & Associates Ltd v The Queen [1991] 2 CTC 221 and The 
Queen v Remai 2009 FCA 340.  
296
  2010 FCA 344 at paragraphs [51]-[52].  
297
  Ibid., paragraphs [54]-[56].  My emphasis.  
298
  2010 FCA 201. 
299
  2010 FCA 344, paragraphs [57]-[59]. 
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case “supports the concept of a holistic approach seen in other cases and the need 
to take into account the circumstances of the parties when interpreting CUPs and 
other market data”300. 
3.26 The FCA’s focus on “eliminating distortions which arise by reason of 
the parties’ community of interest” is central to the decision301.  Arguably, implicit 
support arises for that reason.  But it seems convincing that it is not, in this 
context, a distortion in the sense intended – because independent parties would 
have regard to implicit support.  Moreover, it is not a phenomenon which arises 
from the exercise of control.  The prime target of transfer pricing rules is the case 
where a controlling party imposes conditions on its affiliated counterparty; but the 
“condition” which reflects affiliation benefits is not something which is imposed 
(or perhaps affiliation is not a “condition” at all in the sense of a transactional 
term).  Rather, it is part of the factual matrix within which examination of pricing 
must take place302.    
3.27  One further feature of General Electric which continues to cause 
potential conceptual difficulties is the fact that both the implicit support and the 
transaction being priced (the explicit guarantee) emanated from the same person, 
namely GECUS. This is the “lender as guarantor” paradox mentioned at 
paragraphs 4.49(i) and 4.52(v) below. The response is surely that, in constructing 
a hypothetical comparable transaction, the dimensions of ownership and control 
should be disregarded. In other words, while the characteristics of the parties 
should be respected and translated into the hypothetical transaction (such as a 
borrower being a member of a group of companies with certain attributes), the 
hypothesis must move away from the proposition that the borrower is controlled 
by the actual parent.  See further the discussion of this aspect in relation to the 
McKesson case, paragraph 3.32ff below.  To put this another way, the pricing test 
must proceed by reference to a hypothetical counter-factual – the question is: what 
 
300
  Hickman, Rockall and Hall (2011) section II.  
301
 Cited in Marzen Artistic Aluminium Ltd v The Queen 2014 TCC 194 paragraph [178].   
302
  I commented at the time, in an article entitled GE Verdict Will Set International 
Precedent, that “[t]his need not be regarded as an erosion of the arm’s length principle or 
abandoning respect for separate legal personality: it is just part of the factual matrix” (Clayson 
(2010)).  
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would have happened between hypothetical unrelated parties albeit in similar 
circumstances (including having the same economic characteristics of the actual 
parties), thus eliminating price distortions arising because of the control 
relationship?  
3.28 Further litigation is pending against the GE group in which the CRA 
assert both the recharacterisation rule in paragraphs 247(2)(b) and (d) ITA and the 
unlimited liability nature of the taxpayer company to resist deductions for 
guarantee fees.  A preliminary hearing resulted in the Tax Court rejecting (in 
December 2011) the group’s allegations that the CRA was improperly attempting 
to relitigate the subject-matter of the original General Electric Capital Canada 
dispute303. 
3.29 Two other cases on very similar facts, Burlington Resources Finance 
Company v The Queen and Conoco Funding Company v The Queen are pending 
before the Tax Court.  It is apparent from the report of a preliminary motion304 that 
again the Crown is arguing that, because the Canadian borrower company in each 
case was a Nova Scotia unlimited liability company (having issued billions of 
dollars of bonds supported by its US parent’s guarantee, and having paid a 0.5% 
p.a. guarantee fee to its respective parent), the parent/guarantor was ultimately 
liable for the borrower’s debts in any event i.e. without the need for a guarantee – 
so that the guarantee was valueless.305   
3.30 The Queen v GlaxoSmithKline306 is the Canadian transfer pricing case 
of the highest authority, having reached the Supreme Court in 2012.  The case 
concerned the pricing of the purchase by the Glaxo Canada company of active 
pharmaceutical ingredient from its Swiss affiliate.  The relevant law was section 
 
303
  General Electric Canada Co v The Queen, 2011 TCC 564, summarised in Menyasz 
(2012).  
304
  2015 TCC 71. 
305
  See also HSBC Bank Canada v The Queen 2011 TCC 37 (preliminary motion for 
determination of  questions of law or fact) where it is apparent that the case concerned the 
transfer pricing of guarantee fees paid by the Canadian taxpayer to its Hong Kong, Netherlands 
and UK parent companies.  
306
  2012 SCC 52.  For a detailed review of the facts of the case, and the decision in the 
Tax Court 2008 TCC 324, see e.g. Vidal (2009).  
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69(2) ITA and thus the test being applied was of “the amount … that would have 
been reasonable in the circumstances if the non-resident person and the taxpayer 
had been dealing at arm’s length”.  In the FCA307 (with whose decision the 
Supreme Court did not disagree), Nadon J.A. had relied upon Gabco Limited v 
Minister of National Revenue308 in which it was held that “it is not a question of 
the Minister or this Court substituting its judgment for what is a reasonable 
amount to pay, but rather a case of the Minister or Court coming to the conclusion 
that no reasonable business man would have contracted to pay such an amount 
having only the business consideration of the appellant in mind”.  Thus the test 
“requires an inquiry into those circumstances which an arm’s length purchaser, 
standing in the shoes of the appellant309, would consider relevant in deciding 
whether it should pay the price paid by the appellant … In other words, the test 
mandated by subsection 69(2) [now paragraphs 247(2)(a) and (c)] does not 
operate regardless of the real business world in which the parties to a transaction 
participate”310. 
3.31 The Supreme Court observed that “the challenge is to find an arm’s 
length proxy that replicates the circumstances of Glaxo Canada as closely as 
possible in respect of its acquisition of ranitidine”311.  The statutory requirement to 
consider the “circumstances” meant that “transactions other than the purchasing 
transactions must be taken into account”312.  Support for this conclusion was 
drawn from the TPG (1995 version, paragraph 1.5) on the basis that 
“economically relevant characteristics of the situations being compared” may 
make it necessary to consider other transactions; and enquiring into the price that 
would be reasonable in the circumstances “necessarily involves consideration of 
all circumstances of the Canadian taxpayer relevant to the price paid to the non-
 
307
  2010 FCA 201, paragraph [69]. 
308
  (1968) 68 DTC 5210, 5216. Gabco was a case on section 67 ITA, which also 
contained the phrase “reasonable in the circumstances”.   
309
  And, I would add, wearing the appellant’s clothes generally i.e. assuming its broader 
characteristics.  
310
  2010 FCA 201, paragraphs [73]-[74]. 
311
  Supreme Court decision, paragraph [19]. 
312
  Ibid., paragraph [38].  
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resident supplier … the objective is to determine what an arm’s length purchaser 
would pay for the property …”313.  Moreover, the “economic and  business reality 
of Glaxo Canada” had to be taken into account, although “prices between parties 
dealing at arm’s length will be established having regard to the independent 
interests of each party to the transaction”314.  Thus neither the CRA nor taxpayers 
may “under the guise of a strict technical transfer pricing approach or fictitious 
business world, perform an artificial analysis disregarding factors and 
circumstances which would otherwise be important to arm’s length parties acting 
in the real business world”315.  It followed that the taxpayer’s basic pricing 
structure, which entailed paying its Swiss affiliate multiple times the open market 
price for the API on the basis that this was a component of a “package deal” under 
which it also enjoyed an intellectual property licence from its UK parent, was 
potentially in accordance with the “reasonable in the circumstances” test316.  The 
decision has been described as “recognition from Canada’s highest court that the 
reasonableness of transfer prices must be assessed using a holistic approach that 
takes into account all of the economically relevant circumstances”317.  
3.32 McKesson Canada Corporation v The Queen318 concerned the cross-
border factoring, under a C$900m facility, of trade receivables319 by the Canadian 
taxpayer to its Luxembourg parent.  The case does not directly address passive 
 
313
  Paragraphs [42] and [44]. 
314
  Paragraphs [53] and [63]. 
315
  Vincent, Transfer Pricing in Canada (2013), page 194. 
316
  Albeit a cause of indignation in some quarters of the tax community e.g. Schön 
(January 2013): “[t]his is outright profit shifting.”  See also the articles cited by Schön at footnote 
67.  I rather agree.  This is not a case of intentionally offsetting transactions (where mutuality 
exists between two parties who “give and take”, as contemplated by paragraphs 3.13-17 TPG).  
Put bluntly, the API was bought for an above market price on terms that the taxpayer received a 
cheap IP licence.  Could royalty withholding tax planning, as well as a low effective tax rate in 
Switzerland, have influenced the structure?  Nat Boidman colourfully observed to me “lest 
anybody prematurely pop the champagne or raise the crying towel, the taxpayer has won nothing 
yet because all the SCC did was order a re-hearing by the TCC but this time taking into account 
the licence”.  The case has now been settled without further recourse to the TCC: see e.g. 
taxanalysts Worldwide Tax Daily 8 January 2015.  
317
  Wang (2013) page 193.  Cf. Hickman et al, note 300 above.  
318
  2013 TCC 404.  
319
  New paragraph 7.39 TPG addresses debt factoring and indicates that a CUP method 
could be appropriate in such cases.  
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association, but is nonetheless interesting for its exposition of the application of 
the arm’s length principle, and in particular the assumptions or fictions required to 
arrive at the hypothetical arm’s length analysis.  The CRA made adjustments to 
the taxpayer’s taxable income under section 247(2)(a) and (c) ITA.   
3.33 In dismissing the taxpayer’s appeal against the CRA’s downwards 
reassessment of the factoring rate, the judge observed that: “[w]ithin a transfer 
pricing review, the question arises whether factors that exist only because of the 
non-arm’s length relationship are assumed away in the notional arm’s length 
analysis or remain relevant characteristics and circumstances”320.  As the 
taxpayer’s counterparty was its direct parent company, should the court assume 
that a notional arm’s length counterparty would still have the power e.g. to change 
the taxpayer’s name, sell the taxpayer or do something else to trigger a termination 
event under the receivables sale agreement at will?  Or cause the taxpayer to agree 
to change terms for future transactions, or have access to all relevant financial 
information concerning the taxpayer?    
3.34 Pizzitelli J in Alberta Printed Circuits Ltd v The Queen, himself 
referring to the General Electric decision, was cited with approval on this issue:  
“It is important to note that factors or circumstances that exist solely because of the non-
arm’s length relationship of the parties should not be ignored, otherwise the reasonable 
businessman would not be standing entirely in the Appellant’s shoes … In General 
Electric, the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that no error of law was made in taking 
into consideration the Appellant in that case, as a sub of its larger parent company, stood 
in the position of having an implicit guarantee by its parent of its bank debts. … 
“In short, all circumstances means ‘all’ the circumstances an Appellant finds himself in 
before a reasonable businessman steps into his shoes.”321 
3.35 Thus the Court in McKesson concluded that “all circumstances, 
including those that arise from, derive from or are rooted in the non-arm’s length 
relationship should be taken into account”; and “the better view is therefore that 
 
320
  McKesson., paragraph [128].  
321
 2011 TCC 232 paragraphs [160]–[163], my emphasis. 
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the court can and should consider notional continued control type rights in 
appropriate circumstances when looking at term or executory contract rights.  Not 
to do so would be to not look at all of the relevant characteristics and 
circumstances of the relationships”322.   It was necessary to consider the position 
of a “notional arm’s length MIH” (the Luxembourg parent/receivables purchaser) 
and a “notional arm’s length McKesson Canada” (the 
subsidiary/taxpayer/receivables seller)323.  This required that all the characteristics 
of the respective parties are taken into account.   
3.36 With relevance to a comparability analysis (and relevance to review of 
lender’s circumstances in a lending case – different lenders will have different 
circumstances and thus attitudes to pricing, as with any commodity supplier e.g. 
costs of capital, regulation, portfolio diversity and risk appetite, markets etc – see 
paragraph 5.4 and note 885 below), the judge considered that324:  
“As a general rule, the value of an asset to be sold is not generally affected by a 
particular purchaser’s cost of funds.  Generally, a business or an investor with cash or a 
low cost of funds can profitably make less risky investments with a lower nominal return 
on investment than can a person with a high cost of funds. A purchaser’s cost of funds 
does not decrease the value of the asset it wishes to buy or the investment it is 
considering.  Rather, it simply determines whether that particular purchaser can make the 
purchase or investment profitably, and if so, how profitably.”  
3.37 On 11 June 2014 the taxpayer filed a Memorandum of Fact and Law 
with the Federal Court of Appeal.  This launched a withering attack on the trial 
judge, for “losing sight of his role in the trial process”.  The trial judge (who 
regarded the appellant as accusing him of untruthfulness and impartiality) recused 
himself from further consideration of the outstanding issues in the case325, and the 
taxpayer sought a retrial.   
 
322
  2013 TCC 404 paragraphs [131]-[132]. 
323
  Ibid., paragraphs [330]-[331].  
324
  Ibid., paragraph [347].  
325
  Order dated 4 September 2014; Reasons at 2014 TCC 266.  
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3.38 Aside from the (admittedly transfixing) procedural criticism of the 
judge, the important aspect for this study is the debate around the approach to be 
taken to the control relationship in constructing comparables.  The judge was 
criticised by the taxpayer for “wrongly concluding that the [transaction] was a 
riskless transaction to MIH” (the foreign counterparty to the receivables sale), 
doing so by reference to MIH’s control of the taxpayer and thus its ability to 
“terminate the transaction at will as a result of its status as McKesson Canada’s 
sole shareholder”326.  This was said by the taxpayer to be “a critical misconstrual 
of the arm’s length principle and a clear error of law”327.  The taxpayer contented 
that the arm’s length principle required:  
“a comparison of the terms and conditions – such as price – of the actual transaction 
between non-arm’s length persons to those of a hypothetical transaction between arm’s 
length persons.  The hypothetical transaction is the same in all respects as the non-arm’s 
length transaction – except it takes place between persons dealing at arm’s length. … The 
over-arching purpose of the arm’s length principle is to eliminate, for purposes of 
determining tax liability, distortions in pricing that may arise from the non-arm’s length 
relationship between parties to the actual transaction. … [T]he trial judge disregarded 
the consensus view of the taxpayer and the Crown and made a critical error: in his 
hypothetical transaction, he believed that he was required to assume that the hypothetical 
purchaser somehow would control the supposedly unrelated hypothetical seller.  In so 
doing, the trial judge turned transfer pricing on its head”.328 
3.39 The taxpayer then rounded on the judge’s conclusion that “all 
circumstances, including those that arise from, derive from or are rooted in the 
non-arm’s length relationship should be taken into account” so as thus to 
“consider notional continued control type rights in appropriate circumstances 
when looking at term or executory contract rights”329.  However, this “is 
antithetical to the arm’s length principle.  It is an unwarranted extension of the 
principles set out by [the FCA] in GE Capital, and is wholly inconsistent with the 
 
326
  Appellant’s Memorandum  paragraph 10.  
327
  Ibid., paragraph 44.  
328
  Ibid., paragraphs 71-73.  
329
  Ibid., paragraph 75, citing paragraphs [131]-[132] of the TCC decision.  
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Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in GlaxoSmithKline”.  The recognition of 
implicit support in the GE Capital case is reconciled with the requirement to 
disregard the control relationship on the basis that the former is a “factor which an 
arm’s length person in the same circumstances … would consider relevant” 
whereas “the concept of independent enterprises is similar to the arm’s length 
concept in that both presuppose that neither party controls the other or is subject to 
common control”330.  Thus, said the taxpayer in McKesson: 
“[78]  Two things are apparent from the above excerpt of this Court’s reasoning in GE 
Capital. First, a particular factor must be considered if it would be relevant to an arm’s 
length person pricing the same transaction.  Second, in the hypothetical transaction to be 
considered by the Court, neither party controls the other or is subject to common control.   
“[79] In other words, the membership of each party to a non-arm’s length transaction in 
a corporate group just like the corporate group to which it actually belongs may be a 
factor that an arm’s length party would consider in pricing a transaction with that 
person, in which case it properly informs the transfer pricing of the non-arm’s length 
transaction.  But in no case should the fact that the parties belong to the same corporate 
group, much less the fact that one controls the other, inform the application of transfer 
pricing rules to the dealings between them. That would be the antithesis of the arm’s 
length principle, the object of which is to determine an arm’s length price as if the related 
parties were in fact unrelated and entered into the same transaction. 
“[80] In this regard, GE Capital is consistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in GlaxoSmithKline.  In that case, Justice Rothstein (speaking for the Court) held 
that the requirement, found in a license agreement with its parent, that the taxpayer 
purchase its active pharmaceutical ingredient from an approved source, was a factor to 
be considered in pricing the active pharmaceutical ingredient because it ‘was not the 
product of the non-arm’s length relationship between Glaxo Canada and [its parent] or 
[its affiliate]’ and an arm’s length party ‘might well be faced with the same requirement’. 
“[81] In summary, both GE Capital and GlaxoSmithKline are clear that circumstances 
must inform the arm’s length pricing of a transaction if an arm’s length party wold have 
considered them. An arm’s length party in MIH’s shoes would not have considered that it 
 
330
  Ibid., paragraph 77, citing paragraphs [55], [57] from the FCA decision in General 
Electric.  
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controlled McKesson Canada, because an arm’s length party in MIH’s shoes would not 
have controlled McKesson Canada: in the properly articulated hypothetical, the arm’s 
length person in MIH’s shoes does not control McKesson Canada, and someone else does 
control McKesson Canada.”331 
3.40 It was reported in June 2015 that the case had settled332, so the litigation 
will not now provide further judicial elucidation of the arm’s length principle.  
Nevertheless, the Tax Court’s endorsement of the need to take into account all 
relevant circumstances and characteristics, including those attributable to group 
affiliations, and the taxpayer’s (more limited) acceptance that affiliation may be an 
arm’s length pricing factor, present a solidifying of the recognition of passive 
association in Canadian tax jurisprudence.  
3.41 The Alberta Printed Circuits case333 is mentioned above in the 
discussion of General Electric.  It offers a somewhat helpful general statement of 
the “parity” policy underlying transfer pricing rules: 
“The underlying policy concern behind the transfer pricing rules is, of course, leakage 
from the Federal Treasury due to profits being shifted from one country to another or, 
expressed in more conventional terms, the object is to ensure that parties not at arm’s 
length report substantially the same amount of income in the jurisdiction in which they 
are located as would parties dealing at arm’s length.” 334 
3.42 The case is interesting also because of the judge’s citation of paragraph 
2.6 TPG and the use of internal and external comparables335.  In the loan context, 
the paradigm internal comparable would be where the intra-group borrower has in 
fact also borrowed in a comparable manner (terms, quantum, circumstances, etc) 
from a third party e.g. bank lender (as in Fig. II above, paragraph 2.83).  In 
 
331
  Ibid., paragraphs 78-81.  
332
  24 TMTPR 132, quoting McKesson’s Form 10-K filed with the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  
333
  2011 TCC 232. 
334
  Ibid., paragraph 152.  
335
  Ibid., paragraph [172].  See paragraph 3.24 TPG; paragraph 2.36 above.  The court 
found that internal CUPs existed and were inappropriately ignored by the CRA (paragraph 
[200]).  
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principle, although evidentially more challenging, the outcome should be the same 
in the absence of such an internal comparable - if it is possible to prove, 
hypothetically, what would have happened had the intra-group funding instead 
been raised from an independent lender. 
3.43 Vincent, in Transfer Pricing in Canada, identifies a collection of cases 
which did not make it to trial and final court decision.  One of these, HSBC Bank 
Canada v The Queen, entailed a Tax Court decision at interlocutory stage, under 
which the court provided an observation relevant to “informational asymmetry”: 
“The arm’s length fee cannot be determined on the basis of information that an arm’s 
length party would not have. This does raise the intriguing question of whether the third 
party is deemed to have knowledge that the parent would have had notwithstanding in the 
real world it could not get that knowledge.  My view is that one has to take the real world 
approach.” 336  
3.44 This concept of informational asymmetry is in my view somewhat 
analogous to, but separate from, the effect of passive association.  It is probably 
best perceived as a comparability factor.  In other words, in assessing the 
comparability of a transaction involving a third party, it may be appropriate to 
adjust pricing by reference to informational asymmetry.  In the financing context, 
information about the borrower goes to the heart of the evaluation of credit risk. 
Thus an inadequacy of relevant information would logically be regarded as 
increasing risk and thus pricing, or diminishing a lender’s appetite for lending.  
But in the arm’s length lending context, the problem is typically ameliorated by 
disclosure (as in public debt issues) or by covenants requiring the periodic 
delivery of financial information to the lender. Thus the lender’s understanding of 
the affairs of the borrower, so far as relevant to the risk proposition, may be 
significantly approximated to the knowledge of (say) the borrower’s parent 
company, such that informational asymmetry is largely dissipated.  
 
336
  TCC file number 2006-3579(IT)G; [2011] 1 CTC 2025 paragraph [38]. 
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Tax authority practice 
3.45 Canada has been described as “a relatively aggressive jurisdiction with 
regard to cross-border transactions”337.  In the financial transactions context, 
guarantee fees have attracted particular (and inconsistent as between inbound and 
outbound cases) attention338. The principal CRA publication on transfer pricing is 
Information Circular IC 87-2R (1999) which replaced and updated IC 87-2 (1987).  
The CRA broadly embraces OECD principles including pricing methodologies.  
Neither the Circular nor its predecessor have engaged with the topic of passive 
association; the publications are in the nature of general transfer pricing guidance.  
This is unsurprising given that they significantly pre-date the case law which has 
been the catalyst for the debate.  Of course one must anyway be careful not to 
defer to tax authority guidance as if it were a statute339; indeed, the CRA 
acknowledges (paragraph 3) that the Circular “is not to be construed as a formal 
interpretation of the law”.  It is said nonetheless (paragraph 9) that “the arm’s 
length principle treats a group of parties not dealing at arm’s length as if they 
operate as separate entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified 
business”.  But this statement is no more than a reiteration from paragraph 1.6 
TPG and should not be regarded as a repudiation of the recognition of passive 
association or other group synergy effects (especially given the CRA’s 
enthusiastic adoption of the implicit support proposition in General Electric).   
3.46 Otherwise, of passing interest are paragraphs 159–163 in the intra-group 
services section. Paragraph 159 notes that the arm’s length charge is a function of 
the price at which a supplier is prepared to perform a service, and also a function 
of the value to the recipient.  Thus “the determination of an arm’s length charge 
must take into consideration the amount that an arm’s length entity is prepared to 
pay [or, I suggest, be paid] for such a service in comparable circumstances”. 
Moreover, “where a service is rendered by arm’s length parties, or the service 
 
337
  Zorzi and Rizzuto (2013) page 426.  
338
  Dujsic and Billings (2004), section 2.5.  
339
  Interpretive publications by the CRA are not binding in law, but may in certain 
circumstances be of persuasive value in interpreting ambiguous provisions: see Vincent (2013) 
pages 60-65 and cases there cited.  
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supplier, as part of its ordinary and recurring activities, renders the service for 
arm’s length parties, the price charged in those circumstances is a good indication 
of the arm’s length price”.  And “one must also take into account the economic 
alternatives available to the recipient of the service”.  All these statements are at 
least consistent with the proposition that, in arriving at an intra-group charge, it is 
appropriate to enquire what the service recipient (or, by analogy, borrower) would 
have paid to an arm’s length service provider (or lender/guarantor).  
3.47 In January 1994, the CRA and Department of Finance released a 
statement criticising various aspects of the US section 482 Regulations.  Aside 
from the US dimension, the release is interesting from a Canadian-domestic 
perspective (albeit at a time when section 69 ITA governed) given the emphasis 
on use of “a pricing method unrelated parties would negotiate” to arrive at 
“amounts that would be reasonable if the parties were not members of the same 
economic group”.    
3.48 The CRA’s Transfer Pricing Memorandum TPM-14 (31 October 2012) 
provided an overview of changes made in the 2010 TPG, and revised certain 
cross-references to the TPG in IC87-2R.  The CRA aligned its practice with the 
need to find the “best” method and endorsed the OECD’s 9-step comparability 
analysis. It was also confirmed that the revised TPG would be applied to pre-2010 
transactions and treaties, on the basis that the changes were a “clarification and 
elaboration”.  TPM-15 (29 January 2015) addresses intra-group services.  It 
touches on interest payments and notes that “if an arm’s length amount is not 
otherwise deductible under the Income tax Act, it does not become deductible 
simply because section 247 of the Income tax Act and Article 9 of a tax treaty are 
applied”340.  
3.49 In summary, Canada has led the way, through its case law, to the 
recognition of passive association in pricing controlled transactions.  The General 
Electric case is now cited around the world, though with mixed impact. It provides 
the basis for resolution of the paradox: the effects of passive association should be 
 
340
  Paragraph 44, citing Utah Mines v The Queen 92 DTC 6194.  
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recognised, despite inherently emanating from group affiliation; but they should 
not be regarded as factors which distort pricing due to exercise of the control 
relationship.  The Glaxo case indicates that “all the circumstances” of the case 
must be taken into account to arrive at an arm’s length price, and the taxpayer’s 
argument in McKesson provides a neat reconciliation of the acceptance of that 
proposition with the need, in testing the independent transaction hypothesis, to 
disregard the distortive effects of the control relationship.  
 
Australia 
3.50 The recognition of passive association as a factor in pricing controlled 
financing transactions has long been aired in Australian tax circles, including 
official publications.  It established a legislative toe-hold in the 2013 re-write of 
Australia’s transfer pricing laws, and is clearly supported in official practice 
through ATO/governmental statements, although in my view the statutory position 
is not as clear as some commentators seem to assume341.  In the thin capitalisation 
context, legislative clarification has recently been recommended (paragraph 3.67 
below).  At least for periods prior to the update of the legislation however, the 
relevance of implicit support was vigorously challenged by the taxpayer in the 
Chevron case, but approved in principle by the Federal Court: paragraph 3.82 
below.   
Legislation 
3.51 Australia’s modern transfer pricing laws, introduced in 1982342, were 
substantially rewritten pursuant to the Tax Laws Amendment Act (Countering Tax 
 
341
  Professional advisory opinion seems to have embraced parental affiliation as a 
required step in loan pricing.  See e.g. the Australia chapter by members of Ernst & Young at 
page 57 of Bakker and Levey (2012).   
342
  Applicable to income arising after 27 May 1981.  From 1921 Australia had enacted 
laws based on the UK’s section 31 Finance (No 2) Act 1915: see note 579 below.  
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Avoidance and Multinational Profit Shifting) Act 2013.  A new detailed code343, 
contained in Subdivisions 815-B to 815-D of Division 815 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997, was introduced by the 2013 Act, and the formerly 
applicable Division 13 of Part III of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 has 
been repealed; interim rules contained in Subdivision 815-A of the 1997 Act 
(introduced by the Tax Laws Amendment (Cross-Border Transfer Pricing) Act 
(No.1) 2012) no longer have effect.  Thin capitalisation rules are contained in 
Division 820.344  
3.52 Subdivisions 815-C and 815-D, respectively, are about the arm’s length 
principle for PEs and special rules for trusts and partnerships.  I will focus 
therefore on Subdivision 815-B, titled “Arm’s length principle for cross-border 
conditions between entities”.  
3.53 Section 101 of Subdivision 815-B applies “if an entity would otherwise 
get a tax advantage in Australia from cross-border conditions that are inconsistent 
with the internationally recognised arm’s length principle”.  In such cases, “the 
entity is treated for income tax and withholding tax purposes as if arm’s length 
conditions had operated”.  This is to be achieved by determining “the conditions 
that might be expected to operate between entities dealing at arm’s length”, so that 
if the actual conditions differ from the arm’s length conditions, and – in a cross-
border context345 – an entity gets a transfer pricing benefit (e.g. its taxable income 
would have been greater under arm’s length conditions), the arm’s length 
conditions are taken to operate346.  There is taken to be a difference between the 
actual conditions and the arm’s length conditions if (a) an actual condition exists 
 
343
  Available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/itaa1997240/ (accessed 
27 August 2015).  
344
  A report of 18 August 2015 on corporate tax avoidance by the Senate Economics 
References Committee proposes a final report on 30 November 2015 (now extended to 26 
February 2016) including a focus on transfer pricing and “excessive debt loading”.   
345
  See the table at subsection 815-120(3).  The rules are designed to ensure that 
Subdivision 815-B does not apply to purely domestic arrangements: Explanatory Memorandum 
paragraph 3.60. 
346
  Paragraph 815-105(1)(b) and subsection 815-105(2); paragraph 815-115(1)(b); 
subsection 815-120(1). 
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that is not one of the arm’s length conditions, or (b) a condition does not exist in 
the actual conditions but is one of the arm’s length conditions347. 
3.54 “Arm’s length conditions” are “the conditions that might be expected to 
operate between independent entities dealing wholly independently with one 
another in comparable circumstances”.  To identify the arm’s length conditions, it 
is necessary to use the “most appropriate and reliable” method, “having regard to 
all relevant factors” including “the circumstances”348.  Then, in identifying 
comparable circumstances, “regard must be had to all relevant factors” including 
“the economic circumstances”. “[C]ircumstances are comparable to actual 
circumstances if, to the extent (if any) that the circumstances differ from the actual 
circumstances, (a) the difference does not materially affect a condition that is 
relevant to the method; or (b) a reasonably accurate adjustment can be made to 
eliminate the effect of the difference on a condition that is relevant to the 
method”349. 
3.55 The identification of the arm’s length conditions must (a) be based on 
the commercial or financial relations in connection with which the actual 
conditions operate; and (b) have regard to both the form and substance of those 
relations350.  Transactions may be disregarded/recharacterised in certain cases351.  
Arm’s length conditions are to be identified “so as best to achieve consistency 
with” the TPG352.  In thin capitalisation situations (where Division 820 applies), 
the interest rate is to be determined as if the arm’s length conditions had operated 
and applied to the debt actually issued; but Division 820 may reduce or further 
reduce the debt deductions353. 
 
347
  Subsection 815-120(2). 
348
  Subsections 815-125(1) and (2). 
349
  Subsections 815-125(3) and (4).  
350
  Subsection 815-130(1).  
351
  Subsections 815-130(2)-(4). Taxation Ruling TR 2014/6 provides guidance on the 
ATO’s approach.  But passive association and its financial consequences are just relevant facts 
for analysis and should have no particular interface with recharacterisation principles.   
352
  Section 815-135, emulating the UK statute: paragraph 3.157 below.  
353
  Section 815-140.  
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3.56 In the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the 2013 Bill354 the 
required “arm’s length conditions” hypothesis in section 815-125 is described 
thus: 
“The identification of arm’s length conditions involves hypothesising what independent 
entities would have done in the place of the actual entities.  This process requires the 
postulation of how independent entities in comparable circumstances would have dealt 
with one another had they been dealing at arm’s length.”355 
3.57 Thus the enquiry is into how two independent entities would have 
behaved.  There is no suggestion that one of the entities in the counter-factual is 
the actual taxpayer; it is implicit in the reference to “independent entities … in 
place of the actual entities”, that the required hypothesis relates to two 
hypothetical parties.  
3.58 However, regard must be had to the characteristics of the actual entities 
in postulating the independent entities. The Explanatory Memorandum notes 
significant increases in recent years in the volume and complexity of cross-border 
intra-firm financing transactions.  Importantly for this study of passive association, 
it is said: 
“In the more complex cases involving these financing facilities, determining the arm’s 
length conditions could include factors that relate to an entity’s relative financial 
strength, and how the market would perceive the entity’s financial strength with explicit 
consideration given to the fact that the entity is part of a larger financial group.”356 
 
354
  With effect from 1984, section 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 provided for 
the use of extrinsic material in the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.  Included in the list of 
relevant material is: “any explanatory memorandum relating to the Bill containing the provision, 
or any other relevant document, that was laid before, or furnished to the members of, either 
House of Parliament by a Minister before the time when the provision was enacted”.  See: 
www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Browse
_by_Topic/law/explanmem/wasthereanEM (accessed 20 August 2015). 
355
  Explanatory Memorandum on the Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance 
and Multinational Profit Shifting) Bill 2013, paragraph 3.77, my emphasis.  
356
  Ibid., paragraph 3.78, my emphasis.  
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3.59 Accordingly, “[t]his means that the concept of implicit parental support 
is now enshrined into Australian transfer pricing law.”357  It strikes me though 
that, while the pronouncements of the ATO (paragraph 3.93ff below) have built a 
strong impression that that is the appropriate approach, the words of the statute, 
even when taken with the interpretative influence of the Explanatory 
Memorandum, do not go quite that far.  
3.60 As to comparability: 
“The term ‘comparable circumstances’ relates to the profile of each of the hypothetical 
independent entities.  By requiring that the independent entities be in ‘comparable 
circumstances’ to the actual entities, the nature of the actual entities and the context 
within which they operate is directly relevant in constructing the profile of the 
hypothetical entities.”358 
3.61 Thus “the relevant question for the purposes of Subdivision 815-B is 
whether the conditions which operate between the entities would make 
commercial sense if the entities were dealing wholly independently with one 
another”, i.e. whether the parties “have acted as independent parties would in 
comparable circumstances, so that the outcome of the dealing is a matter of real 
bargaining”359.  In determining the degree of comparability with circumstances 
being compared, “consideration must be given to the range of options that would 
be realistically available to an independent enterprise in comparable 
circumstances”360.  The OECD’s five comparability factors are then listed, with 
summary material derived from the TPG. 
3.62 Division 820 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997361 addresses thin 
capitalisation cases.  Its operation is preserved in transfer pricing cases by a rule 
 
357
  Australia chapter (Fone and Hainsworth) in Bloomberg BNA’s Transfer Pricing 
Forum, vol. 4, no. 4 (December 2013) on Implicit Support;  “[i]t is expected that the ATO will 
release further guidance on its views as to the acceptable treatment of both explicit guarantees 
and implicit parental support” (page 9).   At the date of writing they have not done so.  
358
  Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 3.79.  
359
  Ibid., paragraphs 3.88, 3.89, citing Trustee for the Estate of the Late AW Furse No.5 
Will Trust v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 21 ATR 1123, 1132.  
360
  Ibid., paragraph 3.125, echoing e.g. TPG paragraphs 1.38 and 9.59.   
361
  Inserted by the New Business Tax System (Thin Capitalisation) Act 2001.  
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which requires that where, in applying arm’s length conditions, a rate is applied to 
a debt interest, the rate is to be worked out as if the arm’s length conditions had 
operated.  However, that rate is to be applied to the debt interest the entity actually 
issued instead of the debt interest that would have been issued in arm’s length 
circumstances.  Division 820 can then operate.362 
3.63 The thin capitalisation rules are extremely detailed and it is not my 
intention to examine them beyond noting that one available method for calculating 
a tax-allowable amount of debt363 is the so-called “arm’s length debt amount”364.  
This has been described by the ATO as a “modified” arm’s length approach365.  
The determination includes both “would” and “could” dimensions, namely (i) an 
amount of debt that the entity “would reasonably be expected366 to have” (which is 
attributable to its Australian business), and (ii) an amount of debt that would be 
provided by unaffiliated commercial lenders – i.e. what the taxpayer “could” have 
borrowed.  Several factual assumptions are required, including that “any 
guarantee, security or other form of credit support” provided to the entity in 
relation to the Australian business by its associates is disregarded367.  These words 
appear to refer only to formal or legal obligations, not to implicit credit support 
(although the reference to “other form of credit support” muddies the water). 
 
362
  Subsection 815-140(2); Explanatory Memorandum paragraphs 3.143–3.149. This 
approach is said to maintain the administrative approach in TR 2010/7 (paragraph 3.100 below), 
which was confirmed in Subdivision 815-A.  
363
  Division 974 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 provides a mechanism for 
characterising instruments as debt or equity, including for thin capitalisation purposes.  Division 
974 is itself subject to a review by the Board of Taxation:         
http://www.taxboard.gov.au/content/content.aspx?doc=reviews_and_consultations/debt_and_equ
ity/default.htm&pageid=007 (accessed 17 August 2015).  
364
  Section 820-105 for outbound investment and section 820-215 for inbound.  However, 
most entities subject to thin capitalisation rules make use of the alternative safe harbour test: 
Board of Taxation, Review of the Thin Capitalisation Arm’s Length Debt Test (December 2013), 
paragraph 3.12.  
365
  Taxation Ruling TR 2010/7 paragraph 63.  
366
  In Taxation Ruling TR 2013/1 paragraph 33, the ATO cites Commissioner v Peabody 
[1994] HCA 43 paragraph 31 (a High Court case on Australia’s general anti-avoidance rule): “a 
reasonable expectation requires more than a possibility.  It requires a prediction as to events 
which would have taken place … and the prediction must be sufficiently reliable for it to be 
regarded as reasonable”.  There is a possible read-across here to the UK’s section 154(4)(b) 
TIOPA: paragraph 3.161 below.  
367
  Subparagraphs 820-105(2)(e)(i), 820-215(2)(e)(i). 
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3.64 The Board of Taxation368 issued a discussion paper in December 2013, 
Review of the Thin Capitalisation Arm’s Length Debt Test.  One of the issues on 
which stakeholder comments were sought was “whether credit support from 
related parties could be recognised in particular circumstances when they 
correspond to ordinary commercial dealings and do not represent integrity 
concerns, and how to determine those circumstances”369.  Noting the uncertainty 
as to whether implicit support is currently addressed by the statute, the Board 
observed that “[n]ot excising implicit parent or group support could undermine the 
purpose of isolating the stand-alone business”370.  Stakeholders were invited to 
comment on the extent to which lenders would take into account implied 
support371, it being noted that “[a]ccordingly there is some uncertainty as to 
whether the policy of identifying and excising the support provided to the stand-
alone Australian business should also extend to implicit credit support that can 
arise from parent entities or other group entities”372.   
3.65 And –  
“[a]rguably, parent or group affiliation is directly relevant to the amount of debt an 
Australian business can borrow373.  The strategic position of the entity in the context of 
the group’s business directions, reputation, the economic benefit to the Australian 
business of using the parent’s name and other factors can result in implicit support being 
provided … For example, consider a situation where an Australian company is rated on 
its own as sub-investment grade, but is considered core to its parent.  This could result in 
a significant uplift to the Australian company’s rating, and as a result, it could be argued 
by the taxpayers that the company would be able to borrow significantly more debt374. The 
 
368
  A non-statutory advisory body charged with contributing a business and broader 
community perspective to improving the design of taxation laws and their operation: 
http://www.taxboard.gov.au (accessed 20 August 2015).   
369
  Page 28, question (g).  
370
  Paragraph 4.58.  
371
  Page 36 question (e).  
372
  Paragraph 4.56.  
373
  Contrast the attitude currently (but in my view misguidedly) adopted by HMRC: 
paragraph 3.189 below.  
374
  Paragraph 5.38 acknowledges that “the transfer pricing rules also factor in credit 
support, which the thin capitalisation rules exclude” and  “if the operations of the subsidiary are 
core to the group, the credit rating of a subsidiary could be ‘notched’ up such that it has the same 
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fact that the Australian company is making losses would not affect the uplifted ‘core’ 
rating, as the taxpayer could simply argue that, despite the Australian company’s losses, 
the ultimate parent will continue to fund the Australian company’s debt obligations (for 
example, through equity injections which cover the interest payments).”375  
3.66 Noting that “adjustments to credit support to comply with thin 
capitalisation rules could be complex and require detailed analysis to be 
performed” (against its terms of reference of reducing compliance costs and 
making the arm’s length debt test easier for the ATO to administer), the Board of 
Taxation asked “whether there is a need to better define and provide guidance on 
the identification and exclusion of certain types of credit support to avoid 
inappropriate outcomes and, if so, how this could be achieved?”376.  
3.67 The Board reported on 19 December 2014; the document was released 
on 4 June 2015.  Submissions from Chartered Accountants Australia and New 
Zealand and PwC had contended that “for transfer pricing purposes, implicit credit 
support is a relevant factor in determining arm’s length rates” and proposed that 
“only explicit credit support is to be excluded from the ALDT analysis [as this] 
would provide certainty to taxpayers, would be consistent with commercial 
lending practices, and would better harmonise the thin capitalisation and transfer 
pricing regimes”377.  The ATO interestingly acknowledged the dual effects of 
implicit support as tending to (i) reduce arm’s length interest rates, and (ii) 
increase borrowing capacity378.  The Board concluded, and has recommended to 
 
credit standing as its foreign parent, resulting in the subsidiary paying the same interest rate that 
the parent would be expected to pay for its debt”.  Moreover, in the transfer pricing context, “[i]n 
considering the arm’s length interest rate for a given loan arrangement, all the relevant 
commercial and financial conditions surrounding the two entities need to be taken into account” 
(paragraph 5.40).  Thus the Board asked “whether there is scope for placing greater reliance on 
the analysis undertaken under the transfer pricing rules in applying the ALDT and, if there is 
scope, how this can be achieved while preserving the intended outcomes of both regimes”.  (Q 
5.2 Issues/Questions, (b).) 
375
  Ibid., paragraphs 4.57-58.  
376
  Ibid., paragraph 1.6 and Q 4.2 Issues/Questions, (g).  
377
  Paragraph 5.17. Presumably the comment about implicit support in the transfer pricing 
context relates to the modern law in Subdivisions 813-B to 815-D: paragraphs 3.50 to 3.58 
above.  
378
  Paragraph 5.18.  See the diagrammatic representation at paragraph 5.14, Fig XI, 
below.  
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the Government, that implicit support should not be excluded (so could be 
recognised) in the ALDT analysis.  However, this appears to be based on the view 
that implicit support “tends to affect the price of debt but not the amount of debt 
available in commercial dealings” (the latter being “the crucial question in an 
ALDT context”379).    
3.68 Mention should be made of the formerly applicable law in Division 13 
Part III (sections 136AA-136AG, introduced in 1982 to “overcome difficulties” in 
the former Division 13 exposed by Commissioner v Commonwealth Aluminium 
Corporation Ltd380) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.  This legislation 
was under consideration in the case law discussed below at paragraphs 3.72ff.  
Section 136AC defined “international agreements” as, essentially, cross-border 
agreements involving an Australian taxpayer for the supply or acquisition of 
property, “property” itself broadly defined to include services381.  Where the 
Commissioner was satisfied that the parties were not dealing at arm’s length, 
section 136AD deemed the consideration received or receivable by a taxpayer who 
had supplied property to be that consideration which is “equal to the arm’s length 
consideration”.  Section 136AD(2) addressed the situation where no consideration 
(rather than inadequate consideration) was received by the taxpayer.  Section 
136AA(3)(c) explained “the arm’s length consideration” as what “might 
reasonably be expected to have been given … under an agreement between 
independent parties dealing at arm’s length with each other”.  Section 136AD(3) 
provided the converse rule for acquisitions of “property” by an Australian 
taxpayer, again imputing “arm’s length consideration”.   
3.69 Detailed guidance was provided by Taxation Ruling TR 94/14, but little 
is to be found there of relevance to the recognition of passive association, and 
nothing directly engaging with the topic.  Indeed, TR 94/14 was concerned 
primarily with transactions in goods and other tangible assets.  One interesting 
 
379
  Paragraphs 5.27–5.29, citing discussions with an unnamed Australian lending 
institution and with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.  
380
  (1980) 143 CLR 646; see TR 94/14 paragraph 155.  
381
  Subsection 136AA(1), the definition encompassing transactions for royalties and 
loans.   
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comment though is that, in discussing the importance of bargaining power, the 
ATO decided to “go further” than the OECD382 to “add that where [conditions 
similar to those existing between unrelated parties] do exist, failure by the 
members [of an MNE group] to exercise that autonomy and operate as separate 
profit centres, would be unlikely to lead to a result that is consistent with the arm’s 
length principle”383.  TR 94/14 also observes that “independent parties who were 
dealing at arm’s length would each compare the options realistically available to 
them and seek to maximise the overall value of their respective entities from the 
economic resources available to or obtainable by them”, and “minimise the 
consideration to be given in respect of the acquisition of property”384.  The ATO’s 
glosses upon these related concepts (relative bargaining power and options 
realistically available) lend support to the view that a borrower which could raise 
funds externally at a certain price, or in a certain quantum, should not be required 
to report a less favourable transaction with its parent or other affiliate. 
3.70 Subdivision 815-A (no longer applicable) was introduced by the Tax 
Laws Amendment (Cross-Border Transfer Pricing) Act 2012, controversially with 
application to income years beginning on or after 1 July 2004385, in part as a 
statutory response to governmental dissatisfaction with the SNF case (paragraph 
3.74ff below).  The legislation recited its equivalence to, but independence of, the 
“transfer pricing rules in Australia’s double tax agreements”, and its object as 
ensuring that “amounts are appropriately brought to tax in Australia, consistent 
 
382
  See paragraph 1.5 TPG.  
383
  TR 94/14 paragraph 55.  
384
  Ibid., paragraphs 66, 68(b).  
385
  The new legislation was considered to be “consistent with Parliament’s view that 
treaties provided a separate basis for making transfer pricing adjustments” according to the 
Explanatory Memorandum on the 2012 Bill, page 3, despite the “contrary argument [which] 
relies on a general argument that tax treaty rules cannot be used to extend taxing rights beyond 
the limits of domestic law”: paragraph 1.21.  However, “tax treaties do not generally apply to 
restrict the right of states to tax their own residents”: paragraph 1.34, citing paragraph 6.1 OECD 
Commentary on Article 1 MTC.  Australia’s tax treaties are incorporated into domestic law by 
the International Tax Agreements Act 1953.  In Case 53 (1963) 11 CBTR (NS) 261, 279, the 
Board considered that a forerunner of Article 9 (Article IV in the then applicable UK-Australia 
treaty) was “not a formula for determining taxable income; it is a directive to be observed in the 
course of determining taxable income … the Commissioner could, in our view, take into account 
in the course of determining taxable income profits … calculated in accordance only with Article 
IV”.  See now the Chevron case (paragraph 3.82ff below) at paragraph 61 for the Federal Court’s 
conclusion that Article 9 does not confer a separate and independent power to tax.  
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with the arm’s length principle”, namely “profits which would have accrued to an 
Australian entity if it had been dealing at arm’s length, but by reason of non-arm’s 
length conditions operating between the entity and its foreign associated entities, 
have not so accrued”386.  The key operative provision, section 815-10, permitted 
the “negation” of a transfer pricing benefit, but only in cases where a tax treaty 
with an associated enterprises provision equivalent to Article 9 of the 
Australia/UK treaty applied to the entity.   
3.71 For Australian resident entities, a “transfer pricing benefit” would arise 
if the requirements of a treaty associated enterprises article are met; “an amount of 
profits which, but for the conditions mentioned in the article, might have been 
expected to accrue to the entity, has, by reason of those conditions, not so 
accrued”; and, had that amount of profits so accrued to the entity, its taxable 
income for the income year in question would be greater than its actual amount387.  
Thus, in effect, “the transfer pricing articles contained in Australia’s tax treaties 
are able to be applied independently of Division 13 through explicit incorporation 
into the ITAA 1997”388.  Determining whether a transfer pricing benefit had been 
obtained, and interpreting a treaty provision, were to be done consistently with the 
MTC and its Commentaries and the TPG389.   
Case law 
3.72 Before the important Chevron case (paragraph 3.82ff below), which 
bears directly on the passive association topic, Australia had provided just two 
significant substantive390 transfer pricing cases, Roche Products Pty Ltd v 
 
386
  Paragraph 815-5(a).   
387
  Subsection 815-15(1).  
388
  Explanatory Memorandum paragraph 1.52.  
389
  Section 815-20.  The TPG were described as “the international consensus on transfer 
pricing” containing “authoritative know-how on the application of transfer pricing rules”, citing 
the view expressed in the UK’s DSG case (paragraph 3.165 below) that the TPG were “the best 
evidence of international thinking” on the topic: Explanatory Memorandum paragraph 1.93.  
390
  Syngenta Crop Protection Pty Ltd v Commissioner [2005] FCA 1646 and W R 
Carpenter Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner [2008] ATC 20-040 focused on procedural issues; 
Daihatsu Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner [2001] ATC 4268 was an unsuccessful attempt by 
the taxpayer via judicial review under the Judiciary Act 1903 to invalidate Division 13 
assessments; San Remo Macaroni v Commissioner [1999] FCA 1468 concerned the application 
of Division 13 to an unrelated party transaction.  See the Australia chapter by Richard Vann in 
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Commissioner391 and Commissioner v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd392.  Both cases 
were concerned with sales of goods to Australian taxpayer companies by their 
foreign affiliates, and in both cases the relevant law was primarily Division 13 of 
Part III of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. 
3.73 The Roche case has little to say of general importance about 
interpretation of the arm’s length principle.  The focus was on the “arm’s length 
consideration” demanded by section 136AD of the 1936 Act, though the 
Commissioner also invoked Article 9 of the Australia-Switzerland double tax 
treaty and the equivalent provision in the Australia-Singapore treaty.  However, 
the parties “spent little time dealing with the words of either set of provisions and 
effectively accepted that the same result would obtain whichever was applied”, it 
being “pointed out that the concepts of ‘independence’ and ‘arm’s length’ are 
almost interchangeable”393.  The judge did not find it necessary to rule on the 
applicability of the treaties, but thought that “there is a lot to be said for the 
proposition that the treaties, even as enacted as part of the law of Australia, do not 
go past authorising legislation and do not confer power on the Commissioner to 
assess.  They allocate taxing power between the treaty parties rather than 
conferring any power to assess on the assessing body”394.  The case was decided 
on the basis of the expert evidence on pharmaceutical market pricing, rather than 
delving into the significance of the economic characteristics of the parties.  
3.74 The SNF case, on the other hand, contains some significant discussion 
of the arm’s length test, as well as opining upon the legal effect of the TPG.  SNF 
also concerned the application of section 136AD.  The Australian company had 
 
Baistrocchi and Roxan (2012) at page 397ff for a review of these cases.  Case 53 (note 385 
above) engages with the interaction of the early UK-Australia tax treaty and the then applicable 
domestic law in section 136 of the 1936 Act.  
391
  [2008] ATC 10-036; [2008] AATA 639. 
392
  (2011) 13 ITLR 954. 
393
  Roche, paragraph 17. 
394
  Ibid., paragraph 191.  The ATO released a Decision Impact Statement asserting that 
the Commissioner was not bound by the observations of the judge on the treaty aspect and would 
continue to adhere to the position that a treaty may provide a separate basis for assessing transfer 
pricing adjustments.  Also the “decision is confined to the facts of the case”: 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?DocID=LIT/ICD/NT2005/7/00001 (accessed 17 August 
2015).  
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purchased polyacrylamides from French, Chinese and US affiliates.  It had been 
consistently loss-making. The Commissioner determined that the prices paid by 
the taxpayer exceeded arm’s length prices. 
3.75 SNF has been controversial for two reasons.  First, it rejected (in the 
context of a dispute about the relevance of the Commentaries/TPG to the 
application of Australia’s treaties with France, China and the US) the applicability 
of the TPG – on the basis that the Commentaries were an aid to construction only 
where the states concerned had agreed that they should be so, or it was the practice 
of the states to do so.  The guidelines were no more than that: guidelines395.  
Secondly, and partly in view of the conclusion on the relevance of OECD 
principles, it was not necessary for comparable transactions – in the context of a 
comparability examination - to reproduce all the circumstances of the taxpayer 
apart from the lack of independence: instead, as reflected in OECD thinking, it 
was acceptable to have regard to similar cases where adjustments could reasonably 
be made396.  
3.76 The latter point is relevant to this study.  In SNF the ATO argued that 
“the transfer pricing exercise requires the change of only one fact – the 
relationship of the parties – and that otherwise the taxpayer was to be regarded as 
 
395
  “It is plain from that statement [paragraph 16 of the preface to the TPG], however, 
that the guidelines are just that – guidelines. Under art 31(3) [of the Vienna Convention] they can 
be examined only if they reflect the subsequent agreement of the states in question or, under art 
31(3)(b), ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’.   … There was no evidence that any of the 
states in question had adopted the practice of applying the guidelines to any of the circumstances 
in which art 9 of the model law might obtain in their jurisdictions. … The guidelines are not a 
legitimate aid to the construction of the double taxation treaties. … There is no principle of 
statutory interpretation which requires domestic legislation of the present kind to be read as if it 
were itself an international agreement”: SNF, Full Federal Court at paragraphs [116]–[118]. 
396
  The Full Federal Court approved – at paragraph [121] - the trial judge’s approach (at 
[2010] FCA 635 paragraph [44]) to identifying arm’s length consideration: “I do not accept the 
Commissioner’s submission that the test is to determine what consideration an arm’s length party 
in the position of the taxpayer would have given for the products.  The essential task is to 
determine the arm’s length consideration in respect of the acquisition.  One way to do this is to 
find truly comparable transactions involving the acquisition of the same or sufficiently similar 
products in the same or similar circumstances, where those transactions are undertaken at arm’s 
length, or if not taken at arm’s length, where suitable adjustment can be made to determine the 
arm’s length consideration that would have taken place if the acquisition was at arm’s length.”  
The judge’s reference to the “position of the taxpayer” should not, in my view, be taken to mean 
that the taxpayer’s position (circumstances) is irrelevant, but rather that adjustments could be 
made to align a putative comparable with that position.  
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having all its other characteristics, including in this case that the taxpayer was in 
perennial loss”397.  
3.77 As in the Roche case, a large portion of the SNF decision is preoccupied 
with the quality of the competing evidence on comparables.  Much attention is 
paid to comparability of contractual terms, comparability of product, differences 
in markets and the functional analysis of buyers.  Aside from the taxpayer losses 
issue, none of this touches on the economic circumstances of the buyer in a way 
relevant to this study’s discussion of passive association.  The Court did however 
set out the fundamental interpretive challenge in assessing what is meant by a 
transaction between “independent parties at arm’s length” (as postulated by 
section 136AA(3)(d)). The possibilities contemplated by the Court were: (a) a 
purchase by the taxpayer from a hypothetical arm’s length supplier; (b) a purchase 
by a hypothetical purchaser from the taxpayer’s actual supplier; (c) a purchase by 
a hypothetical purchaser from a hypothetical arm’s length supplier398.  This can be 
analogised into the loans/credit context: (a) a borrowing from a hypothetical arm’s 
length lender; (b) a borrowing by a hypothetical borrower from the actual lender 
(e.g. the parent company in a simple parent company lending scenario); (c) a 
borrowing from a hypothetical borrower from a hypothetical arm’s length lender.    
3.78 At first sight surprisingly, the Court in SNF took exception to the 
Commissioner’s advocacy of the proposition that “[o]ne simply removes the fact 
of interdependence and non-arm’s length dealing, but otherwise the exercise 
involves taking into account all the circumstances which bear on the price” - in 
other words, the arm’s length principle requires an enquiry into what a purchaser 
in identical circumstances to those of the taxpayer would have paid, but for its 
membership of the group, with reliance being placed on paragraph 1.6 TPG.  
Leaving aside the particular context of the loss-making Australian taxpayer, as a 
general proposition this does not seem extravagant. However, the Court grumpily 
complained that “[t]he deeply impractical nature of this submission is manifest 
from the outset” – and regarded the consequence of the Commissioner’s position 
 
397
  (2011) 13 ITLR 954, 958d. 
398
  Paragraph [91].  
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as “requiring a strict norm of operation inflexibly requiring one kind of 
comparable and forbidding all others and it refuses to admit the possibility of 
making adjustments for differences”399. It seems however that the Court’s 
irritation was with the Commissioner’s insistence that the only comparable 
situations which could lawfully be examined under section 136AD(3) were those 
sharing the same characteristics as the taxpayer’s (apart from its non-
independence from the group)400, rather than with the formulation above:  
“but what is to occur, one may ask, if no such comparables are available; what if there 
exists no other business sharing all the same features of the taxpayer bearing on price so 
that the crystalline perfection the Commissioner submits is demanded by s136AA(3)(d) 
cannot be achieved? The Commissioner’s submission necessarily means that a taxpayer, 
who bears the onus in tax appeals, can never succeed in such a case for the bar will be set 
at an unattainable height.”401   
3.79 This feels like quite an extreme way of rejecting the Commissioner’s 
basic formulation of the arm’s length hypothesis.  Moreover, the rejection is not in 
terms applied or addressed to the taxpayer’s loss-making history.  The Court went 
on to explain how the TPG contemplate comparability adjustments by reference to 
the five comparability factors (which of course include the “economic 
circumstances of the parties”).   Referring to the UK DSG case (paragraph 3.164ff 
below), the Court concluded that when there were material differences between 
the taxpayer and any proposed comparable, such differences should, where 
possible, result in adjustment and not the exclusion of the comparable402.  The 
ATO placed some reliance on the Special Commissioners’ comments about the 
relevance of the actual characteristics of the parties: paragraph 3.165 below.  But 
“on no reading did [the TPG] support the Commissioner’s submission that one 
was required to examine only putative purchasers who were in the same 
 
399
  Paragraph [102]f.  There is an echo here of the US Tax Court’s approach in the US 
Steel case, paragraph 3.220 below.  
400
  Paragraphs [9]-[10].  
401
  Paragraph [102].  
402
  Paragraph [105].  
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circumstances as the taxpayer”403.  Clearly this is correct where credible 
adjustments can be made.  
3.80 Given the Court’s tantalising formulation of the interpretive meaning of 
“independent parties acting at arm’s length” (paragraph 3.77 above), the decision 
is disappointing because, having formulated the question about the hypothesis to 
be applied, it fails to answer it.  The judgment philosophises about the notion that 
independence is a relative concept: “[a] requirement, for example, that two 
businesses be more than 20km apart says nothing about where either business is 
situated.”  In looking at section 136AD –  
“it would be unsound to read it as requiring any more than that the two parties in 
question should be independent of each other; that is, the ordinary meaning is not as the 
Commissioner contends … There is no doubt that section 136AD(3) is, as the 
Commissioner submits, about the taxpayer; however, it does not follow from acceptance 
of all those features that arm’s length consideration – which does not, in general, refer to 
the actual position of either party – must be treated as overlaid by a further requirement 
that the consideration not only be at arm’s length but that the arm in question be attached 
to the taxpayer.”404   
3.81 Thus, at least prior to the legislative modernisation described above, 
“[t]he decision suggest[ed] that the arm’s length principle of Australian tax law 
must be characterized as an objective, market-based standard that deviates from 
the arm’s length principle of Article 9(1) of the OECD model tax treaty”405.    
3.82 With judgment delivered in October 2015, Chevron Australia Holdings 
Pty Ltd v Commissioner406 has been the first Australian transfer pricing case to 
address loan pricing, and represents a significant step in the development of 
international jurisprudence on the recognition of passive association.  The 
taxpayer in the case was an Australian subsidiary (“CAHPL”) of the merged 
Chevron/Texaco group.  CAHPL borrowed funds from its own US subsidiary 
 
403
  Paragraphs [104]–[106].  
404
  Paragraph [99]. 
405
  Wittendorff (2012) page 1132.  
406
  [2015] FCA 1092.  
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(“CFC”) which had been formed to raise finance by issuing US$ commercial 
paper to the market, guaranteed by Chevron Corporation (no guarantee fee being 
charged to CFC).  CFC lent substantial amounts to its parent CAHPL in Australian 
dollars.  See Fig. VII below, including the red highlighting of the loans/interest 
which were contentious407.   Over five years, CAHPL paid CFC approximately 
A$1.47 billion of interest.  For the most part, the interest rate charged was A$ 
LIBOR + 4.14%, totalling about 9% p.a.  By contrast, CFC’s commercial paper 
carried rates at or around US$ LIBOR (around 1.2%).  Of the interest paid by 
CAHPL, the ATO sought to disallow A$601 million, invoking section 136AD 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and alternatively Subdivision 815-A and 
asserting interest and penalties of around A$88 million. The ATO argued that the 
rate of interest payable by CAHPL should be suppressed by implicit support 
available to it from within the Chevron group.  In addition, the ATO considered 
that Article 9 of the Australia-USA double tax treaty provided a separate and 
independent basis for making an adjustment to the taxable income of CAHPL.  
Whereas the ATO’s expert witnesses suggested that a standalone rating for 
CAHPL of “BB” should be increased by even as much as 6-9 notches to A/AA, 
the taxpayer denied the legal recognition of implicit support, failing which “at a 
stretch the most that the parent company, Chevron Corporation, would be taken to 
affect the risk rating of the subsidiary borrower, CAHPL, is one notch on the risk 
rating scale”408.   
 
 
 
 
 
407
  Chevron’s arrangements have been portrayed by the media and NGOs as an alleged 
tax avoidance scheme: see e.g. Sydney Morning Herald, 9 October 2014, referring to the interest 
rate differential, and dividends flowing back to the taxpayer in tax-free form, quoting academic 
censure of “effectively eroding the tax base in Australia”.  
408
  Taxpayer’s Outline of Submissions, file 569/2012, 11 August 2014, paragraphs 180 
and 195.  
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Fig. VII 
 
3.83 The case has addressed multiple complex and inter-related issues, 
including the validity and interaction of assessments under Division 13 and 
Subdivision 815-A; the effect of Article 9 of the Australia-US tax treaty, both as a 
separate and independent taxing provision and as an “associated enterprise article” 
within section 815-10(2); the ability of the tax authority to recharacterise or 
reconstruct the transaction undertaken (e.g. as regards currency, loan terms, 
seniority, security); and the constitutional validity of Subdivision 815-A.  
Importantly for this study, one particular battlefield was the significance of 
implicit support from Chevron Corporation in the pricing of the intra-group 
lending from CFC to CAHPL. 
3.84 Specifically, the taxpayer contended that the legislative phrase 
“consideration that might reasonably have been expected to have been given … 
[by] … independent parties”409 “is one that necessarily requires the removal of all 
 
409
  Section 136AD(3)(d) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. 
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the connections between the actual parties in the hypothesis or comparison 
mandated by the provision.  Unless all connections are removed, parties will not 
be independent of each other.  That includes common ownership by a single 
person”; and “the legislation ordinarily requires one to exclude the particular 
attributes of the parties in question, and to focus instead upon the intrinsic value of 
the property or services in question.  As a consequence, s 136AD should be 
construed as requiring the specific circumstances of the taxpayer to be 
disregarded” 410.  The taxpayer then drew the analogy with property valuation 
where the actual attributes of the seller (e.g. actual willingness to sell) are said to 
be irrelevant.  On the other hand, the taxpayer (correctly, of course) accepted that - 
“the general rule against introducing [attributes of the parties] to the Division 13 
hypothetical inquiry needs to be qualified.  The provision of financial accommodation is 
an example of such a transaction.  From an economic perspective the characteristics of 
the borrowing entity are of utmost importance in determining an interest rate on a 
loan”.411  
3.85 However, the taxpayer maintained that - 
“the assets, risk and functions of CAHPL to be attributed to the hypothetical inquiry are 
those of CAHPL as a standalone entity.  This is the point of disagreement with the 
Commissioner. … That would require the exclusion (if such a thing exists as a legal 
concept) of what ratings agencies refer to as ‘implicit support’, namely the assumed 
existence of a willingness (or the perception of the existence of a willingness) of a parent 
of the borrower to provide the borrower with credit support in the event of default on the 
obligation to repay the loan, in the absence of any legally enforceable obligation to do so.  
The concept of ‘implicit support’ or credit benefit obtained by reason of the taxpayer’s 
affiliation with Chevron Corporation is the very product of the non-arm’s length 
relationship.  To take account of so called implicit support requires a preservation of a 
key aspect of the non-arm’s length relationship between CAHPL and CFC, which is 
 
410
  Taxpayer’s Outline of Submissions, file NSD569/2012, 11 August 2014, paragraphs 
132(b) and 140.  
411
  Ibid., paragraph 151.  
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contrary to, and incompatible with, the concept of ‘independent parties’ prescribed by s 
136AD(3)”. 412  
3.86 Moreover, in testing the conditions on which paragraph 815-15(1)(c)  
operates, i.e. the conditions “which might be expected to operate between 
independent enterprises dealing wholly independently with one another” –  
“[t]he relationship between the lender and the borrower must therefore be eliminated in 
order to undertake this task, and in a situation where they are sister companies, so too 
must the relationship between each of them and their common parent. … The OECD 
Guidelines provide that two enterprises are ‘independent’ if they are not ‘associated 
enterprises’.  It follows therefore that all and any attributes that give rise to entities being 
‘associated’ within the meaning of Article 9 must be disregarded in determining the 
attributes of the independent parties. … The terms of Article 9 thus require one to 
hypothesise a standalone borrower and a standalone lender.  There is no room for 
implicit parental support which of necessity derives from the common owner, Chevron 
Corporation.”413  
3.87 It is notable also that the taxpayer took the position that –  
“in most cases the attribution of the characteristics of the supplier of financial 
accommodation (including their cost of funds) is not required because those 
characteristics do not, ordinarily, impact on the pricing of the financial accommodation. 
What is priced is the likelihood of default by the borrower which, in turn, depends on the 
characteristics of the borrower. … On that basis, … the characteristics of the actual 
lender, and in particular CFC’s own funding costs, are irrelevant to the statutory 
hypothesis. … The only attributes of the actual parties that are removed in determining 
the attributes of the hypothetical independent parties are those that arise from the 
relationship between the actual borrower and the actual lender (and their common 
parent) which result in those actual parties not being ‘independent’.”414 
3.88 The Commissioner on the other hand argued that a ratings agency 
would have attributed to CAHPL a rating “having regard to, among other factors, 
 
412
  Ibid., paragraphs 153–154.  
413
  Ibid., paragraphs 236-239.  
414
  Ibid., paragraphs 155-156.  Compare paragraph 5.4 below.  
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the implied support CAHPL enjoyed by virtue of its position as a prominent 
subsidiary of [Chevron Corporation], rather than as if CAHPL was an orphan with 
no parental support”415.  In particular, the legislation “(a) [did] not authorise the 
artificial assumption that CAHPL was not 100% owned by [Chevron Corporation] 
(or a hypothetical equivalent parent); (b) [did] not authorise the determination of 
the arm’s length price to be made on the false hypothesis that CAHPL enjoyed no 
parental support”416.  Moreover, “[i]mplied support is no different to any other 
factor which might influence a lender’s view of the creditworthiness of the 
borrower and the terms on which it might be prepared to lend. … In this way, 
parental support influences a subsidiary’s arm’s length borrowing cost”417.  The 
ATO also disagreed that the lender’s cost of funds and risks assumed were 
irrelevant418, and argued that it is erroneous to permit a taxpayer simply to “enter 
into a related party loan on such disadvantageous terms to the lender in respect of 
gearing, covenants, repayments and currency that would inevitably lead to a loan 
that would be unattractive to a lender and would either not be made by an 
independent party or, if so, would involve a very high rate of interest”419.   
3.89 The Federal Court robustly dismissed the taxpayer’s case420 on the 
procedural and constitutional issues and indeed has rejected its argument that the 
quantum of its interest payments was at or below the arm’s length consideration421 
(though the Court found that the tax treaty could not be relied on by the 
Commissioner as a taxing power independent of the national legislation422).  
Substantial evidence of ratings methodology and rating agency practices was 
heard and summarised in the decision, but ultimately the judge found that the 
 
415
  Commissioner’s Outline of Submissions, filed 25 August 2014, file number 
NSD569/2012, paragraph 15(a).  
416
  Ibid., paragraph 122.  
417
  Ibid., paragraphs 140-141.  
418
  Ibid., paragraph 108.  
419
  Ibid., paragraph 112.  
420
  An appeal to the Full Federal Court was filed by Chevron in December 2015: 
http://taxinsight.thomsonreuters.com.au/chevron-transfer-pricing-case/ (accessed 9 January 
2016).   
421
  [2015] FCA 1092, paragraph 525.  
422
  Ibid., paragraph 61.  
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correct comparator for the controlled transaction was commercial (bank) 
lending423 and therefore ratings practice was not relevant424.   
3.90 On the correct comparability hypothesis, the Court found the exercise to 
be “to address an agreement between two parties independent of each other, 
neither being an actual party to the actual loan … [T]he exercise should [not] 
depart from reality more than is necessary … [and] should remain close to 
undertaking the actual loan … [including] what has been shown on the evidence to 
be relevant in the market in question … [e.g. whether] the hypothetical borrower 
not being the taxpayer has at the time of the loan certain financial resources which 
the lender would regard as relevant to the pricing of the loan”425.    
3.91 Specifically on the effects of group affiliations, while the Court 
accepted the requirement to assess conditions between independent parties –  
“it by no means follows that where, as here, the entities in question are sister 
companies426, also to be eliminated is the relationship between each of them and their 
common parent … [I]ndependent enterprises dealing wholly independently with one 
another may still be subsidiaries and may still have subsidiaries … I therefore accept the 
respondent’s submission insofar as he contended that there was no legislative warrant for 
ignoring affiliation between a hypothesised party to a transaction and other members of 
that party’s group of companies. …  ‘Implicit support’ may be generally relevant when 
assessing a borrower’s credit rating.”  
3.92 Thus Chevron presents an endorsement of the requirement to recognise 
passive association in pricing controlled transactions.  In any particular case, the 
evidential and quantitative aspects may be challenging (in Chevron “implicit 
support had very little, if any, effect on pricing”427), but the principle is clear.  
Thus the Court has rejected the taxpayer’s view that attributes arising from the 
group relationship should be excised.  This sits comfortably alongside the 
 
423
  Ibid., paragraph 503.  
424
  Ibid., paragraphs 254, 433, 469.  
425
  Ibid., paragraphs 499-502.  
426
  In fact the parties were parent and subsidiary, but the judge’s point is correct to the 
extent of looking to a common controlling parent i.e. Chevron Corporation.  
427
  Chevron judgment, paragraph 606.  
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Canadian jurisprudence.  It is appropriate to eliminate price-distorting effects of 
control, but it goes too far to eliminate all effects of affiliation.  
Tax authority practice 
3.93 Early ATO guidance on Division 13 as it related to loans and credit 
balances428 confirmed that “all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding an 
international agreement will be taken into account in determining an arm’s length 
consideration”; this would include the credit standing of the borrower429.  The 
ATO also confirmed their view that “independent parties when evaluating the 
terms of a potential deal would compare the deal to the other options realistically 
available to them and would enter into the deal only if there was no alternative 
clearly of greater commercial advantage to the individual entity”430; “[i]t would 
not be expected that a seller would accept less or a buyer pay more than the open 
market price … or settle, for example, for less profit … than would have been 
available to an uncontrolled enterprise.”431 Also as to comparability, “the 
fundamental principle of the [TPG] and the statutory objective of the Australian 
rules are the same, namely, what truly independent parties acting independently 
would probably have done in the taxpayer’s circumstances”432.  In relation to 
intra-group services, including the provision of finance, “the position on incidental 
benefits taken by the OECD in paragraphs 7.12 and 7.13 of its 1995 Report” is 
adopted by the ATO433. 
3.94 A thoughtful and informative discussion paper was produced by the 
ATO in June 2008: Intra-group finance guarantees and loans – Application of 
 
428
  TR 92/11.  
429
  Ibid., paragraphs 80(a), 83(g).  
430
  TR 94/14 paragraph 315; TR 97/20 paragraph 2.4.  In this context (TR 97/20 
paragraphs 2.5 and 2.17) the ATO also posed the question as “what would have happened if the 
ownership link had been severed and the enterprise was motivated by its own economic 
interest?”  I do not consider that one can infer from this that the ATO was rejecting the 
recognition of passive association; in any event, subsequent developments are clearly to the 
contrary. 
431
  TR 97/20 paragraph 2.17.  
432
  TR 97/20 paragraph 1.23, my emphasis.  
433
  TR 1999/1 paragraph 32.  
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Australia’s transfer pricing and thin capitalisation rules434, inviting comments 
from the public on the ATO’s “suggested methodology and framework” for 
arriving at arm’s length debt pricing.  The paper did not commit the ATO to any 
particular position, and has since been withdrawn, but nonetheless may be 
regarded as a fair summary of their thinking at the time.  One objective was to 
build on TR 92/11 which, as noted above, included creditworthiness as a factor in 
determining an arm’s length interest rate, but did not address how creditworthiness 
is determined.   
3.95 The paper observed that “major lenders and the capital markets more 
generally will have regard to group relationships in evaluating the credit risk they 
are prepared to assume in respect of any one group or industry”, and “a lender 
may be prepared to lend to a subsidiary of a major multinational, which may not 
be creditworthy on a strict stand-alone assessment, where the lender judges that 
the subsidiary is conducting activities that are core to the group’s activities and 
that accordingly the parent is likely to stand behind the subsidiary in the event of 
difficulty lest its own credit rating be adversely affected”435.   
3.96 Four scenarios were discussed in detail: (i) a parent loan to a subsidiary 
that could not borrow on a stand-alone basis; (ii) a parent loan to a subsidiary that 
could borrow by itself; (iii) a parent guarantee for the benefit of a subsidiary that 
could not borrow on a stand-alone basis; (iv) a parent guarantee for a subsidiary 
that could borrow by itself, but which enables the subsidiary to access a lower 
interest rate.  “Explicit credit support” is distinguished from “implicit credit 
support”, the latter including “credit support obtained as an incidental benefit from 
the taxpayer’s passive affiliation with the multinational group, its parent or 
another group member”436.  In each of the four cases, the ATO was at least 
amenable to implicit support being taken into account in pricing the relevant 
instrument.  In scenario (i), the arguments for and against are recited: “[s]ome say 
that to do so would be inconsistent with the arm’s length principle embodied in the 
 
434
  Cited in the Indian Micro Ink case, paragraph 3.139 below.  
435
  Paragraphs 25-26.  
436
  Ibid., paragraphs 52-53.  
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Associated Enterprises Articles of Australia’s double tax agreements and Division 
13, which are based on the outcome that would be achieved by independent parties 
dealing wholly independently with each other.  Others argue that since the 
notching advantage flows from the market and not something the parent company 
has done or provided, the benefit to the subsidiary should be regarded as incidental 
and attributable solely to its being part of a larger concern”437.  The ATO then 
seemed to lean towards the recognition of passive association:  
“There are no widely accepted objective criteria for allocating such economies or 
diseconomies of scale or benefits and disadvantages of integration and in such 
circumstances it a may be appropriate to determine the outcome by reference to what the 
subsidiary could achieve itself through dealing directly in the open market, despite the 
fact that the market will pay some regard to affiliation.  
“Accordingly, if on a stand-alone basis the subsidiary had a credit rating below 
investment grade which dictated an interest rate of 15% but the market was prepared to 
notch up the credit rating without any further financial support or binding commitment 
from the parent to a level that allowed the subsidiary to borrow at 12% it could be argued 
that the 12% interest rate represents the correct arm’s length transfer price.”438 
3.97 Similarly in scenario (ii), “it is arguably not appropriate to adjust a 
market price that includes notching benefits that incidentally arise from the 
passive association of the subsidiary with the wider group”439 (i.e. arguably it is 
appropriate to recognise passive association).  In scenario (iii), independent 
borrowers would not “be expected to pay fees for benefits that are already 
available, whether those benefits are available on a cost-free basis or have already 
been purchased for full value”; and “[w]here a subsidiary derives implicit credit 
support as an incidental benefit from its parental affiliation, the benefit derives 
from the market, not from the provision of any service by the parent  … 
Depending on the facts and circumstances, it may be that a subsidiary that is not 
creditworthy on a pure stand-alone analysis is able to obtain the debt funding it 
needs because the market is prepared to notch up the credit rating on the basis of 
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  Ibid., paragraphs 74-75.  
438
  Ibid., paragraphs 75-76. 
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  Ibid., paragraph 80.  
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the subsidiary’s group affiliation”.  An example is given of a subsidiary with a 
strict stand-alone rating of BB which is nonetheless accorded a rating of A+ by the 
market based on parental affiliation; the AA-rated parent then provides a 
guarantee: “[t]he benefit the parent has provided to the subsidiary is the 
improvement in the credit rating from A+ to AA”, thus [t]he benefit to the 
subsidiary is the marginal saving in interest expense from being able to borrow on 
an AA rated basis instead of the A+ rating it would have obtained without the 
guarantee.  This is the only benefit for which an independent borrower would be 
prepared to pay.”440  Again, in scenario (iv) the value to the credit-worthy 
subsidiary of an explicit parental guarantee is said to reflect the difference 
between its rating “after any notching up of the subsidiary’s stand-alone rating that 
the market was prepared to make” and the parent’s rating441.  Having provided 
some rather clear indications that passive association is a relevant factor in pricing 
controlled lending or guarantee transactions, the ATO slightly muddied the water 
with the concluding words in the discussion paper: 
“[W]here a borrower and a guarantor or lender are related parties, the application of the 
arm’s length principle in determining a guarantee fee or loan interest rate requires that 
regard be had to the creditworthiness of the borrower considered independently of its 
parent.  Unless an MNE group member is hypothesised as if it were an independent 
stand-alone entity separate from the group and its other members it is impossible to 
determine whether conditions operate between the parent and subsidiary that distort what 
would have occurred if the parties were independent of each other and dealing wholly 
independently with each other.  The essence of the arm’s length principle is the reliability 
of the outcomes produced by independent parties dealing wholly independently with each 
other in the open market.  It is the absence of any organisational influence or impact and 
the economic tension between the parties in these circumstances in seeking to optimise 
their economic outcomes that generates reliability … 
“Accordingly, an arm’s length creditworthiness can be defined for the purposes of 
applying the transfer pricing rules as being the level of creditworthiness at which an 
independent party would regard the risk as acceptable in providing a loan or guarantee 
 
440
  Ibid., paragraphs 107-114.   This 2008 commentary was strikingly prescient of the 
Canadian General Electric case (paragraph 3.16ff above).  
441
  Ibid., paragraph 117.  
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to a borrower company without requiring financial support undertakings from its parent, 
and which results in a cost to the borrower that allows it to remain viable and obtain an 
acceptable return from its line of business.  Thus, an arm’s length creditworthiness for a 
borrower is appropriately determined using the criteria an independent lender or 
guarantor would use to determine the probability of default if its only redress were 
against the borrowing subsidiary.”442 
3.98 This was less than crystal clear, but probably the ATO’s references to 
“financial support undertakings” and “redress” meant contractually binding 
recourse, such that passive association still fell to be considered in assessing the 
borrowing capacity of a subsidiary in applying the arm’s length test.  The phrase 
“absence of any organisational influence or impact” has a strong flavour of 
behavioural distortions caused by a control relationship, not mere passivity.  The 
paper was withdrawn in December 2009.  
3.99 At that time the ATO issued draft practice statement PS LA 3187.  This 
offered a “practical rule of thumb” approach, permitting taxpayers to set outbound 
related party interest flows at a rate reflecting the weighted average cost of debt of 
the taxpayer’s foreign parent company. One commentator thought that this “could 
amount to an implicit endorsement of the ‘notching’ concept when analysing 
intercompany interest, wherein a subsidiary is viewed as having the same credit 
rating as its parent even in the absence of a formal guarantee”443.  The “rule of 
thumb” was criticised by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia as 
akin to global formulary apportionment for interest expense and because “it fails 
to have regard to any factors that might materially impact interest rates on loans 
between independent parties e.g. security, subordination, term, etc”444;  the ATO 
eventually accepted the Institute’s representation that the draft practice statement 
should be withdrawn.  
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  Ibid., paragraphs 185-188.   
443
  Duff & Phelps Transfer Pricing Times vol. VII issue 3, available at 
http://www.duffandphelps.com/services/tax/Pages/TPTimesArchive.aspx?itemid=28 (accessed 6 
July 2015).  
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3.100 Taxation Ruling TR 2010/7 importantly discusses the interaction of the 
Division 820 thin capitalisation rules and the transfer pricing rules, albeit that 
coverage of the latter related to the now repealed Division 13.  The Ruling focuses 
only on inbound finance, although “it is expected that the ATO will apply the 
same principles for outbound transactions”445.  The ATO emphasises the need for 
the outcome to make “commercial sense in all the circumstances of the case” 446.  
Naturally enough, the CUP method finds favour, both in a worked internal 
comparable example where transfer pricing rules are found inapplicable because a 
loan from an independent lender is “sufficiently similar” to the intra-group debt447, 
and in a general statement about determining arm’s length consideration in 
relation to debt funding: “[i]n practice, the most reliable method is that which uses 
available data as to the pricing of a comparable loan between comparable 
independent parties dealing at arm’s length in comparable circumstances … all the 
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the ‘international agreement’ will be 
taken into account in determining that consideration”448.   
3.101 The significance of implicit support is acknowledged: “[w]here, for 
example, the operations of the borrower are core to the group in the sense that its 
functions were a vital part of an integrated business, it would generally be 
expected that the borrower company would have the same credit standing as its 
parent”, and (noting the importance of the credit standing of a borrower) “factors 
include … parental affiliation”; and a possible approach is “to consider the 
circumstances of comparable companies which operated in the particular market 
which, under their capital structures and/or with the benefit of parental affiliation, 
were able to borrow from third parties the amounts in question” 449.  Yet more 
explicitly, in the associated Compendium of stakeholder representations and ATO 
responses, the ATO stated unequivocally that –  
 
445
  Duff & Phelps (2014), Australia chapter by Shannon Smit and Adriana Calderon, page 
163.  
446
  TR 2010/7 paragraph 50.  
447
  Ibid.,  paragraph 17.  
448
  Ibid., paragraph 46.  
449
  Ibid., paragraphs 49, 52 and 57.  
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“[w]e consider that taking account of parental affiliation is consistent with the arm’s 
length principle embodied in the transfer pricing provisions where, in determining the 
creditworthiness of a borrower, it is a feature of the market to take account of any 
affiliation the borrower has.”450 
3.102 In summary, it is plain that the ATO has embraced the notion of implicit 
support.  For some time it has asserted the effect of passive association on related 
party loan and guarantee pricing451.  Chevron vindicates the approach adopted; if 
anything, the current law in Subdivisions 815-B to 815-E should be clearer still.  
More specifically, a statutory foundation has been laid for the recognition of such 
effects in Australia’s modern transfer pricing law at section 815-125 and the 
accompanying explanatory material.  Further engagement with the topic may 
follow in the thin capitalisation context if the Board of Taxation’s 
recommendations are followed.   
 
 
India 
3.103 Transfer pricing has become the single most important weapon in 
India’s international tax armoury and is perceived as “the best policy instrument 
for securing a fair allocation of taxes and addressing BEPS”452.  Transfer pricing 
 
450
  Compendium of responses to issues raised by external parties to draft TR 2009/D6 
(the predecessor of TR 2010/7, itself a reissue of draft Tax Determination 2007/D20), issue no. 5.  
In TR 2009/D6 paragraph 32, the ATO said “[t]aking account of parental affiliation is consistent 
with the arm’s length principle embodied in the transfer pricing provisions where, in determining 
the creditworthiness of a borrower, it is a feature of the market to take account of any affiliation 
the borrower has.” 
451
  See e.g. PwC (2013), Australia chapter: “Informally PwC is aware that the ATO has 
challenged guarantee fees where it has formed the view that they have been priced without regard 
to passive association or implicit support.” 
452
  Dr Parthasarathi Shome, Chairman, Tax Administration Reforms Commission, 
Government of India, speaking at the “TP Minds” conference in Singapore on 24 September 
2014.  
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adjustments for 2014-15 have been reported as 46,465 Rs. Crore (c.£4.65 
billion)453. 
3.104 India’s transfer pricing code, introduced in 2001, is a relative youngster.  
Yet it has spawned more than 700 reported cases454, some of those dealing directly 
with financial transactions including the pricing of intra-group loans and 
guarantees.  However, the jurisprudence which emerges from the cases is 
sometimes chaotic, and the quality of the logic and reasoning applied, particularly 
in the several benches of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), is (given the 
fertile ground for judicial exposition) often frustratingly thin.  Decisions from 
India’s various High Courts are generally of greater rigour, but at that level the 
case law with even indirect relevance to the topic of passive association is sparse.  
In short, the subtlety of adjusting pricing of related party transactions to take 
account of passive association has not yet arrived in Indian transfer pricing law.  
Yet the seed has been planted and surely a convincing judgment on the topic will 
emerge soon.  One might expect that embracing notions of implicit support should 
eventually appeal to the tax authority of a net capital importing country (see 
paragraph 1.27 above).  
Legislation 
3.105 The Indian Finance Act 2001 introduced transfer pricing rules as 
sections 92 and 92A-92F Income Tax Act 1961, effective from 1 April 2002, 
applicable to international transactions between associated enterprises (AEs): 
arm’s length pricing is to govern for tax purposes455.  The legislation “is broadly 
in line with the OECD Guidelines”456.  The Finance Act 2012457 made significant 
amendments.  The basic rule at section 92(1) prescribes that “[a]ny income arising 
from an international transaction shall be computed having regard to the arm’s 
 
453
  Jindal (2015) page 24.  
454
  Source: discussion with Mukesh Butani of BMR Legal, New Delhi, 16 July 2014 – the 
figure is now significantly greater.   
455
  For a review of the pre-2001 position, where various statutory provisions afforded 
scope for tax assessments in the nature of transfer pricing adjustments, see Butani (2007) chapter 
2.  
456
  Butani (2007) page 294.  
457
  Available at http://law.incometaxindia.gov.in/ (accessed 24 August 2015).  
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length price”.  The “arm’s length price” means “a price which is applied or 
proposed to be applied in a transaction between persons other than associated 
enterprises, in uncontrolled conditions”458.  The transfer pricing rules were 
extended to certain “specified domestic transactions” in 2012.  The arm’s length 
rule operates as a “one way street” in that it cannot reduce income or increase a 
loss459.  
3.106 The meaning of “associated enterprise” is at first sight (section 92A(1)) 
closely modelled on the relationships described by Article 9(1) MTC, adopting the 
concept of participation by one enterprise, directly or indirectly, in the 
management, control or capital of another, as well as enterprises under common 
control of those types.  Then an individualistic list of deemed association cases 
follows in section 92(2), including 26%+ voting power, loans of at least 51% of 
the borrower’s book value, guarantors of 10%+ of another enterprise’s debt, board 
control, various other cases of economic inter-dependency and a sweeper for cases 
where “there exists between the two enterprises, any relationship of mutual 
interest, as may be prescribed”.  
3.107 Apart from limited classes of “specified domestic transaction”, India’s 
transfer pricing rules apply to “international transactions”.  This means “a 
transaction between two or more associated enterprises, either or both of whom 
are non-residents, in the nature of purchase, sale or lease of tangible or intangible 
property, or provision of services, or lending or borrowing money, or any other 
transaction having a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets of such 
enterprises” (also certain cost contribution arrangements are described). 
Transactions with unrelated persons are deemed to be between AEs “if there exists 
a prior agreement in relation to the relevant transaction between such other person 
and the associated enterprise, or the terms of the relevant transaction are 
determined in substance between such other person and the associated 
 
458
  Section 92F(ii). “Enterprise” is widely defined to mean a person engaged in any of a 
long list of business-like activities (including providing a loan) (section 92F(iii)), and 
“transaction” includes “an arrangement, understanding or action in concert” whether or not 
formal or written and whether or not legally enforceable (section 92F(v)).   
459
  Section 92(3).  
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enterprise”460.  This rule of extension may apply to situations where (a) a borrower 
subsidiary agrees with a third party lender to procure a guarantee from its (the 
borrower’s) parent, or (b) the terms of a borrower subsidiary’s third party loan are 
negotiated by its parent.  An “Explanation” was added by the Finance Act 2012 
confirming inter alia that, with retrospective effect from 1 April 2002, 
“international transaction” shall include “(i)(c) capital financing, including any 
type of long-term or short-term borrowing, lending or guarantee, purchase or sale 
of marketable securities or any type of advance, payments or deferred payment or 
receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business”.   
3.108 Section 92C prescribes methods for arm’s length pricing, including the 
familiar CUP, as well as “such other method as may be prescribed by the Board”.  
The “most appropriate” method is to be applied “in the manner as may be 
prescribed”.  These provisions thus cross-refer to the Income Tax Rules 1962, as 
amended461.   
3.109 Rule 10AB of the 1962 Rules provides that the “other method” within 
section 92C(1)(c) “shall be any method which takes into account the price which 
has been charged or paid, or would have been charged or paid, for the same or 
similar uncontrolled transaction, with or between non-associated enterprises, 
under similar circumstances, considering all the relevant facts”.  “Uncontrolled 
transaction” means a transaction between enterprises other than AEs462.  Rule 
10B(1)(a) elaborates upon the CUP method: “(i) the price charged or paid for 
property transferred or services provided in a comparable uncontrolled transaction, 
or a number of such transactions, is identified; (ii) such price is adjusted to 
account for differences, if any, between the [transaction under review] and the 
comparable uncontrolled transactions or between the enterprises entering into such 
transactions, which could materially affect the price in the open market; (iii) the 
adjusted price arrived at under sub-clause (ii) is taken to be an arm’s length price 
 
460
  Section 92B(1) and (2).  Finance (No.2) Act 2014 made clarifying amendments with 
effect from 1 April 2015.  
461
  Made under section 295 Income Tax Act 1961.  Section 92CB contemplates safe 
harbour rules; these were issued by the CBDT on 14 August 2013, and extend to certain intra-
group loans and guarantees: paragraph 3.110 below.  
462
  Rule 10A(ab).  
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in respect of the property transferred or services provided in [the transaction 
under review]”.  Rule 10B(2) requires that comparability be judged via several 
factors strongly redolent of paragraph 1.36 TPG, covering specific characteristics 
of property transferred or services provided; functions performed; contractual 
terms, including as to risks and benefits; and conditions prevailing in the relevant 
markets.   Rule 10C dictates that the “most appropriate method shall be the 
method which is best suited to the facts and circumstances of each [transaction 
under review]”. 
3.110 The subsequent Rules are mostly concerned with information and 
documentation requirements and with India’s advance pricing agreement system, 
but conclude with provisions governing safe harbours.  Eligible transactions 
include certain intra-group loans463 and corporate guarantees.  A “corporate 
guarantee” means “explicit corporate guarantee extended by a company to its 
wholly owned subsidiary being a non-resident in respect of any short-term or 
long-term borrowing”; an Explanation in the Rules confirms that “explicit 
corporate guarantee does not include letter of comfort, implicit corporate 
guarantee, performance guarantee or any other guarantee of similar nature”464.  
Here at least is express recognition in the legislation of the distinction between 
explicit and implicit support.  The amount guaranteed must not exceed certain 
limits (depending on the credit rating of the AE debtor)465.  A safe harbour 
minimum guarantee fee of 2% or 1.75% (depending on that credit rating) is 
prescribed by Rule 10TD.  The safe harbour rules are not available when the AE is 
located in a zero or low tax territory466.  
3.111 For several years, the Indian Government worked on a new Direct 
Taxes Code – essentially a form of tax law re-write project.  The most recent 
version of the draft Code was released in April 2014, and Part F Chapter XII 
 
463
  Defined by Rule 10TA(f) to be one advanced to a wholly owned non-resident 
subsidiary, sourced in rupees, not being advanced by a financial enterprise in the ordinary course 
of business and not being an advance with no fixed repayment term.  
464
  Rule 10TA(c).  
465
  Rule 10TC(v).  
466
  Rule 10TF. A low tax territory is one where the maximum rate of income tax is less 
than 15%: Rule 10A(i).  
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contained “Special Provisions Relating to Avoidance of Tax”, in which the 
transfer pricing rules were found.  The rules were however closely modelled on 
the existing legislation, containing the basic arm’s length pricing rule at clause 
119, the most appropriate method rule in clause 120, provision for safe harbour 
rules (section 120(8)) and broad and extended definitions of “associated 
enterprise”, “international transaction” and “transaction”.  The capital financing 
heading (paragraph 3.107 above) was specifically legislated at clause 
127(11)(a)(iv).  Nothing however in the re-write appeared likely to influence the 
debate regarding passive association in Indian transfer pricing laws.  The revised 
Code was shelved in the 2015 Budget by the Government of India elected in 
2014467.  
3.112 India is not a member of the OECD, but sits as an “observer” at the 
CFA.  In a number of relevant cases discussed below, the TPG are invoked, and 
tax offices have indicated their intent of broadly following the TPG during audits 
to the extent not inconsistent with the Indian legislation468. In the Supreme Court 
in Union of India v Azadi Bachao Andolan469, interpretative reliance was placed 
on the OECD MTC Commentary.  Butani (2007) cites other authorities supporting 
the need “to give due regard to international conventions and norms for construing 
domestic laws more so when there is no inconsistency between them and there is a 
void in domestic law”470.  See paragraph 3.119 on reference to the TPG and UN 
Manual.   
3.113 India’s double tax treaties typically adopt a provision based on Article 
9(1) MTC.  If a tax liability is imposed by domestic statute, the taxpayer may 
 
467
  Speech of Arun Jaitley, Minister of Finance, 28 February 2015 (“… there is no great 
merit in going ahead with the Direct Tax Code as it exists today”).  
468
  PwC’s International Transfer Pricing, 2013/14, page 486.   
469
  (2003) 263 ITR 707.   
470
  Page 395, citing the Supreme Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council v A.K. 
Chopra JT (1999) 1 SC 61.  However, official comment (29 June 2007) on the relevance of 
OECD guidance remains dismissive: http://www.itatonline.org/info/index.php/relevance-of-
oecd-guidelines-departments-view (accessed 22 December 2015).   
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invoke an applicable treaty to eliminate or reduce that liability; a treaty cannot 
itself impose tax not contemplated by the statute471.  
3.114 Butani also notes472 that foreign case law from countries with the same 
system of jurisprudence may, while not being formally binding, be used in 
interpreting Indian legislation dealing with the same subject matter, subject always 
to the primacy of the language of the Indian statute.  
3.115 India does not have statutory thin capitalisation rules.  The importation 
of debt capital is regulated by exchange control rules concerning “external 
commercial borrowings” (ECB), including with regard to debt:equity ratio and 
capping interest payable by Indian residents.  However, by analogy with other 
cases, it seems that permissibility under exchange control regulation will not 
establish that a payment is at arm’s length from the transfer pricing perspective473. 
3.116 A general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) (proposed Chapter XA Income 
Tax Act 1961) is anticipated474. This will target “impermissible avoidance 
arrangements” i.e. certain classes of arrangement, the main purpose of which is to 
obtain a tax benefit.  One case is where the arrangement “creates rights or 
obligations which are not ordinarily created between persons dealing at arm’s 
length”.  Various counteraction mechanisms will be available including treating 
the impermissible avoidance arrangement as if it had not been carried out, and 
“reallocating amongst the parties to the arrangement any accrual, or receipt, of a 
capital nature or revenue nature, or any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate”475.  
Also, “any equity may be treated as debt or vice versa”476.  Expressly, treaties may 
 
471
  Azadi Bachao Andolan at page 733.   
472
  Page 395.  
473
  CIT v Nestlé India Ltd ITA 662/2005; Coca Cola India Inc v ACIT 309 ITR 194, cited 
in Bakker and Levey (2012), India chapter by Mukesh Butani, pages 289-290. 
474
  The 2015 Budget announced that implementation of GAAR will be deferred until 1 
April 2017.  
475
 Section 98(1)(b) and (e), the latter perhaps drawing inspiration from the US section 
482.  
476
  Section 98(2)(i). An Indian court may be prepared to invoke recharacterisation 
concepts following what is now paragraph 1.122ff TPG to treat excessive debt as equity, see e.g. 
the Delhi High Court at paragraph 149 of the Sony Ericsson case, citation at note 486 below.  
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be overridden477.  Clear transfer pricing and thin capitalisation themes are visible 
here, but nothing that is likely to bear on passive association more so than the 
existing legislation.      
Case law 
3.117 An extraordinary proliferation of cases, mostly at ITAT level, has 
addressed the arm’s length pricing of loans, guarantees and outstanding 
receivables478.  The guarantee cases have mostly addressed “outbound” guarantees 
granted by Indian companies in respect of indebtedness of foreign AEs.  Reported 
litigation has been scarce479 in the converse case where an Indian subsidiary pays a 
guarantee fee for a foreign parent’s guarantee to a third party as in the Canadian 
General Electric case: paragraph 3.16ff above.  Nevertheless, General Electric is 
now being cited in argument.  However, aside from a passing reference to 
taxpayer argument in the Nimbus Communications case (paragraph 3.133 below), 
the effect on pricing of implicit support has not yet made its way into the Indian 
financial case law.  Perhaps this is partly due to the pattern and process of transfer 
pricing litigation whereby taxpayers adopt a certain position, the tax authority 
imputes a higher level of income, and then the appeals process judges whether the 
tax authority position is sustainable – mostly it has not been480.  One might expect 
that invoking the notion of implicit support would favour taxpayers in outbound 
guarantee cases, because it tends to suppress the quantum of the arm’s length price 
required to be reported by the guarantor.  
3.118 Yet it is surely only a matter of time before passive association features 
as a pricing factor in Indian financial transfer pricing litigation.  It has been 
suggested that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Director of Income Tax v Morgan 
Stanley & Co. Inc481 that no charge was justified for stewardship activities and the 
 
477
  The Expert Committee’s Final Report on General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR) in 
Income-tax Act 1961 (2012) recommended (page 44) that where a treaty has specific anti-
avoidance provisions these should not be displaced by the GAAR.     
478
  A good summary is provided in chapter 4 of Jindal (2015).  
479
  Compare e.g. the DSM case: paragraph 3.140 below.  
480
  The approach to process and onus of proof does not e.g. follow the US model 
described at paragraph 3.219 below.  
481
  Appeal (civil) 2914 of 2007 (9 July 2007).  
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work performed in India by staff sent there by the taxpayer group’s US parent may 
“be extended to the understated passive association or implicit support in case of 
financial transactions”482.  Elsewhere, the concept has appeared expressly in 
Knorr-Bremse India Pvt Ltd v ACIT483 in relation to expenses claimed for various 
putative intra-group services.  The ITAT found that the evidence “only goes to 
reveal that incidental and passive association benefit has been provided by the 
associate enterprise.  In this view of the matter there could neither be any cost 
contribution or cost reimbursement nor payment for such services to the AE.  The 
TPO, therefore, has rightly adopted nil value for benchmarking the arm’s length 
price in respect of both these services”.  Similarly, in Mitsubishi Corporation 
India Pvt Ltd v DCIT484, in the context of development of intangibles, the Delhi 
ITAT ruled –  
“[t]he particular business model which gives rise to this edge, assuming that there is 
indeed an edge, to the assessee is a result of group synergy, and intangibles as a result of 
such group synergy cannot, therefore, be assigned to the assessee alone.  In any event, 
when the impact of group synergy is taken into account, it is only when it consists of 
deliberate concerted action485 benefits, and not when it merely consists of the passive 
association benefits.  There is no such suggestion of deliberate concerted action benefits 
in this case.” 
3.119 The Indian courts are comfortable referring to the TPG and the UN 
Manual (paragraph 2.90 above) in transfer pricing cases.  A good transfer pricing 
example (addressing local advertising, marketing and promotion expenditure by a 
distributor) is the Delhi High Court’s decision in Sony Ericsson Mobile 
Communications India Pvt Ltd v Commissioner of Income Tax (and joined cases): 
“[w]e have taken note and liberally referred to the two guidelines as it is found to 
be conducive and helpful in deciding the issues”.  Additionally, the High Court in 
 
482
  Bloomberg BNA Transfer Pricing Forum, Implicit Support, India chapter by Rahul 
Mitra, Aditya Hans and Devendra Gulati (2013).  
483
  ITA No. 5097/Del/2011 paragraph 14.  In BMW India Pvt Ltd v ACIT ITA No. 
385/Del/2014 the ITAT heard how the TPO had invoked paragraph 7.13 TPG and the Knorr-
Bremse decision to resist expense deductibility; the case was remitted by the ITAT to the TPO 
for further consideration upon the evidence.  
484
  ITA No. 5042/Del/11.  
485
  A phrase precisely echoing the BEPS reforms, paragraph 2.82 above.  
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Sony Ericsson referred to the US section 482 regulations and to ATO guidance, 
emphasising the arm’s length principle’s objective “to correct distortion” and “to 
ensure that the controlled taxpayers are given tax parity with uncontrolled 
taxpayers”486.   
3.120 Loans.   An important modern (2015) authority on the correct approach 
to loan transfer pricing is the Delhi High Court decision in Cotton Naturals (India) 
Private Limited v Commissioner of Income Tax487.  This case reviewed the main 
ITAT judgments (discussed further below), and rejected the TPO’s attempt to 
restructure the transaction (a US$ loan to the taxpayer’s US subsidiary), citing the 
“exceptionality” standard in what are now paragraphs 1.121-125 TPG, 
emphasising the need for a careful comparability analysis reflecting the approach 
in the TPG and the UN Manual.  This required consideration of “what an 
independent distributor and marketer, on the same contractual terms and having 
the same relationship, would have earned/paid as interest on the loan in 
question”488.  The High Court also noted that transfer pricing logic must be 
applied equally to both inbound and outbound loans, contrary to the Revenue’s 
submission489.  
3.121 An oddity in some of the cases is the lack of connection made (by the 
tax authority at least) between arm’s length interest rates and the currency of the 
loan in question.  For example, in Siva Industries & Holdings Limited v ACIT490 
the Indian taxpayer had lent US$ to its foreign AE, but the TPO, referring to the 
Indian prime lending rate, proposed 14% on the basis that this was required to 
compensate the lender for adverse foreign currency movement risk.  The ITAT 
rejected this approach, ruling that a LIBOR-based rate should be used, so that the 
actual (higher) rate charged by the taxpayer was not susceptible to transfer pricing 
 
486
  ITA No. 16 of 2014, paragraphs 60, 77, 122-123, 125, 127.  My emphasis.  See also 
CIT v EKL Appliances Ltd ITA Nos. 1068 and 1070/2011 paragraph 19 accepting the TPG as 
“valid input” regarding recharacterisation, and other cases cited by Jindal (2015) at page 40ff.  
487
  ITA No. 233 of 2014. 
488
  Paragraph 23. 
489
  Paragraph 37.  
490
  ITA Nos. 2148/Mds/2010; 1917/Mds/2011.  
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adjustment.  The tax authority has been curiously persistent with its use of rupee 
benchmarking of loans which are in foreign currency.  It is now clear that this 
approach is fundamentally flawed: see e.g. Cotton Naturals491 applied in Hinduja 
Global Solutions Ltd v ACIT492. 
3.122 By contrast, the tax authority prevailed in arguing for the use of US$ 
LIBOR plus a 1.64% margin, based on five putative comparables, in Perot 
Systems TSI (India) Ltd v DCIT493, contrary to the taxpayer’s position that no 
interest needed be charged to its Bermudan and Hungarian subsidiaries because 
the loans in question were quasi-equity.  The taxpayer’s attempt to recharacterise 
its own transaction by invoking paragraph 1.37 TPG (1995 edition) was rejected, 
as was reliance on the applicable Hungarian thin capitalisation rules and an 
esoteric reference to the UK’s tonnage tax manual494.   The ITAT observed that 
“[t]he aim is to examine whether there is anomaly in the transaction which arise 
out of special relationship between the creditor and the debtor”495: there is a nod 
here to the policy underlying transfer pricing being the elimination of distortions 
attributable to the control relationship496.   
 
491
  Delhi ITAT, ITA No. 5855/Del/2012; High Court decision, note 487 above, quoting 
Vogel (3rd edition) commenting on Article 11(5) OECD MTC.  
492
  ITA No. 254/Mum/2013.  Also see e.g. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd v ACIT ITA No. 
586/Mum/2013; Ces Pvt Ltd v DCIT ITA No. 1445/Hyd/2010; Apollo Tyres Ltd v ACIT ITA No. 
16/Coch/2011; Vijay Electricals Ltd v ACIT ITA No. 1159/Hyd/2013; Videocon Industries Ltd v 
ACIT ITA No. 1728/Mum/2014; Aditya Birla Minacs Worldwide Ltd v DCIT ITA No. 
7033/Mum/2012; Prolific Corporation Ltd v DCIT ITA No.237/Hyd/2014; Manugraph India Ltd 
v DCIT ITA No. 4761/Mum/2013.  An alternative tax authority strategy has been to start with the 
relevant LIBOR rate, but then add extravagant margins for credit risk and transaction costs.  That 
approach was rejected in favour of the Reserve Bank of India’s guidance on external commercial 
borrowings in Ion Exchange (India) Ltd v ACIT ITA No. 5109/Mum/2013.  
493
  [2010] 37 SOT 358. An attempt by the TPO to apply a rate of LIBOR + 0.25% to 
short-term interest-free advances was rejected in Wipro Ltd v DCIT  ITA No. 1178/Bang/2007 
following an utter failure to present any comparables.  
494
  Probably what is now TTM07500: “[m]any shipping groups use intra-group interest-
free loans from one UK company to another as a more flexible alternative to an equity 
investment.  Under the transfer pricing rules, interest is not imputed on loans which cross the ring 
fence if they are properly regarded as performing an equity function – i.e. where, and to the 
extent that, the loan renders the debtor company thinly capitalised.” 
495
  Paragraph 10 of the decision.  
496
  See e.g. paragraph 1.3 TPG – a central theme of this study.  
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3.123 In Aithent Technologies Pvt Ltd v Income Tax Officer497 the ITAT held 
that the CUP method was applicable for pricing an outbound interest-free loan (the 
implication of the tribunal’s approval of Perot Systems being that US$ LIBOR 
was the appropriate base) and, in the absence of valid comparables submitted by 
either party, remitted the case to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration.  What 
was required was “assessment of the credit quality of the borrower and estimation 
of a credit rating, evaluation of the terms of the loan e.g. period of loan, the 
amount, the currency, interest rate basis, and any additional input such as 
convertibility and finally estimation of arm’s length terms for the loan based upon 
the key comparability factors and internal and/or external comparable 
transactions”.  The source of the taxpayer-lender’s funds, and notions of 
“commercial expediency”, were “wholly irrelevant”498.     
3.124 Outbound non-rupee loans have been scrutinised by the ITATs in 
several other cases.  The general themes emerging from the decisions are (a) a 
rejection of the TPO’s attempts to apply the familiar 14% rupee rate and approval 
of relevant currency market rates499, (b) scepticism about the relevance of 
“commercial expediency” as a justification for any particular transaction500, and 
(c) criticism (usually directed at the TPO) of a lack of rigorous comparability 
analysis501.   
 
497
  ITA No. 3647/Del/2007  (2011 Delhi ITAT).  
498
  Paragraph 7.  The High Court in Cotton Naturals (paragraph 3.120 above) was 
reluctant to reject “commercial expediency” out of hand, dismissing the argument that 
“commercial expediency and related benefits have no connection or relationship with the rate of 
interest” although “this fact could be of marginal significance and effect” (paragraph 27).  
499
  Tata Autocomp Systems Limited v ACIT ITA No. 7354/Mum/11; Mylan Laboratories 
Ltd v ACIT ITA No. 1615/Hyd/2010; Auriopro Solutions Ltd v ACIT ITA No. 7872/Mum/2011, 
itself applied in PMP Auto Components Pvt Ltd v DCIT ITA No. 1484/Mum/2014; Tooltech 
Global Engineering Pvt Ltd v DCIT ITA No. 273/Pn/2013; Four Soft Ltd v DCIT, paragraph 
3.129 below.  
500
  Crest Animation Studios Ltd v ACIT ITA Nos. 5212 and 5348/Mum/2007, paragraph 
2.4.4; compare Mascon Global Ltd v DCIT  ITA No. 2205/Mds/2010, paragraph 21.  
501
  Maharishi Solar Technology Pvt Ltd v Income Tax Officer ITA Nos. 4393 and 
4561/Del/2009; The Indian Hotels Company Ltd v DCIT ITA Nos. 6712/Mum/2008, 
2678/Mum/2009.   
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3.125 Bharti Airtel Limited v DCIT502 addressed loans made by the taxpayer 
to its AEs in the US, the UK and Canada.  These were in USD, GBP and CAD 
respectively, and said by the taxpayer to have borne interest at “LIBOR + 160 
basis points” resulting in an interest rate of 7.33%503. The TPO tediously imputed 
interest at 14% by reference to BBB-rated rupee bonds; unsurprisingly the ITAT 
found such rate to “have no relevance at all”504.  Nor was it relevant to distinguish 
between bank and non-bank lenders, or to increase the interest rate for risk on 
account of the loans being unsecured.  On the latter point, the ITAT considered 
that “the assessee has advanced monies to its subsidiaries which are under its 
management and control – a factor which substantially reduces the risk rather than 
increasing it”505.  (This approach seems dubious given the need to postulate an 
arm’s length transaction and thus to postulate a dealing between unrelated 
parties.506)  One further interesting point (also in my view dubious) is that the 
ITAT thought that “the proposition that the credit rating of the parent company 
and subsidiary company will be the same is not of universal application but it is 
certainly a good indicator, in the absence of anything else to the contrary, of the 
credit rating of the subsidiary as well”.  On that basis, the taxpayer’s own cost of 
funds (in the relevant currencies) was regarded as a good internal CUP.   
3.126 Indeed in VVF Limited v DCIT507 the ITAT remitted the case for 
reconsideration by reference to the parent company lender’s own LIBOR-related 
foreign currency cost of funds (though paid no heed to any difference in 
creditworthiness between lender and borrower).  And in The Great Eastern 
Shipping Co Ltd v ACIT508 (where the TPO had “proceeded on an entirely 
 
502
  ITA No. 5816/Del/2012.  
503
  Something is awry here given the universal interest rate but the different currencies.  
504
  Paragraph 61.  
505
  Paragraph 66.  
506
  In Glamour Enterprises (Private) Ltd v DCIT ITA No. 1114/Jp/2011, disconcertingly, 
but probably obiter, the Jaipur ITAT commented that “[t]he loan given to subsidiary company 
has a lower risk as the assessee has indirect control on it” (paragraph 2.6): this seems to infringe 
the principle of disregarding the control relationship in hypothesising a transaction between 
independent parties.  On this, see also the introductory comments on certain European countries 
at paragraph 3.237 below.    
507
  [2010] TIOL-55-ITAT-Mum, cited in Bharti Airtel.   
508
  ITA Nos. 397 and 437/Mum/2012.  
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erroneous basis”, and on “facts which were not even remotely connected with the 
facts of the case”, to propose the seemingly standard 14% rate on outbound loans), 
the taxpayer’s US$ rates were sustained via an unsatisfactory reliance on its own 
cost of funds.    
3.127 In Kohinoor Foods Ltd v ACIT509, interest-free loans were, promisingly, 
evaluated by the TPO by reference to a coherent list of factors, including credit 
ratings for borrowers with similar standing, financial/credit risk for the lender, 
risks inherent in the business of the borrower and structural risk; the TPO again 
invoked General Electric510.  From there the TPO sought the advice of CRISIL511, 
who opined that an interest rate of 13.49% would be appropriate. The Delhi ITAT 
rejected the proposition that the taxpayer parent company was comparable to a 
financial institution lender.  The CUP method was appropriate, but “multi-national 
corporate set-up involves creation of subsidiaries and associate enterprises for 
advancement of their overseas business.  They help them in terms of finance by 
offering soft loans and subsidiary loans; they are primary [sic] focused to spread 
the business of the principal unit.  In our view, re-coursing straightaway to 
CRISIL, which deals in hardcore institutional finance transactions … is wholly 
inapplicable”512.  Thus the 13.49% rate proposed by the tax authority was rejected.  
Instead, the “correct comparable” was LIBOR.  (No margin was mentioned.)  
While one can see that the crude CRISIL rate was not obviously based on the 
scientific factors first tabled by the tax authority (and was presumably – though 
not apparent from the report - a rupee rate rather than a rate appropriate for the 
currency of the loans concerned), such that the applicable LIBOR (for currency 
and tenor) should provide a starting point, the ITAT did not bother to dwell on any 
analysis of credit risk and thus margin over LIBOR in the way that an arm’s 
length lender would do.   
 
509
  ITA Nos. 3688-3691/Del/2012; 3867-3869/Del/2012.    
510
  Paragraph 63.3.E(vi).   
511
  A Standard & Poor’s company, headquartered in Mumbai.  
512
  Paragraph 68.1.  
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3.128 Deputy Director of Income-tax (International Taxation) Mumbai v The 
Development Bank of Singapore513 is unusual in addressing intra-entity “loans” 
between the bank’s Indian branch and its head office in Singapore and other 
branches.  Thus these “loans” were not actually legal transactions at all, but 
merely intra-entity arrangements (“dealings” in OECD parlance514).  The decision 
does not dwell on this fundamental structural aspect at all but instead focuses on 
the appropriate “interest” charge.  This is curious given the threshold condition for 
application of Indian transfer pricing law of an “international transaction” between 
two or more associated enterprises.  One might have expected that the controversy 
should just have been concerned with the calculation of profit attributable to the 
Indian branch.  That said, the Indian tax authority considers that “transactions 
between the head office abroad and a branch in India are ... subject to these 
transfer pricing regulations”515.  The case in fact addressed the status of LIBOR as 
an “arithmetical mean” of prices (finding it to be such), so that the taxpayer’s use 
of that rate, together with a +5% variance band (under the law then applicable) 
was sanctioned by section 92C(2).  Of course, within a single entity, no question 
of passive association could arise.  Note here the general rule promulgated by 
OECD (reflecting legal and commercial actuality) that PEs have the same credit 
rating as the entity as a whole: paragraph 2.66 above.   
3.129 Guarantees.  In Four Soft Ltd v DCIT516 the Hyderabad ITAT had 
followed the approach in Siva and approved the use of a LIBOR rate for outbound 
loans to AEs rather than the 14% Indian corporate bond rate proposed by the TPO.  
In the ITAT’s 2011 decision for the 2006-7 assessment year, the taxpayer’s 
provision of a parental guarantee to support its foreign subsidiary was found not to 
be an “international transaction” within the meaning of the transfer pricing 
legislation; but the changes introduced by Finance Act 2012 to section 92B were 
 
513
  ITA No. 6631/Mum/2006.  
514
  Paragraph 2.65 above.   
515
  Circular 14, 22 November 2001. Butani (2007) at page 65 notes that the term 
“permanent establishment” has been included in the definition of “enterprise” in section 92F.  I 
am not sure that puts the point beyond argument given the requirement for a “transaction” which 
is “between two or more associated enterprises” (section 92B(1)).  
516
  ITA No. 1495/Hyd/2010.  
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considered to render that argument ineffective in subsequent litigation for the 
following assessment year517.  In that later case (March 2014), the ITAT 
distinguished the 3.75% rate proposed by the TPO, based on a standard or “rack” 
rate charged by ICICI Bank for a bank guarantee, from a corporate guarantee: 
“[a]s the corporate guarantee is not in the nature of bank guarantee, the rate 
applicable to bank guarantee provided by the bank cannot be applied to corporate 
guarantee which is provided by group company”518.  Following Glenmark 
Pharmaceuticals v ACIT (paragraph 3.135 below) and Infotech Enterprises Ltd519, 
the ITAT remitted the issue back to the TPO to redetermine the quantum of 
guarantee fee based upon the approach in Glenmark.  
3.130 Everest Kanto Cylinder Ltd v DCIT520 concerned the adequacy of a 
0.5% fee paid to the Indian taxpayer parent company by its wholly-owned Dubai 
subsidiary for a guarantee issued by the parent in respect of the subsidiary’s bank 
borrowings.  The TPO pointed to various arm’s length guarantee fees observable 
in the market and selected 3%.  The Mumbai ITAT however found that the TPO 
had not presented any evidence of the terms and conditions and circumstances in 
which banks had been charging such fees; therefore the TPO had not made out 
comparability. 521 
3.131 The ITAT preferred as a comparable a separate guarantee 0.6% fee paid 
by the taxpayer itself to the bank which had made the loan to its subsidiary.  The 
TPO had argued that, but for the guarantee by the taxpayer, the bank would not 
have lent the money, or might have charged a much higher interest rate, 
“considering the enterprise risk”, citing General Electric522.  The ITAT rejected 
the taxpayer’s proposition that there could not be any cost or charge for the 
guarantee, but felt that the 0.5% actually charged was “quite near” to the 0.6% 
 
517
  The same conclusion was reached by the Mumbai ITAT in Mahindra & Mahindra v 
DCIT ITA No. 8597/Mum/2010, but see paragraph 3.139 below.  
518
  ITA No. 1903/Hyd/2011 paragraph 25.  
519
  ITA Nos. 115 and 2184/Hyd/2011. 
520
  ITA Nos. 542/Mum/2012; 7073/Mum/2012.  
521
  Similarly, in Asian Paints (note 531 below), the ITAT rejected the TPO’s use of 
“naked quote from banks”.  
522
  Paragraph 11; paragraph 3.16ff above on General Electric.  
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paid by the taxpayer itself to the same bank for a guarantee facility.  It is 
unsatisfying that, in arriving at this view, it is not apparent that the ITAT applied 
any sort of qualitative comparability criteria.  There is no trace of the terms of the 
two guarantees being compared; bizarrely the tribunal felt that the difference of 
0.1% “can be ignored as the rate of interest on which [the bank’s Bahrain branch] 
has given loan to [subsidiary] is at 5.5%, whereas assessee is paying interest rate 
of more than 10% on its loan taken with [the bank in India].  Thus, such a minor 
difference can be on account of differential rate of interest”523.  Evidently the 
taxpayer/assessee was “a prominent and reputed industrial company … [which] on 
account of its financial strength has tie up with many large banks … [whereas] the 
subsidiary in Dubai, which was newly-formed and unknown, had a low credit 
rating”524.  Thus the 5.5% vs. 10%+ interest rate differential cannot have been 
down to creditworthiness.  It seems likely that the interest rate difference was 
significantly attributable to the respective currencies of the loans: the subsidiary 
had borrowed in US$; I infer that the taxpayer’s 10%+ interest cost was for rupee 
debt.  If correct, that surely crumbles the foundations of the ITAT’s finding in that 
respect?   
3.132 Nevertheless (noting that the TPO appears to have failed to discharge 
the burden of proof, rather than on issues of legal principle), the decision is useful 
for its recognition of relevant economic factors including, critically, risk, in 
evaluating arm’s length guarantee fees.  Yet despite the TPO’s citation of General 
Electric and the guarantor’s high credit-standing, the topic of implicit support is 
absent from the discussion.  (Of course, it would not suit the TPO to argue that 
point, which would tend to suppress rather than augment the guarantee fee.)  The 
Revenue’s appeal to the High Court was dismissed as not raising any substantial 
question of law525. 
 
523
  Paragraph 21.  
524
  Paragraph 11.  
525
  ITA No. 1165 of 2013. 
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3.133 Nimbus Communications Ltd v ACIT526 concerned guarantees given by 
an Indian parent company taxpayer to a UK bank lender to the taxpayer’s UK and 
US subsidiaries; no guarantee fees were charged.  Again the TPO referred to 
benchmark bank fees in the range 0.15–3%, and selected 1.5% as a point within 
that range.  Tantalisingly, the ITAT rehearsed how the Commissioner of Income 
Tax (Appeals) had observed that “[s]ometimes taxpayers take the position that a 
parent company’s support for a subsidiary is to be implied and therefore no 
specific guarantee fee payment is required”527.  The CIT(A) rejected the TPO’s 
use of a “naked quote” which failed to heed qualitative factors, noting that 
guarantor banks typically take into account credit rating/risk, financial position of 
the borrower, guarantee terms including duration and amount, credit history, 
market dynamics and competition, bank profit margins, negotiation and client 
relationships.  The CIT(A) was attracted to the precedent set by the French Société 
Carrefour case528, and found that a balance was to be struck between the normal 
commercial practice of charging a fee and “the general rule that a parent company 
may provide a free services [sic] as long as it can justify that the act was in its 
own interest”.  On that basis, the French approach was followed and, as in that 
case, a 0.25% guarantee fee set.  
3.134 The ITAT, drawing support from paragraph 7.13 TPG, found a “clear 
benefit” to the AEs such that guarantee commissions should have been charged at 
the arm’s length price.  However, because the facts were “materially similar” to 
those in Everest Kanto Cylinder, the ITAT preferred to follow the decision of its 
co-ordinate bench and impute a 0.5% guarantee fee.  The coherence of Everest is 
questioned above, so it is frustrating that Nimbus uncritically adopts it as well as 
 
526
  ITA Nos. 2359 and 3664/Mum/2010.  
527
  Paragraph 5 of the ITAT decision, resonant of the CRA’s argument in General 
Electric.  
528
  Conseil d’État, #81690-82782, 17 February 1992. The taxpayer guaranteed third party 
loans to its foreign subsidiaries without charging a fee. The tax authority considered this an 
abnormal act of management and adjusted the taxpayer’s profits by adding the value of the 
services rendered, set at 1% of the guaranteed amounts.  The Court found the taxpayer’s conduct 
to be an unsound business practice; free services could be justified, but only where that was in 
the parent’s own interest. The financial strength of the subsidiaries was good and so the parent’s 
risk was low; it was (questionably?) relevant to take into account the parent’s increased dividend 
income, but an adjustment was still required, albeit reduced to 0.25%.  
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according (almost) equivalent respect to Société Carrefour, the reported decision 
in which is itself unburdened by quantitative analysis.  In particular, the ITAT 
passed no comment on the CIT(A)’s “balancing” process which appeared to 
sanction free services by a parent as long as they were “in its own interest”: this 
notion seems to go way beyond the classes of shareholder activities contemplated 
by paragraphs 7.9-10 TPG.529 
3.135 General Electric was cited by the TPO in Glenmark Pharmaceuticals 
Limited v ACIT530, another case on guarantee fees and commissions for letters of 
credit, though still without reference to the implicit support concept; instead, the 
TPO seems simply to have cast about for supposed comparables, claiming to have 
found one in the 1% guarantee fee rate sustained by the Tax Court of Canada.  The 
ITAT rejected the TPO’s use of “naked quotes” from banks, and also found a 
“conceptual difference” between bank and corporate guarantees, though the 
articulation of this difference is dubious, bank guarantees, unlike corporate 
instruments, being said to be “foolproof” - default being treated as a “service 
deficiency” under banking regulation; it is mildly surprising in these post-financial 
crisis days to hear of bank obligations being regarded as “foolproof”. The ITAT 
upheld the taxpayer’s rates by reference to rates sustained or applied in other 
cases531, but without any quantitative or qualitative analysis of the underlying risks 
bearing upon the taxpayer’s own facts and circumstances (thus falling into the 
same trap as the TPO did with his citation of the 1% rate from General Electric).  
3.136 In Bharti Airtel532 the Delhi ITAT presented a startling decision on 
guarantees.  The taxpayer guaranteed a working capital facility provided to its AE 
by Deutsche Bank; it appears that no borrowings were in fact drawn under the 
 
529
  Reliance Industries (note 531 below) is similarly frustrating, with the ITAT adopting a 
simplistic averaging of ten questionable comparables.  Technocraft Industries (India) Ltd v ACIT 
ITA Nos. 7159 and 7990/Mum/2011 also adopted an unsatisfying averaging approach.  
530
  ITA Nos. 5031 and 5488/Mum/2012.  
531
  Asian Paints Limited ITA Nos. 408 and 1937/Mum/2010; ITA No. 7801/Mum/2010; 
Everest Kanto Cylinder (paragraph 3.130 above); Nimbus Communications (paragraph 3.133); 
Reliance Industries Ltd v ACIT ITA Nos. 885 and 1725/Mum/2009; Cox & Kings Ltd v ACIT 
ITA Nos. 1354 and 7770/Mum/2014.   
532
  Paragraph 3.125 above. The Hyderabad ITAT in the 2014 Four Soft Limited decision 
(paragraph  3.129 above) did not refer to Bharti Airtel, which had been released only days 
previously.    
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facility533.  No fee was charged to the subsidiary, but the taxpayer volunteered a 
0.65% transfer pricing adjustment.  In appealing against the TPO’s assessment of 
a 4.68% fee (the TPO invoking paragraph 7.13 TPG and General Electric), the 
taxpayer argued that provision of the guarantee was a shareholder activity and 
anyway entailed no cost, so that no transfer pricing adjustment was permitted.  
The appeal was allowed on the basis of a clever exercise in statutory construction.  
The ITAT considered that the section 92B Explanation added by the Finance Act 
2012 (paragraph 3.107 above), as it related to guarantees, was merely clarificatory 
and “for the removal of doubts”, so that it had “to be read in conjunction with the 
main provisions, and in harmony with the scheme of the provisions”534.  
Explanation (i)(c), dealing with “capital financing”, could only be regarded as 
elaborating upon the part of section 92B(1) which addresses “any other transaction 
having a bearing on profits, incomes, losses or assets” of the relevant enterprise.  
Although “future” impacts on profits etc were to be taken into account, the ITAT 
distinguished “contingent” effects, and concluded that provision of the guarantee 
did not have any such effect: it did not alter the income, profits, losses or assets of 
the assessee535.  Thus the guarantee did not rank as an “international transaction” 
as defined in the statute.  The decision was welcomed in some quarters536, and the 
ITAT’s approach to construction of the statute is at least tenable, but it is 
surprising that the absence of (immediate financial) cost to a parent company 
guarantor should be enough to take cross-border guarantees out of the realm of 
transfer pricing.  Does not failure to charge a guarantee fee have a negative effect 
on the profits of the guarantor?  Bharti Airtel was applied in Videocon Industries 
Ltd v ACIT537 and Redington (India) Ltd v JCIT538, but see further below.    
 
533
  Paragraph 30.  
534
  Paragraph 27.  
535
  Paragraph 32.  
536
  E.g. Ostwal (2014): a “classic and landmark decision” which it is “important to 
welcome, admire and follow”.  Ostwal observes that imputation of guarantee fees would, given 
net capital import flows, have negative implications for the Indian economy in outbound fee 
cases; but that does not affect the correct application of the arm’s length principle.  Compare 
Jhabakh: the ITAT’s conclusion “may not last for long”.  However, see paragraph  3.139 below.  
537
  ITA Nos. 6145, 6662/Mum/2012; 1728-9/Mum/2014, expressly distinguishing the 
General Electric case by reference to the different domestic law under consideration (paragraph 
35).  
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3.137 Although Bharti Airtel was pleaded by the taxpayer in Kohinoor Foods 
Ltd v ACIT539, that case proceeded on the basis that transfer pricing adjustments 
could indeed be made in an Indian parent company guarantee situation.  The tax 
authority assessed guarantee fee income based upon a supposedly standard bank 
commission of 2.25% and added a margin of 2%.  The tribunal contented itself 
with the view that the 1% charge reported by the taxpayer was fair and reasonable 
by reference to rates used in the Nimbus and Reliance cases (paragraph 3.133 and 
note 531 above), rather than undertaking any separate analysis of the 
creditworthiness of the actual debtors or the comparability of the circumstances in 
those cases.  
3.138 The durability of Bharti Airtel did at first indeed seem limited.  Apart 
from Kohinoor Foods, Hindalco Industries Ltd v ACIT540 and Aditya Birla Minacs 
Worldwide Ltd v DCIT541, concerned Indian parent company guarantees of foreign 
subsidiaries’ bank borrowings related to corporate acquisitions.  In Hindalco the 
taxpayer challenged the tax authority’s position that a fee should have been 
charged, but the Bombay High Court rejected the taxpayer’s case on procedural 
grounds without ruling on the substantive issue.  The case proceeded to the 
Mumbai ITAT where the taxpayer’s invocation of Bharti Airtel was rejected on 
the basis that in that case the observations of the tribunal upon the Explanation 
were “obiter dicta only”542.  In Aditya Birla the ITAT ignored the taxpayer’s 
invocation of Bharti Airtel, and preferred a 0.5% guarantee fee on the basis of the 
supposed precedent in Everest Kanto (paragraph 3.130) without the slightest 
examination of comparability543.   
3.139 Bharti Airtel has however received significant support in the November 
2015 decision in Micro Ink Ltd v ACIT544.  The Ahmedabad ITAT agreed that 
 
538
  (2014) 49 taxman.com 146. 
539
  Paragraph 3.127 above.   
540
  Writ petition no. 2782 of 2011.  
541
  ITA No. 7033/Mum/2012.  
542
  ITA No. 4857/Mum/2012, paragraph 29.  
543
  Likewise in Manugraph India Ltd v DCIT ITA No. 4761/Mum/2013.  
544
  ITA No. 2873/Ahd/10.   
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cases where no guarantee fee had been charged did not have “a bearing on the 
profits, income, losses or assets” of the taxpayer (mere contingent liability not 
being enough to have such an effect)545.  Thus the issue of a corporate guarantee 
for no fee was not an “international transaction”.  On the particular facts of the 
case, the guarantee was seen (as the taxpayer proposed) as a contribution to 
“quasi-equity” or a shareholder activity, not amounting to the provision of a 
service.  General Electric was cited but (quite properly) distinguished as 
addressing different statutory language.  The case is therefore important, under 
current Indian law, for situations where (i) the guaranteed entity could not itself 
raise debt on the basis of its own credit-standing, and (ii) (perhaps 
consequentially) no guarantee fee is charged.  In arriving at their decision the 
ITAT referred to Chapter VII TPG (“international best practices”546), ATO 
statements547 and US literature548.   
3.140 The debt of the Indian assessee in DSM Anti-Infectives India Ltd v 
ACIT549 was guaranteed by its Dutch AE.  Counsel for the taxpayer admitted that 
“there is international practice to pass on 50% of such financial savings” (i.e. due 
to the guarantee).  No forensic examination of the split is offered, but one might 
think that acceptance of the benefit share principle should open the door to more 
rigorous discussion of relative bargaining power in future cases.  
3.141 Receivables.  Several of the Indian cases address situations where trade 
credit is allowed to an AE, typically without interest550.  Some have resulted in the 
 
545
  So the guarantee was not regarded as a service; cf. notes 636, 835 below on the US 
position.   
546
  Paragraph 34.  But it is doubtful whether the facts of the case really fit with TPG 
notions of shareholder activity.  The ITAT quoted paragraph 7.9 TPG (2010 edition, substantially 
reproduced in the BEPS Final Reports), which refers to an activity “relating to group members 
even where those group members do not need the activity (and would not be willing to pay for it 
were they independent enterprises)”.   
547
  Paragraph 32.  
548
  Paragraph 36.  Miller (1994) is cited with approval.  
549
  ITA No. 1290/Chd/2012.  
550
  Compare the US safe harbour permitting interest not to be charged on intercompany 
receivables for approximately 3 or 4 months (depending on whether the debtor is in or outside the 
US): Regs. § 1.482-2(a)(1)(iii). It is recognised that longer interest-free periods may be used 
when that is regular trade practice. 
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imputation of income551.  In Commissioner of Income Tax v Indo American 
Jewellery Ltd552 the Bombay High Court found there to be “complete uniformity” 
in the assessee’s approach to not charging interest on trade outstandings with both 
AEs and unassociated persons, so the ITAT’s decision to delete the transfer 
pricing adjustment was upheld.553  But no receivables case has engaged with the 
passive association topic.   
Tax authority practice 
3.142 The Indian Central Board of Direct Taxation has been “rather reluctant” 
to provide national transfer pricing guidance554.  None at all has been issued 
regarding the passive association topic555.  Nonetheless, “[t]he Indian tax 
authorities are closely following the developments in the international arena, with 
the higher tax authorities showing some signs of inclination towards global best 
practices”556.  As recorded above, the Canadian General Electric case has been 
cited before the ITAT on several occasions, but argument which focuses on the 
effect of implicit support on financial transactions has not yet been reported.  
 
551
  E.g. Logix Micro Systems Ltd v ACIT ITA Nos. 423 and 529/Bang/2009, applied in 
Cheil India Pvt Ltd v DCIT  ITA No. 1230/Del/2014; Tech Mahindra Limited v DCIT ITA No. 
1176/Mum/2010; cf. Evonik Degussa India Pvt Ltd v ACIT  ITA No. 7653/Mum/2011.  
552
  ITA(L) No. 1053 of 2012 (judgment 8 January 2013), distinguished in Dania Oro 
Jewellery Pvt Ltd v Income Tax Officer  ITA No. 6827/Mum/2012.  
553
  Other receivables cases are Boston Scientific International BV India v Assistant 
Director of Income Tax [2010] 40 SOT 11 (transfer pricing imputation of interest on trade 
receivables deleted by reference to offsetting payables); Commissioner of Income Tax v Patni 
Computer Systems Limited ITA No. 1148 of 2012 (case remitted to Pune ITAT in view of 
retrospective addition of the Explanation to section 92B); Mylan Laboratories Ltd v ACIT ITA 
No. 66/Hyd/2013 (taxpayer’s charge of LIBOR + 1% upheld by reference to the 1% guarantee 
fee approved by the Dispute Resolution Panel); Bausch & Lomb Eyecare (India) Pvt Ltd v ACIT 
ITA Nos. 3861/Del/2010, 4924/Del/2011, 6382/Del/2012 and 6580/Del/2013 (allowing 
taxpayer’s appeal against the imputation of interest income where taxpayer allowed interest-free 
credit to both AEs and unconnected persons, applying Indo American Jewellery); Micro Ink Ltd v 
ACIT, paragraph 3.139 above (taxpayer’s appeal sustained because time value of money included 
in goods sale price).  The Mumbai ITAT has also ruled that share subscription money left 
outstanding for a period of “inordinate delay” can attract an imputed interest charge under 
transfer pricing rules: PMP Auto Components Pvt Ltd v DCIT, see note 499 above.   
554
  Dr Parthasarathi Shome, Chairman, Tax Administration Reforms Commission, 
Government of India, former adviser to the Indian Finance Minister, speaking at the “TP Minds” 
conference, Singapore, 24 September 2014.  
555
  Aside perhaps from the hint mentioned in paragraph 3.145 below.  
556
  Ahuja (2012).  
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(However, at least some professional advisers advocate notching up a borrower’s 
credit rating to take account of implicit support557.)  
3.143 One source of Indian governmental practice is found in the UN 
Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries558.  Chapter 10, 
entitled “Country Practices”, includes a section on “Emerging Transfer Pricing 
Challenges in India”.  In particular, “[t]ransfer pricing of inter-company loans and 
guarantees are increasingly being considered some of the most complex transfer 
pricing issues in India.  The Indian transfer pricing administration has followed 
quite a sophisticated methodology for pricing inter-company loans which revolves 
around: comparison of terms and conditions of loan agreement; determination of 
credit rating of lender and borrower; identification of comparable third party loan 
agreement; suitable adjustments to enhance comparability”.  For outbound loans, 
“[t]he Indian transfer pricing administration has determined that since the loans 
are advanced from India and Indian currency has subsequently converted into the 
currency of the geographic location of the AE, the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) of 
the Indian banks should be applied as the external CUP and not LIBOR or 
EURIBOR rate”559.  But it will be plain from the case law discussion above that 
this latter position has now become untenable in most scenarios.  Indeed, the 
statement was expressly disapproved by the Delhi High Court in Cotton 
Naturals560.  
3.144 The UN Manual also identifies guarantee fees as a controversial issue.  
Again the focus is on outbound investment and thus guarantees extended by 
Indian parent companies for the benefit of their foreign subsidiaries.  While 
sensibly asserting that the CUP method is appropriate561, the position is taken that 
 
557
  See e.g. Tolia, Mehta and Gajar (2011), section II.  
558
  See paragraph 2.90.   
559
  Paragraph 10.4.10.2.  
560
  At paragraph 42; paragraph 3.120 above.   
561
  This is generally consistent with the approach taken in the cases, and also in the 
Guidance Note on Report under Section 92E of the Income Tax Act 1961 issued by the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants of India (August 2013) paragraph 6.5(d). The form of transfer pricing 
report to be furnished by an accountant under section 92E and Rule 10E (form No.3CEB) 
requires inter alia details of international transactions in respect of lending or borrowing of 
money and guarantees. 
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“[i]n most cases, interest rate quotes and guarantee rate quotes available from 
banking companies are taken as the benchmark rate to arrive at the ALP.  The 
Indian tax administration also uses the interest rate prevalent in the rupee bond 
markets in India for bonds of different credit ratings.  The difference in credit 
ratings between the parent in India and the foreign subsidiary is taken into account 
and the rate of interest specific to a credit rating of Indian bond is also considered 
for determination of the arm’s length price of such guarantee.”562 Again, recent 
case law mostly presents an emphatic rejection of the use of “rack rate” guarantee 
fees and of rupee rates where foreign currency transactions are concerned.   
3.145 Finally, it is acknowledged that “the Indian transfer pricing 
administration is facing a challenge due to non-availability of specialized database 
and transfer price of complex cases of inter-company loans in cases of mergers 
and acquisitions which involve complex inter-company loan instruments as well 
as implicit element of guarantee from parent company in securing debt”563.   This 
must be intended as a reference to the implicit support phenomenon as an effect 
upon the pricing of guarantees, just as in General Electric, which the Indian tax 
authority is plainly aware of given the way it has been cited repeatedly in the 
cases.  Thus the point is seen as a “challenge” in a context which is “complex”.  
3.146 Notwithstanding the extraordinary proliferation of Indian transfer 
pricing case law, including in the financial transactions context, and despite 
increasing citation of the TPG including paragraph 7.13 and General Electric and 
the Indian tax administration’s acknowledgment of the issue, no clear guidance yet 
exists in Indian tax law and practice regarding the recognition of passive 
association in pricing controlled transactions.  It seems inevitable however that the 
point will soon emerge, if not otherwise then via litigation, either by the tax 
authority looking to maximise taxable income or minimise deductible expenditure, 
or by taxpayers with converse motivations.    
 
 
562
  Paragraph 10.4.10.3.  
563
  Paragraph 10.4.10.4.  
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New Zealand 
Legislation 
3.147 New Zealand enacted transfer pricing legislation in 1995 with effect for 
the income tax year 1996-97 onwards564. Its transfer pricing code is now 
principally contained in Subpart GC of the Income Tax Act 2007.  The Act 
represented the final stage in New Zealand’s rewrite of income tax legislation 
using plain English techniques.  That included rewriting Parts F to Y of the 
Income Tax Act 2004, which had previously housed Subpart GD addressing 
transfer pricing.  The 2007 Act is not intended to introduce changes in policy save 
as signalled in Schedule 51; no such changes are listed in relation to old Subpart 
GD.  Section GC6(1) observes that the purpose of the rules is “to substitute an 
arm’s length consideration in the calculation of a person’s net income if the 
person’s net income is reduced by the terms of a cross-border arrangement with an 
associated person for the acquisition or supply of goods, services, or anything 
else”.  Where “the amount of consideration” payable or receivable by a taxpayer is 
other than the “arm’s length amount”, the arm’s length amount is imputed565.  
Section GC13(1) prescribes that “an arm’s length amount of consideration must be 
determined by applying whichever one or a combination of the methods listed in 
subsection (2) produces the most reliable measure of the amount that completely 
independent parties would have agreed upon after real and fully adequate 
bargaining”.  The methods listed in subsection (2) are the CUP, resale price, cost 
plus, profit split and comparable profits methods.  The hypothesis emphasises the 
use of “completely independent” parties who must be assumed to have entered 
into “real and fully adequate bargaining”.  It seems doubtful that these aspects of 
 
564
  With explanatory guidance provided in Tax Information Bulletin vol. 7 no. 11 (March 
1996).  
565
  Sections GC7 and GC8.  
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the meaning of “arm’s length amount” substantively alter the hypothesis posed by 
Article 9(1) OECD MTC (used in all New Zealand’s double tax treaties566).  
Presumably “independent” in Article 9(1) inherently means “completely” 
independent; and bargaining power is already recognised as a pricing factor567.  
But if anything the emphasis lends support to the view that the comparator 
transaction should be one between two hypothetical parties.  
3.148 An interesting point of detail in the New Zealand legislation is its active 
engagement with share capital.  The issue of shares is expressly excluded from the 
operative concepts of acquisition and supply, save in the case of fixed rate shares 
“because such shares are analogous to, and highly substitutable with, loans.  As 
loans are covered by the transfer pricing regime, it is appropriate that fixed rate 
shares are also covered”568.  
3.149 A separate statutory code at Subpart FE of the 2007 Act applies thin 
capitalisation rules on a formulaic basis rather than by utilisation of the arm’s 
length principle569.  
Case law 
3.150 There is no transfer pricing case law in New Zealand570. 
Tax authority practice 
3.151 On 10 April 2015, the New Zealand Inland Revenue published its 
“Transfer pricing focus in 2015 and 2016”: among other things, they promised to 
“maintain a special focus on … loans in excess of NZ$10m principal and 
guarantee fees”.  Less recently, in October 2000, the Revenue issued its own 
 
566
  The New Zealand Inland Revenue has acknowledged that “in the event of any 
inconsistency [with the domestic transfer pricing rules], the double taxation agreement provisions 
will prevail in the normal manner”: Tax Information Bulletin vol. 7, no. 11, page 12.  
567
  Paragraph 1.5 TPG.  
568
  Section GC14; Tax Information Bulletin vol. 7 no. 11, page 2.  Compare the UK 
Abbey National case, paragraph 3.179 below.  
569
  Guidance on thin capitalisation is provided in Tax Information Bulletin vol. 7, no 11, 
from page 13.  
570
  Smith (2013), confirmed by Robyn Rakete of IRD, email of 27 August 2015.  
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“Transfer Pricing Guidelines”571.  These refer to the application of section GD13 
of the Income Tax Act 2004, which differs in various respects from the current 
section GD13, but crucially the “arm’s length amount” concept is in all material 
respects identical to that now used.  The Guidelines enthusiastically endorse use of 
the arm’s length principle and the OECD TPG (e.g. to secure “broad parity of tax 
treatment for multinationals and independent enterprises”572); the Inland Revenue 
Guidelines “should be read as supplementing” the TPG.  It is said that useful 
reference may also be made to ATO material and the US section 482 
regulations573.  Also, “the arm’s length principle seeks to remove the effect of any 
ownership relationship between members of the multinational from the transfer 
price it adopts”574.  Taken literally, this might be seen as providing support for the 
opponents of recognising the effects of passive association in pricing controlled 
transactions.  However, I think it needs to be seen as a rather general statement 
made in relation to the merits of using the arm’s length approach, at a time when 
the passive association controversy had not yet begun in earnest.   
3.152 Nowadays the Inland Revenue acknowledges that although -  
“in determining an appropriate interest rate, we generally evaluate the credit risk of the 
company in question on the basis that it is a stand-alone entity, rather than an 
inseparable part of a single unified business575 … [s]ome subsidiaries in a multinational 
group are so central (or core) that, even absent any formal guarantees, if the subsidiary 
should be unable to repay its debt, the parent will intervene with the necessary financial 
support.  This parental intervention will occur either due to reputation concerns or in 
order for the parent to ensure that its own credit rating is not jeopardised by the rumour 
mill. … The arm’s length principle which underpins international transfer pricing 
practice does not operate in a vacuum.  Would bank credit approvals of a subsidiary in 
 
571
  As an appendix to Tax Information Bulletin vol. 12, no. 10, available at 
www.ird.govt.nz/technical-tax/tib/vol-12/ (accessed 17 August 2015).  Inland Revenue has 
advised that it will not be updating the Guidelines, and instead taxpayers should refer to the 
practice issues now published on its website.  
572
  Paragraph 64.  
573
  Paragraph 13.  See also IRD’s 2012 Tax Policy Report endorsing international tax 
policy coordination with Australia.  
574
  Paragraph 63.  
575
  Echoing paragraph 1.6 TPG.  
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the local New Zealand market take into account the wider multinational group’s 
creditworthiness?  If so, this market condition must be factored into the transfer pricing 
analysis, in just the same way as third party banks and rating agencies do currently in 
their decision-making.”576 
3.153 There is no formal guidance from Inland Revenue on how passive 
association or implicit support should be taken into account in the case of 
guarantees577.  Logically, recognition of passive association should follow in the 
same way as for loan transactions.   
3.154 The almost casual cross-reference to – adoption of – ATO guidance and 
the US section 482 regulations does seem rather significant (though perhaps this is 
to be understood by reference to such material at the time of the 2000 Guidelines).  
As noted above, ATO guidance, at least that currently applicable, provides quite 
strong support for the recognition of passive association (see paragraph 3.93ff 
above, including the discussion of TR 2010/7); and the US legislation, particularly 
Regs. § 1.482-9(l)(3)(v) and the Examples at Regs. § 1.482-9(l)(5), provide a 
powerful indication that passive association is to be taken into account as a 
comparability factor (paragraph 3.209ff below).  
 
 
United Kingdom 
Legislation 
3.155 One might think that firm foundations are present in UK tax law for the 
recognition of the effects of passive association in pricing controlled transactions.  
The principal statute requires interpretation in a manner consistent with the TPG, 
 
576
  http://www.ird.govt.nz/transfer-pricing/practice/transfer-pricing-practice-financing-
costs.html  (accessed 17 August 2015).  Robyn Rakete of IRD confirmed to me in an email dated 
27 August 2015 that “[i]n practice, IRD does recognise implicit support … Guidance is usually 
taken from the rating agencies’ published criteria in assessing cases”.   
577
  PwC (2013), New Zealand chapter.  
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and it is to be expected that the decisions of foreign (especially common law and 
Commonwealth) courts of high repute will be accorded a high degree of 
persuasive influence578.  Thus e.g. the decision of the Canadian Federal Court of 
Appeal in General Electric and the Australian Federal Court in Chevron 
(paragraphs 3.16 and 3.82 above) should be regarded as influential in the 
application of UK transfer pricing law.  On the other hand, the UK statute presents 
a serious obstacle (paragraph 3.160 below), and tax authority practice has at best 
been ambivalent towards the concept of implicit support.  Specifically, HMRC 
consider that its effects should be confined to the quantum of guarantee fees or 
interest rates, and not to borrowing capacity (paragraph 3.188 below).   
3.156 The UK’s transfer pricing code is in Part 4 Taxation (International and 
Other) Provisions Act 2010 (TIOPA)579.  The Article 9(1) MTC concept of 
“conditions made or imposed” between controlled persons is transposed into UK 
tax law via the analogous notion580 that “the actual provision” which is “made or 
imposed” between two persons who satisfy a “participation condition” (the test of 
common control) “differs from the provision (‘the arm’s length provision’) which 
would have been made as between independent persons”581.  The UK’s rules can 
apply to entirely domestic transactions582, though usually the sting is removed via 
a form of domestic corresponding adjustment583. 
 
578
  In Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 491, 507, Viscount Simonds was “ever 
willing to get help from seeing how the law, which is our common heritage, has developed on the 
other side of the Atlantic”.   
579
  UK transfer pricing rules articulating the arm’s length rule date back to section 37 
Finance Act 1951, the forerunner of section 770 ICTA, but the earliest manifestation of UK 
transfer pricing legislation can be traced back (at least) 100 years to section 31 Finance (No.2) 
Act 1915, which in a cross-border control context, focused on “income which might be expected 
to arise”, on which see Gillette Safety Razor Ltd v IRC [1920] 3 KB 358.  Baistrocchi and Roxan 
(2012) at page 303ff provide a good historical survey: “[t]he Inland Revenue even regarded the 
arm’s length principle as going back to the agency provisions in section 41 of the 1842 Act”.  In 
the modern code, exemptions are provided for small and medium-sized enterprises, subject to 
certain exclusions (sections 166-168 TIOPA).  The diverted profits tax introduced by Part 3 
Finance Act 2015 is a unilateral UK response to BEPS. It provides HMRC with a supplemental 
weapon beyond transfer pricing – but does not bear directly on the passive association topic.  
580
  Finance Bill 1998 explanatory notes to clause 106, paragraph 42.   
581
  Section 147(1)(d) TIOPA. 
582
  Though note the comments of Advocate-General Geelhoed in the Thin Cap case, 
finding it “extremely regrettable that … Member States … have felt obliged to ‘play safe’ by 
extending the scope of their rules to purely domestic situations where no possible risk of abuse 
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3.157 Part 4 is to be read in such manner as best secures consistency between 
the effect given to certain specified provisions – including the basic rule described 
above – and the effect which, in accordance with the 22 July 2010 TPG, is to be 
given, in cases where double tax treaties incorporate the whole or any part of 
Article 9 MTC in its form on 9 February 1988 or other rules in equivalent 
terms584.  The Special Commissioners have held that this rule applies generally 
and independently of whether or not there is a relevant double tax treaty between 
the two jurisdictions in which the parties to a “provision” are located585; and 
“provision” should be given a similar meaning to “condition” in the MTC586.  
Moreover, although reference to the TPG was not to be found in UK tax 
legislation until the Finance Act 1998, the Special Commissioners considered that, 
even in relation to prior transfer pricing rules which simply referred to the “arm’s 
length price”, the TPG could be regarded as a “useful aid” to be applied “in the 
absence of any other guidance as they are the best evidence of international 
thinking on the topic”587. 
3.158 The term “passive association” is not found in the UK transfer pricing 
legislation, but to an extent finds expression in rules which address cases 
involving guarantees.  In broad terms, section 152 TIOPA applies where a 
 
exists.  Such an extension of legislation … is anathema to the internal market”: paragraph 68 of 
the opinion reported at [2007] STC 906, 929.   This view was reiterated by the Commission in its 
Communication on anti-abuse measures (page 6): paragraph 2.111 above.   
583
  Section 174 TIOPA; INTM 412130.  This is potentially important in the EU law 
context:  paragraph 3.175 below.  
584
  Section 164 TIOPA. The Treasury may designate an updated or supplementary 
version of the TPG – to cope with updates produced by the OECD.  Such designation is now to 
be anticipated in view of the BEPS 2015 Final Reports.  Previously HMRC said that “the scope 
of [Part 4] can be no wider than the scope of Art. 9, as informed by the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines” (INTM 432040), but now they say, more blandly, “interpretation of transfer pricing 
legislation must be consistent with Article 9 … and in accordance with the [TPG]” (INTM 
421010).   Vega (2012) page 20 observes that “[i]n comparison to other countries, the British 
legislation is precise when indicating the version of the OECD Guidelines to be considered, 
which increases legal certainty in this area”.  
585
  DSG Retail Ltd v CIR [2009] UKFTT 31 (TC), TC 00001, paragraph 71 (confirming 
the assumption of both HMRC and the taxpayer).  
586
  Ibid., paragraph 66.  
587
  Ibid., paragraph 77.  In Meditor Capital Management Ltd v Feighan [2004] STC 
(SCD) 273 at paragraph 51, the Special Commissioner relied on paragraph 1.21 of the 1995 TPG 
to ascertain the nature of a required functional analysis that in turn informed the relevance of 
document production sought by the Revenue.  
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“security” (ordinarily, a debt security such as a note or bond, but extended in 
meaning by the statute588) is issued by one of the controlled parties to the other; 
and section 153 applies where a security has been issued to a third party and a 
guarantee has been provided by the other controlled party.  In comparing the 
actual provision with the arm’s length provision, and specifically in testing (a) the 
borrower’s overall level of indebtedness589, (b) whether it might be expected that 
the borrower and any particular person would have become parties to the 
transaction for the issue of a security or making of a loan, and (c) the rate of 
interest or other terms, in general account must be taken of “all factors”, but no 
account is to be taken of (or of any inference capable of being drawn from) any 
“guarantee” provided by a company with which the borrower was in a control 
relationship590. 
3.159 Section 152 thus addresses intra-group lending cases, and section 153 
bites upon the classical “indirect thin capitalisation” situation where a borrower in 
country X, instead of raising excessive debt from parent in country Y, borrows 
from an independent lender (ostensibly on arm’s length terms), supported by the 
guarantee of its country Y parent.  Where section 153 is applicable the 
“guarantee” is to be disregarded, leaving the borrower’s ability to raise debt to be 
tested by reference to its own financial standing.  
3.160 This rule has potential application in passive association situations 
because of the broad definition in section 154(4) TIOPA of “guarantee”.  It 
includes a “surety” and also “any other relationship, arrangements, connection or 
understanding (whether formal or informal) such that the person making the loan 
to the issuing company has a reasonable expectation that in the event of a default 
 
588
  Interest or other consideration payable or given for other advances of money is treated 
as payable or given in respect of a security; “references to a security are to be read accordingly”: 
section 154(7) TIOPA. 
589
  Provocatively, Ghosh, in the IFA 2008 Cahiers vol. 93b pages 743-744, remarked that 
“most creditors, other than banks, could be said to be perfectly happy to lend to any debtor, 
irrespective of its credit rating or its debt:equity ratio. … It is arguable that the thin capitalisation 
provisions are difficult to operate intelligibly to the satisfaction of HMRC at all.” 
590
  Sections 152(5) and (6)/153(5) and (6) TIOPA.  
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by the issuing company the person will be paid by, or out of the assets of, one or 
more companies”591.  
3.161 Whereas “arrangements”592 or “understandings” are likely to entail 
some level of activity on the part of the putative “guarantor”, or consensus 
between it and the lender or borrower, the references to “relationship” and 
“connection” are inherently passive; in the paragraph 3.159 case above the parent 
and subsidiary are obviously related and connected.  Thus a reasonable 
expectation of support by (in that example) parent in favour of lender, in 
circumstances where subsidiary might fall into financial distress, where such 
expectation is attributable to the parent-subsidiary relationship, can amount to a 
“guarantee”.  As a matter of plain language, a “reasonable expectation” in this 
context does not mean “any possibility, however slight”, of support.  There is no 
directly applicable authority in this context, but some guidance may be taken from 
other fields, perhaps indicating that what is required is a “more than 50% 
likelihood” of support593.  
3.162 This very broad definition of guarantee, to the extent it captures mere 
passive association, is arguably at odds with paragraph 7.13 TPG and indeed the 
broader application of the arm’s length principle.  The argument is based on the 
proposition in that paragraph that mere passive association does not entail the 
provision of a service, and (by necessary implication) is not compensable, 
 
591
  Emphasis added.  There are identical definitions in sections 191(4)/192(6) TIOPA in 
the related but distinct context of allowing a form of compensating adjustment to guarantors: 
paragraph  3.183.  See also the Australian Peabody case, note 366 above.   
592
  See e.g. CIR v Payne (1940) 23 TC 610, 626 per Greene MR and Crossland v 
Hawkins [1961] Ch 537 CA on the meaning of “arrangements” in another context, in each case 
emphasising the need for “steps”.   Also, British Slag Ltd v Registrar of Restrictive Trading 
Agreements [1962] 3 All ER 247, 255: “all that is required to constitute an arrangement not 
enforceable in law is that the parties to it shall have communicated with one another in some way 
and that as a result of the communication each has intentionally aroused in the other an 
expectation that he will act in a certain way” (per Cross J, cited by Diplock LJ in the Court of 
Appeal).  
593
  See e.g. Bradley v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 36, 
per Chadwick LJ; also Atkinson v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 191 and Kitching v HMRC [2013] 
UKFTT 384 on the objective nature of a “reasonable expectation” test (in another context) and R 
(on the applications of SRM Global Master Fund LP and others) v Commissioners of HM 
Treasury [2009] EWHC 227 which may be seen as implying a test which approaches the need for 
some legally binding support.  “Implicit support exists along a spectrum, from strong implicit 
support, akin to a legal guarantee, to weak or no implicit support”: Burnett (2014) page 66.   
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implying that the party benefiting from passive association is entitled to retain, 
without payment, affiliation benefits (e.g. lower borrowing costs) which arise 
from affiliation alone and not from any specific activity of the group594.   I doubt 
however that the section 164 TIOPA directive to “read” Part 4 so “as best secures 
consistency” with the TPG permits the plain words of section 154 to be displaced 
by reference to what is at most an inference drawn from paragraph 7.13 TPG.  
Nevertheless, sections 152-154 in my view fall short of scrupulous 
implementation of the arm’s length principle into UK tax law.  On that basis, it 
may be open to a taxpayer, armed with a UK double tax treaty incorporating the 
Article 9(1) MTC format, to argue that the arm’s length standard demanded by the 
treaty can displace the effect of those sections where (as in a thin capitalisation 
scenario) the taxpayer’s deductions would be suppressed below an arm’s length 
amount595.  The observation that “the arm’s length principle is applied, although it 
is applied to a modified reality”596 (i.e. not to the actual facts) is just not good 
enough.  
Case law 
3.163 Despite having one of the oldest systems of transfer pricing in the 
world, the UK has experienced almost no significant transfer pricing litigation.  
Almost all cases are settled between taxpayer and HMRC.  
3.164 At least until the decision in DSG Retail Ltd v CIR597,  the slight volume 
of UK transfer pricing case law shed no meaningful light on the significance of 
passive association.  Two reported decisions of the Special Commissioners, 
Ametalco v CIR598 and Waterloo plc v CIR599, both concerned legislation (section 
 
594
  See e.g. ABA Guarantees Paper, 13 September 2012, page 58.  
595
  See paragraph 2.7 above.  Compare Utah Mines Ltd v The Queen (1991) 92 DTC 6194 
(Canadian Federal Court of Appeal) where a domestic restriction on royalty deductibility was 
held not to contravene the permanent establishment profit attribution rule in the Canada-US tax 
treaty.  But the focus there of the court was on an ambulatory interpretation of the treaty, 
combined with the inapplicability of the PE non-discrimination rule (not infringed because the 
restriction applied equally to Canadian residents). The answer in an Article 9 MTC case might be 
quite different.  
596
  Burnett (2014) page 47.  
597
  [2009] UKFTT 31 (TC), TC 00001. 
598
  [1996] STC (SCD) 399. 
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770 ICTA) that preceded the UK’s modern transfer pricing code, and related to 
interest-free loans (where one might think that passive association as an element 
of pricing could be potentially relevant), but did not engage with quantitative 
issues at all.  
3.165 DSG Retail is the leading modern UK case in the transfer pricing field, 
and one of only two cases600 on what is now the transfer pricing regime in TIOPA 
Part 4.  Because the periods in dispute straddled the introduction of the modern 
transfer pricing code601, the predecessor rule in section 770 was also considered.  
3.166 While passive association is not mentioned specifically, the Special 
Commissioners did rule (“it is clear to us”) that (a) in section 770, in reaching the 
price which would have been paid if the parties “had been independent parties 
dealing at arm’s length”, no adjustment was required “to the actual characteristics 
of the parties other than their independence.  The actual assets, business and 
attributes of each party remain constant and may be relevant to the determination 
of the arm’s length price”; and (b) what is now section 147(1)(d) TIOPA, “should 
be interpreted as requiring consideration of what provision independent 
enterprises sharing the characteristics of the actual enterprises would have 
made”602.  Moreover, the Commissioners appeared to consider that “the only 
assumption required in determining the taxpayer’s profits is that it is independent 
of the particular counterparty”603.  
3.167 In my view, these statements support the recognition of passive 
association in pricing controlled transactions.  Surely the references to the 
attributes and characteristics of the actual parties should be regarded as extending 
to the empirical fact, if such can be established as a matter of evidence, that (say) a 
 
599
  [2002] STC (SCD) 95.  
600
  See paragraph 3.179.  
601
  By section 108 and Schedule 16 Finance Act 1998, inserting section 770A and 
Schedule 28AA ICTA, with effect for corporation tax purposes for accounting periods ending on 
or after 1 July 1999.  
602
  [2009] UKFTT 31 (TC) at paragraph 78, my emphasis.  
603
  Ibid., paragraph 90 (my emphasis), though this proposition is advanced as a reason for 
another which the Commissioners then reject, with resulting uncertainty as to the weight it is to 
be accorded. 
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lender would have regard to an expectation (albeit one unfounded on any legal 
rights) that the borrowing company would be supported by its parent?  Suppose 
further that “the only assumption” statement above can indeed be regarded as 
attracting judicial approval.  Then take a case where Subsidiary S1 borrows from 
sister Subsidiary S2 in circumstances where their common Parent, P, can be 
expected voluntarily to support S1 in respect of its external debt.  If the only 
assumption required is that S1 is independent of S2, S1’s affiliation with P 
remains in play as one of its relevant attributes or characteristics.  (See further 
paragraph 4.19.)  
3.168 A potential difficulty arises if instead one postulates Subsidiary S 
borrowing from Parent P where the assumed provider of support would also be P. 
What then does the “independent of P” assumption entail?  On this see the broader 
discussion of what I have termed the “lender as guarantor” paradox at paragraphs 
4.49(i) and 5.10.    
3.169 DSG is also of interest given the prominence given by the Special 
Commissioners, in their consideration of comparables604, to the concept of relative 
bargaining power.  As observed at note 51 above, and as recognised in e.g. 
paragraph 1.5 TPG, this can be an important comparability factor605. A company’s 
membership of an MNE group with a high-quality reputation (and thus its passive 
association with that attribute), such that counterparties are in relative terms more 
desirous of transacting with that company in the group, could result in increased 
bargaining power for the company, so that it is able to purchase or sell goods or 
services, at arm’s length, at relatively favourable prices (compared with the 
position it would have been in absent its affiliation with the group).  The Special 
Commissioners in DSG considered it appropriate to seek a result which “replicates 
the outcome of bargaining between independent enterprises in the free market” 
(citing paragraph 3.21 of the 1995 TPG)606.  Passive association as a contributor to 
bargaining power is not expressly addressed in DSG, but the case is important in 
 
604
  Ibid., paragraphs 96–138.   
605
  The concept featured prominently in the Norwegian ConocoPhillips cash pooling case 
Utv 2010 at 199.  See Andresen, Pearson-Wood and Jørgensen (2010).  
606
  DSG, paragraph 153.  
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the way it develops the importance of bargaining power in transfer pricing; and if 
actual bargaining power is respected as a relevant attribute in arriving at an arm’s 
length price, it may fairly be said that the effect of passive association equally 
should be respected.   
3.170 A fly in the ointment is however presented by the Court of Appeal 
decision in the Thin Cap case607.  That case ultimately upheld the validity of the 
UK’s (now repealed) thin capitalisation legislation when tested against the EU 
freedom of establishment assured by what is now Article 49 TFEU (paragraph 
2.99ff above).  As what appears to be a last throw of the dice, Graham Aaronson 
QC argued for the taxpayers (by way of contingent cross-appeal608) that when 
applying the arm’s length test to a subsidiary within a group of companies it was 
necessary, in order to comply with EU law, for HMRC and the court to take into 
account the subsidiary’s membership of that group.  An independent third party, in 
considering whether to lend to such a subsidiary, would have regard to the fact 
that its parent company was a reputable and credit-worthy company that was 
unlikely to allow its subsidiary to fail to meet its liabilities.  One of the sets of UK 
rules in dispute, section 209(2)(da) ICTA, had been found by the ECJ to constitute 
a restriction on the freedom of establishment609.  The UK Government argued that 
the restriction went no further than was necessary, being based on the arm’s length 
principle610.  The Court accepted that justification was possible where the national 
measure applied only to interest “if, and in so far as, it exceeds what those 
companies would have agreed upon on an arm’s length basis”611.  A gloss on the 
arm’s length principle in UK tax law, specifically section 209(8A)–(8F) ICTA612, 
 
607
  Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v R&CC [2011] EWCA Civ 127.  
608
  Paragraph [58]ff of the Court of Appeal report.  
609
  ECJ decision, Case C-524/04, paragraphs 59-63.  The interest deductibility restriction 
was effectively disapplied when the lender was a UK resident company: section 212 ICTA.  
610
  Ibid., paragraph 71.  
611
  Ibid., paragraph 80.  
612
  These rules contained a forerunner of the TIOPA rules discussed at paragraph 3.160 
above, touching on passive association by requiring no account to be taken, in determining 
borrowing capacity and interest rate, of any “relationship, arrangements or connection (whether 
formal or informal) between the [borrower] and any person”: section 209(8A)-(8B), my 
emphasis.   
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did not permit the group position to be taken into account; this, Mr Aaronson 
argued, rendered the rules non-compliant.  (See paragraph 2.104 above.)   
3.171 HMRC contended that this submission, if accepted, would render the 
arm’s length test ineffective for its purpose, and also noted that Henderson J at 
first instance had doubted the validity of the claimants’ argument in this respect: 
“I do not think it is open to the claimants in the light of the ECJ’s judgment613.  In 
my view the judgment must be taken to have endorsed the use of an arm’s length 
test for this purpose.”614  Stanley Burnton LJ agreed, based upon the ECJ’s 
apparent awareness of the effect of the UK legislation, despite Mr Aaronson 
arguing615 before the ECJ that “the OECD test takes into account the borrowing 
capacity of the group” but the UK statute failed to reflect that.  To illustrate the 
passive association phenomenon, Mr Aaronson before the ECJ had said: 
“If someone is lending to any Volvo company, they will know that Volvo’s reputation is at 
stake.  Although Volvo simply cannot allow a subsidiary to default on its loan.  If it did so, 
no one wold ever lend money to Volvo again.  This is why the OECD test takes into 
account the borrowing capacity of the group.  But this simply cannot be taken into 
account in the UK context …”616  
 
613
  In the Thin Cap case.  
614
  Paragraph [74] of the High Court decision, [2009] EWHC 2908 (Ch), cited at 
paragraph [59] in the Court of Appeal report.  
615
  Graham Aaronson put it this way to me in correspondence of 28 April 2015, which I 
quote here with his permission: “I remain firmly of the view that what I said in the contingent 
cross-appeal in Thin Cap was not merely right, but blindingly obvious.  The fact that a company 
is a member of a well-established and highly profitable group is empirically something that 
positively affects that company’s terms of trade and creditworthiness vis-à-vis third parties; and 
the fact that the UK’s thin cap rules precluded recognition of the existence of the wider group 
relationship must mean that they depart from that commercial reality. Stanley Burnton LJ in the 
Court of Appeal was unsympathetic to the Claimants’ arguments in that case; and Henderson J 
did not pay serious attention to this argument in the High Court because he was absolutely sure 
that HMRC’s case was hopeless on other grounds.  So the cursory dismissal of the argument 
reflects the general state of mind of the respective judges.” 
616
  Quoted at paragraph [60] of the Court of Appeal decision.  Ian Roxan in Baistrocchi 
and Roxan (2012) page 331 suggests that Henderson J’s view may “have been influenced by the 
argument, made explicitly by a witness in the IBM case, that the thin cap restrictions did not 
reflect the reality of commercial borrowing, since a UK subsidiary would be able to borrow from 
a third party on terms that would take into account the credit of the whole group”: this 
presumably is the evidence of Ms Bishop, quoted at paragraph 152 of the High Court decision, 
that “[i]f NRH had been seeking to borrow from an unconnected party, it is inconceivable that 
such a third party lender would not have taken into account the fact that it was the UK holding 
company for one of the world’s largest multinational corporations”.  
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3.172 Unfortunately the Court of Appeal was unmoved.  For Stanley Burnton 
LJ: “I do not accept Mr Aaronson’s submission that the UK arm’s length test is 
more stringent than the OECD test.  His submission is inconsistent with the 
‘functionally separate entity’ approach of the OECD”617.  Rimer LJ agreed618, and 
for Arden LJ, who delivered a dissenting judgment, the claimants’ contingent 
cross-appeal did “not arise”619.  Thus we are left with Court of Appeal statements 
to the effect that the requirement to ignore passive group association in testing 
borrowing capacity, in the context of the UK’s thin capitalisation rules prior to the 
codification of transfer pricing legislation, is not at odds with the arm’s length 
principle.  But these statements are highly unsatisfying given the total lack of 
reported reasoning.  In the High Court, Henderson J observed620 that “Mr 
Aaronson’s argument was not pursued in his oral submissions”; and the judge’s 
comment that the ECJ’s judgment “must be taken to have endorsed the use of an 
arm’s length test” brings us no further forward – the argument was simply that 
increased borrowing capacity was part of the arm’s length test.  Then in the Court 
of Appeal, Stanley Burnton LJ notes that “[t]here is nothing in the [ECJ’s] Thin 
Cap judgment to suggest that UK legislation might have been incompatible 
because of its failure to take into account a subsidiary’s membership of a non-UK 
group of companies”; yet this can hardly be equated with a finding to that effect 
by the ECJ.  If there is a ratio at all in the Court of Appeal on this point, it is the 
ten word assertion that the submission was “inconsistent with the ‘functionally 
separate entity’ approach of the OECD”.  But not the slightest attempt is made to 
justify this conclusion by reference to the TPG or indeed the obvious persuasive 
authority available by the time of the Thin Cap decision from the General Electric 
case (paragraph 3.16 above)621.   
 
617
  Paragraph [61].  
618
  Paragraph [81].  
619
  Paragraph [111].  
620
  Paragraph [74] in the High Court judgment. 
621
  The Court of Appeal decision is also unsatisfactory as regards its approach to the 
question of commerciality as a taxpayer defence to pricing adjustments in circumstances where 
the arrangements in question do not adhere to the arm’s length principle: “the application of an 
arm’s length test is appropriate and sufficient for this purpose” Stanley Burnton LJ at paragraph 
55, which appears to conflate the two separate limbs of proportionality – a commerciality 
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3.173 Regrettably, one could imagine that a court faced with a case in which 
sections 152(5)/153(5) and 154(4) TIOPA were in dispute might draw upon Thin 
Cap to form the view that the statutory disregard of “guarantees” as defined is 
consistent with the arm’s length principle.  It would be a brave tribunal to hold 
otherwise, and it may be necessary to go to the Court of Appeal622 or beyond to 
revisit the analysis properly.   
3.174 Yet EU law might still provide recourse for a UK taxpayer facing 
HMRC’s rejection of passive association in reliance on those TIOPA provisions. 
Take the case of a UK parent company lending to a (say) French subsidiary.  
Assume that the market would expect support from the parent and would 
accordingly upgrade its view of the subsidiary’s creditworthiness so as to justify a 
borrowing rate of 5%.  HMRC on the other hand denies that economic effect and 
imputes interest income to the parent of 6%.  Alternatively, take the case of a 
French parent company’s UK subsidiary with a certain market borrowing capacity 
(based on market expectations of parental support).  HMRC however regards the 
borrower’s debt quantum as excessive, having disregarded passive association 
effects.  Just as with the Belgian rules at issue in the SGI case (see paragraph 
2.102), a taxpayer may be able to argue that the UK transfer pricing rules in 
TIOPA represent a restriction on freedom of establishment (or possibly indirect 
discrimination).   
3.175 While it is true that those UK rules apply between UK group members 
as well as in cross-border cases, on a detailed practical level UK-to-UK transfer 
pricing may be regarded as a relatively minor compliance irritation.  This is 
because of the corresponding adjustment mechanism available, as of right, only as 
between UK taxpayers (an obvious EU alarm bell), in section 174 TIOPA.  
Contrastingly, in a cross-border case, a corresponding adjustment would be 
achievable only under a double tax treaty’s mutual agreement procedure 
 
defence and a limit on tax adjustments to the arm’s length price – in paragraphs 71-72 of the SGI 
judgment, note 206 above).  
622
  Subject to the limitations in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Ltd [1944] KB 718.   Possibly 
more could be made of the effect of Article 9(1) of an applicable treaty: see paragraphs 2.7 and 
2.107 above.   
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(“MAP”)623, perhaps including arbitration where that is included in the treaty, or 
under the EU Arbitration Convention.  But the timeline, costs and uncertainties of 
such processes represent significant disadvantages in cross-border cases.  “[A]s far 
as economic double taxation is concerned, the extent to which this is prevented 
under EU law depends on whether the home state takes measures to mitigate it 
domestically but does not extend such measures in a cross-border situation”624.   
3.176 MAP does not provide a mandatory binding solution625, and treaty 
arbitration on the Article 25(5) MTC model is as yet, despite the evangelism of the 
BEPS programme, available only in a limited number of treaties626.  Moreover, 
complete consensus remains elusive across the EU as regards the Arbitration 
Convention’s scope for addressing thin capitalisation cases627 (see paragraph 
2.96).  In these respects, the UK approach may well impose a restriction on (or 
even indirect discrimination against) cross-border establishment628.  In the SGI 
case, the ECJ observed629 that, as regards recourse to the Arbitration Convention: 
 
623
  Authorised by section 124 TIOPA.  
624
  HJI Panayi (2013) page 249.   
625
  “[F]or many countries the MAP is a black hole of taxpayers’ rights, where the 
taxpayer has neither the right to initiate the procedure, nor to participate, no certainty that there 
will be an outcome and no certainty that the outcome will be implemented”: Baker and Pistone 
(2015) page 53.  In the EU arena, the Commission has acknowledged that “[t]he taxpayer has no 
guarantee that double taxation will be eliminated, nor that tax administrations will proceed 
swiftly”: Double Taxation in the Single Market, COM(2011) 712 final, page 10.  Aspirational 
improvements to MAP are enumerated in the BEPS Action 14 final report Making Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms More Effective (October 2015).   
626
  Within the EU, the UK’s bilateral tax treaties containing an arbitration provision are 
limited to those with Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.   
627
  Or indeed under MAP: see e.g. INTM 423060.  
628
  A restriction on freedom of establishment is prohibited by Article 49 TFEU “even if 
of limited scope or minor importance”: Case C-9/02 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant, paragraph 
43, and cases cited therein.  Even being required to keep local accounts was a restriction in Case 
C-250/95 Futura Participations SA.  More generally, a parallel may be drawn with the Case C-
196/04 Cadbury Schweppes decision paragraph 45. The UK parent of a CFC was found to be 
placed at a disadvantage relative to a UK parent of a UK subsidiary; in the former case, but not 
the latter, the parent was taxable on the profits of its controlled subsidiary.  One might also bring 
to bear certain other EU law principles: “the detailed procedural rules designed to ensure the 
protection of the rights which individuals acquire under Community law are a matter for the 
domestic legal order of each Member State … provided that they are not less favourable than 
those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render 
impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the Community 
legal order (principle of effectiveness)”: Case C-392/04 i-21 Germany GmbH, paragraph 57; 
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“an additional administrative and financial burden is imposed on the company which has 
submitted its case to such a procedure.  Moreover, a procedure aimed at resolution by 
mutual agreement, followed, if necessary, by an arbitration procedure, may extend over 
several years. During that period, the company in question must bear the burden of 
double taxation.  Furthermore, it is apparent … that the legislation at issue in the main 
proceedings is applicable in certain situations falling outside the scope of the Convention. 
“[55]  It follows that legislation of a Member State such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment within the meaning of 
Article 43 EC, read in conjunction with Article 48 EC.” 
3.177 Put another way, the UK rules, in view of these practical hurdles, may 
make lending to a foreign subsidiary less attractive than lending to a UK 
subsidiary, and consequentially less easy for foreign subsidiaries to raise capital 
from the UK (first case in paragraph 3.174 above).  Similar reasoning applies in 
the reverse situation where a UK subsidiary contemplates raising capital from its 
EU parent (second case above)630.  To the extent that the UK fails to apply the 
arm’s length principle, it will be liable to “cause” double taxation: “in relation to 
double taxation caused by a single Member State, it is clear from the Court’s 
jurisprudence that the Member State in question may have to give relief in 
situations where relief of economic double taxation is granted domestically”631. 
3.178 Aside from pointing to UK-to-UK transfer pricing, the UK Government 
would doubtless argue that the TIOPA transfer pricing rules should be justified by 
reference to securing the balanced allocation of taxing powers and the need to 
prevent avoidance.  But a failure to apply the arm’s length principle itself fails to 
adopt an adequately “balanced” approach.  “The corrective tax measure must be 
confined to the part which exceeds what would have been agreed if the companies 
 
Case C-362/12 Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation, paragraph 
32.   
629
  Paragraphs 54-55.  
630
  Compare a version of this “two-way” analysis (in the context of dividend taxation/free 
movement of capital) in Case C-319/02 Manninen, paragraphs 20-24.  
631
  O’Shea (2013) page 106, citing Case C-315/02 Lenz; Case C-319/02 Manninen; Case 
C-374/04 ACT IV GLO and Case C-170/05 Denkavit International.  But EU law does not in 
general preclude double taxation: see notes 201 above and 633 below.    
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did not have a relationship of interdependence”632.  The taxpayer may also be able 
to assert that, freedom of establishment having been engaged, the lack of legal 
certainty in the UK tax code, given the need to resort to MAP/arbitration, itself 
prevents the UK rules from being proportional633. 
3.179 In Abbey National Treasury Services Plc v HMRC634 the First-tier 
Tribunal was prepared to apply Schedule 28AA ICTA to a share issue in the 
context of a tax avoidance scheme, and then to disregard the share issue, applying 
the principles in paragraph 1.37 of the 1995 TPG, as a step which was not 
“commercially rational” and which “impeded the tax administration from 
determining the appropriate transfer price”, to arrive at a comparator situation in 
which the shares had not been issued at all.  The case does not offer any profound 
commentary on the nature of the arm’s length principle. 
Tax authority practice  
3.180 Long before the publication of their official manuals, the Inland 
Revenue (as it then was) expressed the view that the “arm’s length price” meant 
“the price which might have been expected if the parties to the transaction had 
been independent persons dealing at arm’s length i.e. dealing with each other in a 
normal commercial manner unaffected by any special relationship between 
them”635.  Extensive guidance on transfer pricing is nowadays provided in 
 
632
  SGI, paragraph 72; see also the ECJ judgment in Thin Cap, paragraph 92.   
633
  See Case C-318/10 SIAT, paragraphs 57-59,  cited in Case 282/12 Itelcar, paragraph 
44, note 206 above.   In SIAT the Court disapproved of the fact that “the assessment concerning 
the applicability of the special rule is carried out on a case-by-case basis by the tax authority” 
(paragraph 26).  Aside from the arguments above, it might even be open to a taxpayer to argue 
that a transaction priced with regard to passive association satisfied the “commerciality” test 
which should be regarded as a separate limb of proportionality: see paragraph 2.105 above.  
Taking the case to the ECJ might of course be unnecessary if the UK court could be persuaded 
that a proper application of the arm’s length principle required passive association to be taken 
into account and Article 9(1) of an applicable tax treaty displaced sections 152(5)/153(5) and 
154(4) TIOPA. See paragraphs 2.7 and 2.107 above. The UK has bilateral tax treaties containing 
a provision based on Article 9(1) OECD MTC with all other EU Member States.  It would not be 
for the ECJ to rule on a possible infringement of a bilateral tax treaty: Case C-298/05 Columbus 
Container Services BVBA & Co v Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt, paragraph 46, cited e.g. in 
Case C-128/08 Damseaux v Belgium.  
634
  [2015] UKFTT 341 (TC) paragraphs 99–106.   
635
  Notes by the UK Inland Revenue, The Transfer Pricing of Multinational Enterprises, 
published in Intertax 1981/8, paragraph 2.  
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HMRC’s International Manual636.  An introductory formulation of the arm’s 
length principle is that “transactions between connected parties should be treated 
for tax purposes by reference to the amount of profit that would have arisen if the 
same transactions had been executed by unconnected parties”637.   
3.181 HMRC do acknowledge638 the concept of an “implicit guarantee”, but 
what this means is not explained in a precise way.  They say: 
“If a guarantee is only implicit, the lender will not be able to sue the guarantor in the 
event that the borrower defaults on a loan.  The guarantor may not have taken on a risk to 
which a price can be attached. Even a comfort letter from the UK parent may not be 
sufficient to create a measurable guarantee, unless it binds the issuer in the event of its 
subsidiary’s default.  Expectation in such circumstances may count for as much as a 
legally binding commitment.  
“Seeking to impute a fee in relation to the effect of simple membership of a group is 
inappropriate [TPG paragraph 7.13 is cited]. 
“It may come down to what evidence there is that the guarantor will make good its 
implicit guarantee. It may have a track record of supporting or abandoning subsidiaries 
which get in trouble; it may have a reputation for defending its name and standing by its 
subsidiaries. A lender is not going to set much store by an unenforceable ‘letter of 
comfort’ unless it can have confidence that the signatory keeps their word.  It is a matter 
of weighing up the likelihood of an implicit guarantee being honoured and the effect that 
it would have on the borrowing terms of the borrower.” 
3.182 Interestingly, HMRC then comment on the pricing of explicit 
guarantees, saying that “under OECD guidelines” (and thus, it would seem they 
consider, UK tax law) a fee may be imputed if the guarantee provides a benefit to 
the borrower “after taking into account any implicit support”639.  The implicit 
support aspect is not in fact found expressly in the TPG, but the statement 
 
636
  Available at www.gov.uk/government/collections/hmrc-manuals (accessed 15 July 
2015).   
637
  INTM 412040.  
638
  INTM 501050. 
639
  Ibid.  
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represents HMRC acceptance that implicit support is a relevant factor in pricing 
an explicit guarantee.  This is followed by the lukewarm comment that “there is an 
argument” that an arm’s length guarantee fee “should be reduced if it is found that 
the borrower already has the benefit of implicit guarantees”; and: “to charge for 
the explicit guarantee without taking account implicit support could be regarded as 
charging for something that was, to some extent at least, already in place”.  
Reference is made to that being the line taken in the Canadian General Electric 
case640.  Elsewhere, HMRC acknowledge specifically that “all relevant factors 
should be considered … [including] consideration as to whether the guarantee 
brings the borrower something beyond the implicit parental or group support 
provided by passive association with fellow group members”641. 
3.183 It is understood from professional experience that HMRC draw a 
distinction, as a matter of terminology, between “implicit guarantees” and other 
forms of implicit support.  The former represents something falling within the 
statutory definition of “guarantee” in section 154(4) TIOPA but which falls short 
of a contractually binding guarantee or surety.  Other forms of (perhaps yet lesser 
quality) implicit support may not, in HMRC’s view, influence a borrower’s ability 
to raise debt642.  In the related but distinct context of allowing guarantor 
companies a form of compensating adjustment, HMRC say643: 
“The term ‘implicit guarantee’ is also used in [section 192 TIOPA]644… Where affiliated 
companies make such claims on the basis that a guarantee is implicit because of the 
relationship between the thinly-capitalised and the claimant company, that should not of 
itself be taken as evidence of the existence of an actual guarantee that requires pricing.” 
3.184 More generally in the context of guidance on thin capitalisation, HMRC 
assert that, because the arm’s length provision is that which would have been 
made as between independent enterprises, “the arm’s length borrowing capacity of 
 
640
  See paragraph 3.16ff.   
641
  INTM 413130.  
642
  This is a position which, in professional practice, I have seen HMRC adopting: see 
paragraph 3.189.   
643
  INTM 501050. 
644
  Actually it is not. 
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the borrower is therefore the debt which it could and would, as a stand-alone 
entity, have taken on from an independent lender.  To establish this, it is necessary 
to consider the borrower separately from the other members of the same group of 
companies.  This is the ‘separate entity’ or stand-alone basis for determining 
borrowing capacity… no account is taken of any guarantees, explicit or implicit, 
from connected companies”645. Paragraph 1.6 TPG is then cited: “… treating the 
members of an MNE group as operating as separate entities rather than as 
inseparable parts of a single unified business”.  However, equating the “separate 
entity” approach (mandated by the TPG) with the “stand-alone” concept (used by 
rating agencies) seems misconceived; the separateness required by the OECD 
demands respect for the separate legal corporate existence of the company in 
question rather than viewing things from the perspective of the MNE “firm” as a 
whole or on some sort of consolidated basis. The rating agencies themselves 
recognise that, in determining creditworthiness, the stand-alone position may then 
be adjusted for group affiliation646.  
3.185 While it is unobjectionable that mere implicit support or passive 
association does not amount to “the existence of an actual guarantee” (at least in 
the legal sense), in my opinion HMRC’s broad approach is inconsistent with the 
statute.  The sections 154(4)/191(4)/192(6) definitions are inclusive: instruments 
that would, as a matter of ordinary legal terminology, be recognised as guarantees 
will clearly fall into the definition; other lesser forms of assurance are then, by 
extension, brought within the term “guarantee”.  The statutory test on its terms 
embraces inter alia any “relationship” or “connection” that may produce a 
“reasonable expectation” of payment.  Let us accept (as seems reasonable) the 
proposition that “reasonable expectation” implies a prospect something in excess 
of 50%647.  It is in my view logically irrefutable that there may exist cases where 
the implicit support from which a putative borrower may benefit may (a) produce 
a prospect of payment for a lender of less than 50% - let us say “40%”, but 
nonetheless (b) favourably influence the pricing of, or willingness to advance, a 
 
645
  INTM 413070.  
646
  See the S&P Group Rating Methodology, note 38 above.  
647
  See paragraph 3.161 above.  
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loan to the borrower.  True, the quantitative effect may not be large, or easy to 
determine, but the principle seems plain.  
3.186 Some sections touching on passive association have been removed from 
INTM648.  Unsurprisingly, this archived material does not resolve any 
uncertainties.  HMRC themselves acknowledged that “the issues of whether and to 
what extent passive association improves a borrower’s credit rating and at what 
point group support becomes more than passive association are difficult and 
complex”649.  HMRC do however seem to consider that the existence of an 
implicit guarantee depends on behaviour of the parties, and that passive 
association can have an effect on the terms of a loan650. 
3.187 HMRC facilitates occasional discussions on financial transfer pricing 
with professional practitioners through a “Joint Thin Cap Forum”. Implicit support 
in financing cases has been the subject of debate in that group, first at a meeting 
on 15 October 2013,  and then on 27 January and 14 October 2014.  The group 
generally operates subject to the Chatham House Rule, but I can say that at the 
earlier of these two meetings (illustrating the uncertainty in this area) the opinions 
of the six major UK accounting firms and the law firm present were split fairly 
evenly as to the appropriateness of making implicit support adjustments in lending 
scenarios; at the latter meeting views were no further advanced.  The main 
perceived difficulty is the broad UK statutory definition of “guarantee” (paragraph 
3.160 above): some were of the opinion that implicit support can only be 
meaningful if it creates the “reasonable expectation” referred to in section 154(4) 
TIOPA, at which point it must be disregarded.  Reference was made to the two 
examples included in the OECD’s July 2013 discussion draft on Intangibles (see 
paragraph 2.80ff), which have been retained in the updated Section D.8 Chapter I 
TPG.  However, HMRC did indicate in the October 2014 meeting that its 
competent authority work included a number of challenges from other tax 
 
648
  Archived HMRC manual material is available from various sources including e.g. 
CCH’s HMRC Tax Manuals Archive service available by subscription from www.cch.co.uk. 
649
  INTM 542090.  See now INTM 413110.  
650
  Ibid.  “Where there are intra-group guarantees, explicit or implicit, the effect that the 
guarantee has on the terms of the loan need to be separated from any effect that can be attributed 
to passive association.” 
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authorities in the context of interest rates and guarantees, and that many countries 
seemed to have accepted the concept of implicit support651.  At that time HMRC 
“had no policy” on implicit support, but were firmly of the view that it could not 
increase borrowing capacity.   
3.188 In confidential correspondence with a client taxpayer, HMRC at first 
persisted with the view that implicit support from a parent company to its 
borrower subsidiary cannot be taken into account in pricing a loan from that 
parent to that subsidiary.  “The HMRC view is that while the provision, that is the 
arrangements, between [parent] and [subsidiary] must be compared with the 
provision that would have taken place at arm’s length this does not change the fact 
that [parent] is the lender. We need to consider on what terms [parent] would lend 
at arm’s length but [parent] remains the lender and would not, at arm’s length, 
provide support for its own loan in the case of a default.”652 Subsequently, HMRC 
accepted “that implicit support is a relevant concept but only to the extent that it 
affects the pricing of debt”653; they have maintained (and reaffirmed in a letter of 
19 June 2015) the position that implicit support is not relevant to borrowing 
capacity.  
3.189 Consistent with that position, at a meeting with HMRC on 12 August 
2014, an HMRC officer indicated that consideration of the significance of implicit 
support had developed within HMRC in recent months and that revised guidance 
could be expected. He also said that HMRC would be imminently providing 
proposed language to OECD for inclusion with the group synergies material in the 
September 2014 paper on Intangibles (see paragraph 2.80ff above). As trailed at 
the August meeting, HMRC are understood to have proposed to OECD that 
implicit support should indeed be recognised as a market phenomenon, but that its 
 
651
  That might be thought to imply that other countries were invoking the notion of 
implicit support to argue for a lower interest rate (or guarantee fee) payable by a local borrower 
to a UK lender or guarantor.  
652
  Confidential letter (quoted with client permission) from HMRC dated 9 May 2014 to a 
UK corporate taxpayer in the course of a dispute regarding the application of section 447 
Corporation Tax Act 2009 under which exchange gains or losses must be left out of account for 
tax purposes by reference to loans to the extent that, under section 147 TIOPA, profits or losses 
are computed as if all or part of the loan had not been made.  
653
  Confidential letter from HMRC dated 22 September 2014 in the same matter.  
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effects should be limited to the rate of interest charged on a borrowing (or, one 
assumes, as in the General Electric case654, the quantum of a guarantee fee), but 
should not be regarded as having an impact on borrowing capacity i.e. the thin 
capitalisation aspect of the debate.  This seems logically flawed: if the presence of 
implicit support is accepted as enhancing (relative to the pure stand-alone 
position) the creditworthiness of a company, surely it is self-evident that a putative 
arm’s length lender would be prepared to advance relatively more funds (or 
advance funds in circumstances where, with a stand-alone credit analysis 
perspective, it would not do so at all)?  For the moment, the examples reiterated by 
OECD in the BEPS 2015 Final Reports (paragraph 2.83 above) have not expressly 
developed the analysis beyond the position apparently favoured by HMRC.  
However, paragraph 1.157 TPG does now contemplate “increased borrowing 
capacity” in the group synergies discussion, contrary to HMRC’s position.  
Perhaps additional clarification will be forthcoming by the time the BEPS project 
comes to a conclusion (see paragraph 2.85 above).  
3.190 In summary, while the UK’s transfer pricing legislation explicitly (but 
guardedly) adopts the OECD TPG for interpretative purposes, and HMRC are 
vocal supporters of the arm’s length principle, only a rather limited and grudging 
acceptance of the effects of passive association in pricing controlled transactions is 
so far apparent.  In many cases, the statutory requirement to disregard 
“guarantees” will serve as a serious obstacle to recognition of such effects, despite 
this being somewhat at odds with paragraph 7.13 TPG and the arm’s length 
principle generally.  
 
 
 
 
 
654
  Paragraph 3.16ff above.  
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United States 
“We can simply interpret arm’s length to mean what we think it should mean, and if we 
say it correctly, that’s what it means”.655 
Legislation 
3.191 The United States must be credited with the first statutory expression of 
arm’s length pricing; “the United States has been the standard-setter for the 
development of the arm’s length principle.”656  Legislative antecedents date back 
to 1917657.  To support section 45 Revenue Act 1928, which provided authority to 
the government to “distribute, apportion or allocate” income to reflect the 
taxpayer’s income, regulations were published in 1935 which recited the objective 
as placing “a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer” 
and included the rule that “the standard to be applied in every case is that of an 
uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with another uncontrolled 
taxpayer”658. The US’s first double tax treaty – with France, 1932 – applied the 
arm’s length principle for income allocation purposes in a provision which 
resonates with today’s Article 9(1) MTC659.  The US has been a formative 
influence on international transfer pricing thinking, its regulations significantly 
affecting the development of the TPG.  Indeed, there has been “a long-standing 
US tax policy to export the Sec. 482 regulations to other countries with a view to 
 
655
  Edward Kleinbard, Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, with citations, 
including an Alice in Wonderland allusion, in Wittendorff (2009) note 211.  
656
  Wittendorff (2010a) page 14.  
657
  War Revenue Act of 1917, Regulation 41, Articles 77-78 referenced by Wittendorff 
(2009) note 21.  For historical accounts see Avi-Yonah (1995) and Wittendorff (2010a) chapter 
2.  It is hard to over-state the importance of the US in the development of modern transfer pricing 
thinking.   
658
  US Treasury Regs. 86, Art. 45-1(b) (1935), reflecting some slightly earlier cases on 
section 45: see Oates and O’Brien page 12.  
659
  Article IV: “the first of its kind in a tax treaty”: Avery Jones et al (2006).   
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creating an international consensus on the application of the arm’s length 
principle”660.  
3.192 However, although one might expect the US to have developed 
sophisticated thinking on the topic of passive association, significant uncertainty 
and professional disagreement persists on that topic661.  The concept appears to be 
firmly recognised as an element of comparability analysis in the services 
context662, but its effect on risk, and thus on financing transactions, remains 
controversial.  Nonetheless, the emphasis placed in case law on the principle that 
transfer pricing rules are there to ensure parity of treatment between controlled 
and uncontrolled transactions, and the focus on pricing distortions attributable to a 
control relationship663, together provide a springboard for deeper recognition of 
the effects of implicit support.  
3.193 The foundation for US transfer pricing law is section 482 of the Internal 
Revenue Code 1986: 
“In any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses (whether or not 
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not 
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary 
may distribute, apportion or allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances 
between or among such organizations, trades or businesses, if he determines that such 
distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes 
or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades or businesses.  In the 
case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the meaning of Section 
936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate 
with the income attributable to the intangible.” 
 
660
  Wittendorff (2009) page 109, citing at note 27 US Assistant Treasury Secretary 
Stanley Surrey from 1966.  Langbein (1986) (page 627) described an “‘export campaign’ 
undertaken by United States officials and experts during the 1960s and 1970s, the process by 
which those officials sought to ‘internationalize’ ideas novelly developed by the United States 
during the 1960s.” 
661
  Lowell, Burge and Briger (on-line service) paragraph 6.07[4][e] say that “the extent to 
which membership in an MNE group is a benefit requiring arm’s length compensation” is an 
issue “that arises frequently in transfer pricing examination and controversy contexts”.  
662
  Paragraph 3.206ff below.  
663
  Both found e.g. in the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner v First Security 
Bank of Utah:  paragraph 3.218 below.  
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3.194 Regulations under section 482 were published in 1968 in response to an 
invitation by the Conference Committee Report on the Revenue Act of 1962 to 
“explore the possibility of developing and promulgating regulations under the 
[authority of section 482] which would provide additional guidelines and formulas 
for the allocation of income and deductions in cases involving foreign income”664.  
The regulations “for the first time imbued the arm’s length standard with practical 
meaning by formulating the three classical methods of Comparable Uncontrolled 
Price (CUP), cost plus and resale price, all of which depended on finding 
comparable uncontrolled transactions to those engaged in by the related 
parties”665.  The internationalization of the regulations was achieved via the 
OECD: 
“The United States initiated a targeted campaign with the aim of creating an 
international consensus behind the United States’ reading of the arm’s length principle, 
and the need for rules on corresponding adjustments. The OECD Fiscal Committee was 
seen as being the key to the resolution of this problem. After their publication, the section 
482 regulations were put before the OECD Fiscal Committee. The campaign culminated 
in the 1979 OECD Report, which largely adopted the section 482 regulations.”666 
3.195 The US has also exercised a formative influence on the introduction, 
content and periodic updating of the TPG, including their issue in 1995 and the 
abandoning in 2010 of the traditional hierarchy of methods – reflecting the 
emerging acceptance of profit-based methodology and the US “best method” 
concept667.  On the other hand, the US “has been less explicit in terms of 
 
664
  H.R. Rep. No. 2508, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. 18-19 (1962), cited in the Statement of 
Robert S McIntyre and Michael J McIntyre before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 
25 March 1993, available via Citizens for Tax Justice at http://www.ctj.org/html/multimjm.htm 
(accessed 18 August 2015).  
665
  Avi-Yonah (2009) page 1.  
666
  Wittendorff (2010a), pages 38-39.  Thanks to Nat Boidman for the entertaining 
remark that “the OECD should have paid a royalty to the US for basically copying, in ’79, the US 
482 Regs written in 1968”.  
667
  Regs. §1.482-1(c)(1), i.e. “the most reliable measure of an arm’s length result”. 
According to the IRS’s Report on the Application and Administration of Section 482 (1999) at 
page 8 “[t]he central guidance for taxpayers and IRS examiners on the application of the arm’s 
length standard is set forth in the final regulations under section 482 issued in July 1994. … 
These regulations were developed at the same time as, and are fully consistent with, the 1995 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines” (though some might differ regarding “fully consistent”).  
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recognizing the Guidelines’ relevance as a means of interpreting the arm’s length 
principle.  A primary reason for this is presumably that the Treasury Regulations 
… provide for an even more detailed interpretation … As a result, there is not the 
same need to resort to the Guidelines in the United States as in countries with less 
detailed transfer pricing law.  In line with this, the US courts rarely refer to the 
OECD Guidelines.”668 
3.196 Section 7805 IRC empowers the US Secretary of the Treasury to 
promulgate regulations to enforce the Code.  The IRS is a bureau of the Treasury; 
its tax regulations constitute the Treasury’s interpretations of the Code.  Typically, 
regulations are first published in “proposed” (non-binding) form for consultation.  
“Temporary” regulations are effective upon publication in the US Federal Register 
and can be valid for up to three years from issue669.  Regulations which are of an 
interpretive nature may be found to be ultra vires the primary legislation: the 
validity of regulations may be tested under a two-step approach enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Chevron, USA Inc v NRDC670 whereby the court first considers 
whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and then, 
if not, analyses whether the relevant agency action is based on a permissible or 
reasonable construction of the statute671. Recent challenges to the validity of 
regulations include the Altera672, Amazon673 and 3M674 cases.  The US 
Government considers the section 482 regulations to be consistent with treaty 
 
668
  Bullen (2011) page 40 and note 177, noting the Xilinx case (paragraph 3.224 below) as 
an exception.  Similarly, Vega (2012) page 24: “the existence of detailed regulations on transfer 
pricing has made circulars referring to the OECD Guidelines unnecessary”.  
669
  Section 7805(e)(2).  
670
  467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
671
  Jones, Roberson and Yoder (2013).  An alternative basis of challenge lies with United 
States v State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co 463 US 29 (1983), invoked successfully by the 
taxpayer in the Altera case: note 672 below.   
672
  TC Dkt Nos. 6253-12 and 9963-12, decision reported at 145 TC No. 3 (US Tax Court 
27 July 2015) finding Regs. §1.482-7(d)(2) invalid.  Altera is now challenging subsequent 
versions of the regulations: TC Dkt No. 31538-15.  
673
  TC Dkt No 31197-12.  See also Dominion Resources, Inc v United States 681 F.3d 
1313; Cohen v United States 650 F.3d 717; United States v Home Concrete & Supply LLC 132 
S.Ct. 1836 (2012). 
674
  TC Dkt No. 5186-13. 
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obligations and the OECD TPG675.  Section 1.482-1 introduces the arm’s length 
principle and the conditions for its application, and subsequent sections address 
different transaction categories.  Proposed regulations on global dealing have been 
published.  
3.197 Regs. §1.482-1(a)(1) expresses the general objective of the US transfer 
pricing code (echoed in paragraph 1.8 TPG) that “[s]ection 482 places a controlled 
taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer by determining the true 
taxable income of the controlled taxpayer”.  
3.198 Regs. §1.482-1(b)(1) provides that – 
“In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be 
applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an uncontrolled 
taxpayer.  A controlled transaction meets the arm’s length standard if the results of the 
transaction are consistent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled 
taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the same circumstances (arm’s 
length result). However, because identical transactions can rarely be located, whether a 
transaction produces an arm’s length result will generally be determined by reference to 
results of comparable transactions under comparable circumstances.”  
3.199 The use of the abstract “a taxpayer” and “uncontrolled taxpayers” is 
noteworthy: like Article 9(1) OECD MTC, it signposts price testing against the 
behaviour of hypothetical taxpayers (undertaking the same transaction under the 
same circumstances), rather than postulating a transaction between a third party 
and the actual taxpayer.  
3.200 Despite promulgating the best method rule, as regards comparability the 
CUP method “will generally be more reliable than analyses obtained under other 
methods if the analysis is based on closely comparable uncontrolled transactions, 
because such an analysis can be expected to achieve a higher degree of 
comparability and be susceptible to fewer differences than analyses under  other 
methods”676.  Where a simple internal comparable is available, the CUP method 
 
675
  Advisory Memorandum 2007-007, issue 5.  
676
  Regs. §1.482-1(c)(2)(i). 
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will be preferred.  On the other hand, “in accordance with the best method rule, a 
method may be applied in a particular case only if the comparability, quality of 
data, and reliability of assumptions under that method make it more reliable than 
any other available measure of the arm’s length result”677.   
3.201 Five comparability factors are adopted, along essentially similar lines to 
those in the TPG, including contractual terms, risks and economic circumstances.  
Contractual terms will generally be respected if they are consistent with economic 
substance of the underlying transactions678.  And the allocation of risks will 
usually be determined as specified or implied by the taxpayer’s contractual terms, 
if consistent with that substance679.  Relevant risks naturally include “credit and 
collection risks”680.  For comparability purposes, the “alternatives realistically 
available to the buyer and seller” are among the significant economic conditions to 
be taken into account681.  
3.202 The concept of “true taxable income” as used in the regulations is 
defined as “the taxable income that would have resulted had [the controlled 
taxpayer] dealt with the other member or members of the group at arm’s 
length”682.  Under the heading “allocation based on taxpayer’s actual transactions” 
the Commissioner is directed to respect the “transaction as actually structured by 
the taxpayer unless its structure lacks economic substance”.  In this context 
however the Commissioner “may consider the alternatives available to the 
taxpayer in determining whether the terms of the controlled transaction would be 
acceptable to an uncontrolled taxpayer faced with the same alternatives and 
operating under comparable circumstances”683. An Example which follows shows 
 
677
  Regs. §1.482-8(a) (Examples of the best method rule),  and Example (1) at paragraph 
(b). 
678
  Regs. §1.482-1(d).  
679
  Regs. §1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B). 
680
  Regs. §1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(A)(4). In the Proposed Regulation on global dealing the 
creditworthiness of the counterparty is listed: Prop. Reg. §1.482-8(a)(iii)(D). 
681
  Regs. §1.482-1(d)(3)(iv)(H).  
682
  Regs. §1.482-1(i)(9). 
683
  Regs. §1.482-1(f)(2)(ii)(A). In response to the Bausch & Lomb case (paragraph 3.223 
below), “the reaction of the US tax authorities … has been to incorporate the concept of realistic 
alternatives in the 1994 Sec. 482 regulations, under which such alternatives may serve both as 
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 200 
an intra-group IP licence being respected “if it has economic substance”, but notes 
that the licensor’s ability itself to manufacture product may be taken into account 
in the pricing analysis.  Thus the US regulations juxtapose the notions found in the 
TPG of recharacterisation (or derecognition) for want of economic substance and 
the need to consider options realistically available in a comparability analysis.  
Some have worried that “the authority left in the IRS’s hands to consider 
alternatives available to the taxpayer and to base transfer pricing adjustments on 
those alternatives, seems no less potent than the authority to actually 
restructure”684.  Also, the provision does not require the “alternative” to be 
“realistic”, unlike other methodological rules e.g. Regs. §1.482-3(e)(1) which 
refers to the “general principle that uncontrolled taxpayers evaluate the terms of a 
transaction by considering the realistic alternatives to that transaction, and only 
enter into a particular transaction if none of the alternatives is preferable to it”685.   
However, the IRS have said: 
“It is a longstanding principle under § 1.482-1(f)(2)(ii)(A) and in the valuation field, 
generally, that, although the Commissioner will evaluate the results of a transaction as 
actually structured by the taxpayer unless it lacks economic substance, the Commissioner 
may consider alternatives available in determining the arm’s length valuation of the 
controlled transaction.  The realistic alternatives principle does not recast the 
transaction.  Rather, it assumes that taxpayers are rational and will not choose to price 
an arrangement in a manner that makes them worse off economically than another 
available alternative.”686 
3.203 Regs. §1.482-2(a)(1)(i) provides specifically that “[w]here one member 
of a group of controlled entities makes a loan or advance directly or indirectly to, 
or otherwise becomes a creditor of, another member of such group and either 
charges no interest, or charges interest at a rate which is not equal to an arm’s 
length rate of interest (as defined in paragraph (a)(2) of this section) with respect 
 
independent criteria for price determination and as a factor in the comparability test”: 
Wittendorff (2009b) page 208.  
684
  Insley and Ackerman (1995).  
685
  Regs. §1.482-2(a)(2)(i). See also Regs. §§1.482-3(b)(2)(ii)(B), 1.482-4(d)(1), 1.482-
7(g)(2)(iv)(A), 1.482-7(g)(4)(i) and (ii)(A), and 1.482-9(h).  
686
  T.D. 9456 section C.  
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 201 
to such loan or advance, the district director may make appropriate allocations to 
reflect an arm’s length rate of interest for the use of such loan or advance”. Under 
paragraph (a)(2), “an arm’s length rate of interest shall be a rate of interest which 
was charged, or would have been charged, at the time the indebtedness arose, in 
independent transactions with or between unrelated parties under similar 
circumstances”.  Moreover, “all relevant factors” must be taken into account, 
“including the principal amount of the loan and  duration of the loan, the security 
involved, the credit standing of the borrower, and the interest rate prevailing at the 
situs of the lender or creditor687 for comparable loans between unrelated parties”.  
Particular transfer pricing methods are not specified for loans688 and in practice 
“the principles of the transfer pricing methods established in the section 482 
regulations are relied upon to benchmark intercompany debt”689.   
3.204 The ABA has recommended that guidance on guarantees should be 
placed in Regs. §1.482-2 as a “specific situation” alongside the loans and 
advances guidance690.  More specifically, the ABA notes that advocates of the “no 
affiliation” approach (i.e. to ignore passive association: see paragraph 4.64 below) 
“submit that the reference to the ‘borrower’ explicitly distinguishes the borrowing 
entity from all other affiliates, thus prohibiting consideration of affiliation benefits 
in determining an arm’s length rate”691.  But surely the answer to this is that the 
borrower’s credit standing “is what it is” i.e. having regard to passive association 
if indeed that has an empirical effect; to disregard that association would entail a 
departure from taking into account “all relevant factors” including the “credit 
standing of the borrower”.  Indeed, the ABA notes that advocates of the 
“market/affiliation” model (paragraph 4.65 below) also cite Regs. §1.482-
2(a)(2)(i) in support of their case.   
 
687
  Regarding the position of the lender see paragraph 5.4 and note 885 below.   
688
  Other than a “situs of the borrower” rule under which a loan out of proceeds of a loan 
raised by the lender at the situs of the borrower may be priced at the rate paid by the lender plus 
the lender’s costs (Regs. § 1.482-2(a)(2)(ii)) and a safe harbour for certain US dollar bona fide 
debt based on a monthly published “applicable federal rate” (Regs. § 1.482-2(a)(2)(iii)).  
689
  Bakker and Levey (2012), US chapter by Mac Calva, Krishnan Chandrasekhar and 
Mike Gaffney, page 534.  
690
  ABA Guarantees Paper (2012) page 3.  
691
  ABA Guarantees Paper page 56.  
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3.205 Regs. §1.482-3(e) addresses “unspecified methods” in the context of 
transfers of tangible property. It recites the “general principle that uncontrolled 
taxpayers evaluate the terms of a transaction by considering the realistic 
alternatives to that transaction, and only enter into a particular transaction if none 
of the alternatives is preferable to it”.  Thus it is appropriate to compare “a 
controlled transaction to similar uncontrolled transactions to provide a direct 
estimate of the price to which the parties would have agreed had they resorted 
directly to a market alternative”692.  Regs. §1.482-3(e)(2) presents an Example – 
illustrating the application of a bid comparison in an export/distributorship 
context.  Similar enlightenment may be available if there are prevailing rates for a 
particular product quoted on a public market693.  It should follow that loan pricing 
may be informed by analogy where a bank is prepared to lend (at least if a firm 
quote based on proper credit analysis is available).  Moreover, this approach 
seems to me to confirm consistency between the propositions that: 
(a) the correct comparison required by the arm’s length standard in Regs. § 1.482-
1(b)(1) is between the controlled transaction and a hypothetical transaction 
between hypothetical parties; and 
(b) the hypothetical borrower in a lending scenario must have all the same 
characteristics as the actual borrower in the controlled transaction, including its 
ability to secure certain pricing had it “resorted directly to the market”.   
3.206 Recognition of the passive association concept has to date been most 
visible in the “Services Regulations”, found in their final form at Regs. §1.482-9, 
effective from 31 July 2009, but electively applicable back to 2003694.  The 
regulations permit certain services to be charged for at cost i.e. with no mark-up: 
the arm’s length price is deemed to be the “total services costs”695.  However, 
 
692
  Regs. §1.482-4(d)(1) provides a parallel rule for transfers of intangible property.  
693
  Subject to various qualifications: Regs. §1.482-3(b)(5). 
694
  Summarised e.g. by DeNovio (2007), Feinschreiber and Kent (2008) and Green and 
Jenn (2009).   
695
  Regs. §1.482-9(j).  
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financial transactions including guarantees are excluded from application of this 
method696.   
3.207 In general, under Reg. §1.482-9(l)(1), a “controlled services transaction 
includes any activity (as defined in paragraph (l)(2) of this section) by one member 
of a group of controlled taxpayers (the renderer) that results in a benefit (as 
defined in paragraph (l)(3) of this section) to one or more other members of the 
controlled group (the recipients)” [my emphasis].  “Activity” includes 
performance of functions, assumption of risks, use of property, capabilities or 
knowledge, and making available property or resources of the “renderer”697.  
Despite the apparently non-exhaustive definition (“includes”), there is a strong 
sense here of positive action rather than the mere passivity with which this study is 
concerned.  “Benefit” is provided “if the activity directly results in a reasonably 
identifiable increment of economic or commercial value that enhances the 
recipient’s commercial position, or that may reasonably be anticipated to do so”.  
And benefit will generally be presumed where an uncontrolled taxpayer would be 
willing to pay another to perform the same or a similar activity or if the recipient 
would have done it for itself698.   
 
696
  Regs. §1.482-9(b)(4)(viii). When the Services Regulations appeared in proposed form, 
IRS Deputy Associate Chief Counsel (International) Steven Musher confirmed that the character 
of loan guarantees had not been taken on as part of the project (see Ryan et al (2004) note 1).  
General Counsel Memorandum 38499 (September 1980) took the position that a guarantee 
should be characterised as a service and thus under the regulations then in force an arm’s length 
charge could be equal to the costs incurred by the provider – typically zero.  Field Service Advice 
FSA 1995 WL 1918236, 1 May 1995, indicated that in certain circumstances a guarantee may be 
treated as a service.  That position was abandoned in 2006, the preamble to the temporary 
regulations including the comment that “no inference is intended … that financial transactions 
(including guarantees) would otherwise be considered the provision of services for transfer 
pricing purposes”: T.D. 9278, 21 August 2006, Explanation of Provisions paragraph 11(d) 
(confirmed in 2009 by T.D. 9456).  One view is that loans are not services (see e.g. Blessing 
(2010) page 164), possibly putting paragraph 7.13 TPG out of play (but cf. Vögel (2015) page 
647, where it is assumed that “financial services e.g. loans” are indeed covered by Chapter VII 
TPG), though the “no inference” statement above is perhaps rather neutral on the point.  Lowell, 
Burge and Briger (on-line service) paragraph 7.01[5][e] view the characterisation of guarantees 
as “a longstanding area of uncertainty”.  Container Corporation v Commissioner 134 TC No. 5 
(2010), albeit in a different (withholding/sourcing) context, supports the view that guarantees 
entail services.  Breen (2015) at note 4 cites Miller (1994) as “the definitive study of US tax 
issues associated with guarantees”.  But Miller at section III.A incorrectly asserts that an arm’s 
length guarantee fee should be equal to the value of the benefit to the debtor (whereas this in fact 
represents the upper bound of the range).  
697
  Regs. §1.482-9(l)(2).  
698
  Regs. §1.482-9(l)(3)(i).  
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 204 
3.208 This “moved the United States closer to the OECD in this area of 
law”699 – in fact the benefit concept is clearly modelled on TPG paragraph 7.6 
(including the version in place when the Services Regulations were first 
proposed).  “The perspective of the buyer prevails under the benefit test … [but] 
benefits that result from passive association are among the exceptions to the 
benefit test.”700  The Regulations abandoned a “general benefit” concept under the 
predecessor regulations (which dated back to 1968) “under which certain activities 
in a corporate group are presumed to generate a benefit to the controlled group as 
a whole”701.  Moreover, with a broad parallel in TPG paragraph 7.13, Regs. 
§1.482-9(l)(3)(v) confirms that: 
“[a] controlled taxpayer generally will not be considered to obtain a benefit where that 
benefit results from the controlled taxpayer’s status as a member of a controlled group.” 
3.209 And then, importantly: 
“[a] controlled taxpayer’s status as a member of a controlled group may, however, be 
taken into account for purposes of evaluating comparability between controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions”702. 
3.210 The confirmation that (mere) membership of a group may be taken into 
account in a comparability analysis is a powerful pointer towards the recognition 
of passive association as a relevant factor in pricing controlled transactions.  In 
response to the 2003 proposed regulations, concern was expressed that “virtually 
any uncontrolled transaction could potentially be considered unreliable, because it 
 
699
  Zollo et al (2006), page 39. 
700
  Wittendorff (2010a), page 776.  The point is that a benefit from passive association is 
inherently in place prior to (or independently from) any activity by the renderer.  Thus “benefit” 
from “activity” cannot include benefits from passive association. 
701
  Wood and Canale (2004), page 32. Also, “[i]n direct contrast to the [then] Current 
Services Regulations’ general benefit test, the OECD Guidelines provide that an activity whereby 
an associated enterprise receives only an incidental benefit solely due to the fact that it is part of a 
larger concern, and not to any specific activity being performed, does not support a charge for the 
intercompany service”: Hill (2006) referring to TPG paragraph 7.13.  
702
  This is now echoed in paragraph 1.163 TPG: “Comparability adjustments may be 
warranted to account for group synergies.”  See also Regs. §1.482-1(f)(2)(i) Example 3 where 
controlled transactions of another MNE group involving economies of integration are apparently 
(but surprisingly) regarded as a more reliable reference transaction than uncontrolled 
transactions.    
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would not generally reflect the same efficiencies and synergies as controlled 
services transactions”703.  But see the discussion of Bausch & Lomb, Inc v 
Commissioner704 below (paragraph 3.223) and, of special interest, the series of 
Examples705 provided at Regs. §1.482-9(l)(5), including Examples 15 to 19 which 
address passive association (described in T.D. 9278706 as “an increment of value 
that a controlled party obtains on account of its membership in the controlled 
group”).  “These examples draw a contrast between the cognizable benefit 
conferred upon a subsidiary through the parent’s performance of an affirmative act 
and the non-cognizable benefit enjoyed by the subsidiary by virtue of its passive 
association or mere affiliation with the parent. Although phrased in terms of the 
absence of a cognizable benefit to the subsidiary, this ‘passive association’ 
principle can be expressed equally well in terms of the absence of an affirmative 
act by the parent”707.  The Examples represent an advanced quasi-statutory 
recognition of passive association708, and each deserves a mention:  
   (i)  Example 15 “stands for the proposition that a benefit enjoyed by an affiliate 
does not constitute a ‘benefit’ for purposes of section 482 if the benefit arises 
solely from affiliation with its parent”709. The Example concerns a newly-acquired 
subsidiary (“Y”) of a major IT group (“X”) which manages to win a contract for a 
new project which is significantly bigger than anything it has done before due to 
its membership of the acquirer’s group, but without active support from the X 
 
703
  T.D. 9278 paragraph 11(c); Wittendorff (2010a), page 505.  
704
  933 F.2d 1984 (1991).  Wittendorff (2010a) page 505 says “the IRS unsuccessfully 
argued that economies of integration in a controlled transaction meant that uncontrolled 
transactions identified by the taxpayer did not satisfy the comparability requirement; the question 
therefore is whether the new regulations seek to negate the effect of that judgment”. 
705
  It is hard to resist a mention of the so-called “cheese examples” from the 1994 
regulations (Regs. (1994) §1.482-4(f)(3)(iv)), featuring the “Fromage Frere” group, even though, 
being mostly concerned with the development of marketing intangibles, they are not very 
relevant to the current study.  
706
  Paragraph 11(c).  
707
  ABA Guarantees Paper (2012) page 6.  Compare the OECD’s use of “deliberate 
concerted action”: paragraph 2.82 above.  
708
  Australia’s Explanatory Memorandum on its modern transfer pricing law is a worthy 
competitor:  paragraph 3.56 above.    
709
  ABA Guarantees Paper page 6.  
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group or utilisation of marketing intangibles710. No benefit is considered to be 
obtained by Y from the broader group because winning the contract is not 
attributable to any specific activity by X. 
(ii)  Example 16 uses the same facts as Example 15 except that X provides a 
performance guarantee.  This clearly constitutes the active provision of a benefit to 
Y. 
(iii)  Example 17 again uses those facts except that X had itself started to negotiate 
the contract with the customer before acquiring Y.  Thus Y obtains a benefit from 
being able to step into the contract, necessarily with X’s acquiescence.711 
(iv)  Example 18: same facts again, except that X sends the customer a letter 
confirming its ownership of Y and intention to maintain that state of affairs; this 
allows Y to obtain the contract on more favourable terms than it would otherwise 
have achieved.  Interestingly, this is not considered to confer a benefit on Y 
because the letter “simply affirmed Company Y’s status as a member of the 
controlled group and represented that this status would be maintained until the 
contract was completed”.  That seems to me an odd outcome as X has actively 
provided support and indeed what may be a contractually binding stipulation 
potentially to its detriment. The Example has been criticised by the ABA712, who 
nonetheless speculate that perhaps the underlying rationale is that the letter is 
legally unenforceable or because the benefit derived by the subsidiary was 
insubstantial; neither of these are satisfactory explanations. 
(v)  Example 19 (inserted, in response to commentators’ requests for clarification 
of the treatment of passive association, to illustrate a situation in which group 
membership would be taken into account in evaluating comparability713) uses a 
different and slightly more complex fact pattern involving comparables.  
 
710
  Wittendorff’s criticism (2010a, page 504) that the example may be “pointless” unless 
Y uses its new group name seems unfair: the simple fact of its ownership may be enough to 
induce a counterparty to offer favourable terms without the need for a corporate name change.  
711
  “Examples 16 and 17 seem to be inspired by the Hospital Corp of America v 
Commissioner case” 81 TC 520 (1983): Wittendorff (2010a), page 504.  
712
  ABA Guarantees Paper (2012) page 7. 
713
  T.D. 9278, 21 August 2006, Internal Revenue Bulletin 2006-34.  
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Company X and its subsidiary Y respectively buy 1 million and 100,000 units of 
goods from supplier S.  There is no active negotiation and S applies a volume 
discount so as to charge $0.95 per unit, separately billing X and Y.  X charges Y a 
fee of $5,000 representing Y’s supposed benefit from the arrangement.  Unrelated 
singleton company U is comparable to Y and buys 100,000 units at $1 each.  
Similar taxpayers R1 (parent) and R2 (subsidiary) have a purchasing pattern from 
S which is identical to that of the X-Y group, but no intra-group fee is charged.  
The Example concludes that the combined purchasing power advantage enjoyed 
by Y is “entirely due to Company Y’s status as a member of the Company X 
controlled group and not to any specific activity by Company X or any other 
member of the controlled group.  Consequently Company Y is not considered to 
obtain a benefit from Company X or any other member of the controlled group.”  
Thus the $5,000 fee is inappropriate.  This Example interestingly (and in my view 
sensibly) “takes group membership into account for comparability (i.e. 
determining which vendor price levels can be passed through), while 
simultaneously viewing group membership as not conferring a compensable 
benefit”714.  (The relevance of the controlled arrangement between R1 and R2 
seems dubious unless it is simply being presented as correct practice.)    Example 
19, taken together with the Preamble, is said to demonstrate that benefits from 
affiliation should be taken into account, but do not qualify as services715.     
3.211 The ABA Guarantees Paper (2010) observes that Example 19 is cited 
by proponents of the view that credit-standing should in some way be regarded as 
a “group asset”.  That concept is however given short shrift (e.g. because it would 
“seemingly compel the conclusion that all intercompany debt be priced at cost”).  
And it is denied that Example 19 supports the argument that an affiliate should get 
a related party guarantee for free or at a discount to market price: 
“At most, the example stands for the principle that affiliation is a comparability factor, so 
if a third party would price a good at 95c per unit taking affiliation into account, the 
 
714
  Lewis (2006), page 346.  
715
  Wittendorff (2010a) page 506.  Compare the Canadian Indalex case, where the 
offshore purchasing company was found not to have contributed anything to the group’s 
purchasing power, note 50 above.  See also Examples 3-5 in Section D.8 Chapter I TPG, 
paragraph 2.80 above.  
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related party transaction should be priced similarly.  Nothing in the example suggest or 
supports the view that the related party transaction should be priced below the market, at 
90c or 85c per unit or that the good should be given away for free.” 716 
And: 
“[t]he comparability issue would have been presented better in Example 19 if Company X 
or another affiliate had purchased the 1.1 million containers itself and sold 100,000 of the 
units to Company Y.  Then the question would arise regarding the arm’s length price for 
that sale (a related party sale) and whether it would have to reflect the same 5c per unit 
volume discount that would have attached if Company Y purchased them directly from 
Company S.  We anticipate the Government may have answered this question in the 
affirmative, insisting that Company Y not be denied the volume discount on the sale from 
the related party that would have been available to it on the sale from Company S but 
even if this is the intended lesson of Example 19, neither this lesson nor any other lesson 
from this example supports the notion that an affiliate is entitled to acquire a good or 
service from a related party at a price below which it could have acquired the good or 
service from a third party in the marketplace taking account of its affiliations.”717 
3.212 Thus it seems plain, from the text of Example 19 and informed 
commentary, that at least in the purchasing power context, the benefits of passive 
association are to be taken into account as a comparability factor and thus as a 
characteristic of a purchaser of goods under a controlled transaction.  By extension 
the same principle should apply in financing situations.   
3.213 On 6 March 1998 the US Treasury released proposed regulations 
regarding global dealing operations718. The proposed rules, which include various 
illustrative examples of different permissible transfer pricing methodologies 
(including a “comparable uncontrolled financial transaction” or “CUFT” method), 
do not contribute to the passive association discussion, despite some expectation 
that guarantees would be addressed (the topic may be included in an eventual 
reissue of the global dealing regulations). 
 
716
  Page 67.  
717
  Footnote 150, page 68, my emphasis.  
718
  Federal Register vol. 63, no. 44; 63 FR 11177.  
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3.214 A first draft version of the US Model Income Tax Convention was 
issued in 1976, based on the then current OECD Model.  It was revised in 2006.  It 
is supplemented by a US Treasury Technical Explanation.  Article 9(1) is identical 
in form (but for the inconsequential positioning of one word and use of “that” 
rather than “which”) to Article 9(1) MTC.  Article 9(3) does however qualify 
Article 9(1), with language strongly redolent of section 482: 
“The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not limit any provisions of the law of either 
Contracting State which permit the distribution, apportionment or allocation of income, 
deductions, credits or allowances between persons, whether or not residents of a 
Contracting State, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests when 
necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such 
persons.” 
3.215 In a sense, therefore, the US Model heads off potential accusations of 
treaty override by preserving the right (albeit within the terms of section 482) to 
depart from the arm’s length standard.  See further paragraph 3.233 below in 
relation to the Technical Explanation.  
3.216 Section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code separately addresses thin 
capitalisation (beyond the scope of this study).                                                                                                                               
Case law 
3.217 “The IRS lost every single major transfer pricing case it litigated 
between 1980 and 1995, including cases against all the US pharmaceutical 
companies and many other US multinationals.”719 There has to date been a 
surprising lack of sophistication in the analysis and evidence presented to the US 
courts in many transfer pricing cases, even modern ones, both by taxpayers and by 
 
719
  Avi-Yonah (2009) page 2; (2015) page 71.  A useful summary of key cases is 
contained in Avi-Yonah (1995) pages 98–129.  This is perhaps a slightly sweeping statement as 
some decisions rejected the taxpayer’s analysis too, such that the court increased assessable 
income via its own determination.  An example is Sundstrand Corporation v Commissioner 96 
TC 226 (1991), where both parties were criticised for the poor quality of the record, 
“obfuscation” and “antagonism”, so that for the court “[o]ur task was not easy but we have 
shouldered the yoke, and the parties now must reap what they have sowed” (96 TC at 375).  In 
Avi-Yonah (2015) the DuPont case (1979) (note 722 below) is described as “the last unequivocal 
IRS victory in the transfer pricing area”.   
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the IRS720, especially when one reflects upon the US’s leading role in formulating 
global transfer pricing law and the many decades over which arm’s length pricing 
legislation has been in place.  “There have been hundreds of cases decided under 
section 482 and its predecessors”721, of which a good number have become 
internationally well-known to transfer pricing practitioners722, including the 
 
720
  A schadenfreude-inducing example is Westreco, Inc v Commissioner 64 TCM (CCH) 
849, 866 (1992), where, in haranguing the IRS for its expert’s uncritical attachment to SIC codes, 
the Tax Court observed that “[w]e cannot see how architectural services, nuclear power plant 
construction and operation, map making and oceanographic services, tire making, breeding of 
research primates and canines, and packaging material development can be compared with 
petitioner’s food research.” 
721
  Duff & Phelps (2014), US chapter by Mark Madrian and Jill Weise, page 829.  
722
  E.g. Young & Rubicam Inc v United States 410 F.2d 1233 (1969) (IRS allocation of 
income attributable to employee services to subsidiaries rejected); Lufkin Foundry and Machine 
Company v Commissioner 468 F.2d 805 (1972) (reallocation of commissions and discount on 
sales of oil field machinery; intra-group transactions inadmissible as comparables); R T French 
Co v Commissioner 60 TC 836 (1973) (royalty payments to recipient corporation with only 
partially common ownership found to be arm’s length); Engineering Sales Inc v United States  
510 F.2d 565 (1975) (reallocation of revenues from sales of cooling towers between commonly 
controlled US corporations); E I DuPont de Nemours & Co v United States 608 F.2d 445 (1979) 
(reallocation of Swiss sales subsidiary’s income to taxpayer); Hospital Corp of America v 
Commissioner 81 TC 520 (1983) (allocation to US parent of 75% of income of Cayman 
subsidiary from Saudi hospital management contract); Ciba-Geigy Corporation v Commissioner 
85 TC 172 (1985) (taxpayer’s royalty rate to Swiss parent for licence to manufacture and sell 
herbicides upheld); G D Searle & Co v Commissioner 88 TC 252 (1987) (transfer of 
pharmaceutical/medical intangibles to Puerto Rican subsidiary in exchange for stock sustained – 
allocation to taxpayer of 25% of subsidiary’s net sales); Central Bank of the South v United 
States 834 F.2d 990 (1987) (reallocation of unpaid equipment lease rent sustained); Eli Lilly and 
Company v Commissioner 856 F.2d 855 (1988) (pharmaceutical intangibles transferred to Puerto 
Rican subsidiary in exchange for stock sustained; sale of product into the US susceptible to re-
pricing); Sundstrand Corporation (see note 719 above) (intangibles licensing to Singapore 
manufacturing subsidiary, sales of product to US taxpayer, both reassessed);  Merck & Co, Inc v 
United States 24 Cl. Ct. 73 (1991) (rejecting IRS allocation of royalty income to taxpayer from 
Puerto Rican pharmaceutical manufacturing subsidiary); Westreco, Inc v Commissioner 64 TCM 
(CCH) 849 (1992) (rejecting IRS’s allocations of income to US contract research services 
subsidiary of Swiss group); Perkin-Elmer Corp v Commissioner 66 TCM (CCH) 634 (1993) 
(court’s reallocations of parts prices and royalties between taxpayer and Puerto Rican 
subsidiary); Seagate Technology, Inc v Commissioner 102 TC 149 (1994) (court’s reallocation of 
component/disk prices charged by taxpayer’s Singapore subsidiary to taxpayer and royalties 
charged by taxpayer to Singapore; services charge sustained); National Semiconductor 
Corporation v Commissioner 67 TCM (CCH) 2849 (1994) (reallocation by the court of income 
of taxpayer’s Asian component packaging subsidiaries based on an adaptation of the “least 
unacceptable” expert proposal); Pikeville Coal Co v United States 37 Fed. Cl. 304 (1997) 
(taxpayer’s sales of coal to Canadian parent; IRS offered section 482 downwards adjustment of 
income; taxpayer sought a greater reduction and tax refund); Compaq Computer Corporation v 
Commissioner 78 TCM 20 (1999) (Singapore manufacturing subsidiary selling printed circuit 
assemblies to US parent: found to have satisfied CUP method); DHL Corp v Commissioner 285 
F.3d 1210 (2002) (trademark disposition and licensing; pricing of services); Veritas Software 
Corporation, Symantec Corporation v Commissioner 133 TC 297 (2009) (adequacy of buy-in 
payment by taxpayer’s Irish subsidiary for pre-existing intangibles under a cost sharing 
arrangement).  Significant further cases are pending e.g. Eaton Corp TC Dkt 5576-12 
(cancellation of advance pricing agreements covering component production by Cayman 
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famous US$3.4 billion settlement in 2006 between the IRS and GlaxoSmithKline 
relating to the value of product and marketing intangibles723.  But these cases 
provide only infrequent insights into the character of the arm’s length principle. 
Perhaps this is in part due to the highly codified regulatory approach in the US – 
leaving less room than in some other jurisdictions for interpretative argument.  In 
any event, as yet, no clear judicial statement has yet emerged as to the recognition 
of passive association.  
3.218 The US Supreme Court, in Commissioner v First Security Bank of Utah, 
has at least emphasised the keystone principle that “the purpose of section 482 is 
to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer”724.  
The Commissioner allocated insurance premium income from a reinsurance 
company to its affiliated banks which had arranged sales to customers. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s judgment for the taxpayers because it 
was illegal under federal banking law for them to receive insurance sales 
commissions.  Thus there was no shifting or distortion of income because the 
banks simply could not receive insurance premium income.  It was only where the 
“controlling interest” had power to shift income between affiliated companies, and 
where that power had been exercised in such a way that the “true taxable income” 
of a taxpayer had been understated, that the Commissioner was authorised to 
reallocate under section 482 (that power “hardly includes the power to force a 
subsidiary to violate the law”).  Thus the holding company “did not utilize its 
control over the banks and Security Life to distort their true net incomes”725.  So 
 
affiliates); Amazon.com Inc TC Dkt No. 31197-12 (value of intangibles contributed to cost 
sharing agreement with Luxembourg subsidiary); Guidant LLC v Commissioner  TC Dkt 5989-
11 (transfers of goods, intangibles and services); Microsoft TC Dkt 2:14-mc-00117-RSM (cost 
sharing buy-in payment); Medtronic TC No. 6944-11 (valuation of intangibles and resulting 
royalties); Henry Schein Inc TC No 6862-15 (alleged under-charging for executive services).  
Bray International v Commissioner TC No. 7347-14 filed 1 April 2014 involves allegedly 
excessive interest on intra-group loans, so could conceivably include argument regarding passive 
association.  
723
 117 TC No.1 (filed 5 July 2001) TC No. 5750-64 (filed 4 February 2004).  
724
  405 U.S. 394, 400 (1972), rehearsing Regs. § 1.482-1(b)(1).  
725
  Ibid., paragraph 23, applied in Proctor & Gamble Co v Commissioner 95 TC 323, 335 
(taxpayer unable to exercise control over Spanish subsidiary in circumstances where remittances 
of royalties were effectively proscribed by Spanish laws), also citing Hospital Corp of America v 
Commissioner 81 TC 520, 594.   See Jones, Roberson and Yoder (2013) on 3M’s challenge to the 
validity of Regs. § 1.482-1(h)(2) in the light of the First Security Bank of Utah case.  Paragraph 
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this case, of the highest authority, presents two important themes: (i) the objective 
of parity with uncontrolled transactions; and (ii) the need for a pricing distortion 
which is caused by the exercise of control.  The latter point finds further support 
in the dictum that “[s]ection 482 is not designed to punish the mere existence of 
commonly controlled entities nor the unexercised power to shift income among 
them”726. 
3.219 A useful summary of the US transfer pricing rules of engagement is 
found (for example) in H Group Holding Inc v Commissioner727, a case 
concerning the Hyatt hotel group and the use of trademarks/trade names and the 
provision of management services: 
“Section 482 determinations are to be sustained absent a showing that the 
Commissioner’s discretion was abused. … Consequently, taxpayers bear a heavier than 
normal burden of proving that the Commissioner’s section 482 allocations are arbitrary, 
capricious or unreasonable. … In reviewing the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s 
allocation under section 482, we focus on the reasonableness of the result, not the details 
of the methodology employed. … The applicable standard is arm’s length dealing between 
taxpayers unrelated either by ownership or control.  See sec. 1-482-1(b)(1), Income Tax 
Regs [the 1968 regulations]. Taxpayers bear the burden of showing that the standard they 
used or that they proposed is arm’s length. … If it is established that there was an abuse 
of the Commissioner’s discretion and a taxpayer fails to show that questioned 
transactions met an arm’s length standard, then the Court must decide the amount of an 
arm’s length allocation.”728 
 
1.75 TPG addresses cases where a country “blocks” payments of amounts owed between 
associated enterprises.  
726
  Merck & Co v United States (1991) (note 722 above) citing Your Host Inc v 
Commissioner 58 TC 10, 24 (1972) affirmed 489 F.2d 957 (1973).  
727
  TCM 1999-334 (1999).  
728
  Pages 59–60.  The picturesque “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable” formulation 
first comes as a surprise to the uninitiated.  As the “abuse” notion suggests, however, it is 
somewhat akin to the UK standard for judicial review of administrative action sometimes 
referred to as “Wednesbury unreasonableness” (after Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v 
Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223).  
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3.220 A now fairly distant case, which appears to adopt a rather simplistic 
approach, but which has nonetheless been subsequently cited with approval729, is 
United States Steel Corporation v Commissioner730.  In essence, the taxpayer’s 
Liberian shipping subsidiary Navios charged the same rates to all its US 
customers, including the taxpayer, for the transportation of ore to US ports from 
Venezuela.  The Tax Court ruled for a significant allocation of additional income 
to the taxpayer having regard to the substantial volumes transported for the 
taxpayer and the companies’ continuing relationship.  The decision was reversed 
on appeal. The Second Circuit considered that “[w]here, as in this case, the 
taxpayer offers evidence that the same amount was actually charged for the same 
service in transactions with independent buyers, the question resolves itself into an 
evaluation of whether or not the circumstances of the sales to independent buyers 
are ‘similar’ enough to sales to the controlling corporation under the 
circumstances, ‘considering all relevant facts’”731.  The Court was unimpressed by 
the alleged effect of the long-term relationship, or by the fact that the subsidiary’s 
ore-carriers were the largest of their kind in the world, such that the transportation 
for the parent “had never been done before” so that the comparability tests in the 
Regulations could not be relied upon: 
“We are constrained to reject this argument. … To say that [the independent] Pittsburgh 
Steel was buying a service from Navios with one set of expectations about duration and 
risk, and Steel another, may be to recognize economic reality; but it is also to engraft a 
crippling degree of economic sophistication onto a broadly drawn statute, which if 
‘comparable’ is taken to mean ‘identical’, as Judge Quealy would read it, would allow 
the taxpayer no safe harbour from the Commissioner’s virtually unrestricted discretion to 
reallocate.”732 
 
729
  E.g. in Bausch & Lomb Inc v Commissioner 933 F.2d 1084 (1991) at paragraph 48; 
Perkin-Elmer Corp v Commissioner 66 TCM (CCH) 634, 666; Seagate Technology, Inc v 
Commissioner 102 TC 149, 239 (1994).  Reuven Avi-Yonah in Baistrocchi and Roxan (2012) 
page 52 comments on the “continued vitality and extensive effect” of US Steel.  
730
  36 TCM (CCH) 586 (1977); 617 F.2d 942 (1980).    
731
  Paragraph 26.  There is a loose parallel here with the taxpayer’s win in the Canadian 
case involving an offshore purchasing entity: The Queen v Irving Oil Limited 91 DTC 5106 
(FCA); cf. the Crown’s victory in the Indalex case, note 50 above.  
732
  Paragraph 43.  “The US Steel case gave rise to the detailed rules on the comparability 
analysis in the 1994 Sec. 482 regulations addressing other maters than the products (functional 
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 214 
3.221 The Second Circuit accepted that certain transactions between Navios 
and unrelated customers were with “independent” parties because the taxpayer - 
“had no ownership or control interest in any of these firms and thus was not in a position 
to influence their decision to deal with Navios. To expand the test of ‘independence’ to 
require more than this, to require that the transaction be one unaffected by the market 
power of the taxpayer, would be to inject antitrust concerns into a tax statute.  But in § 
482, a tax statute, it is appropriate to limit the concept of what is not ‘independent’ to 
actions influenced by common ownership or control.”733 
3.222 This comes close to a rejection of relative bargaining power as a 
potential component of comparability analysis, a view which seems unlikely to 
attract favour today734.  The case does however provide clear recognition of the 
essential target of transfer pricing law: “actions influenced by common ownership 
or control”.  Despite the continued recognition of US Steel by the US courts, it 
seems highly likely now that an ever-increasing degree of “economic 
sophistication” will be brought to bear in assessing transfer pricing cases.  
Certainly the time, trouble and expense spent by both adversaries nowadays on 
expert economic evidence results in sophisticated (albeit often misdirected) 
economic arguments being presented to the courts.   
3.223 Bausch & Lomb Inc v Commissioner735 entailed the provision of 
technology and trademark licences by the US taxpayer to its Irish subsidiary and 
sales of manufactured contact lenses from the Irish subsidiary to the taxpayer.  It 
is important regarding the comparability hypothesis.  The IRS was “indifferent as 
to whether the royalty is increased or the transfer price [for the sales to the US] is 
decreased as long as the result is that B&L Ireland receives only its costs of 
production and a reasonable mark-up”736.  Regarding product sales into the US, 
 
analysis, contractual terms, economic circumstances and business strategies).  In 1995, the US 
rules found their way to the OECD Guidelines, which are based on the same comparability 
factors”: Wittendorff (2009b) page 205.  
733
  Paragraph 37.  
734
  See the discussion of relative bargaining power in the context of the UK DSG case: 
paragraph 3.169 above.  
735
  933 F.2d 1084 (1991). 
736
  Ibid., paragraph 33.  
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the Commissioner contended that the standard for comparability had not been met.  
In particular, the Commissioner argued that the taxpayer’s relevant functions 
included the provision of knowhow, trademarks, regulatory approval, R&D and 
ready-made markets.  But the Court considered these attributes relevant to the 
intangibles licensing arrangement, not the separate sales of product, and criticised 
the IRS because “the position urged by the Commissioner would preclude 
comparability precisely because the relationship between B&L and B&L Ireland 
was different from that between independent buyers and sellers operating at arm’s 
length.  This, however, will always be the case when transactions between 
commonly controlled entities are compared to transactions between independent 
entities”;  the US Steel case was cited with approval.737   
3.224 The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rather extraordinarily 
rendered its decision and then changed its mind about the outcome in Xilinx, Inc v 
Commissioner738.  The case represents a reaffirmation of the central importance of 
the arm’s length principle in US transfer pricing law.  Indeed, the withdrawal and 
reissue of the Court’s opinion followed an international chorus of protest from 
business and commentators, concerned to preserve the integrity of the arm’s 
length principle.  The US taxpayer was party to a cost sharing arrangement with 
its Irish subsidiary, but had not, within that CSA, recognised costs in respect of 
employee stock options.  It was established as  factual matter (which the IRS did 
not contest on appeal) that parties at arm’s length would not have included such 
costs in a CSA.  On the other hand, Regs. § 1.482-7(d) required that “all” costs be 
taken into account.  This presented an apparent conflict between the specific 
requirement of the cost sharing rules and the general principle in Regs. § 1.482-
1(a)(1) that the “standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing 
at arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer”.  The choice for the Court was 
therefore to “1. apply a rule of thumb: the specific controls the general; 2. Resolve 
the ambiguity based on the dominant purpose of the regulations … The first 
alternative presents a simple solution.  It is plausible.  But it is wrong.  It converts 
 
737
  Ibid., paragraphs 47–48.  
738
  598 F.3d 1191 (2010), reversing the decision of an identically constituted court at 567 
F.3d 482 (2009) (withdrawn on 13 January 2010), and thus affirming the decision of the Tax 
Court 125 TC 37 (2005).   
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 216 
a canon of construction into something like a statute. … Purpose is paramount. 
The purpose of the regulations is parity between taxpayers in uncontrolled 
transactions and taxpayers in controlled transactions.”  Weight was also given to 
the use of the arm’s length standard in the US-Ireland tax treaty and the US 
Treasury’s Technical Explanation of that treaty which noted, as regards Article 9, 
that the treaty incorporates “the arm’s length principle reflected in US domestic 
transfer pricing provision, particularly Code section 482”739. 
Tax authority practice 
3.225 There is no specific IRS guidance in the context of intercompany 
financial arrangements addressing the effects of passive association on the pricing 
of controlled transactions.  
3.226 In 1988 the IRS and U.S. Treasury published their paper A Study of 
Intercompany Pricing under Section 482 of the Code, often known as the “White 
Paper”740.  The paper was produced in the wake of the “commensurate with 
income” standard added in 1986 to section 482 (i.e. that the income from a 
transfer or licence of intangible property must be commensurate with the income 
attributable to the intangible).  It is a seminal work on the transfer pricing of 
intangibles, so is mostly directed at issues beyond the scope of this thesis.  It is 
nonetheless interesting for the comments made about the general nature of the 
arm’s length principle.  On one rather extreme view, it “played a major part in the 
demise of the traditional ALS” [arm’s length standard]741 and (less extravagantly) 
was “a turning point for the arm’s length principle”742.  However, in the face of 
international criticism of the commensurate with income rule, the White Paper 
 
739
  Ninth Circuit opinion (2010) paragraphs 2, 5 and 6.  Judge Noonan delivered the 
revised opinion, repeating verbatim this aspect of his 2009 dissent.  See now the Altera case on 
the validity of the regulations: note 672 above. 
740
  1988-2 C.B. 458.  
741
  Avi-Yonah (1995) page 91, who considered that, at least measured against the 
traditional ALS with its reliance on CUPs, and despite the language used, the White Paper 
advocated a significant broadening of the ALS, in fact a “revolution in the United States’ 
approach to transfer pricing” (page 135), noting also the new emphasis on results rather than 
pricing e.g. by the adoption of the “comparable profits method” (page 144) so that “the 
traditional ALS is defunct in practice” (page 147).   
742
  Wittendorff (2010a) page 43. 
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robustly asserted that “the arm’s length standard is the accepted international norm 
for making transfer pricing adjustments”, and reaffirmed that “Congress intended 
the commensurate with income standard to be consistent with the arm’s length 
standard, and that it will be so interpreted and applied by the Internal Revenue 
Service and the Treasury Department”743. 
3.227 As regards comparability, the notion of “exact” comparables is 
described as “the best evidence of what unrelated parties would do in a related 
party transaction”.  The intangibles context of the White Paper naturally enough 
means that an exact comparable is said to entail that “the comparable transaction 
involves the same intangible property transferred under substantially similar 
circumstances”; but the concept would seem to be (even more) readily adaptable 
to financing transactions – where the property provided is money. For exact 
comparability, the comparable transaction and the related party arrangement must 
take place in “similar economic environments” and “must contain substantially 
similar contractual features”744.  
3.228 Some comments are also offered on risk-bearing in the context of 
comparability.  For example:  
“In general, in a related party transaction, the market reward for taking risks must be 
allocated to the party truly at risk.  Companies take risks in all dealings in the 
marketplace, and are rewarded for doing so.  Some of this risk disappears in related party 
transactions. The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 noted: ‘In addition, a 
parent corporation that transfers potentially valuable property to its subsidiary is not 
faced with the same risks as if it were dealing with an unrelated party.  Its equity interest 
assures it of the ability ultimately to obtain the benefit of future anticipated profits, 
without regard to the price it sets. … [Risk] allocation should be based on the risks 
arising out of the true economic activities undertaken by parts of the enterprise, not on 
mechanisms that merely shift risks within the group. … [I]n searching for appropriate 
comparables, one should look for situations in which an unrelated party contracted to 
 
743
  White Paper at 1988-2 C.B. 458.  Rollinson and Frisch (1988) present some 
supplemental theoretical issues reinforcing the approach taken in the White Paper.  
744
  Ibid., pages 485-6.  
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perform an economic activity that is about equal in riskiness to the activity done by the 
affiliate ...”745.  
3.229 Prior to the decision of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in the 
General Electric case, panellists at an ABA Tax Section meeting on 7 May 2010 
discussed the pricing of related-party guarantees.  Treasury Associate International 
Tax Counsel David Ernick criticised the view that the arm’s length standard 
required implicit support to be ignored.  It was, in his view, inappropriate to 
hypothesize the group companies “as if they were completely unrelated and not 
part of a group”; rather, the arm’s length standard “requires you to reach the price 
that unrelated parties would”.  Thus in pricing an (explicit) parental guarantee, it 
was relevant to recognise how the market would “bump up” the creditworthiness 
of the borrowing subsidiary on account of implicit support, and thus appropriate to 
calculate the benefit of the guarantee against the benchmark of the subsidiary’s 
borrowing cost on that basis746. 
3.230 It is understood that the IRS applies the concept of implicit support in 
determining intra-group financing charges under advance pricing agreements747.  
However, despite a 2006 suggestion that guidance would be made available748, 
and despite indications from 2010 that the IRS was studying transfer pricing issues 
involving financial guarantees749, no guidance has yet emerged; and no formal 
response from the IRS or the US Treasury has been issued in response to the 
 
745
  Ibid, page 491.  
746
  Reported by Moses: 19 TMTPR 58; see also Stewart (2010), in which Steven Musher, 
IRS Associate Chief Counsel (International) was quoted, with Ernick, as suggesting that “future 
guidance may seek to value guarantees in terms of the reduction in borrowing costs relative to 
borrowing costs of an affiliated company absent a guarantee rather than the cost of debt for the 
subsidiary as if it had been an unaffiliated company”; Ernick also said that “the arm’s length 
standard does not require ‘hypothesising’ related companies as if they were completely 
unrelated”, and Musher pointed to Example 19 in the Services Regulations to support this view 
(see paragraph 3.210(v) above). 
747
  Blessing (2010) page 158.  
748
  T.D. 9278 paragraph 11(d).  
749
  Musher, quoted in Duff & Phelps’ Transfer Pricing Times vol. VII issue 2 (2010).   
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detailed analysis and call for such guidance in the 2012 ABA Guarantees Paper 
(discussed at paragraph 4.62ff below) 750.    
3.231 The IRS’s Internal Revenue Manual751 is essentially concerned with 
organisation, governance and process matters and does not represent a technical 
advisory manual in the way that the HMRC manuals function. It does not contain 
commentary on substantive transfer pricing law.   
3.232 The IRS has also issued a number of “International Practice Units”, 
designed as IRS staff “job aids and training materials on international tax 
issues”752.  Of several on transfer pricing topics, one addresses the “Arm’s Length 
Standard”753 but the content is of a very general nature and does not touch on the 
passive association topic.  
3.233 Article 9(1) of the US Model Income Tax Convention of 15 November 
2006 is essentially identical to Article 9(1) OECD MTC.  The Treasury 
Department Technical Explanation is an official guide to the Model, though its 
coverage of Article 9 is very general.  Its preamble states that it “reflects the 
policies behind particular Convention provisions, as well as understandings 
reached with respect to the application and interpretation of the Convention”.  In 
relation to Article 9 it is said that “[t]his Article incorporates in the Convention the 
arm’s length principle reflected in the US domestic transfer pricing provisions, 
particularly Code section 482”. Article 9(1) addresses situations where enterprises 
are related “and there are arrangements or conditions imposed between the 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations that are different from those 
that would have existed in the absence of the relationship”.  The “commensurate 
 
750
  My New York colleague Dennis Caracristi commented: “The IRS and Treasury are 
notorious for saying that they are studying issues, and for taxpayers to be ready for regulations or 
other pronouncements, only to do either absolutely nothing or to promulgate rules after many, 
many years. From my reading, it looks like they were probably looking to issue guidance in the 
form of regulations.  Unfortunately, that kind of project usually takes the longest.  It isn’t 
uncommon for regulations to be ‘just around the corner’ for 5, 10 or 15 years or even longer.”  
751
  Available at www.irs.gov/irm/ (accessed 3 August 2015).   
752
  Available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/International-Practice-Units 
(accessed 3 September 2015).  
753
  DCN ISI/9422.09_06(2013).  
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with income” standard (see paragraphs 3.193, 3.225 above) is self-servingly said 
to have been “designed to operate consistently with the arm’s length standard”.  
But at least if the conditions of a controlled transaction “are consistent with those 
that would be made between independent persons, the income arising from that 
transaction should not be subject to adjustment under this Article”.  This at least 
fits with the notion that (say) a subsidiary should not be expected to pay more to 
its parent under a financial transaction than it would pay to a third party, including 
where the third party offers pricing based upon assumed implicit support.  On the 
other hand, Article 1(4) of the US Model “relieves the residence state from its 
obligations to comply with the arm’s length principle when it makes primary 
adjustments”754.  The US Government is working on a revision to the Model and 
plans to release a final revised version in early 2016755, but changes to Article 9 
are not proposed756.   
3.234 In summary, while the US has undoubtedly led the world for several 
decades regarding the development of transfer pricing law and practice, and while 
transfer pricing litigation has been prolific, there remains a curious dearth of 
legislative or indeed tax authority guidance on the recognition of passive 
association in pricing controlled transactions, despite promises (still unfulfilled 
after some years) of clarification of the treatment of guarantees.  The Services 
Regulations at least provide a firm basis for accepting group affiliation as a 
comparability factor, and senior government officials appear to have endorsed that 
approach at least informally.   
Conclusions 
3.235 Here is a high level tabular summary of the degree of recognition of 
passive association in pricing controlled transactions under the laws and tax 
authority practices of the countries surveyed.  
 
754
  Vögel (2015) page 598.  
755
  TMTPR 18 December 2015.  
756
  The proposed changes, released on 20 May 2015, are available at 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/international.aspx (accessed 5 
August 2015).  
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Fig. VIII 
   Canada    
Firmly established via the General 
Electric case in the Federal Court of 
Appeal. 
   Australia    
Apparently established in legislation 
and expressly acknowledged in ATO 
guidance.  The Chevron case now 
provides conceptual endorsement.  
   India    
No clear position developed, despite 
prolific case law, but TPG and 
General Electric cited regularly.  
   New Zealand    
Inland Revenue recognition that 
group membership may affect 
pricing.  
   United Kingdom    
Legislation expressly rejects taking 
into account “expectations” of 
support; otherwise, limited HMRC 
recognition of passive association 
concept (but not so as to affect 
borrowing capacity). Thin Cap case 
presents a negative view of 
recognition of passive association.  
   United States    
Group membership recognised in 
section 482 regulations as a 
comparability factor.  Otherwise, no 
legislative or case law engagement 
with the issue.  
 
3.236 A range of approaches – in other words, some degree of inconsistency, 
can be observed.  But strong recognition, in case law and/or in tax authority 
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practice, of the pricing effect of passive association is established in Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand; limited acceptance of the principle can be seen in the 
UK; there is the potential for acceptance in India; and a clear signpost is present in 
the US transfer pricing regulations.   
3.237 It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the approaches taken in 
countries other than those mentioned above.  But it is apparent that other countries 
too have moved in the direction of recognising passive association.  One striking 
case is The Netherlands, where modern governmental practice757 expressly 
recognises implicit support in the financing context and approves guarantee 
pricing by reference to a “derivative rating” i.e. one derived by reference to 
perceived group support (resonating with General Electric).   In Norway, the 
Bayerngas Norge AS case provides authority for recognition758.  Singapore’s 4 
January 2016 Transfer Pricing Guidelines note that “IRAS may accept a credit 
rating of the borrower based on the overall group credit rating if it can be 
substantiated that an independent lender will similarly accept such group credit 
rating”759.  Malaysian legislation prescribes that “any charge made by a person in 
a controlled transaction in respect of the intra-group services shall be disregarded 
if it involves … services that provide incidental benefits or passive association 
benefits”760.  In France, recent case law761 indicates that the fact that a borrower 
belongs to a group of companies can be taken into consideration if this affects its 
borrowing capacity.  Interestingly, a different but somewhat analogous approach 
has evolved in Germany762 and Sweden763.  This at first sight appears to be at odds 
with the arm’s length principle because it adjusts pricing to take account of control 
 
757
  Decree of 14 November 2013 no. IFZ 2013/184M, section 10.  
758
  Utv. 2012 s 1411, Oslo District Court.    
759
  Paragraph 13.24, page 82.  
760
  Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules 2012, P.U.(A) 132 rule 9(2).  
761
  Sté Stryker Spine, Bordeaux Court of Administrative Appeals, 2 September 2014, 
#12BX01182.  
762
  E.g. BFH decision 17 December 2014 I R 23/13.   
763
  Diligentia AB, Supreme Administrative Court, 28 June 2010, Case 2483-2485-09.  
Contrast the Cambrex case, Administrative Court of Appeal (Gothenburg), Case 2481-2485-03 
(2005) where the court applied a stand-alone assessment of creditworthiness in the case of a loan 
to the Swedish taxpayer from its foreign sister company (cited by Wittendorff (2010a) page 509).  
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(rather than eliminating the effects of control on pricing).  In that sense, regarding 
a parent company’s loan to a controlled subsidiary as effectively secured on the 
subsidiary’s assets – because the parent can, by the exercise of control, gain access 
to those assets and more generally inhibit default – seems itself to be an 
adjustment to pricing attributable to the ability to exercise control. The approach 
seems to represent a leap beyond the recognition of passive association as a 
comparability factor.  I expect that further comparative research to analyse and test 
the logic of this aspect of these and other legal systems will be rewarding.    
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4.   CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ADDRESSING THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF PASSIVE ASSOCIATION IN TRANSFER PRICING 
 “One man’s arm’s length principle is not necessarily another man’s arm’s length 
principle.”764 
 
Introduction 
4.1 This chapter surveys the academic and professional literature which 
discusses, or touches upon, the recognition of passive association or implicit 
support in the pricing of controlled transactions.  The Canadian General Electric 
case in 2009 was the catalyst for significant debate, so most of the literature 
engaging directly with my topic post-dates that decision.  However, because 
passive association is itself merely one facet of the arm’s length principle, I have 
selected various (pre- and post-2009) items which discuss that principle more 
generally to bring out some key themes which inform the analysis.   
4.2 I start with a high level summary of the arguments emerging from the 
literature respectively for and against the recognition of passive association.  
Although this thesis represents a legal study, I have mentioned below certain 
policy arguments advanced by commentators.  To the extent these amount to pleas 
for change, they are not of course instructive as to what the law currently means; 
to the contrary, they may imply that the law does not currently fit with the policy 
that is promoted. They are interesting though for that latter reason, and indeed 
intrinsically.   
4.3 Proponents of the recognition of passive association consider it to be 
entirely consistent with the separate entity approach; if an entity in fact benefits 
from passive association, that is an attribute of that entity.  In other words, all 
economically relevant characteristics of the parties (including the effects of 
passive association) must be taken into account.  In a comparability analysis, the 
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  Joseph Andrus, head of the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Unit, speaking at a Bloomberg 
BNA conference in Paris on 1 April 2014: 22 TMTPR 1447.   
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correct comparator is a hypothetical buyer (or borrower) with all the 
characteristics (including the effects of passive association) of the actual buyer, 
dealing with a hypothetical seller (or guarantor/lender) with all the characteristics 
of the actual seller.  It is therefore inappropriate to eliminate the passive 
association attribute from the analysis.   
4.4 Moreover, the appropriate way to recast the pricing of a transaction to 
arrive at an arm’s length outcome is to eliminate pricing distortions caused by the 
exercise of influence or power, but not to disregard all features of affiliation.  
Passive association is a matter of fact.  The parties to a controlled transaction do 
not distort pricing because of or by reference to passive association; it is not a 
price-distorting aspect of the control relationship.  
4.5 The OECD TPG are regarded as strongly supportive of the recognition 
of passive association.  Paragraph 7.13 TPG implies that passive association 
should be taken into account in pricing controlled transactions. The important 
concepts of relative bargaining power, and “options realistically available”, in 
arriving at an arm’s length price are themselves powerful indicators that a 
subsidiary which can borrow on certain terms from a third party will not pay more 
to its parent.  If an internal comparable exists, this presents evidence of the arm’s 
length price; it follows logically that a hypothetical comparable should be 
constructed on the same basis.   
4.6 On the other hand, the instinct of those opposed to the recognition of 
passive association is that the separate entity approach inherently requires passive 
association to be disregarded.  In principle, comparability adjustments should be 
applied to the uncontrolled reference transaction, not the controlled transaction.  
Therefore, an arm’s length lender’s recognition of passive association should be 
“reversed out” of the pricing of an uncontrolled transaction to arrive at a proper 
CUP.   The requirement to take into account, in a comparability analysis, the risks 
assumed by the parties means that a parent-to-subsidiary loan cannot be 
analogised with a transaction between independent parties.  Where a parent 
company is lender/guarantor, its status as creditor displaces the relevance of 
implicit support because it is oxymoronic to propose that it should deserve less 
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interest or fee by asuming that it would support the credit of the obligor subsidiary 
(“lender as guarantor paradox”). Recognising passive association is seen as 
inconsistent with the requirement to focus on the legal rights of the parties and the 
recognition of the actual transaction undertaken.  
4.7 Then various economic objections are raised: (1) recognising passive 
association so as to suppress financing costs produces a windfall benefit or a “free 
ride” for a borrower; (2) recognition of passive association is “directionally 
inappropriate”: where a subsidiary relies on passive association, an “asset” of the 
parent (its credit rating) is eroded, but so would be its remuneration; (3) ratings 
agency methodology represents a flawed basis for the application of transfer 
pricing rules e.g. because of the use of a “deemed consolidation” approach.  
4.8 The disagreement described above about the impact of the separate 
entity approach goes to the heart of this study.  However, it seems clear to me that 
one can respect the separateness of the actual parties to a controlled transaction 
and indeed do so rigorously by imputing all their qualities into a comparable 
transaction.  
4.9 As regards the proper conclusions to be drawn from paragraph 7.13 
TPG765, what is evident is that (i) benefits arising from mere affiliation are 
expressly recognised as an empirical matter, but (ii) are not to be remunerated.  I 
see nothing there to require that passive association be disregarded; instead its 
recognition by OECD as a factual state of affairs plays naturally into a 
comparability analysis.  The alleged inconsistency between recognising passive 
association and respecting the actual legal rights of the parties under the 
transaction undertaken is to my mind a flawed “apples versus pears” argument – 
because passive association is inherently not part of the legal construct; rather, it is 
a “background” circumstance or characteristic of one or more of the parties.   
4.10 Unless regarded as an economics-based policy proposal, it seems 
misplaced to regard a parent company’s creditworthiness as an “asset” which is 
“eroded” by a subsidiary’s “use” in borrowing for its own account. First, there is 
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not, in any legal sense, an asset of this nature; it is an attribute or characteristic of 
the parent, not something it can “own” in a proprietary sense.  Secondly, it seems 
at least dubious to assert that the attribute is dissipated when a subsidiary enjoys a 
funding advantage (and thus perhaps a business enhancing opportunity for the 
MNE group) attributable to its passive association with the parent.  One could 
conduct a separate research project into the effect on parental credit ratings of 
incremental subsidiary borrowings.  But the proponents of this argument in the 
legal literature do not cite any such evidence.  And reference to consolidated 
ratings is misguided in the transfer pricing context where the touchstone is the 
separateness of the transaction parties. 
4.11 Arguments which amount to policy proposals (including arguments 
favoured by enthusiasts for abandonment of the arm’s length principle) are 
mentioned in this chapter because they are often intertwined with more legalistic 
arguments.  Hence for example the proposal that “synergy rents” be taxed in the 
country from which they “emanate”.  But like it or not, that is not what the arm’s 
length principle prescribes.  And a policy proposition which favours aligning the 
treatment of inter-company transactions with “dealings” between a permanent 
establishment and its head office is detached from legal and commercial reality.  
4.12 The potential “free ride” enjoyed by a subsidiary benefiting from 
passive association provokes objections from traditionalists.  But surely this is 
precisely what paragraph 7.13 TPG prescribes?  If one focuses on the required 
process in undertaking a comparability analysis, with the central objective of 
identifying internal or external CUPs in transactions involving independent 
parties, adjusting for transactional differences, but also having regard to the 
circumstances of the parties, it seems entirely right that a subsidiary’s ability to 
enjoy benefits from passive association should go into the mix.  
4.13 The proposition that implicit support, where present, must be “reversed 
out” of the comparator transaction to align it with the actual transaction (where, it 
is said, no implicit support can exist) presents what I term the “lender as guarantor 
paradox”.  This is the apparent conceptual peculiarity in asserting that a parent 
company which might otherwise generally be expected to support its subsidiary 
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will do so in relation to a loan made by itself to that subsidiary, such that the 
interest rate on the intra-group loan should be reduced on account of that support.  
However, even aside from the case where implicit support might be found within a 
group but other than between the affiliated parties to a controlled transaction (e.g. 
potentially the sister-to-sister lending situation with assumed parental support766), 
the “reverse out” principle would surely lead to absurdity when tested against an 
actual internal comparable: it would be perverse to ratchet up the internal CUP 
from an essentially identical transaction with an independent party to arrive at the 
“arm’s length” price of a controlled transaction.  
4.14 A final introductory comment is that the literature arguing against the 
recognition of passive association does not actively engage with some of the most 
compelling arguments to the contrary.  In particular, little attention is paid to the 
fundamental concept in transfer pricing of parity or neutrality between controlled 
and independent taxpayers, and hence the fundamental objective, pursuant to 
Article 9(1) OECD MTC and its analogues, of eliminating price distortions which 
are caused by the exercise of control.    
Literature discussing fundamental elements of the arm’s length principle with 
relevance to the recognition of passive association 
4.15 There is of course a huge volume of material discussing the nature of 
the arm’s length principle.  It would be naïve and misdirected (and impractical) to 
attempt to summarise it all here.  Nonetheless, certain key themes emerge and are 
worth exploring to the extent relevant to the topic of this study.  
4.16 Rollinson and Frisch (1988), writing in the aftermath of the U.S. “White 
Paper” (paragraph 3.226 above), noted that:  
“[a] market based approach is presently adopted by the income tax regulations for the 
purpose of allocating income under section 482 [citing Regs. §1.482].  The goal of this 
approach is to attribute income in the same way that the market would distribute the 
income.  That is, related parties are to earn the same return that unrelated parties would 
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earn under similar circumstances. This approach, often referred to as the arm’s length 
standard, is implemented through separate accounting.”767   
They extol the objective of market neutrality i.e. avoiding tax rules which distort 
commercial behaviour.  “Rules which distort a firm’s activities would not meet the 
goal of clearly reflecting income and would cause needless economic 
inefficiencies in the marketplace.”768  This is consistent with the proposition that if 
(say) a subsidiary company can borrow from a third party lender at x%, it should 
not be compelled or indeed permitted by transfer pricing rules to borrow (or be 
treated for tax purposes as borrowing) from its parent company at >x%.  A critical 
objective of transfer pricing is to avoid discrimination between controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions.  This is a central tenet of the TPG e.g. through the 
“parity of treatment” proposition in paragraph 1.8 (paragraph 2.22 above).  Thus 
there should be no discrimination between cases where the subsidiary borrows 
either from a third party or from its parent.  “Use of the arm’s length standard does 
not distort the decision to use affiliates versus unrelated parties.”769 As Rollinson 
and Frisch put the policy point: 
“Recall the fundamental objective of tax policy in the area of transfer pricing. In general,  
tax rules should distort business decisions as little as possible because rules that minimize 
such distortions will lead to the greatest possible production efficiency.  Transfer pricing 
rules will allow the most efficient production technology to come to the fore if, holding the 
cost functions constant, they result in the same tax burdens whether or not the parties are 
related. … If this goal can be met, transfer pricing policy will refrain from distorting the 
optimal mix of unrelated-party versus within-multinational transactions in the market.”770 
4.17 One might recall here the closely-related policy concern to avoid 
commerce-inhibiting double taxation. This in turn leads to the need for consistent 
treatment between states taxing cross-border transactions.  If national tax laws are 
mismatched regarding the recognition of passive association, this will tend to 
result in double taxation (or non-taxation).  Double tax may discourage an MNE 
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  Ibid.  
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  Ibid., page 12.  
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  Ibid., page 5.  
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group from entering into an intra-group transaction and, in a distortive way, tend 
to induce recourse to third parties, quite possibly in a way that is economically 
inefficient for the group. 
4.18 Maisto (1992)771 cites Black’s Law Dictionary as defining an “arm’s 
length transaction” as a “transaction negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting in 
his or her own self-interest” or “the basis for a fair market value determination” or 
“a transaction in good faith in the ordinary course of business by parties with 
independent interests”.  Maisto also lists six basic elements of the concept, derived 
from the OECD 1979 Report: (i) “transactional” (pricing by reference to a 
transaction, given “the price” terminology in the TPG); (ii) comparison/similarity, 
in view of the need for comparability with another actual or hypothetical 
transaction with similar characteristics; (iii) respect for the legal effects of the 
transaction; (iv) the open market feature i.e. pricing based on market conditions, 
reflecting ordinary business practices and by reference to available data; (v) 
subjective features – taking into account the particular circumstances which 
characterize the transaction; and (vi) functional analysis.  It seems to me that one 
can take account of all of these factors in a way which respects market forces, and 
at the same time strives for a rigorous approach to comparability, especially 
having regard to “subjective” (in essence, personalized) characteristics of the 
parties, so as to bring into account the effects of passive association.  
4.19 Hamaekers (2002) considers that “the essence of the arm’s length 
principle is not comparability of prices and results, but dealing with each other as 
would independent enterprises”772.  Thus the emphasis is on particular 
transactions.  Hamaekers is a proponent of what he terms the “negotiated price 
method” i.e. related parties bargaining with each other as independent parties 
would do773.  This prompts reflection on the case of a sister-to-sister company 
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  Page 28.  
772
  Cited approvingly by Biegalski (2010) page 186.  But Vögel (2015) considers that 
advocacy for this approach “seems to be disappearing” (page 652).  
773
  Paragraph 1.5 TPG states that “it may occur that the relationship between associated 
enterprises may influence the outcome of the bargaining.  Therefore, evidence of hard bargaining 
alone is not sufficient to establish that the transactions are at arm’s length.”  Note also the need to 
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loan, where – let us assume - it is evidenced that the companies’ common parent is 
likely to support the borrower.  To make that likelihood more obvious, consider a 
case, as in Fig. IX, where the lender company, S1, is a joint venture vehicle 51% 
owned by the parent company, P, and 49% by a third party, TP, whereas the 
borrower company, S2, is a wholly-owned strategically important subsidiary of P.  
The joint venture relationship may itself act as a driver of genuine arm’s length 
style negotiation.  Take for example the observation of the Canadian Federal 
Court of Appeal in Petro-Canada v The Queen, referring to the Supreme Court’s 
judgment in Swiss Bank v Minister of National Revenue:  
“[I]n any normal commercial transaction between the corporation and one of the 
shareholders, the other shareholder would ensure that the corporation would be able to 
assert its own interest and would do so.  To paraphrase Swiss Bank, there would be some 
assurance that the terms of any such transaction would reflect ordinary commercial 
dealing between parties acting in their separate interests”.774 
 
 
 
 
 
 
be wary of a “negotiating function clipped by the will of the parent”: Commissioner v SNF 
(Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 74 at paragraph [1]i.  
774
  Petro-Canada: [2004] 3 CTC 156 paragraph [59]; Swiss Bank: [1974] SCR 1144, 
1152.  Paragraph 3.26 TPG recognises the potential (though not necessarily determinative) 
impact of minority shareholders in assessing comparability, and the finding in R T French v 
Commissioner 60 TC 836, 851 supports this theory: “the opportunity may have existed for 
petitioner’s [parents], which also jointly owned [an indirect 51% holding] of MPP’s stock, to 
cause petitioner to agree to an arrangement that unfairly favoured MPP, but it seems unlikely that 
petitioner’s parent companies would have done so, because they would thus have been diverting 
funds from a corporation (petitioner) in which they were the sole stockholders to another 
corporation (MPP) in which a stranger (Chivers) owned 49% of the stock.  The position of 
Chivers in the scheme of things in all likelihood assured the arm’s length character of the 
transaction”.   The UN in its Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing at 3.3.3 and note 35 observes 
that “an equal-footing arrangement is generally not understood to pose a high risk of income 
shifting, although there could still be some room for non-arm’s length pricing.” 
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Fig. IX 
 
 
4.20 Although fact-dependent, it does not seem outlandish in such a case to 
expect that S2’s passive association with P should influence S1’s view of S2’s 
credit-standing and thus the price of the loan.  
4.21 Hamaekers (1992) also identifies in early twentieth century US and UK 
transfer pricing laws the neutrality principle, which he considers to underpin the 
arm’s length principle.  Echoing the policy propounded by Rollinson and Frisch 
(paragraph 4.16 above), and the “parity” objective, the neutrality principle 
attempts to avoid influencing taxpayer commercial decisions and aligns the tax 
treatment of related party transactions with that of transactions between 
independent persons.   
4.22 Transfer pricing rules seek to prevent the manipulation of prices via the 
exercise of control.  Wilkie (2012)775 refers to the TPG as “guiding the elimination 
of profit distortions attributable to terms of dealing imposed through actions made 
possible by association – the assertion of organizational power … The inquiry is 
about whether the opportunity and power to dictate terms and conditions of 
dealing, itself, is accountable for profit distortions”.  This strongly suggests that in 
a comparability study, any actual internal comparable, or failing that a 
conscientious assessment of what would have occurred between a controlled 
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company and an independent third party, provides the best benchmark for the 
actual controlled transaction under scrutiny. Hamaekers further observes776 that 
“an external CUP which is widely known in the relevant economic sector 
concerned would have a high degree of authority for the parties so it would be 
difficult to justify any deviation.  The bottom line is that a sound business 
manager777 would not buy from a related party at a particular price if the open 
market price was lower.”  Again, this perspective is strongly supportive of the 
view that (in the a fortiori internal CUP case), if a subsidiary could actually 
borrow from a third party on certain terms at a certain rate (reflecting the lender’s 
beneficial recognition of the borrower’s passive affiliation with its group), then the 
arm’s length price for an equivalent related party loan should be equal to that of 
the comparable external debt. 
4.23 Schön (2009-10) quotes paragraph 1.8 TPG’s ambition of putting 
“associated and independent enterprises on a more equal footing for tax purposes 
[and thus] avoids the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages that would 
otherwise distort the relative competitive positions of either type of entity”.  This 
is analysed778 as “a legal statement, putting fair and equal treatment of foreign and 
domestic taxpayers into the centre of the argument” and one which –  
“has three major economic ramifications: on the one hand, the local market in a country 
shall not be distorted by the fact that one of several competing economic agents is 
connected to an outside firm; on the other hand, the decision by a multinational 
enterprise whether to internalize certain supplies and services within the firm or to hire 
an independent contractor shall not be distorted by a tax wedge.  The classical ‘make or 
buy’ option for a firm shall be decided on its business merits without having regard to tax 
considerations.  Last but not least, the territorial choice between domestic and foreign 
production within the firm shall remain as undistorted as possible.” 
4.24 Schön also notes that between independent enterprises “transaction 
prices truly allocate income” and “the full recognition of the contractual 
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  Page 603. 
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  See further paragraph 4.284.27.  
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  Part III, World Tax Journal, October 2010, page 232.  
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obligations, their execution and the arising profit should be maintained”.  This 
prompts the question “[d]oes ‘common control’ change the picture?”  
4.25 Several major consequences of the “mere existence” of a controlling 
shareholding are identified: power to appoint the board of a subsidiary thereby 
influencing policy; the ability to extract proprietary information; control over 
profit distributions; the receipt of dividends, this removing normal arm’s length 
conflicts of interests; the risk of a subsidiary’s business failure.  Thus common 
control phenomena “justify traditional transfer pricing rules, which are meant to 
prevent abusive or otherwise misleading contractual terms between the involved 
group companies”.779   
4.26 Pichhadze (2013)780 cites paragraph 6 of the preface to the TPG and 
Bullen (2011) to note that “the effect of special conditions on the levels of profits 
[of parties to a controlled transaction] should be eliminated” so as to construct “a 
hypothetical controlled transaction which is imputed with the ‘conditions’ of the 
controlled transaction, except for those non-arm’s length special conditions”.  
“Structural conditions” are imputed to the hypothetical transaction e.g. “attributes 
of the transaction or enterprises”, “the economically relevant characteristics of the 
situation” and “comparability factors”.  Pichhadze does not in terms engage with 
the treatment of passive association, but the imputation of “structural conditions”, 
which include the attributes of the parties, to the hypothetical transaction is 
consistent with the view that passive association should be taken into account.  
4.27 Bloom and Vincent (2012), in discussing section 247(2) of the 
Canadian Income Tax Act (see paragraph 3.10ff) pose the case of a foreign parent 
(FP) hiring its Canadian subsidiary (Cansub) to perform engineering work.  FP 
agrees in the contract that it will not seek indemnification from Cansub in any 
circumstances for losses caused by Cansub’s work (presumably as a pretext for 
reduced remuneration for Cansub).  All Cansub’s third party contracts provide for 
indemnification.  It is suggested that the waiver of indemnification should 
probably be disregarded in pricing the services because it arises solely by reason 
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of FP’s ability to exercise control over Cansub; or control may serve as a proxy 
for an indemnity.  This is seen as a “minor deviation” from the ceteris paribus 
approach (paragraph 3.14 above) “in order to prevent terms and conditions that 
spring exclusively from one party’s control over another party (or the control 
exercised over both parties by another party) from biasing, or – according to the 
Federal Court of Appeal in General Electric781 – distorting, the price that 
otherwise would have prevailed if the parties had been dealing at arm’s length 
with each other”782.  Thus again the emphasis is on distortions caused by control.  
4.28 Becker (1987) promotes the theory that the arm’s length price has to be 
determined taking into account the discretion of the “reasonable businessman”.  
The concept is traced back to Roman days but is alive and well in a number of 
common and civil law jurisdictions.  With maybe only a bit of a leap, Becker 
concludes that “[b]ecause the concept of the ‘reasonable businessman’ is an 
integral part of the legal systems herein considered, it can also be applied in the 
intercompany pricing area as an international standard of comparison to determine 
an arm’s length price.  Therefore, the ‘reasonable businessman’ is a mandatory 
and fundamental part of the arm’s length principle.”783  This discussion resonates 
somewhat with the discussion of the “business judgment” rule in General Electric 
(paragraph 3.23 above) and also with the ATO’s view of the arm’s length 
principle, at least as it was applied under the old Division 13 Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (paragraph 3.68 above, and Taxation Rulings TR 94/14 
paragraph 166 and TR 97/20 paragraphs 1.1/2.5).  If this rather vague concept has 
anything to say about passive association, I suggest it militates in favour of 
recognising passive association as part of factual and commercial reality.  
4.29 The role of “synergy rents” or “economies of integration” is an 
important aspect of the critical debate concerning the effectiveness of the arm’s 
length principle.  The TPG get off to an unpromising start on this subject, noting 
simply that the principle is in some cases “difficult to apply” e.g. to MNE groups 
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dealing in the integrated production of highly specialised goods; and there are “no 
widely accepted objective criteria for allocating economies of scale or benefits of 
integration between associated enterprises”784.   But the new material in Chapter I 
on MNE group synergies takes an important step forward (paragraph 2.80ff 
above), particularly given the confirmation that (passive) “synergistic benefits of 
group membership need not be separately compensated or specifically allocated 
among members of the MNE group”785. 
4.30 According to Li (2012) –  
“[t]he term ‘synergy rents’ is used to describe the economic value derived by MNEs from 
the synergy effects that are unique to MNEs.  Theories of MNEs emphasise that MNEs 
arise in part due to organizational and internalization advantages relative to purely 
domestic firms. Typically, synergy effects can be achieved only by related parties.  MNEs 
make greater profit by directing the allocation of productive resources instead of leaving 
resource allocation decisions to the market, thereby benefiting from the economy of scale, 
savings on transaction costs, and exploitation of assets which because of their special 
characteristics cannot be fully exploited in the market.”786   
To twist a cliché, the sum of the parts of an MNE group, applying arm’s length 
pricing to individual transactions, is less than the whole.  Of course, the actual 
whole (of the group’s profits) is actually earned, and actually divided between the 
group members; but the location of the incremental share of value can be 
manipulated.  This problem does not however seem to me to be an acute one when 
it comes to the recognition of passive association, particularly in the financing 
context.  Implicit support for a borrower might be regarded as a species of group 
“synergy”787.  However, CUPs are often available for loans, and financing cases 
are not typically associated with the continuum price problem, which is more a 
result of failure to recognise the value of intangibles.  See further Avi-Yonah 
(2009), paragraph 4.46 below.  Moreover, “[a]t least outside the financial sector, 
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  TPG paragraphs 1.9–1.10.  
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  TPG paragraph 1.158.    
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  Page 82.  
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  Indeed it appears under the “synergies” heading in the new material in Chapter I TPG:  
paragraph 2.80 above.  
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debt finance does not increase in value as it passes through a firm’s internal supply 
chain; it is a cost centre rather than a source of economic rents”788.  
4.31 Kane (2014) proposes an interpretation of Article 9(1) MTC which does 
not require the allocation of total profits attributable to group synergies, and 
therefore rejects the notion of a “synergy intangible”.  His focus is on 
remuneration attributable to separately transferable assets and services; the OECD 
has now (paragraph 4.28 above) confirmed that group synergies should not be 
regarded for transfer pricing purposes as intangibles.  Kane’s proposal that 
synergistic profits cannot be taxed by the application of Article 9(1) and the arm’s 
length principle is offered as a legal argument: “[i]f the suggested interpretation is 
superior as a legal matter but one dislikes the outcome from a policy standpoint, 
then one must acknowledge that getting rid of the discretionary aspect [i.e. the 
discretion  of MNE groups to allocate synergy profits unconstrained by traditional 
transfer pricing rules] would seem to implicate a very cumbersome and extensive 
modification of the existing treaty network”789.  Kane’s view is somewhat 
vindicated by the BEPS 2015 Final Reports, paragraph 2.80 above.  
4.32 Wittendorff (2010a) identifies790 several instances of the implied or 
express recognition of economies of integration in the TPG, namely in relation to 
cost contribution arrangements (paragraph 8.8), the services rules (paragraphs 
7.12-7.13 TPG) and application of the transactional profit split method (now TPG 
paragraph 2.113).  See also Chapter IX on business restructurings driven by 
economies of scale and other synergies (paragraphs 9.57-58) and the discussion of 
a central purchasing function (paragraphs 9.154-160), including the specific 
mention in paragraph 9.158 of savings generated by the “activity” of the central 
purchasing entity: compare the inert buying vehicle in the Canadian Indalex case 
(note 50 above) and the OECD’s reference to “deliberate concerted action” 
(paragraph 2.81ff above).  Yet none of this TPG material demands the 
remuneration of passive association, the benefit of which rests where it falls.   
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4.33 In any event, the passive association phenomenon is something rather 
different from conventional notions of economies of integration.  Some MNE 
economies rely on cutting out the middle-man, or aggregating positive attributes 
(e.g. purchasing power), whereas the paradigm case of passive association 
involving the provision of finance points to, or hypothesises, a comparable 
transaction with a third party lender.  “Economies of integration”  is generally a 
concept related to group-wide efficiencies or savings vis-à-vis the outside world.  
It would not generally be thought of as being in play in the case of an intra-group 
loan791 or simply because a parent company guarantees a subsidiary’s debt; still 
less so, then, when support for an external borrowing is implicit.  
Argumentation in the literature to recognise passive association in pricing 
controlled transactions 
4.34 Horst (2011) provides a useful summary of credit rating methodology, 
but mostly concerns himself with an approving review of the General Electric 
case792.  He uses the concept of an “incremental benefit principle” to describe how 
the court addressed pricing of the related party guarantee by reference to the 
incremental benefit enjoyed by the subsidiary (which he predicts “will likely be 
widely cited in future transfer pricing cases in Canada and other countries”793).  
He suggests that economic and policy considerations should equalise the 
creditworthiness treatment for subsidiaries and branches, and also that a credit 
rating should be viewed as an intangible asset jointly owned by all affiliates in an 
MNE group not as the property of the parent company.  But he acknowledges that 
these suggestions are policy proposals not reflected in current tax law.  Mention is 
made of a parent’s right to disclaim explicit guarantees – “a by-product of its legal 
ownership and control (direct or indirect) of the stocks of its subsidiary 
companies” (Horst (2011) page 601).  This is a little odd: if “explicit” means 
contractually binding, it is not obvious how a guarantee can be disclaimed.  
Anyway, a parent could even more so disclaim implicit support.  On the other 
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hand, refraining from doing so – i.e. just acquiescing to a particular state of affairs 
- is not a service or other activity which demands remuneration794.  Wittendorff 
(2010a)795 discusses how omissions may fall within the scope of Article 9(1), 
particularly in the sense of “refraining from acting”.  Various examples are given 
which are concerned with failures to exercise rights e.g. failure to call for 
repayment of a fixed rate demand loan where interest rates rise: that is regarded as 
susceptible to adjustment.  It seems too much though to say that refraining from 
disclaiming support for a subsidiary – essentially doing nothing in circumstances 
where no pre-existing rights are in play - is a condition made or imposed in Article 
9(1) terms.    
4.35 Tremblay (2011) considers that “the arm’s length test should consider 
the relative bargaining powers of the parties, economies of integration, synergetic 
resources, business relationships, and the actual business experience of the parties.  
This means that there must be a subjective, entity-specific valuation made ex 
ante”796.  And the “TPG independent enterprise hypothesis … appears to require 
that we hypothesize parties with no management, control or capital relationship – 
but presumably all other characteristics remain”797. 
4.36 Hollas and Hands (2014)798 consider that lenders may have regard to 
both (i) an expectation of group financial support to a subsidiary in times of 
financial distress, and (ii) an assumption that a borrower would have access to 
management depth and operational capabilities of the group as a whole.  They 
rightly identify the distinction between passive association and active promotion, 
but then focus upon the potential for “active promotion by the treasury or finance 
function regarding the credit rating of the parent, which then benefits the 
subsidiary” – not, they say, to be considered a benefit to the subsidiary of passive 
 
794
  See paragraph 1.7 above.  
795
  Paragraph 3.3.6.3.4.  
796
  “Is FMV really different from ALPrice?” section.  
797
  “The ITA 247/ALP paradigm” section.  Perhaps there is a contradiction here if 
Tremblay advocates disregarding the group relationships?  
798
  Attracting some judicial approval in the Chevron case at paragraph 606 (paragraph 
3.82 above).  
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association799.  Surely however the distinction to be drawn is between a 
(compensable) activity which the parent performs in a way designed to benefit its 
subsidiary, and a (non-compensable) activity by the parent of self-promotion or an 
activity undertaken qua shareholder. 
4.37 Interestingly, Hollas and Hands compare and contrast the separate entity 
approach promoted by the TPG800 with the notion of “stand-alone” 
creditworthiness.  They express the separate entity principle as requiring one to 
view “the financial transaction as occurring between an entity that is a subsidiary 
of a hypothetically separate multinational group and an entity that is the parent of 
a hypothetically separate multinational group. In this view, the implicit parental 
support is coming from the hypothetically separate parent of the subsidiary, which 
is, for analysis purposes, different from the actual parent (or related-party lender);” 
it follows that “the stand-alone concept is not consistent with either the arm’s 
length principle or the separate entity approach. Therefore, implicit parental 
support must be considered to be consistent with the separate entity concept and 
the arm’s length principle.”801   Thus a fully “stand-alone” approach, i.e. one 
which deliberately excises the effects of passive association, is at odds with 
factual reality and thus the relevant economic circumstances of the parties – which 
the TPG require to be taken into account.  In my view Hollas and Hands 
accurately frame the hypothetical comparator.  
4.38 The alleged inability of the arm’s length principle to cope with the 
economics of the MNE group (see e.g. Schön (2011)) prompts consideration of 
whether the recognition of passive association is an aspect of that problem.  The 
MNE group economics phenomenon was described vividly by Moses (2001) 
quoting Irving Plotkin: if two unrelated parties that together manufacture a 
product merge, “two amazing things happen”: the price of the final product 
decreases and the profit of both companies increases; and “there is no logical way 
 
799
  Connection between passive association and implicit support section.  One can draw 
an analogy with the incidental benefits Examples (7 and 8) in the draft UN Services chapter; 
paragraph 2.91 above.   
800
  TPG preface, paragraph 6. 
801
  Stand-alone versus separate entities section.  
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to ascribe the increase in profit to A or B.  It emanates from the fact that they are 
now one company”802.  Sometimes though the difficulty of the problem is, in my 
view, over-stated, perhaps due to an economics-led tendency to view the MNE 
firm as a whole as a single unit.  When one focuses on the separate legal entities in 
a MNE group (as tax systems require), and comparability adjustments are brought 
to bear, many difficulties fall away.  For Lebowitz (2000)803, credit risks are 
described as presenting an illustration of the issue: “[w]here a sale to an unrelated 
party entails bearing some risk of non-payment by the purchaser or incurring a 
cost to eliminate that risk, a sale within a single enterprise does not because the 
buyer and the seller are the same economic entity”.  This is by its terms an 
economic viewpoint.  While it is of course true that sometimes MNE groups will 
not concern themselves with intra-group credit risk, that is simply to rehearse the 
task that transfer pricing presents i.e. (as Lebowitz himself puts it) “to construct 
hypothetical unrelated parties that together replicate the economic results of the 
single enterprise but that nevertheless remain unrelated”.  One cannot disregard 
intra-group credit risk and keep faith with the arm’s length principle. 
4.39 Another exposition of the “group dynamics” problem was offered by 
Francescucci (2004).  His starting point was that the arm’s length principle “is in 
many cases unable to account for integrated MNEs’ network profit (i.e. the profit 
attributable to the existence of an MNE) usually represented by the economies of 
scale and other synergies realized”, known as the “continuum price problem”804.  
His proposal was for “a cascading consideration of group dynamics in the 
application of the ALP … i.e. a spectrum of solutions for the conceptual 
shortcomings of the ALP”, comprising a “group dynamics adjustment so as to 
consider all economically relevant characteristics of the controlled transaction 
under review” or, if that is inadequate, the use of a residual profit split method 
(RPSM), and then a “multilateral RPSM” designed to reflect value contributions 
 
802
  9 TMTPR 815.  
803
  9 TMTPR 61. 
804
  The concept is attributed to Stanley Langbein, see e.g. the Bloomberg BNA Special 
Report (2000) and Langbein (1986), see note 8 above.  
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from core members of the MNE group805.  Francescucci described the crucial 
question as “where [the] additional profit (i.e. the MNE efficiency premium) is 
taxed” (compare Kane (2014), paragraph 4.31 above).  However, the problem is 
regarded as one which arises typically as a result of the use of “one-sided” transfer 
pricing methodologies (e.g. the cost plus method and the residual profit method).  
For such methods, having regard to the choice of tested party, identified as the 
least complex party to the controlled transaction that does not own valuable or 
unique intangibles, the result tends to be that the “MNE efficiency premium” is 
taxed in a jurisdiction other than that of the tested party806.  That is regarded as an 
insufficiently precise outcome, and thus two-sided methods (i.e. the CUP and 
profit split methods) are to be preferred.  Francescucci acknowledges that the CUP 
method, as a two-sided transfer pricing approach (based on a negotiated bargain 
between independent parties) that does not require an analysis of the performance 
of a tested party, should not give rise to the continuum price problem.  A profit 
split approach is proposed for cases where adequate CUPs are not available807. 
4.40 It is often said that reliable CUPs are not available in analysing related 
party transactions within highly integrated MNE groups808.  In lending cases, 
however, the working assumption is that CUPs are commonly available.  
According to Avi-Yonah, “[t]he basic problem arises in situations where there are 
no good comparables.  If good comparables exist, the traditional methods (CUP, 
cost plus and resale price) can be used, and that would end the story.”809  Although 
passive association in some senses resembles the type of “synergy” reflected in the 
MNE efficiency premium, the benefit of passive association is not in a legal sense 
derived from an “asset” as such of the parent.  Loan cases do not display an 
 
805
  Francescucci (2004) pages 55-56.  
806
  Ibid., page 72, citing Moses (2001).  
807
  Ibid., pages 73, 240, citing TPG paragraph 3.47’s endorsement of the profit split 
method as a means “to achieve a division of the profits from economies of scale or other joint 
efficiencies that satisfies both the taxpayer and tax administrations”.  
808
  E.g. Avi-Yonah (2009) page 8: “in those markets in which multinational groups 
operate – that is, in those markets in which transfer pricing issues arise – it is unlikely that 
reasonably close ‘uncontrolled comparables’ can be found.  For example, … there are no 
independently owned distributors of mass-market automobiles in the United States; all of the 
distributors are owned by their manufacturers.” 
809
  Avi-Yonah (2009) page 11. 
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“economy of integration”: the fact of affiliation does not reduce the costs to the 
MNE firm as a whole of borrowing externally compared e.g. with the price of a 
loan to the group entity with the highest credit rating.  Consider also the sister-to-
sister loan case (paragraph 4.19 above) where implicit support of the parent for the 
borrower is no part of the transaction as such and so cannot on any basis be 
rewarded via the transaction price (including via transactional profit splits).  
Finally, returning to the black-letter established norms represented by the TPG,  
paragraph 1.10 (see paragraph 2.23 above) observes that there are “no widely 
accepted objective criteria for allocating” economies of scale or benefits of 
integration; and under TPG paragraph 7.13, read with the revised Chapter I 
TPG810, mere affiliation benefit is not to be rewarded.  At the heart of 
Francescucci’s argument is a policy proposal to attribute remuneration to the 
“provider” of the economy of integration, rather than its beneficiary.  That may be 
a valid proposal, but it is not where the law currently stands.   
4.41 Nielsen and Holmes (2010) propose that “there is a fundamental 
conflict between the ‘separate entity’ approach and the realities of market pricing” 
i.e. “maintaining a strict ‘separate entity’ approach does not reflect ‘normal open 
market terms’ and is therefore in conflict with Article 9” MTC811.  They note that 
it is the “idea that a subsidiary may freely benefit from the group credit rating 
which is challenging to conceptually reconcile with a strict ‘stand-alone’ 
approach”812.  They conclude that “if the ‘separate entity’ approach adopted by the 
OECD Guidelines leads to a strict ‘stand-alone’ credit analysis there is a patent 
conflict between the market realities advocated by Article 9 and the possible 
application of the arm’s length principle as set out by the OECD Guidelines”813. 
They appear, therefore, to support the recognition of implicit support (without 
quite saying that); the “patent conflict” is surely resolved by recognising “market 
realities” as a component of the “application of the arm’s length principle” i.e. by 
moving away from a “strict ‘stand-alone’ approach”.  
 
810
  See paragraphs 2.44, 2.80ff above.  
811
  Introduction. 
812
  Implicit credit support section.   
813
  Conclusion.  
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4.42 A summary is presented by Brooks (2013)814: 
“Strident adherents to the vision of the arm’s length principle may view that principle as 
requiring that adjudicators ignore all aspects of the relationship between the related 
parties. A review of the OECD materials on the meaning of arm’s length seems to suggest 
that the arm’s length approach requires the parties to ignore their relationship in setting 
prices.  However, an approach to giving meaning to the arm’s length principle that 
completely neglects the relationship between the parties seems to stretch reality too far.  
The parties in this case [General Electric Capital Canada], as in all transfer pricing cases, 
are related.  It seems more honest to delineate the benefits of that relationship and to 
grapple with them transparently than to force taxpayer and adjudicators to ignore 
altogether the reality of the facts in front of them.” 
Argumentation in the literature to disregard passive association in pricing 
controlled transactions 
4.43 Wittendorff (2011)815 argues that implicit support should be disregarded 
in applying the arm’s length principle to price a controlled transaction.  He writes 
on the differences between arm’s length pricing and fair market value.  The 
distinction is said816 to be between a “subjective” arm’s length price which takes 
into account the economically relevant aspects and context of the transaction and 
its parties, and an “objective” market value typically assessed as if between 
hypothetical knowledgeable and willing market participants, excluding elements 
of entity-specific value817.   
4.44 Having proposed the arm’s length/market value distinction, Wittendorff 
considers the approach in various contexts to the effects of implicit support – 
which he defines as “the fact that the credit rating of a company that is part of a 
group may be higher than it would if it were a stand-alone company, if a bank or 
 
814
  [2010] BTR 132, 139.  
815
  At page 223.  
816
  An alternative view is acknowledged, ibid., footnote 36.  
817
  In 1963, the Australian Taxation Board of Review thought that “the independent arm’s 
length test prescribed … (in the UK tax treaty) … is not materially different from the fair market 
value test”: Case N69 [1962] 13 TBRD (NS) 270; 11 CTBR (NS) 261 Case 53, cited in ATO 
Taxation Ruling TR 94/14 paragraph 165.  
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rating agency believes that associated enterprises would support the company in a 
period of financial stress even in the absence of an explicit guarantee”818.  An 
illustration is provided of interest rates chargeable by (a) Parent to Subsidiary 
(4%); (b) Bank to Subsidiary (i) with implicit support assumed (3%), or (ii) 
without (4.5%); and (c) Bank to IndependentCo “with rating characteristics 
identical to those of the subsidiary” (5%).  The 4% Parent-to-Subsidiary loan is 
said to be an arm’s length rate; but this assumes the answer to the question being 
debated.  Likewise, describing IndependentCo as having characteristics identical 
to Subsidiary begs the critical question of which characteristics (notably passive 
association with Parent) must be taken into account; there is no discussion of 
comparability requiring that IndependentCo is assumed to benefit from a 
comparable measure of passive association. 
4.45 In my view, Wittendorff errs in inferring from economic analysis the 
nature of the relevant transaction.  Thus: “in practice it is often difficult to 
distinguish between the definition and the pricing of services”819. I fundamentally 
disagree.  Transfer pricing must always involve two essential stages: (1) identify 
the nature of the activity (what is “made or imposed”?) (typically a transaction) 
between the associated enterprises – “delineating” the transaction to use modern 
TPG terminology820; (2) determine the arm’s length price to be paid for that 
activity by its beneficiary.  It is straightforward to understand that certain 
manifestations of the “economies of integration” entail intra-group activity which 
must be priced.  Wittendorff gives pooled purchasing power as an example.  This 
often requires organisation and the making or imposition of a particular 
arrangement (“deliberate concerted action”821).  However, passive association 
inherently does not entail any activity.  
4.46 Wittendorff’s argument is based upon the proposition that a subsidiary’s 
“use” of implicit support “may expose a strong parent company to economic 
 
818
  Wittendorff (2011),  page 243.  
819
  Ibid., page 244.   
820
  E.g. paragraph 1.33 TPG. 
821
  Paragraph 1.158 TPG.   
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disadvantages” in three ways822.  The first is that “when a parent company enjoys 
a higher rating than its subsidiaries, a rating consolidation will lead to raising the 
status of the subsidiaries and downgrading the rating of the parent company”.  The 
precise meaning here of “rating consolidation” is unclear.  Generally, credit 
ratings attach to specific legal entities or particular obligations (e.g. bonds) of 
specific legal entities.  It is true that in assessing an issuer credit rating (“ICR”) a 
step in the process may involve consideration of a “group credit profile” (“GCP”).  
However this is not a rating, but rather a component of the ICR of a particular 
group member823.  Thus for example (unless a particular subsidiary has a potential 
ICR higher than the GCP on the basis of extraordinary government support, or the 
subsidiary is classified as an “insulated subsidiary” with an ICR above the GCP) 
the ICR for a “core group entity” equals the GCP, and for a “highly strategic 
subsidiary is one notch lower than the GCP (unless the stand-alone credit profile – 
‘SACP’ – is equal to or higher than the GCP, in which case use the GCP)”824.  
Secondly, it is said that the raising of additional debt finance may result in a 
downgrading of the consolidated rating, yet again the focus on a consolidated 
rating here seems misplaced.  Thirdly, Wittendorff says that a “parent company’s 
high rating may be achieved by reliance on more equity financing, which is 
generally more expensive than debt financing”.  But “more” (equity finance) than 
what? The passive association proposition being tested does not rely upon the 
parent raising any finance, or any particular form of finance, or indeed doing 
anything at all.   
4.47 In my view, Wittendorff constructs what is essentially an economics-
based argument (including through use of consolidation concepts) for a policy 
approach which departs from the meaning of Article 9(1) MTC.  The parent’s 
supposed “economic disadvantages” are equated with “income shifting among 
associated enterprises”.  But whatever the economic theory, in the real world, and 
(in case this is different) certainly through the eyes of a tax lawyer, in the simple 
case where a subsidiary borrows from an unrelated bank and the bank makes some 
 
822
  Wittendorff (2011),  page 244.  
823
  See e.g. Standard & Poor’s Group Rating Methodology, paragraph 33 (2013).  
824
  Ibid., paragraph 74.  
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pricing allowance in view of the subsidiary’s passive association with its parent, 
there is no question of income shifting – which reflects the fact that nothing has 
happened between parent and subsidiary.  I agree with Wittendorff that things are 
different if a comfort letter or similar is issued: as discussed at paragraph 1.16 
above, that entails positive action which may well require remuneration.  
4.48 Wittendorff asserts that HMRC consider that implicit support is 
recognized in principle as a compensable transaction825, but this misunderstands 
HMRC’s (less than precise) guidance: paragraph 3.180ff above.   
4.49 Wittendorff doubts whether the view that implicit support is relevant for 
pricing controlled transactions conforms to the arm’s length principle of Article 
9(1) MTC.  Five reasons are given826: 
(i)  because in general the form of the controlled transaction must be 
respected827, and because a comparable should be a “perfect mirror image” of the 
controlled transaction, implicit support should be disregarded – it is said that in the 
controlled transaction (unlike the uncontrolled transaction), it “is not present”.  
For example, in a parent-to-subsidiary loan it is circular to say that the loan should 
be priced having regard to the parent’s likely support of the subsidiary’s obligation 
to pay the parent.  I read this as proposing – to sidestep the “lender as guarantor” 
paradox - that the effect of implicit support present in a comparable should be 
“reversed out” of the comparable to align it with the actual transaction.  (HMRC 
voice a version of this argument, albeit on the basis that the parent “cannot 
guarantee an obligation owed to itself”.828)  This almost-Cartesian logic is at first 
seductive, but on closer scrutiny may be found to lose sight of the basic objective 
of arriving at a price for the loan comparable to an arm’s length price.  Say the 
subsidiary had two loans on identical terms (leaving aside for a moment interest 
 
825
  Ibid., page 246, citing INTM 502040.  
826
  Ibid., page 247. 
827
  TPG paragraph 1.64. 
828
  Paragraph 3.188 above.  
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rate), and in essentially identical circumstances829, respectively from its parent and 
also from an unrelated bank.  It would be peculiar if the robust internal 
comparable did not provide a compelling indication of the arm’s length price, 
even where the bank has regard to an expectation of parental support.  Consider 
also the sister-to-sister lending case: it is no longer circular to point to implicit 
parental support of the borrower subsidiary. The notion that a “parent may not 
have the same incentive to support” a subsidiary in such cases is a quantitative 
proposition; it may be true – to the point of the measure of implicit support being 
zero in some cases (parent won’t favour one subsidiary over the other); but it 
could be significant in other cases: see e.g. the joint venture scenario at Fig. IX, 
paragraph 4.19 above; 
 (ii) although a subsidiary’s ability to borrow from an unrelated bank at a 
certain price might be viewed as a “realistically available option”, this concept is 
said to be informative regarding the relative bargaining powers of the parties in the 
context of comparability, but not as a separate means to determine transfer 
prices830.  The citation for the latter proposition however simply expresses a 
concern that “the examination of alternatives may nevertheless be used to second-
guess the appropriateness of bona fide business decisions. The construction of 
alternative business arrangements would be, at best, an uncertain enterprise and 
could prove to be arbitrary”; and the OECD recommendation is simply against 
such second-guessing. This concern should not arise in a case where there is clear 
evidence (possibly an actual internal comparable) of the alternative available;   
(iii) it is said that “when a benefit of a controlled transaction stems from 
group affiliation, the market price of an uncontrolled transaction is not decisive for 
the transfer price of the controlled transaction”. (That of course simply states the 
argument.)  The Norwegian ConocoPhillips cash pooling case831 is given as an 
example of market interest rates not being decisive for “the allocation of 
 
829
  Assume a strong degree of contextual comparability e.g. strong informational 
symmetry as between parent and bank, and a strong measure of relevant control by bank 
(contractually, via loan covenants), and perhaps even security over subsidiary’s assets. 
830
  Citing paragraphs 3.14-18 of the OECD’s Task Force Report (1992).  
831
  Utv. 2010 at 199.   
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economies of integration of the controlled transactions”.  But that case concerned 
the active and collaborative participation in the pool by group members such that 
the effects of economic integration themselves fell to be priced – in that case on 
the basis of a contribution analysis; a passive association case is quite different; 
(iv) a case is proposed where an unrelated party would be prepared to lend 
at a rate less than the relevant associated enterprise would be able to offer; this is 
posed as a scenario where the seller’s minimum price (that required by the 
associated enterprise, say, the parent) exceeds the buyer’s maximum price 
(presumably because the subsidiary has a realistic option to borrow more cheaply 
from the bank; that economic dynamic would ordinarily prevent the transaction 
occurring).  One could conceive of a case where a hypothetical lender with all the 
attributes of the actual parent lender would seek a higher return on its investment 
than the bank in question: the comparability analysis would then require 
adjustment of the terms of the bank loan to align the comparable with the parties’ 
actual circumstances.  But implicit support may nonetheless remain in play as a 
relevant borrower attribute.  The potential pricing “gap” identified in this scenario 
does not bear on the relevance of passive association; 
(v) finally, the fact that implicit support is non-compensable is said to be a 
reason to disregard it in pricing controlled transactions; otherwise parent becomes 
a “two-time loser”, first, for being uncompensated for “use” of the support “at the 
expense of the parent”, and, second, for being inadequately rewarded for its risk 
(though surely these are just two ways of expressing the same point).  However, 
the first of these “losses” is itself the established rule in TPG paragraph 7.13 
(“use” here being an economic concept, but not a “condition made or imposed” in 
Article 9(1) MTC terms); and the second (“inadequate reward”) is itself the 
conclusion sought to be demonstrated.  Both flow naturally from the absence of 
any activity.  Why should the rate charged by an unrelated bank be regarded as 
inadequate?  It is the ideal benchmark.  Evidently the potential “free ride” enjoyed 
by the subsidiary is considered offensive, but it is both (i) a necessary corollary of 
paragraph 7.13 TPG, and (ii) a “fact of family life” – in that children (subsidiaries) 
may often benefit freely in one way or another from their family affiliations 
(usually their parents).  
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4.50 Wittendorff’s earlier book proposed a nice formulation of 
comparability: “[a]n ideal reference transaction should therefore be a perfect 
mirror image of the controlled transaction in relation to all the objective and 
subjective factors that can influence the price formation.”832  The reference here to 
subjectivity is interesting, and does present a potential challenge to the 
“perfection” of an uncontrolled lending transaction as a comparator for an intra-
group arrangement.  If “subjectivity” refers to the state of mind of the parties, and 
in particular the lender, one might worry that a difference would be present 
between the mindset of an independent lender prepared to attach some value to the 
borrower’s group affiliations, and that of the borrower’s parent, to the extent it 
turned its mind to the question at all, which might take the position that a pricing 
discount based on its own willingness to support the subsidiary-borrower would 
be a business contradiction.  This does articulate the particular problem of the loan 
from the specific entity which is also assumed to be the provider of group support 
(“lender as guarantor” paradox); the difficulty does not arise in the same way in 
the sister-to-sister lending case (where the sister-lender might – though always 
dependent on the precise facts and circumstances – anticipate parental support for 
the borrower).  But the answer appears to lie with the construction of the 
hypothetical counter-factual in which the lender assumes implicit support not from 
itself but from the hypothetical borrower’s hypothetical parent or other affiliate.  
4.51 Kamphuis (2010) proposes that the Court in General Electric “wrongly 
interpreted the arm’s length principle by rejecting the reference to comparable 
transactions between independent parties”833.  But the criticism of the Court is not 
backed with reasoning other than by pointing to the example of a central 
procurement company and potential disagreement with Example 19 in the US 
services regulations (paragraph 3.210(v) above).  As I observe at paragraph 1.23, 
the concentration of buying power within a MNE group, with its attendant 
efficiencies, usually arises because of the concrete (“deliberate concerted”) actions 
of one or more of the participants, so is not a good illustration of the effects of 
passive association.   
 
832
  Wittendorff (2010a) page 298.  
833
  Kamphuis (2010), page 296.  
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4.52 Blessing (2010) proposes834 that “the compensation-free passive 
association concept is not appropriately applied mandatorily to intercompany 
financial guarantees or loans”.  Several arguments are proposed: 
(i)  the recognition of passive association could give rise to a form of 
economic double taxation.  If a company in one country were to be regarded as 
benefiting from implicit support from a foreign affiliate (thus enjoying reduced 
costs, and hence increased profits), but the other country could claim that value 
was crossing the border by way of provision of that support such that a fee should 
be paid, but no deductible fee is permitted, the MNE group is effectively being 
taxed twice.  The answer to this however is that (consistent with paragraph 7.13 
TPG835) no fee is appropriate (from either party’s perspective): the “supporter’s” 
tax authority should not be imputing a fee.  A line has to be drawn somewhere to 
demarcate transfer pricing borders: that line, in Article 9(1) MTC terms, is 
articulated via “conditions made or imposed” i.e. some sort of active 
arrangement836 (see paragraphs 2.44-2.45 above on “activity”), rather than the 
presence of mere economic phenomena; 
(ii) acceptance of the principle that a group’s ability to pool purchasing 
power and thus achieve volume discounts837 is “antithetical to the application of 
non-compensable passive association in a financial standing context”. This is said 
to give rise to a “directional” issue: whereas the greater the usage of volume 
discount arrangements, the greater the benefit to the group, the greater the usage of 
implicit support, the greater the detriment to the group’s credit status.  Credit-
standing is regarded as a “finite asset”.  Economists might applaud, and economic 
thinking could be thus presented with a view to shaping policy, but from a legal 
 
834
  Pages 164–168. 
835
  Blessing argues that “loans are certainly not services and so Para. 7.13 has no direct 
relevance” (page 164).  That might be a legitimate view as a matter of US tax law (though cf. 
Container Corp v Commissioner 14 TC 5 (2010), which Blessing considers wrongly decided), 
but the view seems unduly dogmatic in the context of the TPG and international tax parlance 
more generally.   
836
  Translated, for example, into “transactions” in the US and Canadian transfer pricing 
rules and “provisions” in the UK code.  
837
 Compare Example 19 in the US section 482 Services Regulations: paragraph 3.210(v) 
above. 
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perspective it seems wrong to regard credit standing as an asset i.e. a form of 
intangible property: surely it is more in the nature of a characteristic of the legal 
person that is the company in question.  As noted at paragraph 4.46, it seems 
misplaced, in legal (and indeed transfer pricing) terms, to speak of a “group’s 
credit status”: the group is just an aggregation of entities, but it is each separate 
entity that will have its own credit standing.  Moreover, it is at least questionable 
that the credit-standing of (say) a parent company is in some way eroded because 
a subsidiary “uses” its passive association with the parent to borrow favourably 
(there is no reason why the consummation by a subsidiary of a transaction 
favourable to its business must necessarily be regarded as weakening its parent); 
(iii) from a US-oriented view of debt/equity instrument classification, it is 
said that the basic determination must be made on the assumption that the 
borrower receives no credit support from its parent.  Blessing says that 
recognising passive association in setting an interest rate would create an “apples 
and oranges” situation – presumably the concern is potential inconsistency 
between the separate but related issues of instrument classification and pricing?  
This feels too emphatic.  Although the presence of a guarantee may be regarded by 
some taxing jurisdictions as an incremental symptom of equity, it is at most only 
one factor to be weighed in the balance: a guaranteed bond is no less a bond.  And 
I see no reason for a conceptual objection to a two-step approach whereby one 
first characterises an instrument, and then moves on to evaluate its pricing; indeed, 
this is what is mandated by OECD, see e.g. paragraph 4.45 above; 
(iv) case law is said to support a stand-alone approach, though again the 
viewpoint is through US tax spectacles. Nestlé Holdings Inc v Commissioner838 is 
cited, with the remark that each of the taxpayer, the IRS and the Court accepted 
that, in addressing the IRS’s argument that the interest rate paid by the US 
taxpayer to its Swiss affiliate was too low, the determination was to be made on a 
separate company basis. But although in the debt/equity characterisation context 
the taxpayer’s ability to raise debt “as a separate entity” was relevant, the case 
 
838
  70 TCM 682 (1995). 
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does not investigate the meaning of that concept at all, let alone the possible effect 
of passive association as a characteristic of the separate entity; 
(v) like Wittendorff (paragraph 4.49(i) above), Blessing argues that if the 
putative provider of support is also the creditor, the effect of implicit support is 
“displaced” because “it would be circular to conclude that the parent company 
should derive a lower rate on the assumption that it would support the credit of the 
obligor”839; but the contrary argument is that it is appropriate to assess what would 
have happened between independent parties with the same characteristics as the 
actual parties, but not to assume that the independent lender would be the provider 
of support; 
(vi) a case involving a loan to a borrower company from a sister (rather than 
parent) entity is used to suggest that, if passive association is disregarded, the 
sister/lender would be receiving excessive interest relative to its risk of loss – and 
therefore that part of the interest should in fact be paid to the parent company “as a 
guarantee fee”.  But that contradicts the guidance in paragraph 7.13 TPG.  A better 
solution seems to be to reflect the sister/lender’s true risk of loss (as affected by 
any possibility of parental support).  Blessing also suggests that in the sister/lender 
case, there is a less clear rationale for a parent to step in to support the borrower in 
preference to allowing the sister to suffer loss: again this seems to place too much 
emphasis on the attitudes of the actual parties when what is required is a test of the 
hypothetical behaviour of independent parties. See paragraph 4.19 above and the 
quantitative aspect mentioned at paragraph 4.49(i); 
(vii)  Blessing considers that recognition of passive association is 
“inconsistent with the strict legal rights and relationships”.  But the non-
compensation of implicit support (paragraph 7.13 TPG) properly reflects the 
absence of a legal act or event demanding remuneration; the recognition of passive 
association as an economically relevant circumstance or characteristic of the 
borrower is a valuation/pricing consideration based upon fact; 
 
839
  Blessing (2010), page 166. 
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 254 
(viii) finally, in a discussion of relative bargaining power840, Blessing 
perceives an inconsistency in Justice Hogan’s decision in General Electric by 
taking account of (a) the taxpayer’s vulnerability from market expectation that a 
parent guarantee would be provided, and at the same time (b) parental implicit 
support as viewed by those markets: the former is rejected as irrelevant to pricing 
a guarantee fee “regardless of whether a third party would take it into account” – 
but this seems a rather extraordinary proposition in the context of determining 
what would happen between independent parties.   
4.53 Soon after the Tax Court’s decision in General Electric, Blessing was 
reported as criticising the recognition of implicit support as creating uncertainty 
and “inexactitude”.  At the same time Muris Dujsic of Deloitte & Touche argued 
that if implicit support provided a benefit to a subsidiary it should be “considered 
as a separate transaction” with a separate charge (but this is contrary to paragraph 
7.13 TPG).  And KPMG Canada highlighted the use by the subsidiary of its 
parent’s trade name (presumably as an aspect taken into account in measuring 
implicit support841) as a relevant “transaction”842.  But while that could be the case 
(as where a parent formally or informally licenses a trade name to its subsidiary), 
and could thus merit compensation, it would not necessarily be so; it might even 
be the case that the subsidiary was using the name first.  The TPG say that “[a]s a 
general rule, no payment should be recognised for transfer pricing purposes for 
simple recognition of group membership or the use of the group name merely to 
reflect the fact of group membership”.  On the other hand, the licensing of a 
trademark or “other intangible for the group name” which provides a financial 
benefit for the licensee obviously merits remuneration843.   
 
840
  Ibid., page 173.  
841
  E.g. according to Moody’s Rating Non-Guaranteed Subsidiaries: Credit 
Considerations in Assigning Subsidiary Ratings in the Absence of Legally Binding Parent 
Support (December 2003), page 2.   
842
  All this reportage in Menyasz (2009). 
843
  Paragraphs 6.81-83 TPG; paragraph 2.80 above.   
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4.54 Blessing was also reported as opining, at an ABA Tax Section meeting 
on 7 May 2010844, that “passive association in the context of financial transactions 
is a fallacy … It makes sense for volume discounts, but rating agencies do not 
view there as being an indivisible asset that corresponds to some credit rating”.  In 
that context too Blessing promoted the argument that the use of credit “wastes” 
the credit capability of the supporting entity: the greater the borrowing, “the more 
the asset is used up”; whereas with volume discounts the effect of use was 
directionally the opposite.  This reiterates the points described at paragraph 
4.52(ii) above.  As noted, in my view it is mistaken in this context to regard a 
parent company’s creditworthiness as an asset which is dissipated by sensible 
business transactions; and the volume discount case usually entails some level of 
activity, not mere passivity.  
4.55 Hoffman, Dupuis and Rockall (2007) consider that the recognition of 
passive association may amount to a “deemed consolidation”845, i.e. something 
akin to regarding the separate permanent establishments of a company as having 
the same credit rating of the enterprise as a whole846, or the notion of “substantive 
consolidation” as used by a bankruptcy court.  This goes too far in the transfer 
pricing context.  Even the authors acknowledge that “substantial [sic] 
consolidation is considered in the bankruptcy setting to be appropriate only in 
extraordinary circumstances” e.g. fraud.  Although one can see a potential policy 
rationale for arguing for neutrality as between subsidiary and PE cases, the legal 
distinction is self-evident: a PE does in fact generally enjoy the same credit 
standing as the whole enterprise – it simply is part of that enterprise, and the assets 
of the enterprise are generally available to creditors847; this is inherently not the 
 
844
  Reported by Moses in 19 TMTPR 58.  At the same meeting, David Ernick, Treasury 
Associate International Tax Counsel, said that ignoring the implicit benefit of affiliation would 
be a misinterpretation of the arm’s length standard because “related parties do not really have to 
act like unrelated parties to fulfil the arm’s length standard.  Rather, they only have to reach the 
price that unrelated parties would reach”: 
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/thedl.cfm?filename=/TX357000/sitesofinterest_files/2010_May_
Session_D.C._Minutes_TP_Session.pdf (accessed 30 December 2015).  
845
  Section headed “Deemed Consolidation” in 16 TMTPR 333. 
846
  See paragraph 2.66 above regarding the OECD PEs Report, and e.g. the UK provision 
at section 21(2)(a) Corporation Tax Act 2009.   
847
  Compare note 143 above.  
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case for a separate legal entity.  Moreover, the ratings equalisation approach of 
some rating agencies may bear some broad similarity, in terms of its effect, with a 
notion of consolidation, but again that is not manifesting a legal state of affairs: it 
is itself simply the recognition of the very concept of passive association I am 
analysing.   In other words, it is not the case that “potential lenders or creditors 
should assume deemed consolidation” [of a borrower with its parent]848; this is no 
more than the raters (who, as the authors note, operate in the “real world”) 
recognising the “economically relevant circumstances” of the borrower as a legal 
entity.  
4.56 Two non-financial transaction examples are given which are said, by 
logical extension, to illustrate how the recognition of passive association causes 
incongruous results in transfer pricing terms.  First, the case is given of a parent 
owning valuable technology which is licensed to a subsidiary. Applying “deemed 
consolidation principles”, it is said that the interrelationship between parent and 
subsidiary cannot be ignored – and therefore the licence should be royalty-free 
because, within the MNE group, the technology should be regarded as a “public 
good”.  This conclusion appears to be based on the idea that, within the MNE 
group, the technology is in fact freely-available, so that the price should be zero. 
But then all is lost in transfer pricing terms!  Secondly, the authors consider a 
manufacturer parent with a full-risk distributor subsidiary.  Because of an 
assumption that parent would in fact assume the risks of subsidiary (and indeed 
vice versa) it is said that it becomes impossible to apply traditional transfer pricing 
methodologies.  Again, this seems to me not to follow at all.  The authors’ view of 
supposed risk assumption, particularly the subsidiary’s “upstream” assumption of 
parent’s manufacturing risks, seems to contradict the proposed fact-pattern: if the 
commercial reality is that parent will always step in to bear distribution risks (e.g. 
market, inventory or customer credit risks), the pricing of transactions between 
parent and subsidiary should take that state of affairs into account849.  In any 
event, it is not clear why the proposed fact pattern should render it impossible to 
 
848
  Hoffman et al (2007), ibid.  
849
  Particularly given the sharper focus nowadays on the conduct of the parties in 
delineating transactions: see e.g. paragraph 1.46 TPG.   
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arrive at arm’s length prices (typically CUPs) for basic sales of goods transactions 
between parent and subsidiary.  
4.57 Vincent (2010), prior to the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, 
criticised the Tax Court’s judgment in General Electric.  He doubted why, in an 
arm’s length setting, the US parent would have felt compelled to bail out the 
Canadian taxpayer.  In the context of subsection 247(2) of the Canadian Income 
Tax Act, Vincent’s approach was to insert the names of the parties into his reading 
of the legislation, and from there to assert that, dealing at arm’s length, the US 
parent would not have provided support850.  Yet Vincent did not engage with the 
argument that the correct counter-factual is one in which a hypothetical borrower 
(with all the characteristics of the actual borrower) buys a guarantee from a 
hypothetical third party (with all the characteristics of the actual guarantor).  
Vincent proposes to “remove all forms and attributes of arrangements that are 
present by virtue of the fact that the [parties] are not dealing at arm’s length (such 
as implicit support as a result of being part of the non-resident person’s 
multinational group)”.  But, as the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed851, implicit 
support should not be regarded as emanating from the control relationship as such.  
In my view it is significant that paragraph 247(2)(c), which is the Canadian 
statutory articulation of the counter-factual, points to the “terms and conditions … 
that would have been made between persons dealing at arm’s length” [my 
emphasis].  This can sensibly be read as referring to hypothetical persons; the 
Article 9(1) MTC analogue is “independent enterprises”.  I disagree therefore 
with:  
(i)  Vincent’s proposition that the correct interpretation of the legislation is 
that the reference to “persons” means the actual transaction participants;  
(ii) his criticism of General Electric on the basis that recognising implicit 
support “turns into the Kafkaesque exercise of trying to evaluate the value of an 
 
850
  Legal Framework section; see also Vincent (2013), pages 213-214.  
851
  2010 FCA 344, paragraphs [53]-[55]. 
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explicit guarantee in light of an implicit support that will never be exercised as a 
result of the existence of the explicit guarantee”852; and also  
(iii) his proposed reconciliation of the rejection of implicit support as a 
pricing factor with the GlaxoSmithKline decision853: “one should include other 
contractual arrangements that are linked to or have a bearing on the transaction in 
question, and exclude those features or characteristics of a party or arrangement 
that do not result from legally binding contractual arrangements, but rather ensue 
solely from belonging to the multinational group in question”.  This formulation 
fails to take account of the “price distorting” element of the decision in the 
General Electric case854.   
4.58 Vincent also asserts that an arm’s length guarantor could not rely on 
implicit support from the Canadian taxpayer’s US parent to mitigate its risk; it 
would set the price for its guarantee by “excluding any wishful implicit support”.  
This seems to overlook the principle of subrogation: a guarantor called upon to 
satisfy a creditor would typically (either contractually or by operation of law) step 
into the shoes of the creditor and thus acquire a direct claim against the borrower.  
Might not the US parent, in such circumstances, continue to be motivated, to some 
extent at least, to bail out its subsidiary e.g. to avoid painful litigation against the 
group by the guarantor?  See further paragraph 4.68 below.  
4.59 Schön (January 2011)855 develops the discussion around the tension 
between the arm’s length principle and the fundamentals of the theory of the firm, 
and in particular the way in which –  
“within a firm, business units are meant to cater to other business units … this is reflected 
in upfront specific investment, in the creation of proprietary intangibles, in long-term 
 
852
  Vincent (2013), page 224.  
853
  Then in the Federal Court of Appeal. 
854
  Paragraph 3.24 above.   
855
  My impression is that Schön is supportive of recognition of passive association as a 
matter of current law, but is a proponent of change from the policy perspective.  
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contracting and so on.  This brings about ‘synergies’ which contribute to the overall 
profit of the firm”856.   
A consequence is that it will be - 
“possible for some business units to extract rents from the existence of other business 
units within the firm … These rents are due to the fact that the ‘losing’ business unit 
provides a specific business opportunity to the other divisions of the firm.  In other words: 
the ‘winning’ business unit should be taxed not only in its location country but also in the 
jurisdiction where the other unit resides.”857   
Thus Schön promotes the concept that synergy benefits – i.e. presumably the 
profit attributable to such benefits - should be taxable in the territory from which 
such benefits emanate, but upon the entity that is the beneficiary.  The policy 
proposition is that “[i]nternational tax allocation should be built on two elements 
… transfer pricing will be the starting point for profit allocation to the involved 
companies but synergy rents drawn by a group company from dealings with 
another group company shall be taxed in the ‘source country’ as well”858.   
4.60 So in General Electric, should the Canadian taxpayer’s “winning 
business” be taxable in the US in respect of the implicit support found to have 
emanated from its AAA-rated parent?  This is a radically different approach from 
conventional territorial/water’s-edge international tax norms.  Perhaps Schön’s 
broad objective could be achieved after all by disregarding passive association, so 
that General Electric Capital Canada’s guarantee fee expense would not be 
suppressed by reference to potential support from its US parent (“an economic 
factor which is largely connected with the United States”859), so that greater 
income is earned by the parent, thus shifting the synergy rent into the US tax net?  
 
856
  Page 6.  
857
  Ibid., page 9.  
858
  Ibid., page 14.   
859
  Ibid., page 17.  
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At any rate, it is apparent that Schön’s position is advocacy for a policy change, 
not for a construction of current law.860    
4.61 Horst (2012) considers that “allowing a parent corporation to charge a 
guarantee fee to its subsidiary corporation, but not to its unincorporated branch, is 
perfectly logical from a legal perspective, but not from a broader tax policy 
perspective”861.  Noting the rule in the OECD PEs Report that all parts of an 
enterprise have the same creditworthiness and therefore there is no scope for the 
rest of an enterprise to guarantee the PE’s creditworthiness or vice versa,862 Horst 
criticises the resulting distinction (between the treatment of subsidiaries compared 
with branches) as contrary to the goal of tax neutrality.  “But … treating a 
subsidiary as if it were a branch would require fundamental changes in countries’ 
tax laws and their bilateral tax treaties and cannot generally be achieved by tax 
authorities under existing law.”863  He also condones the (economic policy) 
proposition of treating “the parent company’s credit rating as a collective asset 
that should be available at no charge to the affiliates of a multinational group, 
rather as intangible property that is owned just by the parent company.”864  But 
this tramples over the separateness of the corporate entities which form a group, 
that separateness sitting at the core of transfer pricing.   
Some examples of the literature define the problem but do not promote an 
answer 
4.62 An excellent non-partisan exposition of the arguments for and against 
the recognition of passive association in pricing controlled guarantee transactions 
was presented to the US Treasury by the American Bar Association in 2012.  By 
 
860
  Vroemen (2015) observes that (in a conventional supply chain context) it is common 
for residual profit to be allocated to a principal/entrepreneur entity – and therefore “it can be 
argued that the principal is implicitly charging the companies for group synergies” (section C.3). 
There is a loose parallel here with a case of an intra-group loan priced without regard to the 
beneficial effects of passive association on the borrower, where the outcome is tantamount to a 
charge being levied by the parent/lender for the benefit of affiliation (contrary, I suggest, to 
paragraph 7.13 TPG).  
861
  Page 180.  
862
  Paragraph 2.66 above. 
863
  Horst (2012) page 181.  
864
  Compare paragraph 4.52(ii) above.  
LON27983956/13 
 
 
 Page 261 
analogy, much of the reasoning can equally be applied to related party loan 
transactions.  The effect of passive association is an important potential 
component in such a pricing exercise.  No formal response has yet been issued by 
the Treasury or IRS.   
4.63 This “ABA Guarantees Paper”, which embraces the arm’s length 
principle (“the independent market price is generally the conceptual North 
Star”865), sets out the pros and cons for what is termed the “no affiliation” model 
(passive association ignored – as if the borrower had no “upper-tier” affiliations) 
and the “market/affiliation” model (passive association taken into account in 
pricing). 
4.64 Proponents of the “no affiliation” model assert that the arm’s length 
principle requires related party relationships to be disregarded; as passive 
association benefits arise from such relationships, they too must be disregarded.  
Leaving aside argumentation based upon the specificities of US domestic tax 
law866, the “no affiliation” model is said to be based on the following 
propositions867: 
(i)  the “separate entity approach” promoted by the TPG868 “requires that 
benefits flowing from affiliation that represent disguised transfers of value be 
disregarded in an arm’s length analysis”: in my view, this represents an 
unwarranted extension of the proposition that distorting pricing effects caused by 
the control relationship should be disregarded; the passive association 
phenomenon does not necessarily entail any transfer of value, let alone a 
“disguised” transfer (though perhaps there is a nod here to the policy argument for 
reallocating profits from synergy benefits, see e.g. paragraph 4.59);  
 
865
  Page 50.  
866
  Including an argument based upon consistency with “the conceptual framework for 
debt/equity determinations” – which must refer to US tax law (otherwise: whose framework?). 
867
  ABA Guarantees Paper (2012) pages 56-57, and a “rejoinder” to the 
“market/affiliation” approach at pages 59-60.  
868
  Paragraph 1.6.  
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(ii) where a parent company guarantor is perceived as the source of implicit 
support for a subsidiary borrower, it is not comparable to a third party guarantor – 
it cannot itself hope someone else will step in to support the borrower; ignoring 
the effect of passive association thus adjusts for this non-comparability.  This is 
the “reverse out implicit support” argument – see e.g. Wittendorff, paragraph 
4.49(i) above; 
(iii) disregarding the benefit to (typically) a subsidiary borrower of passive 
association (by refraining from suppressing the price of the parent guarantee) 
effectively compensates the parent for any economic cost it suffers; but (I 
respond) this is an economic policy proposition which is at odds with paragraph 
7.13 TPG; 
(iv) third party guarantees in “real-world markets” are rare, and so do not 
present realistically available options to a borrower subsidiary (but this seems 
empirically weak: certainly there are many contexts where third party guarantees – 
typically given by banks869 – can be found, and analogues are available in the 
monoline and surety bond insurance markets; in any event, in the loan context 
there are typically plentiful comparables available);   
(v) often a parent company will undertake some affirmative act e.g. 
providing a “comfort letter”, indicating support of a subsidiary; the absence of 
such action (where only implicit support can be present) is said to be an artificial 
distinction – but (as I propose at paragraph 1.5 on the meaning of “passive 
association”, and at paragraph 2.41 as to the scope of “services” for transfer 
pricing purposes) the presence of parental activity (however low-key) is a 
threshold condition for assessing compensation for the support, so the distinction 
is fundamental and not at all artificial; 
(vi) (related to (iii) above) as an economic matter, disregarding passive 
association is appropriate because it effectively rewards the parent company 
(assumed to be the provider of support) for the borrower subsidiary’s “use” of an 
 
869
  An example is found in The Queen v Melford Developments Inc [1982] 2 SCR 504, 
concerning the deductibility of a 1% p.a. guarantee fee paid by the taxpayer to a German bank for 
a guarantee of the taxpayer’s borrowing from Bank of Nova Scotia.  
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asset of parent’s, namely its financial standing (compare paragraphs 4.49(v), 
4.52(ii) above).  
4.65 Those supporting the “market/affiliation” approach are said to argue as 
follows: 
(i)  fundamentally, evaluating a loan/guarantee transaction by taking 
account of all the borrower’s attributes (including benefits from passive 
association) applies the arm’s length standard “taking the borrower as it is and 
marketplace realities as they are”870, and taking account of all relevant factors. The 
“separate entity” approach in TPG paragraph 1.6 does not require that the 
borrower’s affiliations be ignored871.  The subsidiary may still be considered to be 
affiliated to a comparable (hypothetical) parent, not “treating a child with parents 
as if she were an orphan … [but] simply … as being the ‘child’ of someone else”; 
(ii) the approach is consistent with the “options realistically available” 
principle (paragraph 2.25 above): a controlled subsidiary borrower would never 
pay more for a guarantee from its parent than one available from an independent 
third party; equally, I propose, a subsidiary should never pay more for a loan from 
its parent than it would for an equivalent loan available from an unrelated lender;  
(iii) requiring a parental guarantee to be priced on a basis which ignores 
implicit support effectively remunerates the parent for this attribute (as 
commended at paragraph 4.64(vi) above); but this offends the rule in TPG 
paragraph 7.13 that passive association should not give rise to remuneration.  
4.66 The ABA Guarantees Paper also discusses “adjustments for supposed 
benefits to the guarantor”, noting that “some tax authorities have taken the 
position – rarely seconded by commentators or practitioners – that the transfer 
pricing analysis of a related party guarantee must involve a two-step process” i.e. 
first determine the arm’s length price of the guarantee and then “adjust” that price 
to account for “benefits supposedly flowing back to the related party guarantor”.  
 
870
  Page 57. 
871
  Page 59. 
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Each of the potential benefits is discussed and dismissed, with the concluding – 
and in the context of this study, telling – rhetorical question: “[i]f the guarantee 
reflects an arm’s length price, why should it matter to whom it is paid?” 872 
4.67 Boidman (2011) presents the cases for and against accounting for 
implicit support, but evidently has some sympathies with the “against” camp – so I 
have included my reactions to his article here.  First, a distorting effect on the 
arm’s length principle is perceived if implicit support is to be recognised, because 
“arm’s length profit allocations require that each unit of a multinational enterprise 
be rewarded commensurate with its contribution”873.  A comparative example is 
given of a parent selling highly branded goods to a subsidiary distributor, and the 
question is asked (though dismissed out of hand) whether the subsidiary should be 
able to argue that the transfer price must be reduced because once it owns the 
goods it should be highly rewarded “as owner” of the goods.  Is this different from 
taking into account passive association?  I would say it clearly is very different, 
not least because of the markedly different contexts, and also because the goods 
case entails simple and clearly-defined actions by the related parties, not mere 
passivity.  
4.68 An important legal concept which seems not to have attracted attention 
in the literature is the equitable doctrine of subrogation i.e. a guarantor’s right, as 
a consequence of its payment under a guarantee in respect of a debtor’s defaulted 
obligation, to step into the shoes of the creditor vis-à-vis the debtor.  Boidman 
challenges whether a third party would typically provide a guarantee at all: “[i]s 
the acid test whether a third party financial institution lender or guarantor that is 
not laying off (syndicating out) the credit risk would reduce the financing charges 
to a borrower by reason of implicit support?”874 But third party guarantees do exist 
in the commercial world, and the doctrine of subrogation contributes to their 
viability as a financial instrument.  Opponents of the recognition of passive 
support in the guarantee context urge that a third party would not place any (or 
 
872
  Pages 61-63.  
873
  Basic Issues and Factors section.  
874
  The FCA Position and a Push-Pull Dynamic section. 
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any significant) reliance upon implicit support because the parent company 
“generally would prefer to have the third party guarantor pay the subsidiary’s 
creditors”875; put another way, an attempt to get a third party guarantor “suggests 
the parent company is not willing to support the subsidiary”876.  But this does not 
follow, at least in a typical common law environment, specifically in view of the 
guarantor’s right of subrogation.  Once the guarantor has paid out, it will enjoy 
essentially the same rights against the (subsidiary) borrower as had the previous 
creditor. So (although it is possible that market visibility of the group’s 
predicament may be lessened) the parent is still faced with the dilemma of whether 
to support or abandon its subsidiary, and might in appropriate circumstances 
indeed “come running in to save the hide of the guarantor”877.  Anyway, the same 
dynamic is not present in the case of simple loans, where only two parties are 
present and the comparability exercise is uncluttered by the involvement of a 
third.  
4.69 Boidman criticises the Federal Court of Appeal in General Electric878 
for reasoning from the GlaxoSmithKline decision879 that, if the intercompany 
licence from the UK parent in that case was to be taken into account in setting the 
price payable to the taxpayer’s Swiss affiliate for active pharmaceutical ingredient, 
then so should implicit parental support in General Electric.  This is said 
(correctly in my view) to be a flawed analogy because, whereas in Glaxo the 
taxpayer’s conduct was readily comparable with the behaviour of market 
participants, implicit support does not arise between unrelated parties.  This 
flawed analogy is said to call into question the Court’s conclusion on implicit 
support.  But while the analogy may be poor, that does not seem to me to 
undermine the reasoning as a whole of the Court in General Electric.   
 
875
  Blessing (2011), page 160.  See also the 30 September 2013 comments of the US 
National Foreign Trade Council on the OECD’s 2013 discussion draft on Intangibles: “[a] third 
party guarantor would not take into account the ‘implicit support’ provided by P [parent company 
in respect of its subsidiary’s debt] because P is unlikely to provide such support once the 
guarantee is in place”.  For public comments website see note 163 above.    
876
  Moses (2010), reporting comments of Jean-Paul van den Berg (referred to in Boidman 
(2011)).   
877
  Boidman (2011), Other Background Factors section. 
878
  2010 FCA 344, paragraph 3.16ff above.   
879
  In the same Court, 2010 FCA 201, the Supreme Court not then having heard the case.  
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4.70 Of course, as Boidman observes, it is entirely possible that a third party 
guarantor, when invited to assume implicit support, would ask for that to be put in 
writing.  As discussed at paragraphs 1.8 and 2.41, however, that would turn the 
parent’s actions into a potentially compensable activity – thus presenting a 
straightforward answer to the transfer pricing enquiry.   
4.71 Averyanova and Sampat (2015) present a very recent overview of 
opinion differences concerning the recognition of passive association.  They note 
the divergent views of tax authorities880 and practitioners, including those who 
focus on stand-alone credit analysis, supposedly based on paragraph 1.6 TPG881.  
They think that what they call the “function-of-the-group-affiliation” approach 
remains “questionable” in the light of the TPG, and thus potentially not applicable 
to the pricing of an explicit guarantee882; thus they plead the “necessity of 
additional clarifications”883.    
Conclusions 
4.72 Here are my summary conclusions drawn from the literature described 
above (putting aside further discussion of economic policy advocacy): 
(i) while passive association does not obviously give rise to “synergy rents” for 
the benefit of a MNE group, in any event it may be argued that such profits do 
not fall to be allocated by the arm’s length principle (Kane (2014)) – and 
MNE group synergies are now firmly recognised by the OECD as a 
comparability issue in Chapter I TPG; 
(ii) the independent entities hypothesis mandated by Article 9(1) MTC requires 
one to postulate a hypothetical transaction between hypothetical independent 
enterprises – but with the same characteristics as the actual parties to the 
 
880
  “So far, most countries have applied a stand-alone analysis to ascertain the arm’s 
length interest rate for intra-group debt”: page 368, quoting Burnett (2014) page 47.  
881
  Page 363. 
882
  Page 366, presumably analogous to the “market/affiliation” approach, paragraph 4.65 
above, contrary to the conclusion in General Electric, paragraph 3.16ff above.  
883
  Page 368.  
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controlled transaction (Hollas and Hands (2014)); this resolves the “lender as 
guarantor” paradox (objected to by Blessing (2010) and Wittendorff (2011)); 
(iii) while arm’s length and market value prices respectively may not necessarily 
be identical, it is apparent that the “market” is strongly influential in 
conditioning the prices that may be expected between the hypothetical 
independent enterprises (Hamaekers (1997, 2002)); 
(iv) the essential tax treaty purpose of achieving parity between controlled and 
uncontrolled taxpayers (Schön 2009-10) as an aspect of the neutrality 
principle (Hamaekers (1992)) informs the process of comparability analysis; 
thus if, empirically, third parties would accord pricing significance to passive 
association, controlled transaction pricing should do likewise; 
(v) the independent enterprises hypothesis operates by eliminating pricing 
distortions caused by or attributable to a control relationship (Rollinson and 
Frisch (1988); Wilkie (2012)); it is not necessary (and would contravene the 
requirement to postulate similar circumstances) to eliminate all aspects or 
consequences of affiliation (Nielsen and Holmes (2010); Brooks (2013); per 
contra Vincent (2010)); 
(vi) notions of the “use” by a group member of implicit support eroding an asset 
of the “provider” or causing a consolidated ratings deterioration or providing 
a “free ride” (Blessing (2010) and Wittendorff (2011)) are not based on legal 
or transactional foundations, so should not distract from an empirical factual 
focus (and, in any event, according to the express direction of Chapter I TPG, 
should not merit compensation).  
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5.  SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
“There is a need to find an answer to all transfer pricing problems.”884 
 
5.1 Any differences between national approaches to the recognition of 
passive association in pricing controlled transactions will tend to result in double 
taxation, or possibly double non-taxation.  Double taxation is axiomatically a bad 
thing; there is growing acceptance in modern times that double non-taxation is 
itself a social ill.  Ultimately therefore the aim must be to eliminate differences 
between national treatments so that tax operates symmetrically across borders.  
With this objective in mind, the foregoing analysis of supranational guidance and 
selected national legislation, judicial interpretation and tax authority practice 
represents an attempt to identify some relevant common guiding themes in the 
application of the internationally accepted and defended arm’s length standard.   
5.2 Let me attempt to summarise those key themes, and the momentum 
which, in my view, they provide in establishing the legal validity of the 
recognition of passive association in pricing controlled transactions.  
5.3 Comparability analysis is fundamental to arriving at arm’s length 
pricing.  Internal CUPs, where available, will often present the best evidence of 
the price appropriate to a (truly comparable) controlled transaction. The essence of 
comparability is the alignment (including by adjustment if required) of both the 
transaction under review, and the circumstances of the parties, with one or more 
independent comparables.  The emphasis on the circumstances of the parties is 
critical. The starting point must be that it is appropriate to take into account all 
circumstances in order to draw an accurate comparison. The effect of passive 
association on a party is self-evidently one of the characteristics and thus 
circumstances of that party.  
5.4 Comparability analysis requires the postulation of two hypothetical 
parties who are independent of one another – at least in control terms – but which 
 
884
  An existential proposition from ATO Taxation Ruling TR 97/20 Chapter 3, section E.  
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have the same characteristics and circumstances as the actual parties. Therefore 
e.g. in a lending context one should have regard to all the characteristics of the 
borrower (highly relevant to loan pricing), and indeed all the characteristics of the 
lender (relevant to loan pricing in a relatively limited way885).  In principle, the 
independence hypothesis should result in the analysis excluding pricing distortions 
attributable to the exercise of control which affect the making or imposition of the 
conditions.  But that need not result in group membership attributes being 
disregarded.   
5.5 Eliminate distortions caused by the control relationship. A 
fundamental objective of the arm’s length principle is parity between controlled 
taxpayers and independent parties.  Within a MNE group a controlling parent 
company can impose non-arm’s length behaviour on its subsidiaries, including 
off-market pricing of transactions.  This presents the risk of tax avoidance via the 
diversion of profits (noted in this context by Mitchell B. Carroll even in the 
1930s886); it is this phenomenon that is to be counteracted by transfer pricing rules. 
Therefore the task that those rules must perform is the elimination of transactional 
pricing distortions which are caused by or attributable to the control relationship. 
Transfer pricing operates by deeming a controlled transaction to have occurred on 
arm’s length terms. Thus a legal fiction is imposed on the taxpayer. In arriving at 
the fictional/deemed outcome, and applying a careful purposive approach to tax 
treaty interpretation, there is no need to extend the legal hypothesis beyond what is 
demanded by the task of eliminating distortions.  From another viewpoint, there is 
no legal mandate in Article 9(1) OECD MTC and its analogues for eliminating 
 
885
  A word here about the relevance of the characteristics of lenders in a loan context.  
Different lenders have different characteristics which may affect pricing at the edges e.g. a 
bank’s cost of capital and market/shareholder requirements for return on equity compared with 
unregulated lenders e.g. investors in the capital markets, bank depositors or crowd-funders.  On 
the other hand, in straightforward cases of conventional loans in home market currency, the 
market is highly competitive and transparent, and borrowers may be largely indifferent to lender 
internal considerations, simply looking for the best deal, assuming that the overall “service” is 
the same.  To that extent lender characteristics are likely to play only a small role, if at all, in the 
comparability analysis.  In the Canadian McKesson decision (see paragraph 3.32 above) the 
judge considered it highly doubtful that an arm’s length receivables seller would settle upon a 
discount rate by reference to the buyer’s cost of funds.  In the Australian Chevron case 
(paragraph 3.82 above), evidence was presented contending that attributes of lenders are 
relatively unimportant.  
886
  See Vögel (2015) page 608.  
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from consideration all characteristics of a party which are in any way attributable 
to or connected with affiliation.  Moreover, “distortion” of pricing necessarily 
implies active manipulation of the control relationship.  This proposition resonates 
with the OECD’s modern use of the phrase “deliberate concerted actions” in the 
context of its discussion of MNE group synergies (see paragraph 2.81 above).  
5.6 Options realistically available.  Commercial arm’s length behaviour 
naturally entails looking for the best possible bargain. Thus businesses should 
consider all the “options realistically available” to them and generally choose the 
most attractive of those.  In circumstances where a taxpayer entity, which is the 
beneficiary of passive association, could enter into a transaction with an 
independent third party on certain terms (which take into account that association), 
it would be perverse to require that the characteristic of the taxpayer attributable to 
affiliation be disregarded so as to demand a higher controlled transaction price for 
tax purposes.  
5.7 Hypothetical parties to the comparator transaction.  There is 
remarkably little jurisprudence as to the nature or identity of the “independent” 
parties to a comparator transaction.  What seems convincing, and is at least 
consistent with the law and practice reviewed in this thesis, is that the parties to 
the hypothetical transaction posited by Article 9(1) are indeed hypothetical parties.  
Yet for this to present a workable framework for comparability analysis, those 
parties must have the same characteristics as the parties to the controlled 
transaction.  An important example characteristic is relative bargaining power.  
But this is just one from an infinite menu of attributes. Where characteristics are 
relevant to pricing, they should be imputed to the hypothetical parties to the 
independent transaction with which the controlled transaction is to be compared.  
The effects of passive association are no less valid a characteristic to be taken into 
account than any other.   When one party to a transaction assumes performance 
risk (typically contractual) on the other, the attributes of that other party become 
fundamental to pricing.  In the paradigm case of lending, creditworthiness of the 
borrower is the critical factor.  A market assumption or expectation of group 
support for the borrower, where present, will be an aspect of the creditworthiness 
analysis.  
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5.8 No compensation for the effects of passive association.  This has long 
been implicit in paragraph 7.13 TPG and has now become an explicit injunction in 
the update of Chapter I TPG887.  Logically it should follow that failing to 
recognise passive association (at least where it would suppress pricing) is 
tantamount to “charging for it”.  See paragraph 2.46 above.  
5.9 Thus I arrive at an answer to the question posed at the beginning of this 
study.  At paragraph 1.12 I asked: “In assessing a comparable uncontrolled price 
(CUP), to what extent is the control relationship to be disregarded?  This is at the 
centre of the paradox: one must construct an arm’s length comparator, but take 
into account all economically relevant circumstances, some of which may be 
consequent upon group affiliations.”  The answer, and the resolution of the 
paradox, is that the control relationship must be disregarded to the extent, but only 
to the extent, that it has had the effect of distorting the pricing of a controlled 
transaction.  
5.10 It should follow from the above that there is no conceptual barrier to 
recognising passive association in a case where a parent company is both lender to 
its subsidiary and the presumed source of implicit financial support to that 
subsidiary (the “lender as guarantor” case).  The comparability exercise can 
readily impute all the characteristics of the respective parties to the hypothetical 
independent parties (including the borrower’s benefit from implicit support).  It 
need simply eliminate pricing distortions to the conditions of the actual 
(controlled) loan made or imposed, typically, by a parent upon a subsidiary.  For 
those who object to the apparent “free ride” (upon the parent’s balance sheet) 
enjoyed by the subsidiary, my response is simply that this is one factor in the 
overall factual matrix and, in the context of a MNE group, is a “fact of life” – just 
as a hope or expectation of financial support from a parent may be present in many 
families.  
5.11 A simple example provides a telling insight into the “right” answer.  
See Fig. X below.  This is closely based on (but is a simplification of) Example 1 
 
887
  New paragraph 1.158.  
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now included in the “group synergies” section of Chapter I TPG (see paragraph 
2.83 above), that new material itself representing a significant step towards clarity 
on the topic of passive association.  
Fig. X 
 
 
5.12 Subsidiary has just borrowed an unsecured loan of £100m for general 
corporate purposes from an independent bank lender for 5 years at 7% p.a. on 
certain conventional commercial terms, including typical negative pledge and 
financial ratio covenants, events of default and comprehensive information 
provision obligations.  Bank has priced the loan having some regard to 
Subsidiary’s affiliation with Parent: without that element, Bank would have 
sought 8%.  Subsidiary retains plentiful borrowing capacity. Parent now proposes 
to lend Subsidiary £100m on exactly identical terms, but conscientiously asks 
itself whether to charge 7% by reference to the seemingly robust internal 
comparable, or 8% on the theory that affiliation should be disregarded.  (Suppose 
further, for added spice, that Subsidiary is resident in a high tax territory with an 
aggressive tax authority, whereas Parent is located in a sandy tax haven.888)  
Having regard to Subsidiary’s realistically available options, and the commercial 
need for it not to pay more to its affiliate than the price it could find in the 
marketplace, surely the right rate is 7%? 
5.13 I noted at paragraph 1.20 above that there is a thin capitalisation aspect 
to this study.  In other words, just as one may enquire whether passive association 
 
888
  These are of course intellectually irrelevant considerations.  
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may influence the pricing of a loan (essentially, its interest rate), it is legitimate to 
ask whether passive association may affect borrowing capacity – the ability, on an 
arm’s length basis, to raise a certain quantum of debt889.  I have noted how the 
United Kingdom’s HMRC, while beginning to get used to the idea of passive 
association pricing effects, are resistant to the debt capacity proposition890.  But it 
seems to me that, at least where national transfer pricing codes address thin 
capitalisation by means of application of the arm’s length principle – as does the 
UK’s – rather than by formulaic ratios or similar, then once the pricing impact of 
implicit support is accepted, it is logically irresistible that an independent lender, 
cognisant of implicit parental support for a borrower, could be prepared to lend 
more than would have been the case absent such support. HMRC has never 
explained its position satisfactorily: in my view this is because there is no such 
explanation.   
5.14 Convincingly, “increased borrowing capacity” now features expressly 
in Chapter I TPG as a “group synergy” (see paragraph 2.81 above).  Moreover, 
and although one should be cautious of “banker’s letters” as evidence of what 
would actually happen at arm’s length, in my own recent (October 2014) 
professional experience a highly reputable banking institution was prepared to 
confirm in writing its willingness to lend a certain amount to a relatively weak 
subsidiary in the light of various objective indicia of group affiliations (e.g. 
commonality of directors, use of the group name, centrality to the overall group 
business).  By the way, to illustrate the non-partisan nature of this study, the 
directionally opposite effects of implicit support on sustainable debt quantum and 
interest rate, respectively, are illustrated in Fig. XI below.  But remember that 
“interest rate is influenced by debt amount and vice versa: the two concepts cannot 
 
889
  In their 30 September 2013 comments on the OECD’s 2013 discussion draft on 
Intangibles (see note 163 above), the International Alliance for Principled Taxation noted that “if 
implicit parental support is relevant to the pricing of financial transactions, then it should be 
taken into account not only in the interest rate but also in the quantum of debt a borrower can 
support”.  
890
  Paragraph 3.188 above.  One must acknowledge however that the particular terms of 
domestic law may bear upon the recognition of passive association e.g. the UK’s sections 152-
154 TIOPA discussed at paragraph 3.158 above; query whether the requirement found there to 
disregard “guarantees” should give way to a double tax treaty provision based on Article 9(1) 
MTC: see paragraph 2.7 above.  
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be separated”891.  Thus for a given rating, say AA, in principle incrementally 
greater gearing could (up to a point) be supported by an incrementally greater 
interest rate.  
Fig. XI 
  
 
5.15 In conclusion it can be observed that the recognition of passive 
association in pricing controlled transactions should be regarded as a correct 
application of the arm’s length principle as embodied in Article 9(1) OECD MTC.  
In the financing field, such recognition should extend to the evaluation of debt 
capacity (quantum) as well as to interest rates and guarantee fees (pricing). A 
principled judicial recognition of the pricing effect of implicit support is found in 
the Canadian General Electric case, and has emerged in Australian legislation and 
litigation (Chevron); New Zealand can be expected to follow suit.  Despite a long-
unfulfilled IRS promise of clarification, the section 482 Services Regulations at 
least provide for comparability adjustments based on group affiliations.  It is only 
a matter of time before taxpayer or Government advances implicit support to 
further a case in Indian transfer pricing litigation. HMRC have accepted that 
passive association may influence loan pricing (although they are not yet 
convinced on quantum). Several other countries around the world are falling into 
line. 
 
891
  Burnett (2014) page 62.  
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5.16 With these conclusions in mind, I have offered in the Annex which 
follows some recommendations for amendments to the OECD TPG.  
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ANNEX 
 
PRINCIPLES FOR USE BY TAXPAYERS AND TAX 
ADMINISTRATIONS 
The first Annex to the TPG contains Guidelines for Monitoring Procedures on the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Involvement of the Business Community.  The CFA is 
instructed to monitor implementation of the TPG, including identifying areas where the 
TPG may require amendments or additions including “difficult paradigms” and problem 
areas which present obstacles to an internationally consistent application of the transfer 
pricing methods set out in the TPG.   
 
Proposals: 
Add a paragraph following paragraph 1.113 TPG892 as follows: 
“1.113A  As noted at paragraph 1.36 above, the economic circumstances of the 
parties are also comparability factors. Attributes or comparability factors that 
may be important when determining comparability include all the characteristics 
of the parties (including circumstances attributable to their group affiliations), 
and the business strategies pursued by the parties. In taking into account group 
affiliations as characteristics of the parties, relationships within the group may be 
included in the analysis (though in determining the price that would have been 
paid between independent enterprises, pricing distortions attributable to such 
relationships must be eliminated).” 
Add to paragraph 1.163 (“Comparability adjustments may be warranted to account 
for group synergies.”): 
“This may be the case where a potentially comparable transaction does not itself 
take account of relevant group synergies. One purpose of comparability 
 
892
  As updated in the BEPS 2015 Final Reports.  
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adjustments is to align the circumstances and characteristics of the parties to the 
potential comparable transaction with those of the parties to the transaction 
between the associated enterprises.  So if, for example, an external comparable 
transaction in fact does not reflect any pricing effect attributable to group 
affiliation, but a party to the controlled transaction would be expected to enjoy a 
pricing advantage (or suffer a disadvantage) attributable solely to its being part of 
a larger MNE group (as described in paragraph 7.13), the pricing of the external 
comparable should be adjusted to align the transaction in this respect with the 
circumstances and characteristics of the parties to the controlled transaction.  On 
the other hand, if an internal comparable transaction is priced with regard to such 
group affiliation, that transaction will, in that respect, provide appropriate 
comparability for the controlled transaction (as in Example 1 below).”  
Add a new Example 3 (and renumber the subsequent Examples accordingly): 
“The facts relating to S’s credit standing are identical to those in Example 1.  On 
a stand-alone basis, S would only be able to sustain a debt:equity ratio of 3:1. The 
independent lender, however, is prepared to advance the Euro 50 million despite 
S’s debt:equity ratio becoming 4:1, on the basis of some degree of expectation 
(not backed by any guarantee or other assurance) that P would support S if S 
faced financial difficulties. In other words, S benefits, in the context of an arm’s 
length transaction, from an increased borrowing capacity solely by virtue of 
group affiliation.  In these circumstances, the loan by T to S should be regarded as 
a loan to a borrower with an arm’s length quantum of debt; and, as in Example 1, 
no payment or comparability adjustment is required for the group synergy 
benefit.”  
Amend Chapter III TPG as follows: 
Amend paragraph 3.48 by the addition of the underlined wording as follows: 
“Examples of comparability adjustments include … adjustments for differences in 
capital, functions, assets, risks and the characteristics or circumstances of the 
parties including characteristics attributable to their group affiliations.” 
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Amend Chapter IV TPG as follows: 
Amend paragraph 4.29 by the addition of the underlined wording as follows: 
“The mutual agreement procedure … described and authorised by Article 25 of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention, can be used to eliminate double taxation that 
could arise from a transfer pricing adjustment, including cases where the 
respective tax administrations might differ in their interpretation of, or of the 
application of, the arm’s length principle.  Agreement between administrations 
could be specific to a particular taxpayer’s case, or a matter of agreeing an 
interpretation of the relevant treaty in general (as contemplated by Article 
31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).” 
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